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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores two texts, each of a different era, language 
and culture, to discover what they may each tell us about the role played by 
writing in the construction o f subjectivity. Accordingly, the first part o f the 
dissertation departs from custom in treating the Chanson de Roland less as a 
repository o f accumulated oral performance than as a document o f singular 
textual integrity. Militating against the premise o f textual unity is the 
uncontested fact that the Roland is clearly divided into two distinct narrative 
panels. This reading, however, reveals the manner in which the writer o f the 
Roland integrates the text’s two narrative panels by positioning ‘history’ 
against ‘fiction,’ and ‘word’ against ‘deed’ in order to effect a unified and 
unifying literary work. The argument o f the first part of the dissertation 
concludes with the observation, rooted in the text, that the narrative divide 
mirrors a divide within the subject and the integration of narrative effects a 
reintegration o f the split subject into a newly created subject o f fiction.
Hermann Broch’s Tod des Vergil brings to writing not the integration of 
‘history1 and ‘fiction,’ but the integration o f fiction with the most intimate sort o f 
personal experience, namely, the experience o f an encounter with death. Part
v
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two of the dissertation examines how Broch, in attempting to ‘realize’ through 
fiction a prior encounter with death, creates within the text o f the TDV a 
reflection of his own subjectivity. Broch's writing reveals to the reader that 
death is indeed realized (inscribed) in fiction, and that death is the mirror that 
does not merely reflect subjectivity, as does the verisimilitude of 
representation, but creates the subject through the fictionalization o f personal 
experience. This reading examines closely the TDV fo r what it reveals to us 
about the complex and inextricable relation between fiction and subjectivity.
vi
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AN INTRODUCTION
The texts brought under close critical scrutiny over the pages o f this 
dissertation are o f vastly different times and cultures. The Song o f Roland1 
(hereafter referred to as the Roland) was set down on parchment sometime 
between the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries 
C.E. This work appears at the incipient stages of what was to become and 
continue to be a great and flourishing culture and, as such, plays no small role 
in shaping the succession of political entities that eventually come to define 
themselves as the French nation state. The composition o f Hermann Broch’s 
The Death o f VirgiP (hereafter referred to as T.D.V.) on the other hand, was 
begun in a jail cell in the middle -w hich is to say the nadir— of twentieth 
century Europe. It was written not at the beginning but at what appeared to 
be, at least in the eyes o f its author, the end of another long flourishing culture 
with its corresponding social and political orders.
In terms of their public reception the contrast between these two works 
could hardly have been greater. The Roland remains the rare example, 
alongside such like monuments as the Aeneid, the Iliad and Odyssey, of the 
literary work that embraces and is embraced by a culture and its peoples as
1
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its social, political and cultural representation. T.D.V., by striking contrast, is 
in many respects the orphan o f its age; it is an obscure work not likely ever to 
enjoy anything more than a very limited readership. Its author is a Jew writing 
in German while in detention under Nazi guard in an Austrian prison cell. 
Broch had been placed in a comer of terrible isolation at the time this work 
was begun. And yet, as if in spite o f this, Broch’s literary works, the T.D.V. 
being the foremost among them, were intensely concerned with the shaping o f 
the social, political and cultural spheres of the German speaking world. Some 
months after his release from prison and escape from Nazi Austria Broch was 
able to write his publisher, Daniel Brody: “Ich glaube mit Recht sagen zu 
durfen, dad der Vergil ein Werk ist, welches unbedingt derdeutschen Sprache 
erhalten warden mud, u. z. umsomehr als es von einem Juden
stammt das Buch ist Kulturtat ” (1 believe I should be able to say
that without question the Virgil is a work that must help preserve the German
language; all the more so since it is written by a Jew.............. the book
(referring to T.D.V.) is ‘culture-deed’).3
Though the case for the T.D. V. remains to be made, there is little doubt 
among scholars of all stripes that the Roland is indeed Kulturtat. Little is 
known regarding the public reception of the Roland during and immediately 
following the period in which it was written. There is evidence to indicate that 
there was, in fact, an extended period during which the narration developed 
through oral performance. Tradition has it that parts o f the story were sung by 
Norman warriors prior to the Battle o f Hastings. Whether fact or apocrypha
2
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the tradition is ‘true’ at least in the sense that it underscores the importance o f 
this work in the cultural, social and political spheres of its time. The date at 
which the written text was produced has been determined to fall within a fairly 
limited scope o f years. Scholars generally agree that this occurred sometime 
between the last quarter o f the tenth and the first quarter o f the eleventh 
centuries; some, however, notably Hans Erich Keller, move the date forward 
to as late as 1150, C.E.4 Over time all trace o f the manuscripts that replicate 
what is now identified as the Roland disappear from public purview until, in 
1837, what has come to be known as the Oxford manuscript is rediscovered 
and published by Francisque Michel.5 The scholarly debate in which I situate 
my reading o f the Roland dates from this time.
Roland
The initial critical scholarship dating from the mid-nineteenth century 
and steeped in the positivist ideology so prevalent at the time holds 
considerable sway even to the present.6 Among the scholars and critics of 
that period it is indubitably Gaston Paris whose work and whose critical point 
of view continue to exert the greatest influence. Briefly stated, the scholarly 
premise upon which the work of Paris and that o f his fellow positivists rests is 
that the true ‘historical’ account of the events that occurred at Roncevaux lie 
buried in bits and pieces within the text. The task o f the scholar/critic, 
according to this methodology, is to dislodge from the manuscript those ‘bits 
of history1 from which to accurately reconstruct the events as they occurred. 
In order to ‘attain history1 the critic has to navigate the long oral tradition that
3
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putatively flowed from the ‘actual’ event to its record as fiction. Hans Aarsleff 
gives a resume of the methodology followed by Paris and others:
The battle of Roncevaux is dated 778. but The Song of Roland is some three 
hundred years younger. Since the facts of history could not possibly have 
been preserved so long in the absence of written records, the oral tradition 
was once more invoked to close the gap. Among the slightly different 
solutions, the best known was that of Gaston Paris, which B6dier made the 
chief object of his critique. Paris argued that short poems —‘Chants lyrico- 
Gpiques" or historical ballads— had been composed by witnesses at the time of 
or soon after the events and preserved orally until they flowed into the later 
epics.7
A principal aim of this scholarship was the unearthing o f true ‘historical’ 
events; no matter how greatly the text may be revered, it is evident that this 
tradition places fiction, and so writing, in a secondary or inferior position ws-a- 
vis the evidence o f historical fact.
The 'historical fact,’ such as it is employed by the positivist critical 
tradition, is decidedly oral; inevitably, the critic traces the path leading from 
one ‘witness’ and then another, each leading in greater proximity to the 
original event. The originary event may be the actual battle as it occurred or, 
in other permutations of this same line of critical thought, origin might be re­
defined as the primal song from which all subsequent oral performances and, 
eventually, from which the Ur-Text itself would ultimately be derived. Among 
others Jean Rychner, inspired by the work o f Milman Parry,8 held to the view 
that epic was essentially an oral tradition o f which the written text is only a 
reasonably accurate transcription. Here the scholar faces the challenge of 
reclaiming the words of the bard. One effect o f such a theoretical point o f 
view is the critical bias toward an understanding o f the written text as a 
lengthy suture o f bits and pieces of ‘song’ left over from long oral tradition. In
4
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addition to the valuation of speech over text is the always concurrent bias in
favor of ‘history1 over fiction ’ the succession o f bards, unlike fiction,
would inevitably lead back to an originary witness.
Analogous to the attempt to ‘reconstruct1 from existent manuscripts a
hypothetical oral tradition upon which, it is assumed, the surviving texts are
based is the attempt to reconstruct the Ur-text working from the same set of
existent manuscripts. The methods used in the scholarly pursuit o f the l/r-text
borrow substantially from the editorial principles developed by the positivist-
influenced nineteenth century scholar Karl Lachmann.9 Lachmann’s method
supposed that the same textual errors would not occur in manuscripts that
were independently produced; if the same set o f textual accidents occurred in
two or more manuscripts then one o f these manuscripts would necessarily be
originary and the others mere transcriptions. The scholar could then compare
and discard until attaining the manuscript from which all others were
supposedly derived. But of course there are no Ur-texts to be found and so,
pursuant of the methodology based on sound positivist principles, one had to
make do with a reconstructed text that would be based on bits and pieces of
isolated textual fragments that would be deemed ‘authentic.1
Though versions of this method o f textual ‘recovery’ are still widely
practiced even today a revolutionary alternative was introduced almost a
century ago with Joseph B&Jier’s edition o f the Roland (1913). His approach
was disarmingly simply, as Aarsleff explains:
He based his text on a single manuscript of the seven he had because 
he found that it was on the whole, in purely pragmatic terms, the 
simplest, most reasonable, and most coherent, with good French
5
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grammar and consistent spelling, or in short the manuscript ‘one is 
the least inclined to correct” He did not presume to know or be able to 
divine what the original would have been like.10
There is more to Bgdier’s method, to be sure, than mere practicality or the 
scholar’s modesty when confronted with the mysteries of manuscript 
production. Bedier’s method points to a new definition o f ‘history;’ at least in 
so far as history is to be recovered from the text. Though the point is nowhere 
made explicit in Bedier we are able to easily deduce the following regarding 
the virtues of each o f these two competing methods of editorial practice. The 
effort to establish something as near as possible to the originary text is 
essentially an effort to approximate to the nearest degree possible the original 
historic event, whether that event be understood as the primal text or the 
actual historic ‘occurrences;’ in the case of the Roland, the actual battle at 
Roncevaux upon which this text is based. In the ideal, the perfectly 
reconstructed text would always lead us back to the eye-witness, someone 
who was there, who saw and who recorded the events as they transpired. 
This methodology succumbs to the seductions o f the text that lays claim to its 
own authenticity by an internal appeal to the eye-witness o f its ‘author.’ The 
Song o f Alexis claims for itself to have been taken literally out o f the hands of 
the saint whose life is its subject; the Roland tells its reader that the account is 
written by St. Giles who was present on the field as battle was being waged. 
History, as it is recovered in the reconstruction of the primal text, is 
reassuringly ‘factual;’ the ‘history’ of Bedier’s text, to the contrary, remains 
unapologetically fiction.11
6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
By choosing to publish, with only the few necessary emendations the 
‘best1 of the available manuscripts (the Oxford) as his edition o f the Roland 
Bedier tacitly concedes that the ‘event* o f which he is in search as editor is 
essentially a textual one. Dispensing with the essentially positivist notion that 
the text is a collection o f indicators from which some exterior truth might be 
deduced, the reader o f B6dier*s edition is led to conclude that the historical 
truth of which scholars have been ardently in search is embedded in the text’s 
own fiction. In other words, rather than pursuing the original event that has 
been subsequently recounted by the text, whether ‘original event* is to be 
understood as the actual battle at Roncevaux or some first oral performance 
of which the manuscripts are mere transcriptions, Bedier premises his editorial 
work upon the assumption that the historical event is, in all simplicity, nothing 
other than the creation of the text itself. The Roland has been ‘authored’ and 
as such creates its own ‘history’ all the while encouraging the reader in the 
notion that it is nothing more than the record of those events which are 
presented at the hand o f its supposed actual eye- witness -th e  ruseful St. 
Giles.
For the purposes of this dissertation the differences between these two 
critical approaches can be summed up in this way: the presumption of an 
attainable Ur-text ultimately carries with it the assumption that the narrative’s 
historical subject is described by the text. By gathering details from the 
various available manuscripts the subject o f the narration can be described to 
an ever greater degree of accuracy. If, on the other hand, one accepts the 
idea of a ‘best* manuscript, then emphasis is thereby placed not on the
7
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superiority o f prior evidence but on the integrity o f the fiction; the ‘best’ 
manuscript presents the authored fiction in a form that has the fewest 
grammatical errors and that renders the narration in a clear and coherent 
fashion. The further implication would be that the subject of the narrative’s 
historical subject is one created by the fiction itself. Rather than go in search 
of ‘Roland’ in sources from which the manuscript is thought to be derived, the 
reader of B£dier*s edition finds that Roland is embedded in the fiction, is a 
creation of the text; no need to go searching elsewhere for him.
The theoretical basis of Bedier’s editorial method implies that the 
‘subject* of the Roland is not to be found in a lost manuscript or in an 
imperfectly recorded historical event but in the fiction itself; the ‘best’ 
manuscript would then give the best account o f the sought after ‘textual’ 
event. Bedier’s brilliant contribution to the scholarship of the Roland goes 
largely unappreciated, in my estimation, so long as scholarly debate continues 
to center on the quest for the reconstructed L/r-text or toward marking out a 
hypothetical trail backward in time from manuscript, to oral performance, to 
‘actual’ eye-witness o f the events at Roncevaux. It has only been within the 
recent past that some few medievalists have began to turn attention to an 
examination o f the events within the ficition of the Roland recognizing in them 
points of great historical interest. Among those whose work demonstrates an 
understanding of the full implications of Bedier’s contribution are Albert Girard 
in his article from 1969 “L’Axe Roland-Ganelon: Valeurs en conflit dans la 
Chanson de Roland," Eugene Vance in his article from 1979 “Roland and 
Charlemagne: The Remembering Voices and the Crypt,” and Bernard
8
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Cerquiglini in his article from 1981 “Roland d Roncevaux, ou la trahison des 
clercs.” All approach the Roland with an interest in the historical forces that 
are generated out of, rather than represented by, the fiction o f the text.
Through the work of these and other like-minded scholars, the 
argument for a reading of the Roland as a fiction o f great historical 
consequence has been gathering. Peter Haidu brings these arguments 
together with his own highly original contribution in a work that has proved to 
be of cardinal importance to Rolandean scholarship: his book, from 1993, 
entitled The Subject o f Violence. Haidu makes the case for the Roland as the 
fiction from the late tenth to early eleventh century that purposefully prepares 
the way for the transition o f France from feudal society to modem nation state. 
The supporting argument of this work is as clear as it is thorough: the Roland 
is of greatest historical significance not to the era of which it pretends to report 
but to the era in which it was written. The text is a powerful ideological engine 
that effectively creates a new Spisteme, a structure of state that is no longer 
feudal but monarchical.
I have chosen Bedier's Roland as the working edition for this study for 
reasons that should now be obvious. I have mentioned only a scant few 
names of scholars whose contributions represent the recent tradition in which 
my own work situates itself. No one single contribution is so important to this 
effort as that of Peter Haidu. The chapter o f this dissertation treating o f the 
Roland begins with Haidu’s thesis concerning the central role this text plays in 
the transition that France undergoes at the turn of the eleventh century 
moving from a prior feudal structure to modem nation state. My particular
9
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interests have to do with the role o f the Roland in the creation of a new mode 
of subjectivity, one that is fashioned in accordance with the precepts o f the 
modem (centralized) state.
The first of the four sections in this chapter, that entitled uM-Munjoie," 
examines the manner in which the Roland creates among the French a strong 
political center focused on the emblem immediately associated with the 
emperor Charlemagne. This reading follows the rapid transformation within 
the fiction of the Roland o f a political and social order in which power and 
authority is dispersed, into an order in which power and authority are 
concentrated in the person o f the emperor. The progress in the centralization 
o f power and authority within this text parallels the progress of the 
materialization of the emperor’s war cry ‘Munjoie’ into a banner o f the same 
appellation.
The segment “Outlaws" demonstrates how the introduction of a new 
episteme into the old feudal structure o f state is intentional and comes into 
being by way of authorial ruse. Here the ‘conversion’ o f the French to a new 
mode of subjectivity is traced in its progress over the course of the narrative o f 
the Roland. By the end o f the Roland the French are seen to have unwittingly 
abrogated the old order o f law in favor o f the new. Their forfeiture o f the old 
law is total and irrevocable. They are led to a betrayal o f their most closely 
held social and political convictions by a sovereign/author
(Chariemagne/Turoldus) who calculates with precision the transgressions that 
will lead to an irrevocable commitment to the new social and political order.
10
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“Honur e Dreiture, ” the third of four segments, looks at the ideological 
transformation that occurs at the center of the text, in exactly the space where 
the text's two semi-autonomous narratives join together. The Roland does 
indeed bring together two narratives which seem apart from one another. 
Although other critics have argued that the Roland’s two narrative units were 
originally independent o f one another or that the second narrative is a later 
addition appended to  the ‘original’ text based on oral tradition, I demonstrate 
how the narrative ‘gap’ is integral to the workings o f the larger text. The break 
in narrative allows for a negative textual space in which the feudal concept of 
honur is translated into the concept of divine right (dreiture), a fundamental 
concept in the creation of the structure of monarchy.
The Roland chapter concludes with the segment “Ve/re Pate(R)ne’’. 
Drawing from observations made in the chapter’s previous three segments, 
and, in particular, upon the discussion of the bi-partite construction of the text,
I examine how the exchange of power and authority from feudal state to 
monarchy is analogized in the exchange o f authority from Roland to 
Charlemagne. Critical to understanding the nature o f the transition from one 
social, political and cultural order to another is the understanding o f how the 
change comes about through a translation o f the old into the new. Roland is a 
reduction o f the old order to a single ‘letter1 planted in the heart o f the new 
state. Roland has been appropriated to the new social and political order and 
in the process of appropriation he has been transformed. In the process of 
seeing to it that Roland becomes ‘monumentalized’, Charlemagne rewrites the 
‘prescription’ for his former vassal’s subjectivity, and he does so be rewriting
11
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the narrative created by Roland’s very deed while on the field o f battle at 
Roncevaux.
Virgil
The critical tradition supporting the work of Hermann Broch and of his 
last literary effort, the T.D.V., in particular, is fragmentary and limited in its 
ability to make this very ambitious, if not to say arduous, literary project 
comprehensible to a wider audience. When one considers the nature o f the 
work and the circumstances under which it was written none o f this should 
come as a surprise. Though incidents in the life of the author, specifically, his 
detention at A lt Aussee and the imminent threat o f death experienced there, 
play a critical role in the genesis o f the T.D.V. we must turn not to the 
biographies12 but to the correspondence to attain a grasp of the play between 
death and the subject that is very much a part o f this work.
There is no question but that T.D.V. draws to an unusual degree from 
the life experience of its author. When in a letter to his publicist, Dr. Kurt W olf 
(late 1943),13 Broch declares that “The phenomenon of death stands at the 
center o f this Life-book” ('Das Phanomen des Todes steht also im Mittelpunkt
dieses Lebensbuches ), he may just as well have added that this same
‘death’ remained at the center o f his own life. In a missive of later date 
addressed to Hermann Weigend (Feb. 12, 1946),14 Broch reveals this about 
his T.D.V.: “It was not merely the death of Virgil, it was one’s own death 
imagined" ( ‘Es war nicht mehr das Sterben des Vergil, es wurde die 
Imagination des eigenen Sterbens) Finally, in a letter to Aldoux Huxley dated
12
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May 10, 1945,15 Broch states that “  the reader must be brought to this
[experience of death] through exactly the same process, that I have worked
through " ( ‘ vielmehr mu&te der Leser dazu gebracht warden, genau
den gleichen ProzeR, den ich durchgemacht habe ). From this we
conclude that it is Broch’s intent to share with the reader his own experience 
with death. Biographical material cannot explain meaning but it can, in this 
case, illuminate greatly the operations o f death and the central role death 
plays in this highly esoteric last novel.
Recourse to the correspondence as a source of illumination acquires 
further justification in that the T.D.V. records a particularly intimate relation 
between subject and text. This novel is, in a manner o f speaking, one lengthy 
journal entry recording the author’s own experience in the encounter with 
death, one he attempts to share with the reader only after the fact. The 
author’s ‘shared’ death has both its private and its public aspects. Broch was 
not merely near death at A lt Aussee, rather he was very nearly consumed by 
the forces of social and political disintegration swirling about Europe at mid­
twentieth century. Broch did not wish to merely record a death, rather he 
chose to write himself into death by means o f this manuscript, effectively 
begun during the two or so weeks o f his imprisonment. Broch does not offer 
the reader the mere experience, inevitable to be sure, with death; rather he 
offers the reader a dying into the social and political chaos that inhabits the 
text. The Virgil o f T.D.V. is a subject in the process o f being consumed by his 
own writing; there the reader sees Virgil dying into his own text, offering 
himself in immolation to his own work (cf.: p. 268). Hence his choice o f Virgil,
13
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whose fictionalized death becomes the vehicle to carry the reader through the 
labyrinth o f this experience.
The criticism that has thus far come into print concerning T.D.V. has, to 
my knowledge, been mostly silent on the three point relation, ‘death-subject- 
text,’ that I believe critical to an understanding o f this novel. The biographies 
bring to light little o f relevance to the topic; it is, after all, out of the general 
purview of biographies to examine issues of intense critical speculation. 
There have been critics to address issues that, in one manner or another, do 
touch on questions of subjectivity in the text. Broch's sometime interest in 
Jungian psychoanalysis has led one writer,16 a renowned disciple o f Jung, to 
apply that methodology to an understanding of the T.D.V. Another critic17 
attempts to place Broch in a tradition of mysticism, though to my reading, 
T.D.V. seems to fit even less well into that classification. The constructed 
subject o f Broch’s T.D.V. exasperates any such attempt at understanding by 
means of prior systems of thought.
Yet, because of the permeating influence o f models of subjectivity 
based on Broch’s reading in the literature o f phenomenology, certain critics, 
such as Manfred Durzak18 and Erich Kahler,19 well grounded in this 
philosophical area, have done much to advance an understanding of 
brochean subjectivity as it is rendered in T.D.V. Maurice Blanchot, to my 
knowledge, is the only writer who approaches T.D.V. with a critical interest in 
the interrelation between death, text and the subject; thus his work, in 
particular the article on Broch that forms a chapter o f his Livre a Venir, serves 
as a recurrent point o f reference in this study of Broch’s last novel.
14
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The first of the three segments o f this chapter, Ich-Veriu&t (Dissolution 
o f the begins with an examination o f Broch’s Virgil, whose subjectivity, in 
the first pages of T.D.V., is seen undergoing radical disintegration. From 
radical disintegration of subjectivity, Broch then suddenly shifts to the primal 
moment o f subject identification, the moment of naming at birth. Broch first 
establishes the ‘name’ as the portal through which the subject enter into 
language. This segment follows the progression, as it unfolds with precision 
and in exacting detail, in which subject identity is constructed within the 
framework of the name. Three stages are presented: 1) the name given at 
birth is an as yet empty vessel; 2) the name V irg il’ attains rank in an 
‘unending series of names-of-fathers;’ 3) Virgil’s name/identity breaks with the 
unending series of names-of-fathers’ (die undendliche Reihe der VSter, p. 
178).
The segment entitled Schicksal (Fate) examines Virgil as a figure of 
ongoing subjective inter-reflection. Broch’s ‘subject’ is not a thing but a 
function with three points o f reference: self, self as other, and an 
unquantifiable ‘real’ immanent to the field of language -represented as death 
and the te x t- into which these aspects of subjectivity can be glimpsed in 
reflection. We conclude with a consideration of the phenomenon of ‘World- 
doubling’ (Weltvendopplung), a term employed by Broch to indicate that the 
subject is written twice into language, as ‘se lf and as other. ‘World-doubling’ 
in T.D.V. also implies a representation of the world as a state of constant 
exchange in which ‘truth’ is translated into the ‘real’ and the ‘real’ into ‘truth.’
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The chapter ends with the segment ‘Rome’, which tests one o f T.D.V. ’s 
implied premises, namely, that the radical restructuring o f a given social, 
political, cultural order begins with the reconfiguration of a particular individual 
subjectivity. We look at ways in which the ‘real’ is predicated upon subjective 
cognition. Next, from the newly reconfigured subject, ‘Virgil,’ comes the hope 
of a rejuvenation o f a social order having become moribund. Next we 
examine the scene in which the emblem of Augustus’ validity, the purple toga, 
is metaphorically shown to be without color and desiccated. It is the language 
o f Virgil’s text that will ‘re-ink’ the cloth o f Augustus’ authority. The chapter 
ends with a look at the power of the ‘word’ to recreate the failing social and 
political order of Augustan Rome.
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M -MUNJOIE
As is typically the case with epic, the Chanson de Roland (hereafter 
referred to as Roland) begins in the middle o f things. The opening scene 
informs the reader that after seven hard years the conflict between Saracens 
and Franks, one way or the other, is about to end. Not long thereafter the text 
enters into the feast of carnage that will leave the best chevaliers of both 
camps dead on the field of battle at Roncevaux. Subsequent to the slaughter, 
the Emperor Charles finally arrives after the fact, not having yet drawn his 
sword in combat. Charles returns as if merely to take care of unfinished 
business. He then proceeds to reclaim the loss of honor, to defeat the 
remaining Saracens and to take Spain back into the confines o f the Christian 
world. Charles’ return is decidedly anticlimactic.
This second half of the Roland, beginning with the emperor’s return, 
has often struck the reader as supererogatory, a surplus o f narrative 
extending beyond the story’s main event, namely, the death of Roland at 
Roncevaux. Significantly, the narrative expansion that begins with laisse 
CLXXXVIII maintains the illusion with which the text begins, that o f always
18
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being in the middle of things. It also perpetuates the story’s chief fiction, 
namely, that the Roland presents merely an episode within an historical 
continuum that stretches forward uninterrupted from the beginnings o f the 
Christian world. If that world is fragmented, the text informs us, it is 
synchronically so in terms o f the ever-present opposition between Saracen 
and Frank, Christian and Pagan. With the eradication o f that other, the 
Pagan/Saracen, all can be made well, can be made whole again; a t least for 
the moment. A closer examination o f the text, however, reveals another split, 
one that runs like a fault line through the center of the Frankish camp and 
which threatens the political stability o f Charles’ realm. In the following essay I 
will trace out this internal divide, particularly in relation to the individual 
subject, where the reader encounters a widening gap between the 
significance of name and body, between substance and sign.
Though Charlemagne is not physically present at the battle of 
Roncevaux, neither is he altogether absent. Inadvertently or otherwise, 
Roland, Roland’s boon companion Oliver, and the text’s chief cleric, the 
archbishop Turpin, reconstruct a presence for Charlemagne in the 
vocalization o f a unifying sign that is the war cry Monjoie.1 Monjoie is the 
name of the oriflame, the banner that the emperor will carry forward into 
battle. Over the course o f the text this sign of Charles undergoes numerous 
transformations in both name and in substance. In particular, after the battle 
at Roncevaux, through certain semantic and ritualistic manipulations, this 
vocal sign Monjoie will attain a materiality that Charles, as we shall see, 
somehow lacks.
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Our initial narrative approach to Charlemagne comes via the agency o f 
Blancandrin, the Saracens’ chief negotiator. He arrives at the camp of the 
Franks to offer terms of a costly peace. This is the picture we are given upon 
his encounter, which is the reader’s first encounter, with the emperor
Blanche ad la barbe e tut flurit le chef,
Gent ad le cors e le cuntenant tier
S'est kil demandet, ne I’estoet enseinger. (II. 117 -119)2
(His beard is white and his head hoary,
His body is noble, his countenance fierce;
If anyone seeks him, there is no need to point him out)
The text describes his body in terms more general than particular -nob le
(gent), fierce (fier)— placing into question the nature o f Charles’ own subjective
identity. Employing the adjectives blanche (white) and flurit (flowery), the
description makes use of a rhetorical semiology which throughout the
narrative connotes virility and rejuvenescence as well as wisdom and old age.3
In later descriptions, not of Charles but of his Saracen counterpart the em ir
Baligant, the adjectives blanc and flurit will appear again to signal a renewed
vitality:
Tant par ert blancs cume flur en estet... (1.3162)
(It was as white as a flower in summer...)
Blanche ad la barbe ensement cume flur... (1.3173)
(His beard was white just like a flower...)
“Blanche ad la barbe cume flur en avrill.° (I. 3503)
(‘His beard is white as a flower in April.’)
Charlemagne, at the point at which we first encounter him, stands unmarked,
‘un-inked’ -B lanche...e t tut flurit (white...and in bloom); Charlemagne w ill
20
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generate his own text with its own meaning not through deed in battle, as 
does Roland, but through a control over the signs and the language of the 
subsequent text.
Finally, there remains this to be said about the use o f the adjective 
blanc: throughout the text it serves as attribute to two primary categories of 
things, namely, cloth (in this I include hair and beard taking into account a 
commonplace of rhetorical equivalencies [see Curtius, in particular the 
example o f G6ngora des Vizekdnigs von Neapel p. 111 - ff.])4 and 
armaments; the blank page of the unwritten geste and the swords of 
Charlemagne and Roland, those burnished instruments by which narrative will 
be inscribed on the field of battle. One notable exception must be made for a 
whiteness that pertains to neither cloth nor armaments, the twice mentioned 
‘blanc sarcou,’ the white sarcophagus -literally, the eater o f flesh— that which 
consumes flesh, consumes one narrative that is to be replace by another; but 
more on this later.
If at lines 1350 and 1378 the cry Monjoie continues to evoke Charles 
as referent, at I. 1260 a new alignment develops between the emperor’s sign 
and those engaged in combat. To the Saracen boast that the Franks will die 
in place, Turpin, the archbishop/cleric who will die fighting at Roland’s side, 
responds, rather incongruously, swearing that the Franks will, in fact, not flee:
“Culvert paien, vos i avez mentit!
Carles, me sire, nus est guarant tuz dis;
Nostre Franceis n’unt talent de fuTr.
Voz cumpaignuns feruns trestuz restifs.
Nuveles vos d i: mort vos estoet susfrir.
Ferez, Franceis! Nul de vus ne s’ublit!
Cist premer colp est nostre, Deu mercit!"
“Munjoie” escriet por le camp retenir. (II. 1253 - 60)
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('Vile pagan, you have told a lie!
Charles, my lord, will always guard us well 
Our French have no desire to flee.
All your companions will be laid to rest by us,
I have news for you: you must suffer death.
Strike, Frenchmen, let no one of you forget his duty.
This first blow is ours, thank God’
He shouts ‘Monjoie!’ to hold the field.)
In remarkable contrast to the passage at line 1179 -W e must not forget
Charles' battle-cry’ (L ’enseigne Carle n 'i devum ubli'er. )— Turpin here
states plainly that the coming strikes will be for none other than those present 
in body on the field of battle, that their deeds here will perpetuate no memory 
other than their own. Charlemagne’s failure to meet the most fundamental 
obligation due his vassals, to protect them from impending death, undermines 
his position of authority among the Franks at Roncevaux and places in 
jeopardy the inclusion o f his name in the commemoration at Roncevaux. 
Turpin revives the spirits o f the warring Franks and in the process anchors 
them to the field o f battle through a re-appropriation of the sign, Monjoie, as 
their own. Charles’ ‘presence’ seems waning at this point and the repeated 
insistence that the Franks will stand firm does not answer so much to the 
Saracen taunts as it does to a growing awareness of the fading resolve 
among the Franks. Turpin’s harangue also reveals a split in logic, one that 
seems cynical at the core; in urging the Franks not to ‘forget themselves’; he 
reminds them that they have already been forgotten by Charles.
At a later moment in the text, Turpin reappears to decide the notorious 
dispute between Oliver and Roland over whether or not to call Charles to their 
aid against the overwhelming numbers of advancing Saracens. Oliver urges a
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call to reinforcements; Roland, citing the ‘pride o f the geste, ’ determines to do 
otherwise. In fact, it would already be too late. Charles’ return will not rescue 
anyone, and this the chevalier at Roncevaux, thanks to Turpin’s instruction, 
now well know. Plainly, Turpin’s wish is to save not the lives, but the 
remembrance of those who have fallen, and remembrance, as we shall soon 
witness, is subject to easy appropriation. Turpin initiates an ending to the 
events at Roncevaux by counseling Roland to blow the olifant, summoning 
Charles not as savior, but as subsequent witness to events that will already 
have transpired:5
“Nostre Franceis i descendrunt a pied,
Truverunt nos e morz e detrenchez,
Leverunt nos en bieres sur sumers,
Si nus piurrunt de doel e de pitet,
Enfuerunt nos en aitres de musters;
N’en mangerunt ne iu ne pore ne chen."
Respunt Reliant “Sire, mult dites bien.” (II. 1746 — 51
(‘Our Frenchmen will dismount here;
They will find us dead and hacked to pieces 
They will raise us on to pack-horses in coffins.
They will shed tears of sorrow and pity for us 
They will bury us in a church’s hallowed ground.
No wolf or pig or dog will devour us.'
Roland responds: ‘Sir, you say well.’)
The profane and the divine intertwine in this substitution o f the promise of 
paradise (I. 1479) for glory and pomp in burial; throughout the Roland, this 
warrior cleric is a curious blend of the sacred and the profane. One quickly 
remembers, however, that the subtle Turpin addresses here only Roland and 
Oliver, who will indeed be served in burial with the most elaborate ritual 
performance; the brutal fact remains that all others -those  excluded from this 
dialogue will also be excluded from any particular remembrance— will be 
placed in a shallow grave on the plains just outside Saragossa. The reader
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might well imagine that they will indeed suffer dogs and swine and wolves 
digging at their bodies through a thin covering of soil (cf.: I. 1751 ’No wolf o r 
pig or dog will devour us'... (“N ’en mangerunt ne lu ne pore ne chen”). A ll but 
Roland, Oliver and Turpin will suffer a fate amazingly sim ilar to that o f 
Tervagant and Mohammed, the Saracen idols who, the text tells us, meet their 
end in corporal desecration -T h e y  seize Tervaganfs carbuncle / And fling 
Mohammed into a ditch /  Where pigs and dogs bite and trample on him’
 (E Turvagan tolent sun escarbunde, /  enz en un foss6t b u te n t/E  pore e
chen le mordent e defulent, II. 2590 - 91).
When Charles does finally return to Roncevaux it is with the host under 
his command shouting Monjoie!, a sign rejuvenated by the immediately 
preceding ‘commemoration’ at Roncevaux, a sign soon to be made once 
again interchangeable with the very name of Charlemagne. Naimes, who is 
as sincere as he is narrow and literalist in his interpretation o f Frankish law 
and custom, replaces Turpin as the one chiefly responsible for negotiating a 
new relation between the chevalier and ‘their1 sign:
Respont dux Neimes: 'Baron i fait la peine!
Bataille i ad, par le men escientre.
Cil I’at trait ki vos en roevet feindre,
Adubez vos, si criez vostre enseigne,
Si sucurez vostre maisnee gent
Asez oez que Rollant se dementet!” (II. 1790 - 95)
(Duke Naimes replies: ‘A true vassal is pouring out his suffering!
There is a battle, so help me.
The one who begs you to pretend you have heard nothing has betrayed him.
Arm yourself, shout out your battle cry,
And ride to the aid of your noble household.
You can hear clearly Roland signaling his distress!')
Verse 1793, which associates the cry o f Monjoie with the covering o f 
protective armaments, anticipates the materialization of the sign Monjoie as
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the sword (2508) and the cloth (3094), instruments o f inscription, which we 
shall momentarily take under examination. The word feindre o f the preceding 
line plays a key role in our understanding o f this line. In its Latin derivative 
fingere - to  form an image, a simulacrum, a fiction o f the real— Naimes might 
well be pointing an accusing finger at the one who has seduced the Franks 
into confusing truth as representation with the presentation o f the body in 
battle. The exemplary instance o f the body as self-revelatory fiction comes at 
the moment when the fiction of Roland’s exploits and the presence o f his body 
in battle merge at verses 1638-40: ‘He encountered Roland in his path; / 
W ithout ever having seen him, he recognized him in truth / By his fierce look 
and his noble body, / His gaze and his whole countenance’. (Enmi sa ve/e ad 
encuntret Rollant; iEnceis ne /' vit, s i /' cunut veirement /  A l tie r visage e al 
cors qu'il out gent /  E  a! reguart e a l contenement...). In this reading Naimes 
instructs the chevaliers to rid themselves of their corporal identity and in its 
place to assume a unifying identity under the wraps of the newly reconfigured 
war cry Monjoie; it is a first step into the eventual materialization o f the sign.
Monjoie’s  rejuvenescence, its return to potency promises to the Franks 
who are left under Charlemagne’s command a protection that it failed to afford 
the chevalier left at Roncevaux; hence, the materialization o f Monjoie marks a 
definitive split within the Frankish camp. The sign Monjoie metaphorically cuts 
the world of the Franks in two, dividing those who will receive its protection, 
the subjects o f a newly constituted order under Charles, and those fo r whom 
its protection was forfeit: the fallen at Roncevaux. Prescient o f the death and
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dismemberment that will be part of the process by which Charles’ sign 
(I’enseigne Cariuri) will reconstitute itself, Roland is the one who initiates the 
circulation of ‘sign and remembrance' between the Saracen and the Frank 
camps:
Puis escrient I’enseigne paenisme.
Qo dist Rollant “Ci recevrums martyrie..." (II. 1921 - 22)
Quant en cest camp verdrat Carles, mi sire,
De Sarrazins verrat tel discipline,
Cuntre un des noz en truverat morz XV. r
Ne fesserat que nos ne beneTsse.’ (II. 1928 - 31)
(Then they shout out the pagan battle cry.
Thus says Roland: ‘Here we will receive martyrdom...
‘When Charles, my lord, comes to this battlefield,
He will see such a slaughter of the Saracens
That for every one of ours he will find fifteen of theirs dead.
He shall not fail to bless us.)
In antiphonal response to the Saracen war cry Roland attaches Christian 
martyrdom to a pagan sign; that the ‘pagan sign' (iI’enseigne paenisme) 
remains unnamed up to this moment in the narrative facilitates the operation 
of a graft; Roland inscribes Christian martyrdom onto an unmarked sign that 
emanates not from Charles, but from the pagan host The renewal of Charles’ 
sign does not occur without a troubling exchange taking place. Anticipating 
Charles’ blessing of the dead, Roland mingles Saracen and Frank in the post­
mortem landscape of this scene - in  a ratio of 15 to 1 - glossing over the 
annihilation of his own men, as though it were merely incidental to the 
slaughter o f the Saracens. The absurdity o f his logic stares out at the reader. 
Where in the annals of Christian martyrdom do the martyred wreak 
destruction fifteen-fold upon their persecutors? One plausible solution to this 
apparent paradox would be if Saracens and Franks had somehow both fallen
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victim to the same cause, if both were martyrs to a new order established 
under Charlemagne and signed by the name Monjoie.
Toward the close o f this same episode, Roland further elaborates the 
interconnectedness o f the two camps, Saracen and Frank:
Ki lui veTst Sarrazins desmembrer,
Un mort sur altre geter,
De bon vassal li poQst remembrer.
L'enseigne Carle n’i volt mie ublier
“Munjoie!” escrtete haltemente cler... (II. 1970 - 74)
(Anyone who had seen him dismembering Saracens,
Piling up one corpse upon another.
Would have remembered what a good vassal was.
Nor does he want to forget Charles’ battle-cry.
He shouts out ‘Monjoie!’ loud and clear.)
The text presents slaughter and remembrance in a circularity moving from 
sign (pagan) I. 1921 to martyrdom (Christian) I. 1922 and back again from 
martyrdom (pagan) I. 1970 to sign (Christian) I. 1974. W hatever the numerical 
proportions Charles, upon his return to Roncevaux, will find just such an 
intermingling o f Christian and pagan bodies:
II nen i ad ne veie ne senter,
Ne voide tere, ne alne ne plein pied,
Que il n’i ait o Franceis o paien. (II. 2399 - 2401)
(There is no road or path there,
No open ground, no yard or foot of land,
Not covered with a Frenchman or a pagan.)
Irrespective o f former distinctions of faith, culture and allegiance, the text 
presents Saracen and Frank as a  unified tableau o f bodily remains; des­
membrer becomes re-membrer, dismemberment causes remembrance, or the 
dis-memberment o f those left on the field at Roncevaux w ill be re-membered, 
reconstituted though in a new configuration under the sign o f Charles. W hat 
Roland cannot bring himself to articulate, what he attempts to camouflage by
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signaling out the destruction o f the Saracens, is the fact that the potency, the 
memorability o f I’enseigne Cariun depends as much upon the dismemberment 
of the Franks at Roncevaux as it does upon the that o f the Saracens.
The last mention on the field o f Roncevaux o f either the cry Monjoie or 
its generic I'enseigne hales from the forces under Charles’ command as he 
returns from the pass at Cize:
Carles repeiret od sa grant ost li ben 
De cels de France odum les graisles clers;
Grant est la noise de ‘Munjoie!' escrier. (II. 2149 - 51)
(Charles, the brave, is returning with his great army.
We hear the clear bugles of the men of France;
The noise from those who shout ‘Monjoie!’ is great)
These verses point not merely to a Saracen recognition of the return/rebirth 
(repeiret) o f the Frankish forces under Charlemagne but also the 
rejuvenescence of the sign Monjoie The noise o f those who shout ‘Monjoie*’ 
is great ’ ...(Grant est la noise de Monjoie escrier). This rebirth will be 
confirmed at the next narrative encounter with the sign of Charles. After the 
defeat at Roncevaux, the text makes the first mention of an association 
between Charles’ ensign (Munjoie) and Charles’ sword (Joyeuse); it is the 
narrative’s first attempt to offer an explanation o f the origins o f a newly 
constituted order under Charles:
Ceinte Joiuse, unches ne fut sa per,
Ki cascun jur muet .XXX. clartez.
Asez savum de la lance parler,
Dunt nostre Sire fut en la cruiz nasfret 
Carles en ad la mure, mercit Deu;
En I’oret punt I’ad faite manuvrer.
Pur ceste honur e pur ceste bontet,
Li nums Joiuse I’espee fut dunet 
Baruns franceis nel deivent ublien 
Enseigne en unt de ‘Munjoie!' crier;
Pur go nes poet nuie gent cuntrester. (II. 2501 -11)
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([He] girt about him his sword Joyeuse, which has always been without peer. 
And whose (light) changes thirty times a day.
We could say a good deal about the Lance 
With which Our Lord was wounded on the Cross;
Charles has its point, thanks be to God,
Which he has had mounted in the golden pommel of his sword.
Through this honor and through this grace.
The name Joyeuse was given to the sword.
French barons must not forget it
From it they derive their battle cry 'Monjoie.'
For this reason no race on earth can withstand them.)
C[S]einte Joiuse receives a consecration making it sacred beyond all other 
instruments o f war; although, or perhaps because, up untit this point in the 
narrative, the reader has yet to see it strike a single blow. Joyeuse, Charles’ 
battle sword, performs another crucial function in incorporating the history of 
events at Roncevaux into the larger history of the Christian world. By merit of 
the contents o f its pommel, Joyeuse leads the narrative to ‘the Zero Hour1 (die 
Stunde Null) of the Christian era, which for cleric/scribe would be the 
beginning o f eschatological time. Joyeuse, encasing the spearhead that 
pierced the divine Redeemer hanging from the cross, reaches into the interior 
of the body of God, and if for no other reason than this, the text finds 
justification in proclaiming this an instrument o f both war and narrative: 
‘...which had no peer1 (unches ne fut sa per). This last remark -unches ne fut 
sa per— as well as the description o f the luminescent qualities o f the sword 
invites comparison with Durendal, Roland’s own blade, and we shall see that 
the two swords here contest priorities as the instruments of historical 
inscription.
If only in terms o f their respective properties o f light, there is no 
question, if one were to grant an implicit trust in the honesty of the text, but 
that Joyeuse is the superior instrument of historical writing. Returning to the
29
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
last mention o f Durendal while still in Roland’s possession we find that it, too, 
is presented in terms of a description o f its luminescence:
“E! Durendal, cum es bele, e clere, e blanche!
Cuntre soleill si luises e reflambes!" (II. 2316 -17)
(‘O. Durendal, how fair you are, how clear and white!
How you shimmer and sparkle against the sun.)
Brilliant though it may be, because o f stated physical properties — how clear 
and white!’ ( ‘e clere e blanche!1)— Durendal appears to do no more than to 
reflect light while there exists at least the suspicion that Joyeuse is able to 
generate light, of its own power —’And whose (light) change thirty times a 
day’...( Ki cascun jur muet .XXX. clartez). This is supported by further 
evidence in the only other passage within the text to mention the name 
Joyeuse:
Ki pur soleill sa clartet n’en muet... (1.2990)
(Whose brillance is not diminished by the sun.)
The light emanating from Joyeuse is both lambent and able to rival the light of 
the sun in its intensity.
Joyeuse’s other mark of superiority is that its relic is a unity (‘One’), 
whereas the relics of Durendal are multiple, namely, ‘a tooth of St. Peter, 
blood from St. Basile, hair from the head of St. Denis, a portion of the Virgin’s 
vestments.' The many as opposed to the One deflects a sought after mark of 
hereditary legitimacy, o f immediacy and linearity; it is the mark o f a diffusion o f 
power and of authority that will in the end coalesce under the sign o f Charles. 
Ultimately, the multiple nature o f Durendal’s reliquary, signaling multiple rather 
than a unified point of origin, doubles back on the very question o f Roland’s
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own suspected bastardy.6 When the Franks are instructed not to forget 
Monjoie, a forgetting is implied in the substitution o f one material sign, 
Durendal, in exchange for another, Joyeuse. Through the agency o f the text, 
Charlemagne achieves what Roland could not, the supplanting o f Durendal, 
Roland’s own instrument o f inscription, by the even more powerful instrument 
Joyeuse, Charlemagne’s own. The metaphorical incorporation of Joyeuse 
into Monjoie reestablishes the guarantee o f protection that Charlemagne 
forfeited by his absence from Roncevaux; it also privileges his telling of events 
in that the history o f Roncevaux will be re-inscribed by Charles’ own 
instrument, Joyeuse, which, unlike Durendal, had, up until mid-narrative, 
remained unexposed to view, inactive, silent; though always attendant upon 
this moment o f supplanting.
In laisse 183 we find an act o f exchange that will effectively bind the 
two halves o f the narrative text; it is an exchange of the instruments of 
inscription; then follows the textualization o f the cry Monjoie. In preparation 
for the final encounter with the Saracens the narrative assigns the name 
Monjoie to the the orieflambe, the golden cloth taken from the service of St. 
Peter:
Puis sunt muntez, la bataille demandent;
“Munjoie!” escrient; od els est Carlemagne.
Gefreid d’Anjou portet I’orie flambe:
Seint Piere fut, si aveit num Romaine;
Mais de Munjoie iloec out pris eschange. (II. 3091 - 95)
(Then having mounted their horses, they demand battle
They shout out ‘Monjoie!’ and Charlemagne is with them.
Geoffrey of Anjou carries the oriflamme:
It once belonged to Saint Peter and it bore the name Romaine;
But from Monjoie it has received a change in name.)
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Monjoie now amasses a unity under one sign that is a t once military 
(Joyeuse), religious (Romaine) and political (Charles’ emblem) in form: ‘From 
it they derive their battle cry ‘Monjoie.’ /  For this reason no race on earth can 
withstand them’....(Enseigne en unt de Munjoie c r ie r / Pur go n ’es poet nule 
gent cuntrester, II. 2510-11). In each instance the unity o f the Franks under 
Charles is earned out through a process o f exchange: Durendal for Joyeuse, 
Romaine fo r Monjoie, and the fallen at Roncevaux fo r the new order o f host 
under Charles. The only time we see Charles’ sword drawn it is against his 
Saracen counterpart, Baligant, and unlike the combat at Roncevaux, we 
witness not two chevaliers measuring one another up, but the cataclysmic 
coming together o f two heretofore separate worlds:
Cii sunt vassal ki les oz ajusterent 
Lor enseignes n’i unt mie ubliees:
Li amiralz “Preciuse!” ad criee,
Carles ‘‘Munjoie!’’, I’enseigne renumee.
L'un conuist I'altre as haltes voiz e as cleres. (II. 3562 - 66)
(Those who brought the armies together are valiant.
They have not forgotten their battle-cries:
The emir cried out ‘Precieuse!’
And Charles his renowned battle-cry 'Monjoie!'
They recognized each other by their loud, clear voices.)
Only one sign will survive the battle and surely it will be Monjoie:
‘‘Munjoie!* escriet pur la reconuisance. (I. 3620)
(He shouts out ‘Monjoie!’ (that they might recognize him.)
Charlemagne has, as the text tells us, ‘Repaired is his and his 
remembrance’...(Repairet lo i vigure remembrance, I. 3614). In context of our 
discussion, to recover remembrance is to recover vigor. Charles’ rejuvenation 
is at the expense o f the forces under Baligant, but also, and indiscriminately, 
all of those fallen at Roncevaux, Franks and Saracens alike. Whereas at line
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119 Charles appears in the narrative as sign without need of interpretation -  if 
anyone seeks him, there is no need to point him ou t...’ (S’est kel demandet, 
ne I’estoet enseigner...)— then ‘un-inked’, one might say, with the blood of 
direct combat, here we find Monjoie replete with the full history of the battle 
against the Saracens before during and after Roncevaux. The blood o f 
remembrance imbues Monjoie and so, too, it imbues the name of 
Charlemagne.
In conclusion, let us reconstruct an archeology o f the sign Monjoie such 
as we find it at the end of the conflict between Saracens and Franks. The 
ori'eflambe, the war cry ‘textualized’ as Charles' war banner, swathes Joyeuse, 
having replaced Durendal as the sole instrument o f historical inscription, which 
in turn encases the point of the sword reputed to have pierced the body of 
Christ. These circles within a circle all circumscribe an absent body which, 
according to the most immediate reading of textual description, would seem to 
be the unnamed body of Christ
Asez savum de la lance parler,
Ount nostre Sire fut en la cruiz nasfret
Carles en ad la mure, mercit Deu... (II. 2503 - 05)
(We could say a good deal about the Lance
With which Our Lord was wounded on the Cross;
Charles has its point thanks be to God...)
But the profane nature o f the text such as we have seen it over the course of 
this discussion leads us to suspect the possibility o f yet another exchange, an 
exchange of something sacred for something profane; Charles is in need o f a 
material referent for his sign without locus. Remembering that Monjoie has 
covered over the name that is divine in its association with Rome {Romaine), it
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is more than a little curious that this same name Romain should be the very 
name of the church into which Charles has placed the bodies of the only three 
among all the fallen at Roncevaux to receive ‘proper1 burial: Turpin, Oliver and 
Roland. If one allows for a confluence between Mojoie and Romaine by virtue 
of their shared name, then one finds only these three peers named at the 
center o f Charles’ sign. They are there, buried at the heart o f this church, far 
from the center and, perhaps one might add, from the active remembrance of 
Charles’ seat o f authority at Aix. But just as Christ was said to have had a 
resurrection and in this way to have disappeared from the grave after death, 
so, too, the pilgrim might have doubts about the covered remains o f these 
three bodies placed, after all, in that enclosure which consumes all flesh, the 
blancs sarcous into which the bodies o f Turpin, Olivier and Roland have been 
placed. The only physical trace of Roland remains at another place of 
monumentalization ‘Upon the alter o f noble Saint Seurin’... (Desur I’a lter seint 
Sevrin le baron, line 3685). Here the instrument o f Roland’s voice par 
excellence rests a silent cipher, like a single, now unintelligible letter that has 
fallen from the forgotten alphabet of an extinct language. The rhetorical 
covering written over the surface of Roland’s horn, the olifant, has fallen into 
pieces upon the ground during Roland's last kill at Roncevaux. Its letters have 
been replaced by a pure gold that, cruelly, is meant to at once to fill the horn’s 
cavity and to silence its voice:
Met I'oliphan plein d'or e de manguns:
Li pelerin le veient ki la vunt (II. 3686 - 86)
(He places the oliphant, filled with gold and with mangons,
Pilgrims who visit the place still see it)
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OUTLAWS
On the surface o f things, it appears as though conflict within the Roland 
can be determined by an ever extending set o f pairings: Roland versus 
Ganelon; Charlemagne versus Baligant; Saracen versus Frank; Christian 
versus Pagan, and so forth. But these ‘contests’ merely reflect a much 
greater underlying division from which all other difference emanates. The 
partitioning o f the text into two narrative panels o f near equal length— one 
ending with the announcement o f the death o f Roland (I. 2397), the other 
beginning with Charlemagne’s return (I. 2398)— provides tangible limits to two 
distinct worlds, and, as we shall see, separate laws govern the make up o f 
their respective social, political and military institutions. The unrelenting 
course o f transition between these two worlds, one, moribund, whose laws 
have become dysfunctional, and the other which has yet to obtain the validity 
o f its own structuring principles, becomes the source o f a violence out of 
which all struggle within the Roland narrative originates.
The movement from one narrative unit to the next, from one world to 
the other, can be described as a process o f translation. From 'honor’s ruin,’ o f 
which the ultimate expression is the death o f Roland and the loss o f the
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French at Roncevaux, will derive the absolute prerogative o f the emperor’s 
right, his dreiture. How Charlemagne carries the French, how for that matter, 
the text carries the reader, from failed honor to dreiture will be the focus o f this 
essay. I proceed with an examination o f five scenes, each of which 
demonstrates a significant advance in the transition from the ‘old order,’ of 
which Roland is the exemplum, to the new. They are the council of Saracens 
(II. 10-95); the council o f Franks (II. 96-365); the oratorical dispute between 
Oliver and Roland over the return o f Charlemagne (II. 1722 - 36 and II. 1851 - 
68); the burial o f the Franks, the battle with Baligant and the consequent 
rejuvenation o f the emperor (lines 2845 - 3682); and the conversion of the 
French to the emperor’s dreiture during the trial o f Ganelon (II. 3751 - ff.). 
Through each o f these scenes a single paradigm will continue to replicate 
itself, one that Blancandrin, the subtle Saracen negotiator, establishes during 
the council o f Saracens. There he puts forth a rhetorical construct that makes 
it possible to displace individual figures o f social and political authority, 
principally Baligant and Charlemagne, with the absolute authority of an 
abstracted law. In attacking the protective bonds of vassal allegiance (the 
basis of honor) Blancandrin ‘frees’ men to turn their allegiance to the 
sovereign state and ultimately to become the subjects o f the emperor’s, that is 
to say Charlemagne’s, dreiture. It begins with the Saracen council and with 
Blancandrin’s ingenious proposal.
There is no word to better describe the situation o f the Saracens at the 
opening of the Roland than desperate. After seven years of warfare against 
the invading Franks they take refuge in their last stronghold, Saragossa,
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attending the enemy’s final assault. Their protector, the emir Baligant, has 
been absent despite repeated pleas for a return. Despairing o f his aid at this 
critical moment, the Saracen stand ready to abandon their allegiance to lord 
and to godhead. It is under these circumstances that Marsile convenes his 
barons to council and that Blancandrin, described by the text as a good 
chevalier and among the wisest of Saracens, delivers a proposal that aims to 
reverse their ill fortune.
In place o f Baligant and the ‘pagan’ gods, Blancandrin would pretend to 
substitute Charlemagne and the ‘law of the Christians’ as the supreme 
authority of the realm. In so doing, he appears to carry through on what we 
later learn has been a threat o f long standing. From the first year o f combat, 
Marsile, the embattled Saracen king, sought protection out o f Babylon from 
the emir Baligant. The failure of response and the absence o f necessary 
reinforcements has already led Marsile to consider an accord with 
Charlemagne, one that would, presumably, have brought about an 
unencumbered transfer o f allegiance from the absent Baligant to the emperor 
Charlemagne (lines 2413 - 21). Blancandrin’s treaty, however, proves further 
reaching than this. It sees this failure o f protection and support as something 
not individual, but systemic; it recognizes that not merely Baligant, but that the 
very gods are themselves at fault. Accordingly, his treaty exploits an already 
existent corruption o f the law. Where the word honur appears, shame is 
understood; where service to one’s lord and protection o f one’s dependents 
are promised, betrayal is implied. The following verses disclose the outlines 
of his proposal:
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“En ceste tere ad asez osteiet 
En France, ad Ais, s en deit ben repairer.
Vos le sivrez a la feste seint Michel,
Si recevrez la lei de chrestiens,
Serez ses hom par honur e par ben.
S’en volt ostages, e vos Ten enveiez,
U dis u vint, pur lui afiancer.
Enveiuns i les filz de noz muillers:
Par num d’ocire i enveierai le men.
Asez est meiz qu’il i perdent 16 chefs 
Que nus perduns I’onur ne la deintet,
Ne nus seiuns cunduiz a mendeier!” (II. 35 - 46)
(‘[Say that] He has campaigned long enough in this country.
That he ought to repair to Aix, in France.
Tell him you will follow him there at the feast of S t Michael,
That you will receive the law of the Christians,
Be his man through lands and through goods.
Send him hostages, if he should demand surety.
Ten or twenty of them, by way of guarantee.
Let us send him the sons of our wives:
Though it means that he will be killed, I will send him my own son.
Far better that they should loose their heads 
Than that we should loose our honor and our offices,
Grant that we may never be brought to beggary!’)
What is striking about this treaty is that it replicates the error it pretends to 
correct. At lines 36 - 39, Blancandrin merely proposes a transfer o f allegiance 
from one long absent lord, Baligant, to another; Charlemagne, who resides in 
far away Aix, will prove just as absent and in that absence just as ineffectual 
with respect to the Saracen community in Spain.1 W hat is more, in lieu of the 
Saracens who have already perished as a result o f Baliganfs failure, a failure 
o f their gods and laws to protect them, Blancandrin proposes to set aside his 
own host o f martyrs in the persons o f the ‘sons of our wives’ (II. 40 - 43). He 
offers their lives not in witness to an emerging order or to unity between 
Christian and Saracen under Charlemagne and the ‘law of the Christians’... 
(la le i de chrestiens), but as final proof that the existing order has become 
wholly bankrupt. In this opening scene o f the Roland, Blancandrin alerts the
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reader to the failure o f honur, to the conditions in which the promise of 
allegiance between vassal and lord has already lapsed into meaninglessness.
That the treaty put forth by Blancandrin should seem credible, that for 
practical considerations, for the protection of ‘state,’ it could possibly effect an 
en masse transfer o f allegiance from Baligant to Charlemagne already signals 
to the reader how slight are the differences o f the social and political 
structures between the realm of the Saracen and the realm o f the Frank. The 
logic of Blancandrin’s proposal demonstrates an appreciation o f this very 
powerful truth: as ‘bon chevalier' ( - De vasselage fut asez chevaler, line 25)— 
we can see that Blancandrin, and so the Saracens at large, are only one 
remove from being ‘bon chr6tien’ as well; the ‘law of the Christian’ and the ‘law 
of the feudal lord’ are spoken of here as one and the same. When first the 
reader encounters lines 38 and 39, nothing suggests that these verses should 
be read in any other way than in paratactic relation to one another; in other 
words, that line 38 and line 39 present two distinct and independent 
propositions. Line 38 states plainly that the Saracens should convert to the 
law of the Christians; line 39 that they should swear allegiance to 
Charlemagne. Notwithstanding, the subsequent text supplies ample evidence 
to argue in favor o f a hypotactic reading of these lines with the result that 
honur—the observance of vassal obligations (cf.: I. 39)— and the adherence to 
la le i de chrestiens (I. 38) are found to represent one and the same thing. 
Thus, we can infer a certain ethic from these verses when read hypotactically: 
conversion to ‘Christianity’ entails an obligation to service in arms. I cite three 
examples prominent in their support o f such a reading.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first is taken from a passage that we will examine in greater detail 
later in this paper. Roland, at lines 1854 - 59, eulogizing the French who have 
lost their lives at Roncevaux, comes as close as a mortal can in granting these 
‘martyrs’ paradise in recompense for their loyal service to lord (Charlemagne) 
and peer (Roland). In fighting bravely, so goes the logic o f Roland’s 
reasoning, the French chevalier have earned their heavenly reward and the 
good chevalier is thus granted a ‘fie f in heaven.’ W e see this again in a 
promise made by the archbishop Turpin at the commencement of battle when
he exhorts the French: Confess your sins, ask God’s mercy!/................/  ‘You
will find your places in the great paradise’ (“Clamez vos culpes, s i preiez
Deu m erc it!/............... JSieges avrez e l greignor parei's” II. 1132 and 1135).
Here too the ‘law of the Christians’ and the ‘law of the chevalier’ inter-reflect 
so as to become scarcely distinguishable one from the other.
In a separate incident Turpin bids farewell to the fallen at Roncevaux 
even while contemplating the significance of his own approaching death; here 
the juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane are seen in still greater 
contrast. Below Turpin addresses a ‘prayer1 to the lifeless bodies that a 
diligent Roland has gathered round him:
Apr&s ad dit “Mare fustes, seignurs!
Tutes voz anmes ait Deus li Glorius!
En pareTs les metet en sentes flurs!
La meie mort me rent si anguissus!
Ja ne verrai le riche empereQr.” (II. 2195 - 99)
(Afterward he said: ‘Lords, it was your great misfortune!
May the glorious God have all your souls!
In paradise, may he place them on holy flowers!
My own death causes me such anguish!
I will never again see the powerful emperor!’)
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Turpin’s response admits to a certain reticence o f belief; he conceives of 
death principally, if not exclusively, in terms o f an irrecoverable loss. In the 
utterance ‘Lords, it was your great misfortune!’ { ‘Mare fustes, seignursf), 
hardly the suitable beginning for a prayer commending to God the souls o f the 
dead, Turpin courts blasphemy. Similarly, faced with his own moment of 
dying, Turpin all but declares himself a non-believer. In the final moments of 
life in place of a union with the almighty he is concerned with only the 
perpetual absence of his protecting lord, the absence o f ’the powerful 
emperor1 (7e riche empereur). As the ‘le i de chrestiens' and the ‘le i de 
chevalier* seem to collapse into one another Turpin is seen vacillating 
between two perpetually absent masters, Deus li Glorius and Charlemagne; 
neither will be able to secure either him or the French from the death 
impending at Roncevaux.
Events in the Saracen camp provide yet a third example of the 
intertwining of divine and worldly authorities, again with particular regard to 
their failures. At lines 2580 - 2604, the Saracens are seen cursing their 
godheads, their idols, casting them into a pit and swearing that Baligant 
himself is a coward if he does not return to avenge the humiliations suffered at 
Roncevaux. By these actions, placing blame indiscriminately on Baligant and 
the gods alike, the Saracens demonstrate a virtual synonymy between the 
‘law of the Christians’ and the ‘law o f the Chevaliers;’ neither has afforded the 
protection implicitly promised. With this we are now only a small step away 
from recognizing that the same judgement passed by the Saracens upon 
Baligant and the ‘pagan’ gods can now be turned in judgement upon
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Charlemagne and the ‘le i de crestiens.’ W ithout distinction o f allegiance to 
whatever lord or whatever law, all will die at Roncevaux. The failure of both 
laws in both realms, as pointed out by Blancandrin at lines 38 - 39, is seen 
simply and ultimately as a failure of honur.
Blancandrin’s proposition takes honur into account as the dynamics of 
a law operating on two intersecting social planes. On the one hand, there 
exists the obligation between vassal and lord characterized a t lines 38 - 39 as 
that service which the Saracen pretend to offer Charlemagne; on the other 
hand, there are the obligations of mutual aid among peers —blatantly violated 
by the tenor o f Blancandrin’s proposal at lines 40 - 46. By the spurious 
promise o f allegiance to Charlemagne at lines 38 - 39 and the abandonment 
of kin at lines 44 - 46, it is made plain that honur is held to be wholly in default. 
The sense of Biancandrin’s proposition within these latter verses, that fathers 
should purchase lost honur with the blood of their sons, demonstrates that the 
very concept o f honur has been turned on its head. The obligation to protect 
one’s peers gives way to the decision that will allow for the destruction of 
one’s closest dependents ‘the sons o f our w ives...’ ( ‘es filz de noz muillers). 
And yet this seemingly nonsensical proposition is better understood if we 
compare lines 44 - 45 with a close variant that crops up a few  lines on within 
the text:
“Asez est melz qu’il i perdent 16 chefs
Que nus perduns I’onur ne la deintet..." (II. 44 - 45)
(‘Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose our lands and our offices’)
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‘Asez est mielz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele...’ (II. 58 - 59)
('Far better that they should loose their heads
Than that we should loose fair Spain, the beautiful.')
The very evident syntactical symmetry o f these lines, so proximate one 
another within the text, would seem to suggest a kinship of both form and 
sense, that the quest for personal honur and Blancandrins’ ‘pursuit o f shining 
‘Espaigne, la bele’ might be considered as readily interchangeable goals. In 
case o f point, this is not a defensible reading. Conceptually, honur and 
deintet are shown to function within the text in relation to an intricate 
interdependency o f mutual obligations and responsibilities among individual 
subjects. This stands squarely in opposition to the notion o f ‘clere Espaigne, 
la bele,’ or o f ‘France dulce’ for that matter, as political constructs whose 
coming into existence necessitates the eradication o f the very principles of 
mutual support that form the underpinnings o f feudal social organization. 
Blancandrin proposes not an equivalency between honur and ‘state’ but an 
exchange: individual honur will be replaced by an all-encompassing law to 
which the subject will be solely and directly responsible. Blancandrin has 
foreseen that obligations between vassal and lord and among peers have 
been reduced to a matter o f only secondary importance. He aims to sweep 
aside the old and weakened order based on feudal ties.2 Still, those who 
engage with him in this, engage in outlawry, in a general repudiation of the 
standing law, an act that will soon bring about a violence o f cataclysmic 
proportion.
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Blancandrin’s proposal offers to bring together Saracen and Frank by 
creating a single position of authority at the pinnacle o f their combined worlds 
(cf.: II. 38 - 39), a position, for the moment at least, marked only by traces of 
the variously absent Baligant, Charlemagne and Deus. A danger lies in the 
fact that during the transition to this newly fabricated structure of social and 
political organization their world remains essentially lawless. As he presents 
Biancandrin's treaty to the Frankish chevaliers for deliberation in council, 
Charlemagne reiterates the conditions o f ‘conversion,’ while at the same time 
cautiously raising the specter of an undisclosed anarchy:
“II me sivrat ad Ais, a mun estage,
Si recevrat la nostre lei plus salve;
Chrestiens ert, de mei tendrat ses marches;
Mais jo ne sai quels en est sis curages.”
Dient Franceis: “II nus i cuvent guarde!” (II. 188 -192)
('He will follow me to Aix, to my residence,
There he will receive our law most salutary;
He will become Christian, from me he will hold his marches as fiefs.
But I do not know what is in his heart’
Say the French: 'We should be cautious!')
Though a cursory review of the above lines may suggest that the pending 
conversion to Christianity (line 190) and the promise o f fealty to Charlemagne 
(line 189) might still be considered as separate events, a closer examination 
reveals that, as with Blancandrin before him, the emperor likewise proffers a 
fusion of the worldly and the divine. If, as we have seen (II. 38 - 39), 
acceptance of /a le i de chrestiens leads to a service in arms, here acceptance 
of the emperor’s law —nostre lei— renders the oath taker ‘Christian’ -e r t 
chrestiens. Thus there appears to be only one law though it goes by several 
names: la le i de chrestiens; la le i de chevalier; or, what amounts to the same 
thing, simply honur. Beyond the mere acceptance or refusal o f a Saracen
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conversion, the council o f Franks will be called upon to determine its own
willingness to redefine itself according to a new law —nostre le i plus salve—; 
one that will bring together not just two worlds but the multiplicity o f feudal 
communities under the aegis o f a single master.
Concluding the treaty’s summary with a focus on questions of intent —
mais jo  ne sai quels ert est sis curages— the emperor prompts vague
suspicion among the Franks (I. 192). They reply chorus-like -D ien t Francois:
il nus i  cuvent guardel— as though struck by some foreboding that reaches far
beyond a simple mistrust o f Marsile. Taking his cue from their response,
Roland instructs the Franks on the nature o f their own fears. More
threatening than the failure o f the Saracens to abide by the terms o f their
guileful treaty would be for the common discourse among the Franks to lapse
into complete meaninglessness. Roland translates this absence of truth from
the language of common discourse into a call for unbridled violence:
II dist al rei: “Ja mar crerez Marsilie!
Set anz ad pleins qu’en Espaigne venimes;
Je vos cunquis e Noples e Commibles,
Pris ai Vaiteme e la tere de Pine 
E Balasgued e Tuele e Sezilie:
Li reis Marsilie i fist mult que traltre.
De ses paiens enveiat quinze,
Chascuns portout une branche d’olive;
Nuncerent vos cez paroles meTsme.
A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de voz cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L'un fut Basan e li altres Basilies;
Les chef en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.
Faites la guer cum vos I’avez enprise,
En Sarraguce menez vostre ost banie,
Metez le sege a tute vostre vie,
Si vengez cels que li feis fist ocire!” (II. 196 - 213)
(He said to the king: ‘Believe Marsile at your peril!
It has been seven full years since we first came to Spain;
For you I have conquered both Noples and Commibles,
I have captured Vaiteme and the land of Pine
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And Balaguer and Tudela and Sezille:
King Marsile was every bit the traitor.
He sent fifteen of his pagans.
Each bearing an olive branch;
They spoke to you these same words.
You took council of your French,
They counseled you foolishly.
You sent two of your nobles to the pagan.
One was Basan and the other Basilie;
He took their heads on the hill by Haltille.
Make war as you have begun it
Lead your army you have summoned to Saragossa,
Lay siege there for all your life, if need be.
Avenge those whom the felon has killed!')
Roland rebukes the French, reminding them that Marsile's is a discourse with 
which they are already fam iliar (I. 204), one in which they have already made 
inscription (I. 205). Bad faith on the part o f the Saracens conspiring with the 
imperfect judgement o f the French has produced the bankruptcy o f language 
endemic to both camps. From this point onward, in Roland’s estimation, the 
council of chevaliers can lead to nothing good. To discover the path from a 
universal failure o f language to universal vengeance in arms, the reader must 
follow Roland in the inherently cyclical structure of his argument.
Roland’s narration, from conquest (II. 198-200) to negotiations (II. 201 -
204) to betrayal (II. 205 - 206) to vengeance (II. 210 - 213), has the semblance 
of a reconstruction of events following the logic o f a straightforward, 
uncomplicated chronological order. Likewise, it would appear as though, from 
the beginning, the motivation for warfare against the Saracens has remained 
constant and without change or interruption. This illusion o f linear chronology 
serves to obscure two important facts. Firstly, that this passage (II. 196-213) 
accounts for not one but two cycles o f events, one past and one future, that 
turn on betrayal and vengeance— the past cycle terminating in the deaths o f
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Basan and Basilie, the future cycle to end in the death of Roland and the 
French at Roncevaux. Secondly, that from at least as early as the betrayal of 
Basan and Basilie, a logic different from that of the Franks under 
Charlemagne has motivated the actions of Roland and those Franks under his 
own command. From the account given at lines 196 - 213 we can in all 
reconstruct three possible sequences of events.
If we choose to read lines 197 - 213 as the representation of events in 
strict linear succession, then it follows that Marsile had been pressured to sue 
for peace (II. 201 - 204) only as a direct consequence of Roland’s numerous 
successes in battle (II. 198 - 200). There are obstacles to an acceptance of 
this sequence of events. From textual evidence, we determine that Roland’s 
conquests listed at lines 198 - 200, at least in so far as they are motivated by 
vengeance, do not precede but postdate Marsile’s initial betrayal. At line 197 
Roland signals to the reader: ‘It has been seven full years since we first 
arrived in Spain.’ Hence within the ongoing struggle between Saracens and 
French the conquests listed at lines 197 - 200 do not culminate in Marsile’s 
first petition for peace, rather, the petition serves as an interruption within the 
otherwise continuous series o f events. That interruption takes on an enduring 
reality as the French under Roland become infused with an augmented sense 
o f vengeance as a result o f the betrayal of Basan and Basilie. If at line 210 
Roland urges the French to ‘Make war as you have begun it’ he concludes the 
period at line 213 now instructing them to ‘avenge those [Basan and Basilie] 
whom the felon [Marsile] has killed,’ as though from the outset the conflict 
between Saracen and French had its origins in a vengeance justifiable in
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terms of Marsile’s treachery. In this way Roland revisits the ‘beginnings’ of 
conflict between Saracen and French, supplanting, anachronistically, the 
original drive to impose the ‘law of the Christians’ upon Saracen Spain with a 
desire for ‘meritorious’ vengeance.
The apparent linear chronology of events as they are lain out at lines 
197 - 213 gives way under examination to the cyclical narration that can be 
recounted as follows: At some unspecified moment Marsile sees fit to sue for 
peace (II. 201 - 203); the French consider his proposal and acquiesce (II. 204 -
205); as a result, Charlemagne sends the emissaries Basan and Basilie to the 
Saracens, who murder them (II. 207 - 209); only then do Roland and the 
French seek vengeance against the Saracens as reported at lines 198 - 200. 
The list of conquests with which Roland begins his oration, assuming that 
they, too, have been motivated by vengeance (cf.: II. 210 - 13), stands in last 
place among events as they actually occur -th is  premise is anachronous. 
Hence, the conclusion of this first ‘narrative round’ (II. 197 - 200) takes us 
back to the beginning, to the return of Marsile attempting for a second time to 
negotiate, treacherously, o f course, an end to hostilities. Unlike the 
circumstances surrounding his prior mission for peace, the process is now 
encumbered by a contingent, Roland and his Franks, charged with the desire 
to avenge. Roland, we remember, urges Charlemagne to disband council and 
to bring vengeance swiftly home to Saragossa. But Charlemagne remains 
hesitant; unlike Roland and his followers, the forces under the emperor as yet 
remain ‘innocent’ o f the desire for vengeance. When the Franks under 
Charlemagne finally do embrace vengeance as a motivation for warfare, it will
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not be for the sake o f Basan and Basilie, but in remembrance of those who 
are soon to die at Roncevaux. Thus, Roland displaces the motive of 
vengeance onto both a reconstructed past -th e  initial arrival o f the Franks in 
Spain— and a fiction o f future events -th e  coming massacre o f the Franks at 
Roncevaux.3
We might now postulate yet a second future’ narrative cycle, one that 
proleptically ‘converts’ the Franks under Charlemagne to Roland's manner o f 
warfare as act-of-vengeance. To paraphrase Roland at line 210, they, too, 
[Charlemagne and the Franks who return to Roncevaux from Cize] must 
‘continue the war as they [Roland and the Franks] have begun it.’ This 
proleptic narrative arrangement follows the same order as the chronologically 
first (past) cycle of warfare; only this time in the present and future tense. 
Marsile's present messengers are none other than Blancandrin with his 
current suite o f retainers (II. 201 - 03). For a second time, Charlemagne’s 
‘French’ —vos Franceis— will consider and ultimately acquiesce to Marsile’s 
proposal (I. 204 - 05); at Roncevaux, the Franks under Roland will come to 
stand proxy in slaughter for Basan and Basilie (207 - 09; also, cf.: 3016 - 17). 
The final conquest o f Saragossa will now be led not by Roland, but by 
Charlemagne and ‘his French’ (vos Franceis), who by this time are imbued 
with the Rolandian spirit o f vengeance -he re  one could say that lines 197 - 
200 and 210-213 overlap in such a way as to suggest that the chronology of 
the narrative cycle has attained a certain textual materiality). Whereas a t the 
end o f the first cycle, the motivation for violence adheres to the names Basan 
and Basilie, during the second cycle —that in which Charlemagne and his
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Franks repurchase ‘France dulce’ after the loss at Roncevaux— the spirit of
vengeance attaches to the name Roland.
At line 277, Ganelon is the first to rebuff Roland’s sermon of vengeance 
and he does so in a single phrase. Speaking to Charlemagne, Ganelon 
declares: “He does not care by what death we die” ( ‘/S/e li chalt, sire, de quel 
mort nus m uriuns/1. 277). This is the first sally in a defense that, by council’s 
end, will place Ganelon squarely on the side o f the law based on vassal ties o f 
mutual obligation, that is to say on the side o f a rapidly failing honur. Unlike 
Roland, who operates as something of a free agent at the head of a vast 
number o f vassal dependents, Ganelon sees his allegiance split between two 
vassalic obligations: duty to clan and duty to the larger feudal community. 
Chosen as emissary on an almost certainly fatal mission to the Saracens, 
Ganelon offers his life for the common good on the provision that 
Charlemagne grant assurances regarding the continued safety o f the property 
and kin left behind in death:
‘En Sarraguce sai ben qu’aler m'estoet 
Horn ki la vait repairer ne s’en poet 
Ensurquetut si ai jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels n'en estoet,
Co est Baldewin,” go dit, ‘ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.
Guadez le ben, ja nel verrai des oilz.”
Cartes respunt “Tro avez tendre coer.
Puis quel comant, aler vus en estoet” (II. 310-318)
(‘ I know well that I must hasten to Saraguce.
The man who goes there will not return.
To be sure, remember that your sister is my wife,
And that I have a son, there is none more beautiful 
Than Baldewin,” he said, ‘he will be a noble vassal.
To him I leave my ‘honors’ and fiefs.
Care for him well, I will not see him again with these eyes.”
Charles responds: ‘Your heart is too tender.
Since it is commanded, go as you are supposed to.”
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Staging this scene in the manner he does, Ganelon forces Charlemagne to 
deliberate publicly concerning an otherwise private matter; everyone present 
suddenly finds he has a personal interest in the outcome. By this 
determination, all will recognize either the potency or the impuissance o f the 
emperor's power and authority. Should Charlemagne deny Ganelon outright 
the protection he rightly demands this would be tantamount to announcing to 
all the Franks present that the very law thought to protect them no longer 
obtains.4
Ganelon’s request to Charlemagne comes on the heels of his offering 
himself up -unto death- as a paragon of public duty; he gives his life fo r the 
sake of his liege lord (II. 310 - 311). In the probable event o f his death, 
Ganelon petitions Charlemagne to guarantee the security o f his son and heir, 
Baldewin. The emperor's response, or lack thereof, will determine Ganelon’s 
actions from this point onward. Charlemagne demurs in silence to acquiesce 
to Ganelon’s petition. Interpreting this silence -Charlemagne deigns no 
answer— as a sign of the emperor’s own social/political impotence, Ganelon 
does not delay in taking upon himself what would otherwise have been the 
emperor’s responsibilities. When his men offer to accompany him to 
Saragossa, Ganelon has them instead turn back toward Aix to protect 
Baldewin and, in the case of Ganelon’s death, to swear oaths o f fealty to his 
sole remaining heir.
By the end o f council we see Ganelon’s honur in complete antithesis to 
the perversion of honor represented in Blancandrin’s proposal at lines 38 - 39 
and 4 4 -4 6 ;  Ganelon is both exemplary in service to his lord (Charlemagne)
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and loyal in his duty to kin. Vengeance, however, enters like a virus and 
destroys not only Ganelon, but also the order of law that has been the support 
and protection o f all feudal vassals. ‘His name is Baldewin' (I. 314); ‘I will 
never again see him with these eyes’ (I. 316); ‘You have too tender a heart’ (I. 
317) —already this passage hints at the future reward of Ganelon’s virtues — 
Tendre coer (evisceration); oilz -(blinding); Baldewin [baudoin - the male 
member] (dismemberment). The fact that by the end o f this council Ganelon 
comes to be seen as the outlaw and Roland emblematic o f virtue in arms is 
the surest sign that Blancandrin’s proposal, the original engine for vengeance 
at II. 38 - 39, has taken hold among the Franks.
Dismissing Ganelon, denying him safeguard of honor, property, and kin 
(II. 314 - 318), Charlemagne initiates the dissolution o f legal obligations 
between vassal and lord. Yet at the moment o f Roland’s departure at the 
head o f the rear guard en route to Roncevaux, Charlemagne seems to recant 
this vicious evolution in polity and offers to Roland the protection he had 
earlier withheld from Ganelon:
Li empereres apelet ses nigs Rollant 
“Bel sire nigs, or savez veirement 
Demi mun host vos lerrai en present 
Retenez les, go est vostre salvement”
Qo dit li quens: “Jo n’en ferai nient” (II. 783 - 87)
(The emperor calls to his nephew Roland:
“O gentle sir and nephew, know this truly 
I will now give over to you half my army.
Accept them, this will be your salvation.”
The count replied: “I will do no such thing.”
In his response, Roland again underscores the already dissolving ties o f 
feudal allegiance; no longer will Charlemagne enjoy the service-in-arms of 
Roland and the Franks. Much o f the ideological struggle among the Franks at
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Roncevaux turns on the issue o f whether Charlemagne and his ‘host1 should 
be called into the fray; whether or not, finally, the French should accept 
Charlemagne’s offer o f salvem ent Oliver, in vain, urges Roland to call for the 
emperor’s return. When his efforts fail to persuade, Oliver reproaches Roland 
with severity, summarizing many o f the same complaints Ganelon has 
elsewhere raised against Roland. Roland, however, refuses to seek the 
emperor’s return until the moment when it is clear that all is fost. In the larger 
scheme o f things, Roland and the Franks replicate the circumstances under 
which Basan and Basile die, only this time as victims o f a second and infinitely 
greater round of sacrifice. As such, they are to become the material 
witnesses' to and the motivating factor spurring on the narrative’s second 
round o f violence.
When Charlemagne finally returns to Roncevaux, he will return as the 
avenger. Meanwhile, as the Saracens appear on the horizon with obvious 
hostile intent, Oliver sees an opportunity to remind Roland of the emperor’s 
prior ‘offer o f salvation.’ Hearing o f the coming Saracen onslaught, however, 
Roland welcomes the news: ‘This should be good for out king’ (“Ben devums 
ce estre pur nostre re i,” I. 1009). A few lines down, Oliver makes a second 
attempt and perhaps with the thought that pride stands as an obstacle, Oliver 
offers Roland this face saving measure:
“Guenes le sout, li fel, li traltur,
Ki nus jugat devant I’emperereOr." (II. 1024 - 25)
(‘Ganelon knew it the felon traitor,
He condemned us before the Emperor.’)
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It is not his own fault, so Oliver explains to Roland, if the Franks find 
themselves in this fatal predicament, but the fault o f a treacherous Ganelon. 
Roland rejects outright the compromising solution o f a call for aid and 
reinforcements. An increasingly insistent Oliver, undeterred by Roland’s 
stubborn refusal o f his advice, now resorts to other means o f persuasion; to 
counting (I. 1040), and to underscoring the numerical impossibility o f survival 
without the Emperor's return (I. 1061). To this Roland responds by revealing, 
albeit obliquely, his true purposes in this a ffa ir
“Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort* (1.1058)
(‘I swear to you, all are judged to die.’)
“Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt a mort livrez." (1.1069)
(‘I swear to you, all will be delivered into death.’)
These lines evince erasure of all distinction between Saracens and Franks — 
all are judged, all will die, indiscriminately so, before the conflict has ended. 
This only corroborates Ganelon’s warning of line 227: ‘He does not care what
manner o f death we die’ (“Ne li chalt, sire, de quel mort nus murjuns.")
Finally, despite Oliver’s seeming incomprehensibility Roland spells out clearly 
his purposes:
Respunt Rollant “Mis talenz en est graigne.
“Ne placet Damnedeu ne ses angles 
Que ja pur mei perdet sa valur France!
Melz voeill murir que huntage me venget
Pur ben ferir I’emperere plus nos aimet“ (II. 1088 - 91)
(Roland replies: ‘Because of it my desire is all the greater.
’May it not please Our Lord God nor his angels
That through/for/because of me France should loose her value!
I would rather die (than) that he should avenge my shame.
The Emperor loves us all the more when we strike well.’)
Roland’s wishes will soon come to fruition: from death and shame suffered at 
Roncevaux arise the avenging deeds of the Emperor.
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When finally it is certain that the French will meet their doom then and 
only then, over Oliver’s objections, Roland sounds the olifant calling for 
Charlemagne’s return. It thus becomes clear that the harshest terms of 
Blancandrin’s contract, at least with respect to the ‘sons o f the Franks,' will 
soon be met. Evoking honur as it is defined within the context of 
Blancandrin’s proposal at line 39 Oliver announces that service to the 
Emperor is now in permanent default: ‘Charles the great will have no further 
aid from us’ (“Karfes li magnes, de nos n’avrat are,” I. 1732). Furthermore, 
Roland’s declaration at line 1863 - “Noble French, I see you die 
for/through/because o f me” ( ‘Barons franceis, pur mei vos vie munY)— 
resembles the perverse sacrifice prescribed by Blancandrin at lines 42 - 46, 
namely, that the ‘sons of our wives’ should be forfeited for the cause. In 
pendant orations, appropriately situated within the narrative, one to either side 
of the passage that describes the Emperor’s return, Oliver and Roland 
pronounce upon the meaning of the impending death of the Franks at 
Roncevaux. Oliver judges their death in terms o f the massive loss of vassal 
allegiance to be suffered by Charlemagne; Roland, on the other hand, views 
these deaths in terms of an occasion of glorious commemoration. Despite 
their divergent view points, one thing Roland and Oliver offer in common is the 
means by which Charlemagne will ultimately translate the violent world o f 
feudal allegiance into a world where there exists an infinitely more stable 
system o f social and political organization.
Oliver’s words inadvertently foreshadow the emergence of the ‘future’ 
divine justice, one under which Charlemagne will enjoy a flourishing renewal:
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Qo dist Roilant “Porquei me portez ire?"
E ii respont “Cumpainz, voz le felstes,
Kar vasselage par sens nen est folie;
Mielz valt mesure que ne fait estultie.
Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karlon de nus n'avrat servise.
Sem creTsez, venuz i fust mi sire;
Ceste bataille oQsum [faite u prise];
U pris u mort i fust li reis Marsilie.
Vostre proecce, Roilant, mar la velmes!
Karies le Magnes de nos n’avrat ale.
N’ert mais tel home d6s qu’a Deu julse.
Vos i murrez e France en ert hunie.
Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaignie:
Einz le vespre mult ert gref la departie.” (II. 1722 - 36)
(Thus says Roland: “Why are you so angry with me?’
And he answers: “Friend, you have done ii
For vassalage by reason is not folly;
Just measure is better than foolishness.
The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us in service.
Had you trusted me, my lord would have come by now;
We would have had this battle and won against the enemy;
He would have king Marsile either captured or dead.
Your prowess, Roland, it is our curse!
Charies-the-great will have no further aid from us.
Never will there be such a man until God has His justice.
You will die here and France will be shamed.
Here we have failed the loyal company:
He will witness great sorrow before the evening.’)
Though he is not mentioned by name, Ganelon’s presence haunts this 
harangue leveled at Roland. Through a series o f intra-textual allusions, Oliver 
has successfully tapped into Ganelon’s complaint. The words “Vos 
f(orsf)ei'stes” at line 1723 anticipates what will become Ganelon’s key defense 
during his trial: “Roland has forfeited our allegiance in both gold and in
chattel”...... (Roilant me forfist en o r e en aveir, ” I. 3758). But this same
accusation of forfeiture has additional resonance in that it carries Roland’s 
name back to an earlier event that marks rupture within the community o f 
Franks, namely, the Emperor’s original failure to guarantee protection to the 
property and heirs o f Ganelon (cf.: II. 310 - 22). There Ganelon declares to
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Charlemagne: ‘Sir...Roland has done all these things’ (“Sire go ad tut fait
Roilant,” I. 322). Roland’s forfeiture reflects the social instability that derives 
from his condition of being without father, and so to being without claim to his 
own legitimate inheritance. It is only natural that Ganelon should suspect 
Roland, his own stepson who is also nephew to the emperor, at the moment 
when Charlemagne sends Ganelon on that deadly mission to negotiate with 
the Saracens. W hat other reasons could the emperor have to refuse 
assurances concerning the wealth and the safety o f his only heir except to 
favor Roland to the detriment o f Baldewin. There is a sense in which this very 
personal forfeiture, one o f birth, causes Roland to become a threat to Ganelon 
and a general menace among the Franks.5
At lines 1724-25, by mention of the words folie and estultie, Oliver 
implicates Roland in the same dangers of excess as did Ganelon in an earlier 
passage. We recall line 228 where Ganelon warns o f Roland: ‘It is not right 
that pridefui counsel should increase.’ (“cunseill d ’orguill n ’est dreiz que a plus 
munt.) But it is in bringing this resume of blame to a close that Oliver 
conjures up the word legerie, a word that is, within the Roland, consistently 
associated with violence and reprisals. We compare with the legerie of 
Olivier’s oration these earlier verses:
“A vos Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie..." (II. 205 - 206)
(‘You took counsel of your French about this,
They counseled you foolishly.')
We infer from these lines spoken by Roland to Charlemagne that the 
breakdown in the code o f honor, particularly as an agreement o f mutual
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protection, has become systemic. It accuses not just Marsile and the 
Saracens but, in point of fact, Roland traces the first infraction o f the law to 
the French themselves: they offered Charlemagne suspicious counsel, 
“Something that smacks o f foolishness” {‘alques de legerie’) and he accepted. 
In this way, neither Charlemagne nor the French themselves are innocent of 
the original act o f violence —that o f the murder o f Basan and Basile— that has 
led to the breakdown o f social order.
In an even more prominent use of the word legerie, Ganelon, 
announcing at line 300 his defiance of Roland and the French - “I will play my 
own bit o f foolishness” (E inz i  fra i un poi de legerie)— indicates a serious rift in 
the social fabric. Technically, Ganelon exculpates himself from the recurrent 
charge o f treason by stating his defiance o f Roland plainly and before all. 
Nonetheless, he, too, unsuspectingly contributes to the rapid erosion of the 
ties binding peers to peers and vassal to lord by adducing just one more 
instance -between Roland and him self- of how the feudal allegiance has 
begun to loose all value. Ironically, this collapse of feudal order will give rise 
to a new and, to Ganelon at least, unfamiliar law; one that will, ultimately, 
allow for the charge of treason to be brought against him. Lastly, the charge 
made by Oliver against Roland - “The French are dead by your foolishness” 
( ‘Franceis sunt mort par vostre legerie)— is far more serious than any charge 
that could legitimately be brought against Ganelon under the dictates o f feudal 
law. Roland has acted furtively6 in bringing about the death of the Franks, and 
murder by ruse is, under feudal law, a more heinous crime, one branding the 
perpetrator as outlaw. In his accusation o f Roland, Oliver then places upon
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him a measure o f blame surpassing that o f all others who might likewise have 
been culpable o f legerie.
Having thoroughly fixed blame, Oliver next details the consequences of 
Roland’s ‘forfeiture’, and it reads like a checklist for the fulfillment o f 
Blancandrin’s contractual bargain. The Franks at Roncevaux cease to provide 
Charles (Kariun) with service in arms (cf: II. 38 - 39), and the ‘loyal company’ 
(la leial cumpainie), those who stand ready to give their lives in service to their 
ford, have been abandoned to sacrifice (cf.: II. 40 - 46). The edifice of the old 
law, sen/ice to one’s lord and mutual protection among peers, crumbles. And 
yet, within the gloom of Oliver’s judgement, we spy this unexpected and 
auspicious prophecy. When, with apparent resignation, Oliver states that 
There won’t be another such man [Charlemagne] until the last (God’s)
judgement’ (N’ert mais te l home des qu’a Deu ju ise ), his lament only
foretells o f the Emperor's coming ‘rebirth’. At the trial o f Ganelon, God’s 
judgement turns in the Emperor’s favor, returning power and authority to 
Charlemagne so that he might become ‘the new man.’
Cryptically, at I. 1733, Oliver has given a preview o f what will become 
perhaps the most significant development o f the post-Roncevaux narration: 
the fact that God’s judgement will not only supersede the judgment o f men, it 
will also determine the success or failure o f those deeds, Roland’s own, that 
through combat in arms have been productive o f the geste . Meanwhile, in a 
subsequent laisse, Roland lays the groundwork for the establishment o f a new 
relation between subject and lord, and between subject and law:
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Roilant reguardet es munz e es lariz;
De cels de France i veit tanz morz gesir,
E il les pluret cum chevaler gentill:
“Seignors barons, de vos ait Deus mercit!
Tutes voz anmes otreit il pareTs!
En saintes flurs il les facet gesir!
Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m'avez servit,
A oes Carton si granz paTs cunquis!
Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!
Tere de France, mult estes dulz pars,
Oi desertet [a tant rubostl exill].
Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir 
Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantir;
Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!
Oliver, frere, vos ne dei jo faillir.
De doel murra, s'aitre ne m'i ocit
Sire cumpainz, alum i referir!” (II. 1851 - 68)
(Roland looks toward the mountains and hills.
There he sees lying dead so many of the French,
And he laments them with the tears of a gentle lord:
‘Noble barons, may God grant you mercy!
May He grant all your souls paradise!
May He cause them to lie among holy flowers!
Better vassals than you I have never seen.
You have for so long served me at all times.
Through you Charles has conquered such great countries!
The emperor has nourished you for nothing!
Land of France, it is a sweet country,
You are deserted [by such a terrible exile]
Noble Frenchmen, for me I see you dying:
I cannot give you protection;
May God, who never did lie, should help/have you!
Oliver, brother, I should not fail you.
I will die of grief, if another does not kill me.
My noble companion, let us go and strike again!')
Roland does not dispute the blame; rather, he resigns himself to the center o f 
crisis, though without going so far as to accept the opprobrium implied from  
Oliver’s harangue at lines 1722 - 36. Roland begins his address precisely 
where Oliver’s left off, with the death of the French, with the default o f ‘la le ia l 
cumpaignie.’ Roland’s eulogy for the fallen, like that o f Turpin (II. 2195 - 99), 
shows a strange mixture o f the sacred and the profane. Roland allots 
heavenly fiefs, -pa(re)fs— for the conquest o f earthly kingdoms -pars. In so 
doing, he usurps one o f the Emperor’s greatest sources o f power and
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authority, the privilege o f awarding lands and movable wealth to those o f his 
vassals who are successful in arms. The absurdity o f this claim to reward 
(after all the French are dead) finds its logic in the fact that Roland now has 
the opportunity to demonstrate that the French die Tor his sake’...(upu r mei 
vos vei m urir” I. 1863). The Emperor will have his own reasons for making 
similar assertions when, at line 2937, he will effectively contest Roland’s claim 
to the final allegiance o f the Franks who die at Roncevaux.
The logic o f Roland's claim at line 1863 rests with the fact that 
Charlemagne, absent from Roncevaux, has failed to protect his chevalier from 
death (II. 1860 - 67) and, thus, fails to maintain their allegiance. But in this 
regard, the Emperor is not alone, and at line 1864 we see Roland 
acknowledge his own failure to defend (tenser) or save (guarantir) the Franks 
at Roncevaux. This double default, that of Roland and Charlemagne, leads to 
a peculiar succession o f vassal allegiance. We see first (II. 1860 - 63) an 
implicit transfer o f allegiance from Charlemagne to Roland. Then, because o f 
Roland’s own inadequacies (cf: I. 1864), the safety and protection of the 
Franks, and so their ties o f allegiance, devolve from Roland to God the father 
May God, who never lies, help/have you!’— “A it vos Deus, k i unkes ne mentitl’  
The ‘loss’ o f the Franks at Roncevaux will ultimately be compensated through 
a divine grant permitting Charlemagne to pursue his enemies with vengeance 
(cf: II. 2454-56); the ultimate failure o f council will be compensated through 
divine justice during the trial of Ganelon. In the post-Roncevaux world, though 
Charlemagne will no longer enjoy the aid o f his vassal lords —"Karies li 
magnes, de nos n ’avrat a te ” (I. 1732)— he will have something greater in the
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leveling of divine judgement against his enemies. Furthermore, though 
Roland might have claimed the French as his own— ‘Noble French, I see you 
die for me’...(“Barons franceis, purm ei vos vie m urir" \ . 1863;— Charlemagne 
will be seen to reclaim them through divine favor in the judgement against 
Ganelon. This passage foretells the transfer of authority from Charlemagne, 
to Roland, to God, and then to Charlemagne again in what amounts to a 
pattern o f events that, in its circularity, is not unlike that seen in the previously 
examined lines 197 - 213.
The rejuvenation of the Franks in the post-Roncevaux world is first 
prefaced by a sudden ‘decline’ in the emperor’s honor. The following 
citations, commented briefly, demonstrate the precipitousness with which this 
occurs. These passages mix an undercurrent o f sexual impotency with an 
implied loss o f military/political power and authority. At lines 2890 - 91 
Charlemagne states honor’s denouement without ambiguity in such a way as 
to elicit a sympathy between verbal and bodily expression:
“La meie honor est tumet en declin.”
Carles se pasmet, ne s'en pout astenir. (II. 2890 - 91)
(‘...My honor has turned in decline'
Charles faints, he is unable to stand up.)
Soon afterward, the same passage employs the metaphors —force; baldur; 
sustienget— thereby translating ‘virtue’ into ‘sexual virtue’:
‘Jamais n’ert jum de tei n’aie dulur.
Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
N’en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur.
Suz ciel ne quid aveir ami un sul;
Se jo ai parenz, n'en i ad nul si proz.” (II. 2901 - 05)
(‘Never will there be a day when I do not sorrow for you.
How my force and my strength (baldur) will fail!
I will no longer have one to sustain my onur.
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I will not have a single friend under the heavens;
Though I have kinsmen, I have none of such prowess.’)
The loss o f Roland becomes a loss of sexual potency. There is a distinct 
parallel to be drawn with the case of Ganelon (cf: II. 310-18), which likewise 
ties the loss o f sexual potency -o ilz , coer, Baldewin— to the collapse o f family 
structure. Ganelon’s loss o f Baldewin is more than the loss of a fam ily 
member; it signifies the crumbling of an identity, the destruction o f an 
inheritance sustained in continuity. Likewise, Charlemagne’s loss o f Roland, 
his loss o f baldur, signifies the collapse o f an entire social and political order.
The loss of honor ends with the loss o f the feudal community structured 
on principles o f a close protective interdependence. The scene that charts 
honor's decline is the same in which Charlemagne vents his abundant grief 
over the death of Roland; it concludes with an odd twist by interring, literally, 
honor in a common grave alongside those Franks fallen at Roncevaux:
Gaillardement tuz les unt encensez;
A grant honor pois les unt enterrez.
Sis unt laisez, qu'en fereient il el? (II. 2959 - 61)
(With zeal they covered them all in incense;
With great honor they have interred them,
They left them, what else could they to do?)
From this moment on, we can recognize that honor is permanently lost to the 
Emperor; and yet in spite o f this, after having carefully preserved the bodies o f 
Turpin, Oliver and Roland for eventual enshrinement, Charlemagne proceeds 
to a swift reorganization o f the French under his command.
Before battle actually begins, the Saracen admiral Baligant adds this 
last comment upon the fallen honor o f Charlemagne, where again metaphor 
mixes sexual potency, or the loss thereof, with valor in arms:
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Dist Baligant “Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honors.
II n’en at mie de Roilant, sun nevoid:
N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus.* (II. 3180 - 83)
(Baligant says: ‘Indeed, he is very noble.
In several gestes there is great honor concerning him
Now he will not have the aid of Roland, his nephew:
He will have no virtue that he can sustain against us.’)
‘N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus’ -F o r all his insight, seeing with perfect 
clarity that Roland, and not Charlemagne, sustains honor within the geste, 
Baligant remains blind to the emperor's coming resurgence o f power. Like 
Ganelon before him, who at line 1773 has referred to Charlemagne as ‘infant,’ 
Baligant vastly underestimates the scope of events at Roncevaux, confusing 
the cataclysmic fall o f a great social and political order with the fa ll o f a merely 
great man. W ithout any apparent realization o f the profound implications, 
Baligant puts his finger on the essential by equating the fall o f Roland with the 
fall of the geste(s) (II. 3181-82). In the ensuing battle, defeat comes not to 
Charlemagne, but to a mode of narrative production; the introduction to this 
chapter cites Roland’s words at lines 1013 - 14 to devise the axiom from 
sword-blow to song...{O r guart chascuns que granz coips i  empleit/Male 
cangun de nus chantetne seit!). Beyond Roncevaux, narration can no longer 
be produced by the force of the individual combatant, sword in hand; rather, it 
is dictated according to the terms o f a new law, supported by the writing of 
‘witnesses,’ who will go on to give even textual support to Charlemagne’s call 
to dreiture.
Upon his return to Roncevaux, Charlemagne seeks a renovation o f his 
powers and o f his authority in appealing directly to God:
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‘Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur.* (II. 2430 - 31)
('Counsel me in both dreiture and honur,
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.')
Through the agency o f an angel, God grants him neither dreiture nor honor 
but the vengeance originally prescribed by Roland; vengeance becomes the 
instrument by which the losses o f Roncevaux are made good:
‘La flur de France as perdut, go set Deus.
Venger te poez de la gent criminef.* (II. 2455 - 56)
(‘You have lost the flower of France, this God knows.
You can avenge this criminal race.’)
Charlemagne attempts to place blame with the Saracens fo r the losses at 
Roncevaux. God’s messenger promptly corrects him, however, countering 
the emperor by stating what God already knows ‘You have lost the flower of 
France, God knows this.’ (“La flu r de France as perdut, go set Deus’). God 
holds none other than Charlemagne responsible for the losses suffered at 
Roncevaux. Charlemagne uses the occasion of the subsequent battle to 
regain the allegiance o f the French, though the terms of that allegiance will be 
differently defined. Because he is at fault, authority can no longer be 
reestablished in terms o f honor, in the person o f the emperor, but only through 
recognition of the newly abstracted law, through a recognition o f the 
approaching validity o f a soon-to-appear dreiture.
It is therefore no coincidence that the emperor’s attack on the pagans 
should begin with an attack on their laws. Before joining the Saracens in 
battle Charlemagne addresses his men:
“Veez, paien felun sunt e cuart
Tute lor leis un dener ne lur valt
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S’il unt grant gent, d’igo, seignurs, qui calt?
Ki or ne voelt a mei venir s’en alt!” (li. 3337 - 40)
(‘You see, the pagans are outlaws and cowards.
All their laws are not worth small change.
If they are a great race, my lords, what does it matter?
He who doesn’t wish to come with me leave at once!’)
‘Their law* (for lei) is not worth ‘small change’ (un dener) for its power to 
protect a great host. With these words, the responsibility for the protection of 
one’s dependents shifts from vassal lord to the law itself —lo r leis. 
Charlemagne's pronouncement contrasts sharply with Baliganfs own 
assessment of the strength o f the Franks whom he deems vulnerable to 
defeat in battle in consequence of the death of Roland (II. 3180 - 83). 
However, ascribing the imminent defeat o f the Saracens to the inadequacies 
of their ‘pagan law* leads to damning implications following the defeat o f the 
Franks at Roncevaux. Not the machinations nor the failings of any one 
person or group of persons is responsible for that slaughter of 7a flu r de 
France’ but the complete dysfunction o f a social order based on the guarantee 
of mutual protection...which is to say la le i de chrestiens (cf.: I. 38). The 
defeat at Roncevaux signals the defeat o f a law that no longer obtains, the 
defeat o f lo r leis, which, one would now suppose, should have guaranteed the 
safety of the Franks at Roncevaux, but did not.
immediately following Charlemagne’s judgement on the failure o f 
‘pagan law;’ the French declare in favor o f the law that will sustain them, 
calling on God’s aid (a/e) and God’s justice (jufse):
Dient Franceis: “Icist reis est vassals!
Chevalchez, bers! Nul de nus ne vus fait’ (II. 3343 - 44)
(The French say: “This king is mighty!
Ride on, nobles! None of us will fail you)
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Dient Franceis : “Damnedeus nos aTt!
Carles ad dreit, ne li devom faillir.” (II. 3358-59)
(The French say: ‘May the Lord God help us!
Charles is in the right we must not tail him.')
A icest colp cil de France s’escrient 
“Ferez, baron, ne vos targez mie!
Carles ad dreit vers la gent..........
Deus nus ad mis al plus verai juTse.” (II. 3365 - 68)
(With this blow those from France cry out 
Strike, nobles, do no hesitate for an instant!
Charles is in the right against this race......
God has placed within us the most true judgement')
They begin with an expression o f renewed solidarity: Nul de nus ne vus fa it (I. 
3344); ne le devom fa illir (I. 3359). Unquestionably they turn to God as the 
guarantor o f their safety and of the ir success against the enemy. 
Charlemagne, meanwhile, comes to serve only as the intermediary o f that 
guarantee.
An affinity between these passages and the earlier examined orations 
of Olivier (II. 1723 - 36) and of Roland (II. 1851 - 68) suggest a useful 
comparison. Where Oliver cites rupture: ‘Charles will never again have us in 
service’...(“Jamais Karion de nus n ’avrat servise,” I. 1727); ‘Here we have 
failed the loyal company’...(“O/ nus defa lt la le ia l cumpaigne,” I. 1735), the 
French announce the mending of a break ‘None o f us will fail you’...(“Nul de 
nus ne vus fait,” I. 3344). Be that as it may, the renewed relations between 
Charlemagne and the French bear witness to certain changes effected by 
Roland at lines 1864 - 65. There, we recall, because both Charlemagne and 
Roland had failed to uphold the basic responsibilities o f a lord to his vassals, 
the French were removed from the protection o f mere mortals and placed
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directly into ‘God’s service’: ‘I was not able to give you protection,'/That God, 
who never lies, should help/have you!’...(“Jo ne vos pois tenser ne 
guarantir/Art vos Deus, k i unkes ne mentit!, " II. 1864-65). The French 
promulgate this fine though highly significant difference as they continue to 
cite God, and not Charlemagne, as their protector in battle. The French say: 
'Lord God help us!/Charles is in the right, we must not fail 
him .'...("Damnedeus nus ait/Caries ad dre it...,n 3358-59). The direct and 
personal bond between vassal and lord, the signature of feudal relations, is 
compromised as the French look not to Charlemagne, but to a ‘God given’ 
attribute o f his person, namely dreiture, as their beacon of authority, 
protection, and strength. Finally, those lines in which the French proclaim the 
advent o f God’s justice upon earth - ‘Charles is in the right against this
race /God has placed within us the most true judgemenf (“Cades ad
dreit vers fa gent JDeus nus ad mis a l plus verai ju ise ,” II. 3367 - 68)—
lead to a decipherment o f the sibylline verse spoken by Oliver at 1733: ‘Never
again until God’s judgement will there be such a man’ (N’ert mais tel home
des qu’a Deu juise, II. 3367-68). Oliver is proved prophetic in having tied the 
rejuvenation o f the emperor to an ultimate demonstration of God’s justice. But 
there is a further subtlety to Oliver’s message: that Roncevaux represents a 
permanent and irredeemable break with the past -d e s  qu’a Deu ju ise  (until 
the last judgement..., I. 1733). The French make this manifest as again they 
attribute their success in arms only indirectly to the Emperor; they proclaim not
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Charlemagne’s valor but God’s justice is the guarantee o f their pending 
success against Baligant.
When for a third time in the narrative covering the battle against 
Baligant the word dreit appears, we find Charlemagne, as opposed to the 
French, ascribing this attribute to his person:
Li emperere recleimet ses Franceis:
“Seignors barons, jo vos aim, si vos crei.
Tantes batailles avez faites pur mei,
Regnes cunquis e desordenet reis!
Ben le conuis que gueredun vos en dei 
E de mun cors, de teres e d’aveir.
Vengez vos fils, voz freres e voz hiers,
Qu’en Rencesvals furent morz I’altre seir!
Ja savez vos cuntre paiens ai dreit”
Respondent Franc: ‘Sire, vos dites veir.” (II. 3405 - 14)
(The Emperor reclaims his French:
'Noble lords, I care for you, I trust in you.
You have fought so many battles for me,
You have conquered kingdoms and dethroned kings!
I know well what reward I owe you,
Both of my body and my lands and belongings.
Avenge your sons, your brothers and your heirs 
Who died last night at Roncevaux!
You know that I am in the right against the pagans.’
The Franks respond: ‘Lord, what you say is true.')
Charlemagne’s talk of past conquests conjures up memories of the name
Roland; we recall that during the council of Franks, Roland began
deliberations by reciting a catalogue o f those victories he claimed as his own.
But Roland has shown himself to have been covetous o f something far
greater than a simple recognition as the first among peers. During the
oratorical dispute with Oliver cited earlier, he declares in lament to the French
already fallen:
‘Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m’avez servit... ’ (II. 1857 - 58)
(‘Better vassals than you I have never seen.
You have for so long served me at all times.')
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And again:
“Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir..." (1.1863)
(‘Noble Frenchmen, for me I see you dying.’)
Only following the death o f Roland could Charlemagne have presumed to
appropriate to himself such a manner of discourse. It is as though
Charlemagne revisits the past glories of the French in an attempt to eliminate
the memory o f his persistent absence and to further re-ascribe to his own
person an authority that had otherwise been attached exclusively to Roland.
We discover, however, this difference in their claims: whereas Roland puts
forth a list of fabulous conquests over foreign cities and foreign lands —
Ireland, England, Poland, Bulgaria, to name just a few (cf: II. 198 - 200; II.
2321 - 32; passim)— Charlemagne remains vague in his summarization o f
past victories ‘You have fought so many battles for me’...(uTantes batailles
aves faites pur mei,” I. 3407). Unlike Roland, he credits the French
themselves for the gains they have made and, more importantly, he points
them in the direction of a victory that is ultimately internal to their own realm.
When at line 3411 he declares Avenge your sons, your brothers, your
heirs...\ uVengez vos fils, vos freres, vos fliers.”), he exhorts the French to
reclaim a lost inheritance that is nothing other than France dulce itself.
As the conflict comes to a close the Saracens w ill see Baligant’s 
pennant fall and Mohammed’s staff -th e  staff o f their law (lo r leis)— brought 
low (II. 3551 - 52). By contrast the French will be resurrected in what we now 
recognize as surprisingly fam iliar terms:
Qo dist li reis: “Seignurs, vengez vos doels,
Si esclargiez voz talents e voz coers,
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Kar hoi matin vos vi plurer des oilz.”
Respondent Franc: *Sire, go nus estoet’ (II. 3627 - 30)
(This said the King: My lords, avenge your grief,
Let loose your desires and your hearts.
For this morning I saw your eyes crying.’
The Franks respond: ‘Lord, we will do so.’)
Hearts (coers), eyes (oilz) it appears as though, through a pursuit o f
vengeance, Charlemagne restores to the French that which he had taken from 
Ganelon at an earlier departure (cf.: 316 - 38). The list o f tender and 
vulnerable organs (cf.: II. 314 - 17) is made complete in these last words on 
the Spanish campaign, words which coincide with the return o f the French to 
Aix:
Muntet li reis e si hume trestuz
E Bramidonie, qu’il meinet en sa prisun;
Mais n’ad talent que li facet se bien nun.
Repairez sunt a joie e a baldur. (II. 3679 - 82)
(The King and all his men mount up
And Bramidonie, whom he lead away as his prisoner;
But he had no desire to do her harm, but only good.
His joy and his baldur are now repaired.)
Charlemagne’s lament during the mourning of Roland and the burial o f the 
dead: ‘How my force and my strength (baldur [connected etymologically to 
balddin - the male member) perishes!/l will no longer have one to sustain my
onurJ (“Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur! /  N’en avrai ja  k i sustienget
m’onur,” II. 2902 - 23) has now been brought full circle in what might be 
described as a resurrection o f the dead. Charlemagne and the French have 
been able to resurrect their baldur even in the absence o f Roland; Ganelon, to 
the contrary, has no future, no continuation in Bald-ewin. Charlemagne and 
the French have taken to themselves that which Ganelon held most dear, and
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in place o f honor they have aligned themselves under the auspicies o f the 
emperor’s right, his dneiture.
Charlemagne has utterly crushed the Saracens by the end o f his 
Spanish campaign, and yet we find that, in its own right Blancandrin’s 
proposal, lines 38 -  ff., has proved hugely successful. This should come as 
no surprise to our readers, since from the beginning o f this essay I have 
recounted numerous ways in which Blancandrin’s proposal is something fa r 
more than a mere subterfuge aimed at quickly ridding Spain o f the invading 
Franks. For one, we recall from the initial segment examined in this essay 
how the shift from the immediate allegiance to the emir Baligant to a 
pretended allegiance the Charlemagne results in a significant innovation in the 
structure o f interpersonal, political, and social relations. I indicated then that 
in this new socio-political configuration the subject finds himself not so much 
obliged to a particular lord as to a figurative authority positioned at the summit 
of a newly abstracted law. As we have just seen, the post-Roncevaux 
narration provides evidence o f this socio-political realignment as the French 
turn not to the person of Charlemagne but to dreiture, to the divine attribute 
attached to his name for strength and protection in their final battle against the 
Saracens. The final passages make clear through demonstration the 
distinction between the abstracted law to which the French give their ultimate 
allegiance and Charlemagne who serves as mediator between the French and 
their new law.
The other component o f Blancandrin's proposal, remarked upon earlier, 
regards the non-observance of the obligation to protect even one’s closest
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dependents. For Blancandrin this meant turning over ‘the sons of our wives’ 
(“les filz de noz muillers,” I. 42) as hostages to the Franks; for Roland and 
Charlemagne this meant the abandonment o f the French at Roncevaux (see: 
Roland’s admission of the same II. 1857 - 65). It seems hardly a coincidence 
that the hostages promised by Marsilie miss their final destination. Somehow 
at Aix we find that Ganelon and kin appear in their stead. In this we have the 
surest indicator that Blancandrin’s proposal is not merely an expedient and 
momentary ruse for the Saracens to disembarrass themselves of 
Charlemagne and the Franks, but a contract for social and political revolution. 
Before proceeding to an examination o f the trial o f Ganelon, I wish to cite 
Blancandrin at the very cruel and violent core of his proposal:
“Asez est mielz qu'il i perdent les testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele..." (II. 58 - 59)
('Far better that they should loose their heads 
Than that we loose fair Spain, the beautiful.’)
Already we have allowed for the substitution of Ganelon and kin for the ‘sons 
of the Saracen’; it only remains for us in the above lines to find France dulce 
where the text gives us clere Espaigne, la bele.
The gradual recognition by the French during the battle with Baligant o f 
the renewed authority of the emperor (see: II. 3359; 3367; 3413) leads to a 
brief interlude, the trial of Ganelon, in which the ‘state’ hangs suspended 
between two orders of law. The duration of this interruption is further 
lengthened by the inefficacy o f Charlemagne’s command. He opens ‘council’ 
addressing the baron Franks in the very discourse newly won during the battle 
with Baligant:
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“Seignors barons," dis Carlemagnes li reis,
“De Guenelun car me juget le dreit!" (II. 3750 - 51)
(‘Noble lords’, says Charlemagne the King,
‘Judge me the right (dreit) against Ganelon!’)
Concurrent to the act o f claiming judgment against Ganelon, Charlemagne 
seeks to appropriate what one might have assumed to be the prerogatives of 
the recently acclaimed dreiture. However, what follows will give a clear 
indication that at the moment o f this pronouncement, neither Charlemagne 
nor the Franks have an adequate understanding o f the new law, nor are they 
able to make effective use o f the new law or to operate within its structure.
The trial o f Ganelon begins with an absurdity: the Emperor ‘commands’ 
in a language unintelligible to his subjects. In their ‘deafness’ to the very law 
they help usher in while recognizing the dreit o f Charlemagne against the 
Saracens, the Franks revert to the prior law and to those of its institutions with 
which they are still most familiar. They revert to council and to judging the 
merits o f Ganelon’s case according to the law to which Charlemagne now 
stands firm ly opposed. This is the law that was to have vouchsafed the 
protection of Ganelon's property and kin during his absence among the 
Saracens, a law that Charlemagne has already purposefully ignored. Now 
Ganelon turns to the French in a similar cause, asking that they grant him 
protection where Charlemagne had previously denied it.
Ganelon’s second ‘cause’ is not dissimilar from the first in that he 
bases his demands on a rigorous interpretation of the rights of vassals and 
peers according to the tenets o f feudal law. The French retreat to council (II. 
3761; and 3779), and when they return, they find in favor o f Ganelon. 
Charlemagne’s response, though severe and immediately forthcoming, 
remains marvelously equivocal:
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■Qo dist li reis: “Vos estes mi felun.' (1.3814)
(The King said this: ‘You are my felons.’)
This single line, important in that it alone announces the advent o f the new 
law, provides us with three possible variant readings. The most immediate 
and least ambiguous sense o f these words can be summed up in saying that 
the French have rendered a judgement displeasing to the emperor. But this is 
a weak reading in that it grossly inflates the value o f the word felun. After all, 
in this reading the French have not transgressed the law, they have simply 
found in favor o f Ganelon albeit against the obvious personal wishes of the 
Emperor. A second possible reading is one in which Charlemagne castigates 
the Franks not only for defying his wishes, but especially for overturning his 
prior judgement concerning Ganelon. Where Charlemagne has denied 
Ganelon and those closest to him protection under the law (cf.: II. 313 - 318), 
the Franks in council have reinvested him with those same rights previously 
denied. This reading is not without merit in so far as it suggests the inability of 
the French to take cognizance of the very processes of transformation in 
which, all along, they have been participants. Nonetheless, it falls short in 
failing to take into account that this line in the text in and o f itself marks the 
culminating point o f these very processes o f social and political 
transformation. Only our third interpretation measures this verse as the 
proper cardinal point, which it is, within the text’s narrative development. Here 
Charlemagne declares to the French that together and without exception they 
are all accomplices in transgressing the law.7 Vos estes m i felun -You and I
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are equally felons in having first broken, then abandoned the law through 
which Ganelon now makes his appeal.
The announcement of general outlawry does not simply spring forth 
from a propitious narrative juncture, but has been prepared from the first 
moments of the first Frankish council. There Roland points a blaming finger at 
both Charlemagne and the French, faulting them for that determination from 
which stems the spiraling violence of successive conflicts as well as the 
damaging beyond repair of feudal society’s most basic institutions: namely, 
cunseiU and ate. We recall Roland’s invective as he freshens the memory of 
Charlemagne and his attendant Franks (vos Francois) to a past replete with 
shame:
“A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie;
Dous de vos cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L’un fut Basan e li altres Basilie;
Les chefs en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.” (II. 205 - 209)
(‘You consulted your French barons about this.
They gave you some bad advice.
You sent two of your counts to the pagan,
One was Basan and the other Basile;
He cut off their heads in the hills below Haltilie.')
From the vantage of narrative hindsight, we recognize in these words the first 
declaration o f a barrier having been crossed, that the twin institutions of 
auxilium (are) and consilium (conseill) have become ineffectual at best, and at 
worst a perversion o f their intended offices. Roland is quick to remedy the 
failures of auxilium  with another sort o f call to arms, namely, vengeance ‘Thus 
avenge those whom the felons have killed. (“S i vengez cels que li fels fist 
ocire !” I. 213). When at Roncevaux auxilium fails fo r a second time, now on a 
global scale, Roland relegates to God the care and protection o f the French
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(cf.: II. 1860 - 65); appropriately, God fulfills this office with a grant o f divine 
vengeance —Venger te poez de la gent criminal (I. 2456). When consilium  
has led to internal harm and disruption within the community we find Oliver 
naively prophesying the coming arrival o f divine justice -N ’ert mais te l home 
des qu’a Deu ju ise  (1733). Now when Charlemagne demands o f his French 
“De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!” this is the first call fo r that divine 
judgement and that divine justice won at Roncevaux to be turned against one 
o f their own number.
Momentarily, Charlemagne and the Franks find themselves at an 
impasse. The Emperor, in the face of this new law that he is unable to 
implement by command, expresses helplessness:
Quant Cartes veit que tuz li sunt faillid,
Mult I’enbrunchit e la chere e le vis,
Al doel qu’il ad si se cleimet caitifs. (II. 3815 -17)
(When Charles sees that all have failed him.
He bends down his head and his face.
And for the grief he feels, he bemoans his miserable lot)
Frequently within the Roland we see the Franks suffer the consequences of 
the emperor's lapse of command. The earliest and most salient case is that 
of Ganelon, who at the end o f the first Frankish council solicits Charlemagne’s 
guarantee for the safety o f his heir and fortune; the Emperor, o f course, 
declines in silence. Now, in the course of their second council, it is the Franks 
who fall silent. These two incidents mirror one another though with a 
difference. In the first, Charlemagne threatens Ganelon’s existence passively; 
the failure to act upon his vassal’s legitimate request sends a signal that the 
law has lost its value. During this, the second council, Charlemagne
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articulates a life-threatening menace against Ganelon and kin though 
seemingly in a law which the French as yet find incomprehensible. It will take 
someone to translate this new law into existence, someone who can 
comprehend its nature and demonstrate its effects before this ‘council’ o f all 
the emperor’s baron subjects.
Tierry, whose diminutive stature marks him as someone more apt to 
persuade than to command, arrives a t a solution to this impasse between 
Charlemagne and the French. He proceeds with a subtle, pliant and even 
deceitful manipulation of language in making a case against Ganelon:
“Que que Rollant a Guenelun forsfesist,
Vostre servise I’en doQst bien guarir.
Guenes est fefs d’igo qu’il le trait;
Vers vos s’en est parjurez e malmis." (II. 3827 - 30)
(‘Though Roland may have forfeited his allegiance to Ganelon
Your service obliged him nonetheless to secure Roland's safety.
Ganelon is the felon for acting treacherously against him;
He has perjured and mishandled himself against you.')
Tierry craftily dismisses Roland’s forfeiture against Ganelon as a matter for 
personal rather than communal concern. But this not only occludes the 
significant difference in the manner in which each has contributed to the 
breakdown of vassal ties and so to the dissolution of feudal organization, it 
also inverts the order of magnitude o f their respective blame. Firstly, Ganelon 
declares openly his defiance o f Roland and the French, and so he acts 
according to the prescriptions o f feudal custom, (II. 322 - 26); Roland, on the 
other hand, acts in a decidedly more furtive manner, knowingly and willingly 
leading the French to a death they do not anticipate. In refusing 
Charlemagne’s offer o f salvement and repeatedly refusing to call for the
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Emperor’s aid, Roland provokes Oliver’s express condemnation: "Cumpainz, 
vos forfeistes” (1723). Thus, it is Qanelon’s defiance that takes its aim at the 
individual Roland, but Roland who, through a significant chain o f omissions, 
forfeits his obligations to the entire feudal community. Line 3828 stands in 
clear reference to those twenty thousand Franks lost in battle; taking T ie rr/s  
words at the letter they are said to die not because of what Ganelon has done 
but because o f what Roland and Charlemagne have failed to do. Tierry 
flatters neither Charlemagne nor the memory of Roland when he says: “Your 
service should have been sufficient to save them”. In these few lines Tierry 
pins on Ganelon those charges that would have more aptly been leveled 
against Charlemagne and Roland.
Tierry is careful to maintain the ambivalence of his accusations; an 
undercurrent o f blame continues to circulate freely among Ganelon, Roland 
and Charlemagne. In a final jest before joining Ganelon's ‘man,’ Pinabel, 
Tierry lets slip just how tenuous are these charges pressed against Ganelon:
“Pur go le juz jo a pendre e a murir 
E sun cors metre......
Si cume fel ki felonie fist” (II. 3831 - 3833)
(‘For this I judge that he should hang and die
And let his body be placed......
Like a felon who has committed felonie.’)
Ganelon is condemned to die not because he is a felon but because he is like 
-h a s  the appearance of— a felon who has committed felony. Tierry 
determines the outcome o f conflict not by bodily strength nor even by proof o f 
guilt, but by conjuring blame and, through the skillful manipulation of
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language, focusing that blame away from Charlemagne and onto the person 
of Ganelon.
Tierry sets out to perform the task that Charlemagne has not been able 
to accomplish either by sword or by express command. The true difficulty o f 
the task is measured less in terms o f bodily strength than in terms of subtlety 
of spirit. To illuminate the point we regress to a moment at the height o f battle 
when the baron Oger dares chastise the emperor
“Veez paien cum ocient vos humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu'el chef portez corone,
S’or n’i ferez pur venger vostre hunte!" (II. 3537 - 39)
('See how the pagans are killing your men!
May it never please God that you should wear the crown on your head
If you do not strike blows to avenge your shame!')
His instructions are exact and precise; Charlemagne is called upon not to 
reclaim his honor -h is  honor, as we have seen, having been forever lost— but 
to avenge an abiding shame. By the blows he strikes, the violence he 
perpetrates, he is able to exculpate himself from guilt, to transfer shame from 
his own person onto the bodies o f a slaughtered enemy. Tierry has removed 
all obstacles but one preventing Charlemagne from making the same transfer 
of shame, finally, onto the bodies o f Ganelon and kin. Pinabel stands alone 
as the last bar separating Charlemagne and the Franks from the new law.
Circumspection marks the Franks’ response to Tierry’s subtle 
casuistries:
Respundent Franc: "Or avez vos ben dit" (1.3837)
(The Franks answered: ‘You have spoken well.’)
This is fitting. At risk is something far greater than the defense o f a single 
judgment. Tierry has demonstrated the perversion of the discourse (cunseill)
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that had once kept the balance o f vassal relations intact, the discourse to 
which Ganelon, now as previously (cf.: II. 310 - ff.), vainly appeals.
Next, as the text informs us, 30 hostages are taken in gage o f 
Charlemagne’s ‘d re it:
Fait cels guarder tresque li dreiz en serat (I. 3849)
(He keep s them well guarded until the dreiz is accomplished.)
And the Emperor himself declares that from this trial the dreit will be made
resplendent:
“E! Deus", dist Carles, ‘ le dreit en esclargiez!" (1.3891)
('Oh! God’, say Charles, 'make known the dreit!)
The trial by combat in which Tierry and Pinabel are poised to engage will 
settle a question o f guilt: if Ganelon proves the culprit for the losses at 
Roncevaux then, by default, Roland and Charlemagne are innocent. But what 
is this trial if not the final episode in the conflict first plotted by Blancandrin at 
lines 27 -  60?8 These hostages held “...tresque li dreiz en se ra t are 
innocents, anti-types to those “...filz de noz muillers” (I. 42) promised, though 
never sent, by Blancandrin. These are the final few upon whom Charlemagne 
will at last avenge his shame.
As combat begins Pinabel offers Tierry terms reminiscent o f those o f 
Blancandrin’s proposal:
Dist Pinabel: ‘Tierri, car te recreiz!
Tes horn serai par amur e par feid,
A tun plaisir te durrai mun aveir,
Mais Guenelun fai accorder al rei!” (II. 3892 - 95)
(Pinabel said: ‘Tierry, concede defeat!
‘I will be your man by friendship and by faith,
I will give you my belongings to do with as you please,
But reconcile Ganelon with the king.')
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The fatal difference lies in the last line: ‘But reconcile Ganelon with the king’— 
Mats Guenelun fa i accorderal rei. This is a peace that would take us back to 
the prior order, one that would continue to value the bond between vassal and 
lord above the newly created nexus between subject and state. By not only 
omitting but even contradicting the innovative element o f Blancandrin’s 
proposal, Pinabel reveals his innocence of all that has transpired between 
then and now. The faisse continues:
Respont Terri: “Ja n’en tendrai cunseill.
Tut seie fel, se jo mie I’otrei!
Deus facet hoi entre nus dous te dreit!” (II. 3896 - 98)
(Tierry responds: ‘I will not hold council about this,
I would be a sheer felon, should I agree to that!
Let God himself decide the dreit between the two of us!’)
Tierry’s refusal o f Pinabel’s vassal submission, striking enough in and o f itself, 
is framed in terms of a rejection o f cunseill in favor o f dreit. The demission is 
radical. A t the end of this contest the Franks concede the primacy of the new 
order by placing the judgment o f God, the first principle o f dreiture, above the 
judgment o f men:
Escrient Franc: “Deus i ad fait vertut!
Asez est dreiz que Guenes seit pendut
E si parent ki plaidet unt pur lui.” (II. 3931 - 33)
(The Franks shout ‘God has done a thing of great virtue!
It is just that Ganelon should be hanged
Along with kinsmen, who stood pledge for him.’)
When Charlemagne asks, pro forma, in what manner the hostages are 
to be disposed of, the Franks answer in chorus, swiftly and as though in 
response to a fam iliar litany:
Carles apelet ses cuntes e ses dux:
“Que me loez de cels qu’ai retenuz?”
Respundent Franc: “Ja mar en vivrat uns!” (II. 3947 - 48; 3951)
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(Charles calls his counts and his dukes:
'Advise, what should I do with those who are guarded?
The Franks reply: ‘A curse if so much as one should live!’)
Formulaic thought it may be, their message is not lacking in potency; they
command that not one follower o f the old law, lo r Ibis , be spared oblivion.9 The 
moment arrives when Charlemagne and the French achieve mutual 
intelligibility in observing the dictates of the law governing the social order, 
newly established at the trial of Ganelon.
Where then, finally, is this new dreit that Charlemagne calls upon God 
to make resplendent? There can be no other place than Juliane herself of 
whom the text tells us;
Chrestiene est par veire conoisance. (I. 3987)
(She is Christian by pure knowledge.)
Here is fulfillment o f Blancandrin’s greatest promise:
"Si recevrez la lei de chrestiens,
Serez ses hom par honor e par ben.'' (II. 38 - 39)
(‘Receive the law of the Christians,
And become his man by honor and in goods.’)
Only this conversion is one taken on by ordeal in the epic scope o f the battle 
at Ronceveaux and the scope o f tragedy at the trial o f Ganelon, as though the 
great distance between these two events are telescoped into a single work. 
Juliane, who knows the law 'par veire conoisance' departs for Spain as 
Charlemagne departs for some mythical kingdom outside the confines o f 
France dulce. His great anguish bears witness to the terrible separation 
between the emperor and the law that now dictates not only subject relations, 
but the order o f events. If a new discourse has been created, its makers, the
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heroes o f Roncevaux, are now but a dim historical memory. The illusion, if 
ever there was an illusion, that Charlemagne could command in the language, 
could effect changes that radically alter the order o f state, are dispelled. 
Charlemagne’s only power is in knowing when to remain silent and to obey. 
The gestes, the creation of new language, have ceased living with the death 
of Roland as Baligant astutely recognized:
Dist Baligant “Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honurs.
II n'en at mie de Rollant, sun nevoid:
N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus.” (II. 3180 - 83)
(Baligant said: ‘Indeed, because he is most valiant 
In several gestes he is given great honurs.
He will no longer have the aid of his nephew Roland:
He will not be able to sustain his virtue against us.’)
Baligant, of course, is right; though how could he have anticipated a Tierry
who, in an unforeseen way, does that which Chariemange cannot himself do?
The power o f state no longer lies in the hands o f those whose deeds are
transformed into geste, but in the hands of those, like Tierry, who seem more
cleric than soldier, who are more skilled in the manipulation of this new
language than in creating the geste directly from sword-blows, as did Roland
and the Franks at Roncevaux.
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HONUR E DREITURE
Ma grant honur taveie retenude 
Ed anpur tei mais n’en aveies cure
(Euphemien to an absent Alexis)
An icesft] secte nen ad parfit amor 
La vithe est fraile; n’i ad durable honur 
Cesta lethece revert a grant tristur.
(Alexis to his virgin bride)
At a pivotal moment, immediately following the death o f Roland, while 
seeking to restore the equilibrium lost to his world and to his state Charles 
asks that God grant him both honur e dreiture:
“E! Deus!", dist Carles, “ja sunt li ja si luinz!
Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur.’ (II. 2429 -  30)
(‘Oh, God!’ said Charles, They are already so far removed from us!
Grant me my right and my honur...')
Here the word ‘honur* proves sufficiently labile that in successive editions of 
the Roland B6dier translates it variously as ‘honneur’ (ed. 1922) and as a 
service’ rendered by God (ed. 1931: “Accordez-moi mon droit, faites-moi 
quelque grace”). The beauty of B&Jier’s successive interpretive offerings is 
that the reader need not feel compelled to choose between the one and the 
other, rather, he would do well to combine the two in order to arrive at a fuller
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appreciation o f the import o f this verse. In this instance, ‘honor* and ‘service’ 
are reciprocal values in that it is through the ‘service’ rendered o f avenging 
shame that ‘honor1 is restored.
Here, as elsewhere within the text of the Roland, the word ‘honur1 is not 
so much equivocal as it is polyvalent in its acceptation; it typically demands 
that the reader entertain not one but two or more interpretive meanings at 
once. In the passage in which Ganelon, confronted with probable death, 
solicits from Charlemagne security for his son and heir, Baldwin, ‘honur' 
indicates principally land-holdings:
“En Sarraguce sai ben qu’aler m’estoet,
Horn ki ia vait repairer ne s’en poet 
Ensurquetut si a jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels nen estoet,
Qo est Baldewin,’ 90  dit, ‘ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.” (II. 310-15)
(‘I know well that I must hasten to Saraguce.
The man who goes there will not return.
To be sure, remember that your sister is my wife,
And that I have a son, there is none more beautiful 
Than Baldewin,’ he said, ‘he will be a noble vassal.
To him I leave my ‘honors’ and fiefs.’)
The notion of ‘service’ is certainly implied here, at least to the extent that 
particular obligations accrue to Charlemagne as the guarantor of Baldwin’s 
‘inheritance.’ But the idea of service to Charles is also diminished in that 
Ganelon, in legating property directly to Baldwin (T o  him I leave my lands and 
my fiefs’), effectively supersedes the Emperor’s privilege of demanding 
service in exchange for land. Though the Roland continues to ‘speak’ of 
‘honurs’ and fiefs it is a matter of historical record that fiefs and ‘honurs’ had 
become all but hereditary by the end of the eleventh century and that the 
distinction between the two terms was, by that time, all but lost.1
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Let us, for the moment, compare the two passages beginning with 
those words spoken by Ganelon. The circumstances are such that Ganelon 
speaks with the acknowledgement o f his own almost certain death... (“Horn k i 
la vait repairer ne s ’en poet.”) In preparation for this looming eventuality he 
states clearly that all his holdings together with all the attendant prestige 
(honurs) are to be passed on to his wife’s son; the one whom he has sired. If, 
on the other hand, we ascribe to the legend that indicates Charles as the sire 
o f Roland, through incestuous relations with his sister, Ganelon’s wife, then 
we find in Charles words at lines 2429 -  30 the obverse situation, namely, that 
Charles is preparing to become inheritor to his own son. As emperor no one, 
not even Roland, can logically bequeath to Charlemagne ‘lands and fiefs,’ 
Roland’s g ift to Charles, however, is the restoration o f service (honur) and the 
establishment o f a previously unknown right (dreiture).
The word dreiture remains largely undefined until the last moments o f 
the text, and it is only there, at the scene of judgement against Ganelon, that 
the text finally illustrates to the reader something o f the meaning o f this term 
so critical to understanding the transformative powers of the Roland. The 
reader might, nonetheless, turn to the dictionary not so much for a set 
definition o f this term as for a indication of its approximate meaning. Under 
droit we find: 1. Qui suit la ligne droite; 2. Qui est du cote droit; 4. Vrai, digne 
de foi, v&ridique; 5. Entier, qui atteint la norme.2 Certainly, all o f these 
definitions serve more or less well. By the end o f the Roland it is clear that 
the Emperor’s dreit pretends to a norm (5); makes its claim to veraciousness
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(4); is prescriptive o f a ‘right* way (1). But, perhaps surprisingly, it  is the least 
‘precise’ of these rather simple and straightforward definitions, the one which 
finds its meaning only in reference to its negated opposite, which comes 
closest to discovering the sense of the Emperor’s dreit, namely, Qui est du 
cdt6 dro it Dreiture, in the final analysis, is the instrument by which ‘right1 is 
separated from left, by which those who side with the Emperor continue to 
exist and those who side with Ganelon undergo total annihilation. The radical 
break within the historical continuum which is effected by the establishment o f 
the Emperor’s dreit w ill be the subject o f exploration in the subsequent pages 
of this chapter.
An Immodest Proposal
The Roland opens in the middle of things, among the Saracens army 
that is ‘enemy’ to the Franks. It is there that the reader firs t encounters the 
noble Blancandrin, chosen as emissary to negotiate peace with the Franks; 
and it is here that the reader finds him engaged in the process o f introducing 
treachery into the heart o f his own camp. In a previous attempt to negotiate 
peace, a peace presumably initiated by the Franks, king Marsile, the leader of 
the Saracen forces, had, for the sake o f presumed advantage, slaughtered 
the Frankish emissaries sent by Charles. Now, in a perverse and ironic twist, 
it is Blancandrin who suggests that Saracens sacrifice their own closest kin as 
a means o f maintaining a hold on their possessions (onur) and the usufruct 
(deintet) of them:
“Enveiuns i les filz de noz muillers:
Par num d’ocire i enveierai le men.
Asez est melz qu'il i perdent 16 chefs
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Que nus perduns I’onur ne la deintet,
Ne nus seiuns cunduiz a mendeier!’ (II. 42 - 45)
(‘Let us send to him the sons of our wives:
And though he should be killed, I will send my own son.
Far better that they should loose their heads 
Than that we should loose our lands and offices.
That we should be reduced to beggary.’)
In a moment o f blackest irony, under the pretext o f preserving onur (land and 
privilege), Blancandrin threatens to disrupts the chain o f patrilineal succession 
by offering to kill off his own son (I. 43) and patrimony. Onur’s  most 
fundamental premise, the guarantee o f inheritance and the protection o f one’s 
young, no longer obtains where the ties that bind father and son, lord and 
vassal are abrogated for the purpose o f calculated advantage.
Though the term onur may at first appear to be set in a largely private, 
familial context, (Let us send to him the sons of our wives // ...That we should 
(not) be reduced to beggary) Blancandrin very deftly relates this seemingly 
private matter to a concern o f state:
“Asez est mielz qu’il i perdent fes testes
Que nus perduns clere Espaigne, la bele..." (II. 58 - 59)
( ‘Far better that they should loose their heads,
Than that we should loose fair Spain, .the beautiful.’)
The immediate relation between affairs o f state and affairs o f ‘family’ (cf. line 
3766 : ‘de ses parenz XXX) is underscored throughout the text, though 
invariably the text portrays the relation as a source o f deep-seated conflict. 
Much of the violence both within the opposing camps and between them can 
be traced directly to this same conflict between the private and the public 
spheres. That the devastation wrought by Blancandrin’s terrible bargain o f 
lines 42 -  45 is general and comprehensive to concerns both public and
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private is attested by a later passage in which Marsile confesses to loosing 
both the possession o f state and all possibility hereditary succession:
Qo dist Marsilie: "Sire reis, amiralz,
Teres tutes ici.........
E Sarraguce e I’onur qu'i apent
Mei ai perdut e tute ma gent* (II. 2831 - 34)
(This Marsilie says: ‘My lord king, Emir,
All these lands..........
Both Saragossa and the onor that is connected with it 
I myself am lost and the whole of my kin.’)
Though Marsile solicits his men for the means of escaping death (morf) and 
shame (hunte) (‘And save me from death and shame...uSi me guarisez e de 
mort e de hunte!," line 21) Blancandrin’s proposal will have precisely the 
opposite effect.
The reckless murder o f Basan and Basile had already disrupted any 
presumption of good faith in the negotiations between Saracens and Franks. 
The underlying violence o f Blancandrin’s proposal demonstrates that this 
same disruption had become internalized, at least within the Saracen camp. 
The air of mistrust and suspicion soon arises within the Frankish camp as 
Roland cautions Charlemagne against the advice o f even his own barons:
“A voz Franceis un conseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de iegerie;
Dous de voz cuntes al paien tramesistes,
L’un fut Basan e li altres Basilies;
Les chefs en prist es puis desuz Haltilie.* (II. 205 - 209)
(‘You have taken counsel of your French about this.
They offered you foolish advice.
You sent two of your counts to the pagan:
One was Basan and the other Basile;
He took their heads in the hills below Haltilie.’)
Roland senses that counsel, even that o f the French barons, has become a 
treacherous affair leading to deception and misfortune; thus, he urges
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Charlemagne to leave counsel aside and go directly into battle. Ganelon, on 
the other hand, strongly favors the privileges and obligations of counsel, and 
with good reason. Ganelon turns to counsel when seeking protection o f 
property and the safeguard o f kin (cf.: II. 310 -  ff.); and he will appeal to 
counsel as a defense against the arbitrary judgement o f the Emperor (cf.: 
3747 -  ff.) Paradoxically, by urging Charlemagne to accept Blancandrin’s 
spurious offer o f peace he places into jeopardy the very institution (concilium ) 
he would otherwise seek to conserve. In the realm o f the Saracens and the 
Franks, through the ‘cooperative’ effort of Blancandrin and Ganelon, 
concilium, the safeguard of honur, is irreparably broken.
The text clearly indicates to the reader that mistrust among the Franks 
begins as a ‘family’ problem. To be sure, Ganelon has every reason to 
mistrust Roland, who is something of a ‘coucou’ in the family nest. The son o f 
his wife (Ganelon’s wife is Charlemagne’s sister) by some unnamed sire, 
Roland is a potential threat to Ganelon’s own first bom, Baldewin. Roland 
becomes all the more menacing in that he has no claim to any legitimate 
inheritance of his own. A later passage demonstrates how the creation o f 
Roland’s inheritance ‘ex nihilo' is parlayed into a cause for deep resentment 
not only for Ganelon, but for his Saracen counterpart as well:
“Demi Espaigne vus durat il en fiet,
L’altre meitet avrat Rollant, sis ntes:
Mult orguillos partner i avrez!" (II. 472 • 74)
(‘Half of Spain he [Charles] will give you in fief,
The other half will be given to Roland his nephew:
In him you will have a most proud partitioner!')
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W ith these words, Ganelon creates fo r Marsile a relation to Roland 
comparable to his own. For Marsile, the implications are clear and his 
subsequent actions interpret Ganelon’s ‘message’ accordingly; he cannot 
allow Spain, the inheritance o f his own son, ‘Jurfaleu le blund, ’ to be divided 
between himself and Roland. Either Marsile destroys Roland in ambush, or 
Roland and his twelve peers, all insatiable o f conquest, will soon ravage his 
own portion o f Spain -heritors, inheritance, onur and all. Ganelon could not 
fail to see the difficulties of his own ‘fam ily affair1 reflected in the competitive 
circumstances o f Marsile and Roland in Spain.
Volatility within the complex web o f family relations is on full display in 
the scene where Ganelon is chosen as emissary to the Saracens. There 
Charles declares emphatically (II. 261 -  262) that none of the twelve peers are 
eligible for the simple reason, understood, that that their loss would be too 
great. This having been said, Roland proceeds to nominate Ganelon, his 
stepfather, for the dangerous if not impossible mission:
“Car m’eslisez un barun de ma marche,
Qu a Marsiliun me portast mun message.’
Qo dist Rollant “<?o ert Guenes, mis parastre.’ (II. 275 - 77)
(‘Choose for me a baron from my march
Who will carry my message to Marsile.
Roland replied: ‘It will be Ganelon, my stepfather.')
Ganelon responds:
Dist a Rollant “Tut fol, pur quei f  esrages?
Qo set horn ben que jo sui tis parastres.
Si as juget qu’a Marsiliun en alge.” (II. 286 - 8 8 )
(He said to Roland: ‘You fool, why this rage?
They know very well that I am your stepfather,
Yet you judge that I should go to Marsile.’)
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Unlike the conditions o f Blancandrin’s proposal here it is not fathers offering 
sons but the son who offers the ‘father’ in sacrifice. Yet even this reading is 
complicated by the word parastre. Who, the reader may ask, is Roland’s 
father? Why this conspiracy between Roland and Charlemagne to snare 
Ganelon in a perilous trap? The answer may lie buried in the following line
spoken by Ganelon to Roland:
“Tu n'ies mes horn ne Jo ne sui tis sire.' (I. 297)
(‘Neither are you my man nor am I your lord/sire.’)
Firstly, Ganelon makes clear the absence of obligation between them. But 
also, by his very choice of words, Ganelon subtly underscores the ‘flaw’ in 
their ties of kinship: “jo ne sui tis sire” -m eaning either ‘I am not your vassal 
lord’ o r I am not your progenitor.’ Could it be that the close proximity o f nOies
and sire also camouflages scandal: “Tu n O ies  tis sire” (‘You are the
nephew of your sire.’ In any case, there is ample further evidence
within the text to suggests a ‘conspiratorial’ link between Roland and Charles 
against Ganelon.
Personal betrayals notwithstanding, Ganelon still shows himself not 
only reliant upon, but also skillful in the manipulation of the protocol o f the 
feudal relations. Having accepted the almost certainly deadly mission to 
negotiate with the Saracens, Ganelon turns to Charlemagne for the expected 
guarantee of protection fo r those matters of greatest personal concern:
“En Sarraguce sai ben qu’aler m’estoet 
Horn ki la vait repairer ne s’en poet 
Ensurquetut si ai jo vostre soer,
Sin ai un filz, ja plus bels n'en estoet 
Qo est Baldewin,” go dit 'ki ert prozdoem.
A lui lais jo mes honurs e mes fieus.
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Guadez le ben, ja nel verrai des oilz."
Caries respunt “Tro avez tendre coer.
Puis quel comant, aler vus en estoet* (II. 310 - 318)
(‘I know well that I must go to Saragossa:
The man who goes there does not return.
Indeed, your sister is mine in marriage,
And I have a son, there is none more beautiful:
It’s Baldwin,’ he said, ‘ who will be a noble vassal;
To him I leave my fiefis and my honors.
Guard him well, I will never see him again with these eyes.’
Charles responds: ‘You have too tender a heart 
Because it is commanded, you must go.’)
In this relatively stylized speech Ganelon succeeds at placing ‘family’ 
concerns within the context of a highly visible public forum; and his request for 
‘protection’ is not nearly so naive as it may at first seem. Before acceding to 
Charles’ demands that he go to the Saracen Ganelon seeks public recognition 
for the personal sacrifice he is about to suffer. In doing so all the French host 
are witness to the guarantee of protection, or lack thereof, that a liege lord will 
acknowledge to his vassal subject. Ganelon offers his life in anticipation of a 
public declaration by Charles that his (Ganelon’s) continued ‘existence’ after 
death will be assured by virtue of protection for his honur, namely, property 
and Kin: ‘It’s Baldwin... /  To him I leave my fiefs and my honors / Guard him
well.“ (‘Q> est Baldewin JA lu i lais jo  mes honurs e mes fieusJGuadez
le ben ). But with a show of flagrant indifference Charles declines him
protection. Ganelon’s fears and suspicions are confirmed; tender is his heart’ 
(“Tro avez tendre coer”), vulnerable are his eyes (oilz) and the life o f his first 
bom.
Half way across the text, in a scene that mirrors the confrontation 
between Charlemagne and Ganelon at lines 310 -  318, king Marsile speaks 
to the Emir Baligant o f lost onor.
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Qo dist Marsilie: ‘Sire reis, amiratz,
Teres tutes ici..........
E Sarraguce e I’onur qu’i apent 
Mei ai perdut e tute ma gent’
E cil respunt “Tant sui jo plus dolent
Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlement...' (II. 2831 - 36)
This Marsile said: ‘My lord king, Emir 
All these lands..........
Both Saragossa and the onor that is connected with it;
And myself am lost and the whole of my kin.
And he [Baligant] replies: ‘I am deeply grieved,
But I am not able to speak with you for long.’
This scene, and Baliganfs response in particular, ‘I am not able to speak with 
you for long...’ (“Ne pois a vos tenir lung parlement), indicate that a failure of 
the institution o f concilium  lies at the heart o f the breakdown of feudal social 
order. Roland insinuates as much when warning Charles: ‘You have taken 
counsel of your French about this, // They offered you foolish advice...’ (“A voz 
Franceis un conseill en presistes, / /  Loerent vos alques de legerie...’)  The 
significant difference between these two respective scenes is that in the latter, 
in the confrontation between Marsile and Baligant, consilium  ends following 
‘honor’s’ loss, whereas in the earlier scene the loss o f lhonur> is the result of 
the dissolution o f the office o f consilium. Ganelon’s voice is the first casualty 
in the ultimate defeat o f feudal order.
Before departing, Ganelon turns down the offer of protection even from 
his closest allies. The danger in going into the Saracen camp remain 
undisputed, but Ganelon turns his attention to another danger, one that lies 
deep within the realm:
‘En duice France, seignurs, vus en irez:
De meie part ma muiller saluez 
E Pinabel, mun ami e mun per,
E Baldewin, mun filz que vos savez,
E lui aidez e pur seignur tenez." (II. 360 - 64)
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(To sweet France, my lords, you will go:
Greet my wife for me.
Along with Pinabel my friend and my peer,
And Baldewin my son, as you know;
And aid him and take him as your lord.’)
In many respects Roland has been the truest observer o f the general state of 
the institution of concilium. Tainted by mistrust, the office o f consilium  will 
deliver nothing but disaster fo r those who seek out justice and protection from 
it. We have already seen how, long into the text, Baligant will dismiss counsel
freely and out-of-hand —'"I am not able to speak with you for long...”  (We
pois a vos tenir lung parlem ent). These remarks respond directly to Marsile’s 
statement that he has news for Baligant concerning Charlemagne:
‘Concerning Charlemagne I should give you good counsel ’ (“Vers
Carlemagne li durrai bon cunseill,” I. 2750). Baligant does not have the time, 
does not feel the necessity, to take counsel from one who has lost everything; 
Charlemagne’s dismissal o f Ganelon’s request speaks to sim ilar 
circumstances.
From the beginning the text spells out plainly Ganelon’s culpability for 
the global disaster that is to befall the French at Roncevaux.:
Guenes i vint, ki la traTsun fist
D6 s ore cumencet ie cunseill que mal prist (II. 178 - 79)
(Ganelon, who has committed treason, arrives.
From that point on begins the council begins that went wrong.)
Yet, the reader may question the verity of the following line, spoken in 
reference to Ganelon at the conclusion o f his ‘trial’:
Ki hume traTst sei ocit e altroi. (I. 3959)
(Who betrays a man kills himself and others too.)
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Is Charlemagne not guilty o f gross betrayal when, in the probable eventuality 
o f Ganelon’s death, he deigns not offer protection for his vassal’s proper heir? 
Or, on a more all-encompassing scale, does Charlemagne not instigate great 
harm at lines 180 -  ff. by privileging the advice of Roland above the counsel 
o f all his barons?
Immediately preceding the convocation of all the barons to decide upon 
Blancandrin’s proposal, and indirectly upon the fate o f Ganelon and kin, the 
text describes the Emperor in repose beneath a pine:
Desuz un pin en est li reis alez,
Ses baruns mandet pur sun cunseill finer 
Par cels de France voelt il del tut errer.
Li empereres s en vait desuz un pin,
Sis baruns mandet pur sun cunseill fenir... (II. 165 -169)
(The King went beneath a pine tree,
He calls his nobles in order to finish council:
He wishes to lead into error (errer) those from France.
The Emperor goes beneath a pine,
He calls his nobles in order to finish council.)
W hat could the reader infer from these words: ‘He calls his nobles in order to 
finish counsel...’ (“Ses baruns mandet pu r sun conseill fen ir...”)? One could 
begin by observing that this is the council that finishes all councils, that 
reduces the very institution of concilium  to rubble. The fact that Charlemagne 
sits by passively during the highly volatile exchanges between Roland and 
Ganelon hardly results from an impuissance of authority or from a failure to 
recognize the dangers posed by such verbal excess.3 On this count the text 
informs us: “He wishes to lead into error those from France” ( ‘Par cels de 
France voelt il del tu t errer"). (errer -se comporter, s ’Ogarer, se tromper, mener
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en erreur.) Charlemagne is seen from the beginning as putting an end to both 
concilium and that part of vassalic honor it serves to protect.
Though Charlemagne does not contest the choice of Ganelon for the 
presumably fatal mission to the Saracen, his response to Ganelon’s demand 
that Roland be relegated to the equally dangerous position as head o f the 
rearguard is altogether different. Charlemagne cries out to Ganelon:
Si li ad dit “Vos estes vifs dTabtes.” (1.746)
(He said to him: ‘You are the living devil.')
And yet, though Charlemagne is keenly aware o f the vicious intent o f
Ganelon’s counsel (“Vos estes vifs diables. ") he does nothing to prevent it 
from having the intended fatal effect. Charles’ betrayal o f Ganelon reads very 
much ‘on the surface of things;’ the betrayal of Roland and the French at 
Roncevaux, however, though deftly obscured is no less evident among the 
many textual ‘accidents’ all of which point to betrayal.
Vengeance
From the outset of the council of barons (II. 180 -  ff.) Roland is seen to 
be straddling two worlds, one represented by the old order, the other 
represented by the new. On the one hand, he plays a critical role in bringing 
about the destruction of the social order based upon vassal allegiance. This 
he does, firstly, by proclaiming a profound if unspoken truth. Pointing to the 
dramatic example of Basan and Basile, Roland effectively accuses the feudal 
system of vassal allegiance o f acquiescing to an endless round o f systemic 
violence. Underscoring the system’s fatal flaw, he recommends that 
Charlemagne dispense forthwith with that institution, consilium, which is one
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of, if not the pillar o f feudal social order. On the other hand, Roland himself 
slips back into the old pattern o f deception and violence, not the least instance 
o f which is his recommendation of Ganelon for the perilous mission to the 
Saracen. In the interim o f change, Roland is content to play at the 
advantages offered by both worlds.
In a bold move that will define the first step into a new social and 
political order Roland responds to Blancandrin’s proposal fo r reconciliation 
between Saracens and Franks with a call for vengeance4:
“Faites la guer cum vos I’avez enprise,
En Sarraguce menez vostre ost banie,
Metez le sege a tute vostre vie.
Si vengez cels que li fels fist ocire!” (II. 210 -  213)
(‘Continue to make war as you set out to do:
Lead your summoned men to Saragossa,
Lay siege for all your life,
Avenge those whom the felon had killed!’)
In these lines Roland fairly defines ‘vengeance’ as it operates within the first 
half (through line 2396) o f the text. Vengeance will pursue the Saracens, 
those ostensibly responsible for the murder of Basan and Basile. But, if the 
reader were to give a broader interpretation to line 213, ‘Avenge those whom 
the felon had killed!’ (“S i vengez cels que li fels fis t ocire!’), then he would 
recognize that vengeance does indeed cast a much wider net within the text. 
The felon, the outlaw, the one who kills by deception and betrayal would 
include many within the Frankish camp, the most obvious example of whom 
would be Ganelon. And is it not true that the Emperor wreaks his own brand 
of vengeance upon Ganelon under the rubric ‘ju ise ’ during the ‘trial’ of the 
same? And are the French and Roland not the victims o f this same
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vengeance in repayment for the passive role they played in the betrayal of 
Basan and Basile? Vengeance, it would seem, unleashes its destructive force 
without discrimination, through the camps o f the Saracens and the Franks 
alike.
Ganelon, who appears to sense the inherent potential fo r unleashed 
violence that harbors in Roland’s proposal, speaks prophetically when he 
declares:
“Ki go vos lodet que cest plait degetuns,
Ne li chalt, sire, de quel mort nus muriuns.
Cunseill d’orguill n’est dreiz que a plus munt;
Laissun les fols, as sages nus tenuns!* (II. 226 - 29)
(‘Anyone who advises that you reject this offer 
He does not care, sire, from which death we should die.
Counsel of pride, it is not right that this should increase:
Leave this to fools, and with the wise let us be one!’)
These words ring true considering that Roland, the “K i go vos lodet”  of 
Ganelon’s accusation, will do little to circumvent the coming slaughter. But 
beyond this point o f minor prophecy, Ganelon also carefully culls out just 
those epithets that describe all that is dangerous about the character o f 
Roland.5 Cunseill d ’orguill, echoing the words of advice given by Roland at II. 
205 - 06, is the advice which urges that no advice be taken; Roland, as has 
already been stated, invokes instead an immediate call to arms with 
vengeance as its motivation (II. 210 - 13). Additionally, Ganelon places 
himself on the side o f Les sages, those who would take counsel, providing the 
foil that identifies Roland as chief among les fols. Between les sages and les 
fols it is clear that fate casts its lot with the ’foolish,’ those who would launch 
into immediate warfare.
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But Ganelon’s words reveal to us, the readers o f this text, a quality o f 
character immanent to Yes fols' that is fa r more dangerous than mere personal 
recklessness; namely, they (les fols) do not care “what kind o f death we 
should d ie ...' (“de quel mort nus muriuns”). Replacing the second hemistich 
of line 228 with the post-ceasural -de quel mort nus muriuns o f line 227 we 
arrive at the following construct:
............................ // de quel mort nus muriuns
Consill d’orguill // ......................................
(................................... // from which death we should die)
(Counsel of pride / / .................................................. )
The collapse o f the institution of council (cunseill) brings down with it the 
social institution upon which all feudal allegiance is premised, the institution of 
mutual protection and aid which, in old French, goes by the name aie, in Latin: 
auxilium. The ‘fools’ o f Ganelon’s reproach are more than foolish, they are 
the agents who will cause ruin to the social and political order upon which 
Ganelon depends for both protection and advantage.
Ganelon’s ‘judgement concerning Roland acquires validity at laisse 63, 
in the scene where Charlemagne offers Roland the opportunity to integrate his 
forces with those of the other Franks. There, sensing that Roland and his 
men are vulnerable to attack and devastation, Charlemagne offers sturdy 
reinforcement:
“Bel sire nigs, or savez veirement 
Demi mun host vos lerrai en present 
Retenez les, 90  est vostre salvement."
Qo dit li quens: “Jo n’en ferai nient 
Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!
.XX. milie Francs retendrai ben vaillanz." (II. 784 - 89)
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(‘My dear lord nephew, know this truly,
I leave to you presently half my men.
Retain them, it is your salvation!’
Said the count ‘I will do no such thing;
May God confound me, if I so disgrace the geste!
Twenty thousand very valiant Franks shall I keep.’
Roland refuses reinforcements out o f a sense o f ‘honor,’ this he states 
explicitly at line 788: ‘May God confound me, if I so disgrace the geste!’ (‘Deus 
me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!”) In this situation, however, 
Charlemagne would be no less aware than Roland of the blatant affront that 
this proposition represents to honur. Charles’ offer o f ‘salvement,’ then, is 
calculated to misfire, to be summarily refused. Nonetheless, the refusal of 
Charles’ ‘sensible’ counsel and aid at this critical moment certainly does speak 
to the accusation that Roland is among les fols.
Furthermore, Roland’s refusal of Charles’ aid has equally to do with his 
desire to maintain autonomous authority over the geste, whether one 
understand by geste the narrative product o f Roncevaux, or the Frankish 
nobles who will author the geste in Roland’s name. Evidence of this comes 
only a few lines down as Roland proceeds to gather forces drawing from The 
Franks of France, our land.’ (Francs de France, nostre tere). He instructs 
Gautier de I’Hum to be particularly selective in choosing those who are to 
serve under him in the rearguard at Roncevaux:
Li quens Rollant Gualter de I’Hum apelet
“Pemez mil Francs de France, nostre tere... (II. 803 - 04)
Respunt Gualter “Pur vos le dei ben faire."
Od mil Franceis de France, la lur tere,
Gualter desrenget les destreiz e les tertres.) (II. 808 -1 0 )
(The Count Roland calls to Gautier de I'Hum:
Take a thousand Franks from France, our land.’
Gautier responds: 'For you I should do it well.’
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He takes a thousand Frenchmen of France, their land,
Gautier leads through the mountain passes and the elevations.)
It is fitting, and in accord with feudal custom that a lord, going into battle, 
should gather around him men from ‘his own land;’ for one, the ties o f 
obligation are more immediate, hence, the opportunities for something to go 
wrong more remote. The text, however, does something most subtly 
subversive with a switch from one highly overdetermined word to another: 
Roland asks that a thousand men be chosen from among the Franks o f 
France; Gautier complies with diligence. The text, however, contradicts 
Roland’s express wishes by granting him not a thousand Fanks but in their 
place a thousand Frenchmen. Roland has no claim to authority over the 
larger political body that is to become France, nor does he have authority over 
its subjects, who will be Frenchmen; Frenchmen are subjects to the Emperor, 
and not Roland. From this we surmise that the text supplants Roland’s 
wishes (the Franks) with the wishes o f Charlemagne. Though Roland 
staunchly refuses the Emperor’s men (II. 787 -  88), he gets them anyway; 
only in far lesser number.
All the same, the reader would be in error to suppose that Roland 
adheres strictly to the allegiances determined by the complex web o f feudal 
obligations, or, that Charlemagne seeks simply to destroy them. The jealousy 
with which Roland hews to his own, the Franks of France, only tells half the 
story. And, it is neither Roland nor Charlemagne but Ganelon, who, in 
response to Blancandrin’s questioning, first reveals to the reader the ‘true’
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nature of the relationship between Roland and those to whom the text prefers 
to call the Franceis de France, la lurtere6:
Dist Blancandrins: ‘Mult est pesmes Rollant,
Ki tute gent voelt faire recreant 
E tutes teres met en chalengement!
Par quele gent quiet il espleiter tant?"
Guenes respunt “Par la franceise gent
II I’aiment tant ne li faldrunt nTent.." (II. 392 - 97)
(Said Blancandrin: “Roland is of the very worst sort 
Who wishes to subdue all peoples 
And to place claim on all lands'
With what people does count on to accomplish such exploits?'
Ganelon responds: ‘The French people:
They love him so, they will never abandon him.’)
Blancandrin begins by noting that Roland is ‘o f the very worst sort.’ Then he 
says something which must surely have struck a chord with Ganelon; 
Blancandrin observes that Roland ‘wishes to subdue all peoples II And to 
place claim on all lands!’ (...tute gent voelt faire recreant / /  E tutes teres met 
en chalengement!') Who, to paraphrase Blancandrin, are those who would 
help him in these exploits? Ganelon has ready answer: ‘The French people: // 
They love him so, they will never abandon him!’ (“.../a franceise gent. / /  II 
I ’aiment tant ne li faldrunt nient.") From Ganelon’s account, it would seem that 
Roland has already laid claim to ‘all peoples...[from] all lands’ within the realm 
o f France. The question, however, is not ‘Is this true ...,’ but, rather, ‘In what 
way is this true of the relation between Roland and the ‘Franceis de France?’ 
The text itself is hagiographic in its treatment o f Roland, and the ‘many 
peoples’ under Charlemagne’s command are led to ‘sanctify’ him in that scene 
(II. 2962 -  73) just prior to the gathering up o f forces for a final battle against 
Baligant. But Roland’s claim to the ‘Frenchmen o f France’ is based solely 
upon personal prestige, solely upon a concept o f onor that has more in
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common with the 17th century concept o f gloire than with the complex web of 
feudal relations which onor largely determines. More than any other thing 
within the text it is Roland’s willingness to sacrifice all for the sake o f prestige 
that merits him the epithets orguillos (I. 474) and folie (1.1724).
Whereas Roland covets that measure of prestige which effectively 
demands that all Frenchmen grant him recognition, Charlemange seeks to 
bring together the 'Frenchmen of France’ in a far more practical, political way. 
This is shown by the manner in which the Emperor integrates his forces in 
preparation for the battle against Baligant. At laisses 218 - 225, the text 
shows Charlemagne assimilating his host into units which draw their leader 
from one region, their fighting men from another. Here ‘Ogier the Dane’ is 
assigned to lead ‘the brave men of Bavaria,’ ‘Herman, duke of Thrace’ is 
allotted the “Allemans who come from ‘Germany,’” 'Tedbald of Reims’ 
receives under his command the ‘Bretons,’ ‘Hamon and Rembald of Galicia’ 
receive the ‘Flemings and the brave lords of Frisia,’ and ‘Tierry, the duke of 
Argonne’ will lead into battle both the ‘Men of Lorraine’ and those of 
‘Burgundy.’ Allegiance is created not according to proximity o f geography or 
of blood relation but by the ‘word’ of the Emperor. Here, for the first time, the 
reader sees a truly unified picture of the ‘Frenchmen o f France.’
For Roland, death does not bar the path leading to onor and to the 
production of the geste (cf.: I. 788); quite the contrary. Though he is far less 
forthright about his willingness to sacrifice any and all others to attain this 
same end, his ‘secret’ is revealed, obliquely nonetheless, in the following
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lines. Here he conceives o f death at Roncevaux as a ‘totality1 from which 
none will escape:
“Felun paien mar i vindrent as porz:
Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a mort” (IL 1057 -  58)
(‘These felon pagans shall rue the day they came to the pass:
I swear to you, all are judged to die.')
‘Felun paien mar i sunt asemblez:
Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt a mort livrez.” (II. 1068 - 69)
(These felon pagans shall rue the day they assembled,
I swear to you, all will be delivered into death.')
Roland holds unequivocally to the point that ‘a ll are judged to die, ’ ‘a ll w ill be 
delivered into death’ signaling that his own Franks are being prepared to die 
into the all consuming idea o f pure prestige. How different this idea o f death- 
as-totality from the death for which Ganelon prepares at lines 310 -  318. 
There, Ganelon offers his life on the condition of a continuum: that his onor 
(property, privileges, prestige) be maintained in and through the continued 
existence o f his son and heritor, Baldwin. Death as radical annihilation is a 
revolutionary concept introduced by Roland under the rubric o f ‘vengeance’ 
(cf.: II. 196 -  213); it is a concept which Charlemagne will put into practice 
during the trial of Ganelon as a means o f establishing his dreit among the 
French. Those to whom Roland refers as the felun paien in line 1068 will be 
contrasted with another group of ‘felons’, those who survive the ordeal o f the 
trial o f Ganelon and to whom Charlemagne refers as his own. There, in 
claiming for himself those French who have acquiesced to judgement against 
Ganelon, Charlemagne will cry out: ‘You are my felons...!’ (“Vos estes m i 
felun").
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The manner in with the French are led into death by Roland is the topic
of a rhetorical exposition in which Oliver harshly criticizes his companion.
Oliver explains death in terms of a loss to community, and faults Roland for
the act o f recklessness that he name proGcce:
Qo dist Rollant ‘Porquei me portez ire?”
E il respont “Cumpainz, vos le feTstes,
Kar vasselage par sens nen est folie;
Mielz valt mesure que ne fait estultie.
Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karion de nus n'avrat servise.
Sem creisez, venuz I fust mi sire,
Ceste bataille ousum faite u prise,
U pris u mort I fust li reis Marsilie.
Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veimes!
Karies li magnes de nos n’avrat aie." (II. 1722 - 32)
(Roland spoke: ‘Why do you bear this anger toward me?’
And Oliver responds: ‘Friend, you did it yourself.
For vassalage is through reason and not folly:
Good measure is better than stupidity.
The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us in his service.
If you had believed me, my lord would have come,
We would have had and won this battle,
And King Marsile would be either captured or killed.
Would that we had never been witness to your prowess, Roland!
Charlemagne will have no help from us.’)
Roland’s prowess in battle is laudatory, memorable, but also destructive. It 
flows out o f his decision to spurn counsel, and this sets Roland, along with the 
entire contingency of la franceise gent, apart from the remainder of the 
Franks. A fatal, hence, non-reparable rift is thereby created within the 
Frankish camp. Roland's prowess demands the acknowledgment o f his own 
personal prestige at the expense of that o f all others; hence, it corrodes 
communal bonds by fostering a notion of Roland as the absolute presence of 
the ‘One.’ It is this, Roland’s ‘auto-deictic’ pro-Scce —‘behold, here I am!’- ,  
that lies at the bottom of all the coming woes.
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The excesses of Roland’s prodcce are cause for only half the blame 
leveled against him by Oliver; words like estultie, folie and legerie round out 
the ledger in this lengthy testament o f censure. And yet, here within this 
passage, it is only on the most superficial level that the words folie (folly) and 
estultie (stupidity) bear a meaning similar to that o f legerie. The reader would 
be naive to assume, along with Oliver, that it was only ‘folly’, ‘stupidity1 and 
’senselessness’ that led Roland into the fatal error that was Roncevaux. 
Roland seems, all along, too aware of the risks (cf.: II. 787 -  88) too 
determined to continue in the face o f all the direst consequences (supra: 
comments on lines 1057 -  58; 1068 -  69) for the reader to ascribe his ‘error’ 
to anything like ‘folly,’ ‘stupidity,’ or ‘senselessness.’ To affirm this hypothesis 
I simply turn to the three other passages o f the Roland in which the word 
legerie is employed.
The first is that passage where Roland urges Charlemagne to abandon 
council and proceed directly into war against the Saracen:
“A voz Franceis un cunseill en presistes,
Loerent vos alques de legerie." (II. 205 -  206)
('You have taken counsel of your French about this,
They offered you foolish advice.')
Here Roland is seemingly content not to impugn the intentions of the French 
council that sent Basan and Basile to their deaths as emissaries to the 
Saracen. However, those two remaining passages of the Roland which 
employ the word legerie do so by skewing its meaning toward the cynical. 
Below, Ganelon accepts the role o f ‘emissary’ to which he has been
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nominated’ by Roland; but in doing so, he forewarns his stepson of a bit of 
foolishness’ that is about to be sent his way:
“En Sarraguce en irai a Marsilie.
Einz I frai un poi de legerie
Que jo n’esclair ceste meie grant ire." (II. 299 -  301)
('I will go to Marsile in Saragossa.
But I’ll do something a bit 'foolish'
Before I clear this great anger of mine.’)
By the phrase “something a bit ‘foolish’” (un po i de legerie) it is eminently clear 
that Ganelon means to communicate ‘something a bit tricky.’ Legerie, within 
this context, indicates a menace that will arrive only at the unexpected 
moment. In the fourth, and only other passage within the Roland to employ 
the word legerie the term is clearly associated with intentional violence. 
Marsile chooses the word legerie to describe the action whereby he nearly 
runs Ganelon through with his ‘gold-feathered’ spear:
"Bel sire Guenes," go li ad dit Marsilie,
"Jo vos ai fait alques de legerie,
Quant por ferir vus demustrai grant ire." (II. 512 -  514)
('Dear Sir Ganelon,’ thus spoke Marsile,
‘I did something a bit foolish to you.
When I vented my great anger and made as if to strike you.’)
In a general way, the reader can note that this ‘foolishness,’ which is legerie,
always, within the Roland, results in a dire outcome, and that it has at least
the suspicion o f underhandedness about it. Having said this, we can only
remark that Roland is in default with regards to his obligations to his liege
vassals, and that he has acted surreptitiously by having disclosing nothing to
the franceise gent with regards to the fact that ‘all are judged to die,’ ‘all will be
delivered into death.'
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E x ill
In the preceding discussion, referring to lines 1731 — 32 in particular, I 
remarked that ‘O liver explains death in terms o f a loss to community.’ The 
loss at Roncevaux, however, is of an especially peculiar kind, in that all 
members o f the ‘specific’ warrior community who were allied with Roland 
through feudal/familial obligation perish in battle. Virtually all the fighting 
nobles o f that particular kinship are annihilated, and so, it is noteworthy about 
the death o f the Franks at Roncevaux that, when shame comes circling home, 
no one among them is left to seek honor’s restitution through vengeance. It is 
appropriate, then, that ‘death,’ ‘honur,’ ‘shame,’ and ‘vengeance’ should all be 
defined in a new way, as they will be in the couplet subsequent to lines 1731 -  
32. Let us continue our reading from line 1731 and following:
“Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la veTmes!
Karles li Magnes de nos n’avrat are.
N’ert mais tel home d6 s qu’a Oeu juTse.
Vos i murrez e France en ert hunie.
Oi nus defalt la leial cumpaignie:
Einz le vespre mult ert gref la departie." (II. 1731 - 36)
('Your prowess, Roland, better never to have been witness to it!
Charles the great will no longer have us in his service.
Never more will such a man exist until God's judgement
You will die here, and France will be shamed.
Today our loyal (legal) companionage comes to an end
Before dusk, our parting will be most sad.’)
First, let us examine line 1736, specifically the phrase ‘/a le ia l cumpaignie;’ we 
might translate ‘le ia l’ as ‘loyal,’ but also as ‘legal,’ cumpaignie’ might be 
translated as ‘companionage,’ but also as ‘community.’ The reader is, then, 
left with the choice of interpreting line 1736 as a separation through death of 
one ‘loyal friend’ from another o r as the separation through death of one ‘legal 
community’ from another ‘legal community.’ To shed light on the question we
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appeal to the preceding couplet where the reader is again faced with choices 
in meaning. Who is ‘such a man’ (te l home)? Charlemagne o r the man who 
stood always ready to provide him aid (a/"e)? When is the ‘divine judgement1 
(Deu jui'se) to occur? Is this the last judgement o f heaven and o f earth? Or is 
it the last judgement o f the text, that o f the trial o f Ganelon? W ill there be no 
other such man as Charlemagne until the time o f the last judgement? Or will 
there never again be such men as those who died at Roncevaux from the time 
that Ganelon and kin, men ‘loyal’ to the order determined by the force o f 
honur, die in the outcome of a trial that is decided by God’s judgement alone?
Of all the verses in this one speech by Oliver none presents more 
compelling evidence in favor o f our reading than that o f line 1734. The 
mechanism whereby honur, through an act of retaliation, is repurchased from 
shame is typically earned out by one member, or members, of a community 
for another member, or members, o f the same community. Here, however, 
the text speaks o f all o f ‘France’ being shamed (e France en ert hunie) so that 
‘vengeance’ will be carried out not by members of the community o f which 
Roland was a part, but by members o f all communities which now come 
together to constitute the political entity which will be called ‘France.’ It is 
God’s judgement (Deu juTse), striking final vengeance against Ganelon and 
kin, which will usher this new political entity into existence. Here is where, in 
the couplet at II. 1732 -  33, Oliver makes the sublime connection between are 
and jui'se —Karles li magnes de nos n ’avrat are / /  N ’ert mais tel home desqu’a 
jui'se. W ith the demise of auxilium -K arles li magnes de nos n’avrat are—
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Charles turns to divine judgement -N ’ert mais tel home entrequ’a l Deu ju ise— 
as the means by which to continue the new realm.
Death, as Oliver defines it at II. 1735 - 36, is death in the feudal mode, 
it is a disruption within the communal continuum -O / nus defalt la leial 
cumpaignie— a continuum that could always be re-established through a 
subsequent act o f vengeance. Following Roncevaux, however, the cycle is 
broken and honur becomes the casualty when ‘worldly’ vengeance is replaced 
with divine judgement. That judgement (juise) pertains not just to the 
Saracen, who, by the end o f the epic, have either been ‘converted’ or swept 
from the Iberian peninsula, but also to the Franks who, at the trial o f Ganelon, 
either accept Charlemagne’s new order or will be eradicated from France 
dulce, from the ‘sweet real of France.’ One of the tenets of the old, feudal 
social order was that as one’s death was avenged, so was one’s honur 
restored; vengeance was, in a sense, a process o f ‘memorialization.’ In the 
new order under Charlemagne, however, vengeance is replaced with divine 
judgement (Deu juise) and the one who is thereby condemned to die will 
never be avenged; all memory of him will be eradicated from existence.
In the Roland ‘death’ - Vos i  m urrez- and ‘shame’ -e  France en ert 
hunie— are affinitive aspects of honur. To begin with, we remark that Roland 
understands honur strictly in terms o f shame averted or shame postponed (cf.: 
II. 1091; 1701; 1710; 1927); not once within the text does Roland speak of 
honur other than in reference to its negation ‘shame’. Similarly, shame 
(hunie) is again and again redeemed as honur through a cycle o f deadly
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vengeance, so that honur is restituted, and shame averted, only when, 
through vengeance, ‘death is paid with death.’
There is a passage within the text where Roland seems to be at work 
preparing for the demise o f auxilium (aie) and fo r the advent o f divine 
judgement. Just subsequent to having assigned a place in paradise to the 
souls of the fallen at Roncevaux, Roland proceeds to interpret their death in 
terms of a series o f transfers o f allegiance:
‘Meillors vassals de vos unkes ne vi.
Si lungement tuz tens m’avez servit,
A oes Carton si granz pals cunquis!
Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!
Tere de France, mult estes dulz pals,
Oi desertet [a tant rubosti exill].
Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murrir 
Je ne vos pois tenser ne guarantor;
Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!
Oliver, ffere, vos ne dei jo faillir.
De doel murrai, s'altre ne m’i ocit
Sire cumpainz, alum i referir!" (II. 1857 - 68)
('Better vassals than you I have never seen:
For so long a tome you have constantly served me,
You have conquered such great countries for Charles!
But the Emperor nourished you for naught!
Land of France, you are most sweet.
Today made desolate by a most terrible disaster!
Noble Frenchmen, I see you dying for me,
I cannot protect or save you.
May God, who never did lie, have/help you!
Oliver, brother, I must not fail you,
I will die of grief, if someone does not kill me first 
Companion, sir, let us go and strike blows once more!’)
Roland begins by distinguishing between what he considers as rightfully his 
from that which belongs to Charles. Thus, in the process o f ‘freeing’ his men 
from service to the Emperor (auxilium) Roland claims them exclusively for his 
own - Barons franceis, pur m ei vos vei m urrir (1.1863). Lines 1860 - 62 center 
on the etymologically ambivalent exill - exilium  (exile); excidium  (excision, 
causing to disappear)-- adding significantly to Oliver’s previous definition of
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death at lines 1735 - 36. For Roland death is exile, but exile is more...exile is 
total annihilation. It is in refusing counsel and in choosing to depart from the 
community that Roland is forsfiet. Whereas Roland abandons counsel during 
the early dispute with Ganelon (cf.: II. 205 - ff.) at Roncevaux, he likewise 
abandons auxilium by lifting the obligatory ties that bind vassal to lord (cf.: II. 
1863 - 65). Roland seeks to supersede Charlemagne in declaring that the 
latter has nourished the chevaliers to no purpose, that at Roncevaux they die 
not to Charlemagne’s glory but to the glory o f Roland exclusively (I. 1863). 
Next, in conceding a failure to protect and to guarantee the honur o f those 
fallen at Roncevaux (1.1864), Roland makes one last transference of auxilium, 
and o f a/'e, I. 1865. Service (auxilium), in this passage, has shifted from 
Charles to Roland (I. 1860), then from Roland to God (I. 1865). But this 
covenant between God and the chevaliers established by Roland is a 
covenant between the Divine and dead men. Roland envisions no future for 
France beyond the apogee of his own glory. A t lines 1866 - 68, Roland 
announces his death not as a departure, but as one being struck down (ocit), 
as one who ceases to exist in absolute terms. Roland’s legacy will be one not 
o f existential continuity, but of preserved memory -Barons franceis, pur mei 
vos vei murir— and fo r the sake of commemoration, Roland seeks total 
annihilation rather than the reclamation o f honur. Roland goes into death 
urging that death be met with death, that one killing blow -o c it-  be met with 
another and another —alum i  referir.
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Upon his return, Charlemagne immediately works to distance himself 
from those fallen at Roncevaux. In a formally structured ubi sunt (laisse 177), 
elaborating on the same basic procedure used by Roland at laisse 140, 
Charlemagne proceeds to ask counsel directly from God:
“E! Deus!" dist Carles, "ja sunt il ja si luinz!
Cunsentez [Cunseiliez 1922] mei e dreiture e honur
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur." (II. 2429 - 31)
('Oh, God!’ said Charles, ‘They are already so far removed from us!
Grant me my right and my honur
From me they have taken the flower of France.')
As if in fulfillment o f the prophecy implicit in the prosodic connections made in 
Oliver’s speech between ale and jui'se, an angel of God appears to 
Charlemagne whereby the ‘right’ to vengeance supplants the office of 
counsel:
“La flur de France as perdut, go set Deus.
Venger te poez de la gent criminel.” (II. 2455 - 56)
('You have lost the flower of France, God knows this;
You are able to wreak vengeance on the criminal race.')
As a consequence to the elimination o f concilium  and auxilium, honur can only 
fall into precipitous decline. Charles will accept vengeance and jui'se, in place 
o f auxilium  and cunseill, as the instruments by which to establish his ‘right1 
(dreiture).
As was the case with Roland, Charles, too, sees honur in terms of its 
negativity; yet whereas Roland persistently referenced honur as the protection 
and guarantee against hunte (1091; 1701; 1707; 1927; 2337), Charles (II. 
1867 - 68) conceives of honur as a settling o f the score against the Saracens. 
He deals them a measure of shame (hunte) equal to that suffered by the 
Franks at Roncevaux; thus begins the emperor’s quest for dreiture. Whereas
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Roland has essentially abandoned honur the moment he concedes a failure to 
provide protection and guarantee for his Franks, Charlemagne forsakes honur 
in a calculation that replaces the obligations o f protection with a desire for 
vengeance.
Returning from the foray against those Saracens who managed to 
survive Roncevaux, Charlemagne announces honor’s end:
“La meie honor est tumet en declin.” (1.2890)
(‘My honor has turned in decline.’)
The elimination o f the last remaining chevaliers from Roncevaux marks an 
absolute end of honor for Charles. He reaffirms and elaborates on this 
assessment in a passage in proximity to the above:
“Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m’onur;
Suz ciel ne quid aveir ami un sui;
Se jo ai parenz, n’en i ad nul si proz.” (II. 2902 - 05)
(‘How my power and my strength will fall!
I shall have no one to sustain my honur;
I don’t think I have a sole friend under the heavens:
Though I have kinsmen, none are so courageous as he.’)
These lines detail with greatest economy the dissolution o f all honur, the 
interdependence of honor's two aspects, auxilium and concilium, have 
dissolved. Charlemagne’s reference to parenz is telling in that the material 
expanse of empire has overcome the prerogatives o f the individual authority 
common to feudal organization. Hence, at laisse 208 not individual 
chevaliers, but the anonymous heads of state arrive asking for Roland.
Charles responds to these inquiring heads of state by saying that 
Roland is dead, that for the moment the empire stands headless, and that the
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need for a substitute is pressing. W ithin his own empire as well there will be 
revolt, and Charles will again answer
Internally as well as externally, Charles creates by means o f this locution the 
need for a strongly unifying force in replacement o f Roland. With lines 2904 - 
05, the text bounds forward to a solution. Charles laments the loss o f his sole 
friend (ami un sul, II. 2909;2916;2933),7 Roland, who has extended his powers 
of auxilium  to the extent that, in offering protection to the entire realm, he was 
no longer able to guarantee the protection of the honur o f his own chevaliers. 
Charles no longer has the likes o f such a confederate in arms as was Roland, 
and so he turns to another sort o f subject, one described obliquely in line 2905 
as the prototype of Tierry -H eingre out le cors e graisle e schewid— who will 
rise as the mediator of divine juTse during the trial o f Ganelon.
Auxilium, the force previously used to fend off shame, is replaced by 
vengeance, the instrument o f divine retribution greater than any individual, 
which is used to crush anyone who stands in defiance o f the newly 
established law. Honor is first put to rest in the grave o f the three chevaliers 
memorialized by Charlemagne:
“Morz est mis nigs, ki tant me fist cunquere.”
('My nephew, who conquered so much for me, is dead.’)
(1.2920)
A grant honor pois les unt enterrez...
(They were able to inter them with great honor) 
Then again, and with finality, at the burial of Aide:
(i. 2960)
Lunc un alter belement I’enterrerent 
Muit grant honur i ad Ii reis dunee. (II. 3732 - 33)
(Beside an altar, in noble fashion she was interred; 
The King had given her great honor.)
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When at line 2430, Charlemagne begs of God: ‘Cunseillez m ei e dreiture e 
honur/ and God responds with a call to vengeance, God’s implicit ’counsel’ is 
that Charles should begin the transition whereby honur will be replaced by 
dreiture and aTe will be replaced by vengeance. The text affords a detailed 
comparison of dreiture and honur as an alternative opposition.
Whereas the opposition between honur and hunte is a constant, the 
opposition between dreiture and honur is a historic variable that, unlike the 
first pair, cuts the text diachronicalfy, marking a historical disjunction that 
defines the dynamics o f conflict within the text. This dynamic opposition is 
illuminated by comparing two passages, one incipient to the conflict at 
Roncevaux, the other setting in motion the post-Roncevaux confrontation 
between Saracens and Franks. As already mentioned, Charlemagne begins 
the movement against the Saracens by consultation not with his chevaliers, 
but with God:
“Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur.” (I. 2430)
('Counsel me in right and in honor.')
Marsile, by contrast, requests the counsel o f his barons:
“Cunseilez mei // cume mi saive hume.
Si me guarisez // e de mort e de hunte!” (II. 20-21)
(‘Counsel me // like wise men
Protect me // from death and from shame!’)
Through the use o f chiasmus we find in this couplet a truth bome out by the 
text, namely, that from Blancandrin’s counsel, Marsile will visit shame and 
death upon both camps at Roncevaux:
“Si m' guarisez // cume mi saive hume,
Cunseilez mei // e de mort e de hunte."
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(‘Protect me // like wise men
Counsel me // from death and from shame.’)
Now in placing Charlemagne’s call to counsel in superimposition over that of 
Marsiie’s call to counsel, we find this significant difference, not between 
Saracen and Frank, but between king and emperor:
Cunseillez mei // e dreiture e honur.
Cunseilez mei // e de mort e de hunte.
(Counsel me // in right and in honor)
(Counsel me // in death and in shame)
A comparison of these reconstructed hemistiches reveals two parallel
progressions within the text, one synchronic and the other diachronic. The
synchronic, ‘vertical’ axis is brought into definition at the moment o f Roland’s
death. Up until that moment, the opposition between the term honur and the
term hunte had been a narrative constant. Following Roland’s death,
however, the opposition between honur and hunte lapses and is replaced by
the opposition between mort and dreiture. Hence, the opposition between
honur and hunte, which defines the thematic opposition in the first narrative
half o f the Roland, is exchanged for the opposition between mort and dreiture
which defines the thematic opposition in the second narrative half of the
Roland. This exchange of oppositional terms honur/hunte for mort/dreiture
occurs just at the moment of Roland's death and so causes rupture in the
narrative linearity of the text. For this reason the axis that is defined at the
moment o f the exchange between honur/hunte :: mort/dreiture defines an axis
that is ‘vertical’ in that it divides the text into two semi-autonomous narrative
segments.
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The shift from one of these two oppositional dyads to the other 
inaugurates a shift from the social and political order circumscribed by the 
dynamics o f the oppositional pair honor/hunte to a social and political order 
that is circumscribed by the oppositional pair mort/dreiture. Roland, author of 
the text’s first narrative, is ‘exemplary’ o f the order governed by the opposition 
honor/hunte; Charlemagne, author o f the second narrative panel, is exemplary 
o f the order governed by mort/dreiture. There is, however, a diachronic, 
‘horizontal’ axis whose progression tends to erase all evidence o f narrative 
rupture coincident with the death o f Roland. That axis can be described in 
this way: though the shift from the pairing of honor/hunte to the pairing of 
mort/dreiture points up difference, the translation o f the term honor into the 
term dreiture, and the translation of the term hunte into the term mort places a 
decided emphasis on narrative continuity as the text crosses over into the 
post-Roncevaux narrative. Hence, whereas it can be said that Roland 
purchases honor by avenging shame (his own for the failure to protect the 
Franks at Roncevaux [cf.: “Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantor,” I. 1864]), 
Charlemagne purchases dreiture at the expense o f the lives not just of 
Qanelon and kin, but especially at the cost of the lives o f Roland and of the 
Franks who die at Roncevaux.
D eu ju i'se
The struggle within the text from the beginning through the battle at 
Roncevaux is determined by an opposition between honur and hunte, but not 
in such simplistic terms. Honur, in fact, is the chief concern o f Ganelon, and it
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is through the exercise o f concilium  that honur is preserved. Hunte, on the 
other hand, is the chief concern o f Roland, and it is through the skillful 
exercise o f auxilium  that shame is warded o ff from the Frankish camp. Death, 
the complete cessation of existence, is more properly a post- Roncevaux 
concern, because it is only in the conflict between Charlemagne and Baligant 
that the possibility o f nothingness is confronted. As the reader crosses over 
the text’s central divide marked by the death of Roland, in the place of 
concilium  we find ju ise  and in place o f honur we find dreiture, for it is the 
judgement o f God rather than the counsel o f Charlemagne's barons that will 
solidify post-Roncevaux power. In place o f auxilium we find vengeance and in 
place o f hunte we find mort; for whereas Roland’s chief concern, at least 
going into the battle at Roncevaux, was to guard the French and France 
against shame (1091; 1701; 1707; 1927; 2337), this shifts to a deliberate 
pursuit of visiting shame upon the enemy, beginning with Roland’s instructive 
oration on death and in particular verses 1867 - 68, with the prosodic point 
and counterpoint o f their respective verb endings (ocit -die by sword blow- 
referir the progressive form of ferir) suggesting repeated death blows in return.
These double axes which divide the text both ‘vertically’ and 
‘horizontally’ can be represented in the form of a semiotic square:
Dreiture \ honur
hunte | mort
This paradigm carries radical implications as to the division between truth and 
falsehood within the text, a division that is not so simple as the implied ‘moral’
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division between Saracen and Frank, Christian and Pagan. This divide, which 
cuts the text into four ontological quadrants, finds representation in a series of 
verses that thread through the rich tapestry o f this text:
Quant co veit Guenes qu'ore s'en rit Rollant
Dune ad tel doel pur poi d’ire ne fent.. (II. 303 - 04)
(When Ganelon sees how Roland is laughing at him,
He was so pained that he nearly split from rage)
Li quens Rollant tint s’espee sanglente.
Ben ad olt que Franceis se Dementent;
Si grant doel ad que par mi quiet fendre... (II. 1629 - 31)
(Count Roland held his bloody sword.
Well had he heard the French crying out their distress;
He was so sorrowful that he nearly split from grief.)
Si grant doel out que mais ne pout ester. (I. 2219)
(He was so grief stricken that he was no longer able to exist)
“Si grant doel ai que jo ne vuldreie estre!" (I. 2929)
(‘I am so greatly grieved that I would rather not exist!’)
“Si grant dot ai que ne voldreie v i v r e . ( 1 . 2936)  
(‘I am so greatly grieved that I no longer wish to live. )
Si grant doel ad sempres quiad murir... (I. 3506)
(He was so sorrowful, that he thought he would die on the spot)
“Veez paien cum ocient voz humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu’el chef portez corone,
S’or n’i ferez pur venger vostre hunte!” (II. 3537 - 39)
(’See how the pagans are slaughtering your men!
May it never please God that you should wear a crown on your head 
If you do not strike forthwith to avenge your dishonor!’)
Qo dist li reis: “Seignurs, vengez voz doels,
Si esclargiez voz talenz e voz coers,
Kar hoi matin vos vi plurer des oilz.”
Respondent Franc: “Sire, go nus estoet!” (II. 3627 - 30)
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(Then said the King: ‘Lords, avenge your grief.
Make clear your desires and that which your heart wishes to do.
For this morning I saw your eyes crying.’)
The Franks respond: ‘Lord, this we should do!’)
Morz est de doel, si cum pecchet I’encumbret (I. 3646)
(He is dead from sorrow, as though encumbered by a great sin.)
The cardinal moment within the text is that of Charles’ return framed, as we 
have seen, by the orations given by Roland (laisse 140) and by Charles 
(laisse 178) on death. On the one side o f the divide effected by Roland's 
death we find death defined as non-existence and on the other as non-being. 
Roland suffers a separation from community, whereas Charlemagne speaks 
in absolute terms o f a 'ceasing to be’ (“jo  ne vutdreie est re ). Let us now 
examine each of the above passages in context. A t II. 303 - 04 Roland’s 
laugh causes such pain that Ganelon would split —"pur po i d ’ire ne fe n t” 
Indeed, Ganelon perceives that Roland has placed him into a kind of exile 
(exilium; excidium), that his defiant laughter signals to Ganelon and to all 
present that Ganelon has lost his position of honur among the Franks. To 
qualify this observation, I turn to the passage that makes clear that the
selection for this mission to the Saracens and the approval o f this selection by
Charlemagne come as something disgraceful and particularly odious for 
Ganelon:
“Par ceste barbe que veez blancheier,
Li duze per mar i serunt jugez!” (II. 261 - 62)
(‘By this beard which you see is white,
No one of the twelve peers will be judged to lead this mission!’)
Charles has made clear the primary criterion for selecting an emissary to 
Marsile: the chosen must be someone of secondary rank. Roland’s irreverent
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laughter sets Ganelon dramatically apart. Here, already Ganeion blames 
Roland for his coming death:
“Sur mei avez tumet fals jugement’ (I. 307)
(‘You have turned false judgement against me.’)
Ganelon recognizes that the election to this mission to the Saracens indicates 
a purposeful and permanent separation from community.
A t lines 1586 - 88 the anguish that overcomes Roland causes him also 
to ‘split.’ This separation reflected in the ‘split’ o f Roland is, in a sense, far 
more serious and richer in implication. Roland responds to a recognition that 
the French have arrived at the end of their existence:
DTent Franceis: “Mult decheent li nostre!’ (1.1628)
(The French say: ‘Many of ours are falling!’)
This death as separation marks a critical moment in that the historical cycle 
has been broken; not the individual, but the entire community loses existence. 
From this point, logically, death can only be defined in absolute terms as a 
cessation o f being; Roland follows through this transition:
Si grant doel out que mais ne pout ester... (1.2219)
(He was so grief stricken that he was no longer able to stand.)
Ironically, Turpin never goes so far, never makes this passage into the 
complete cessation o f his own existence. Furthermore, the depiction o f his 
death is tinged with blasphemy:
‘La meie mort me rent si anguissus!
Ja ne verrai le riche empereur.” (II. 2198 - 99)
(‘My death leaves me in such anguish:
I shall never see the rich/mighty Emperor!’)
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Among the three chevaliers buried at Saint Romain, only Roland has seen 
death apart from its communal implications as a ceasing altogether of being. 
In rendering service (are) to God alone (I. 1865), Roland has interpreted death 
not merely as a cessation of being, but as the culmination o f all existence, of 
all community, o f la franceise gent finally and forevermore in his own person.8 
Charles, however, has other plans.
Before examining II. 2929 and 2 9 3 6 ,1 turn to  those passages in which 
the Saracens give pellucid example o f death as the alternative to 
Charlemagne’s dreiture. Death for the Saracens is seen as a failure to justify 
their very being. When at verse 3506 the text informs the reader of Baliganfs 
condition (He was so sorrowful, that he would die at once [S i grant doel ad, 
sempres quiad murir\), this is in response to news o f the loss of his son 
Malprimes. For Baligant who has been given dreiture over Espaigne (Li 
amiraill ad Espaigne droit [I. 2747]) with the loss of his heir there is no 
continuance for him, and hence for the Saracen, in Spain. Baligant’s 
messenger, Jangleu d’Outremer, spells out the finality o f this loss:
E cil respunt “Morz estes, Baligant!
Ja vostre deu ne vos erent guarant” (II. 3513 -14)
(And he responded: ‘You are dead, Baligant!
Your gods will not grant you protection.’)
This passage acquires meaning as the reader recollects Roland’s own 
description o f death, the first to portray death in terms of Being and 
Nothingness:
“Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantor;
Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!" (II. 1864 - 65)
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(‘I can not protect or save you.
May God, who never did lie, have/help you!')
The failure of one’s God to provide help (a/'e), as in the case of the Saracen
Baligant, leads ultimately to an absence o f judgement; ju ise  without the
authoritative signature of a protecting godhead leads to the eradication of
being. Hence the textual assertion that concludes this passage:
Li amiralz alques s’en aperceit
Que il ad tort e Cariemagnes dreit (II. 3553 - 54)
(The Emir begins to realize
That he is in the wrong and that Charlemagne is in the right)
The absence o f dreiture henceforth equates with a new and absolute
cessation of being. Marsile’s death at line 3646 (he is the only Saracen or
Frank to die of grief) shows him to be the last remnant of the Saracen
community in Spain save Bramimunde; she will be spared by Charles for
religious instruction and conversion. The remaining anonymous multitude
either embraces Christianity or perishes by the sword, not for defiance o f God,
but for defiance of Charles (II. 3666 - 3670).
With the death o f Marsile comes the text’s last mention o f hunte (I.
3643); honur finds only one subsequent mention, when Aide is buried with
honur. A call to vengeance motivates the push to kill the last o f the patens.
At the trial of Ganelon, Charles asks not for vengeance but for his dre it
‘De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!
II fut en I’ost tresqu’en Espaigne od mei,
Si me tolit .XX. milie de mes Franceis...0 (II. 3751 - 53)
(‘From Ganelon judge for me the right!
He was with me among the warriors all the way to Spain,
And he took from me twenty thousand of my Frenchmen.’)
Ganelon uses the term treason, which Charles is careful to avoid in reference 
to the Franks9:
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“Venget m’en sui, mais n’i ad traTsun.* (I. 3778)
(‘I took vengeance against him, but there is no treason here.')
The text pretends to a separation between the human vengeance meted out 
against the Saracens and the divine vengeance meted out against Ganelon 
and his kin, as though the destruction o f the latter needed the distance o f 
divine mediation to ensure exculpation. The counsel o f the barons who urge 
that Charlemagne should reconcile differences with Ganelon has been 
rejected, and Tierry steps in as the agent o f divine justice which the text 
designates as li dreiz:
Dist li empereres: “Bons pleges en demant"
.XXX. parenz I'i plevissent leial.
Qo dist li reis: “E jol vos recrerai.”
Fait cels guarder tresque li dreiz en serat" (II. 3846 - 49)
(The Emperor said: 'I will have good pledges.'
Thirty kinsmen offer themselves to him as pledge.
This said the King: 'With this I will place him [Ganelon} in your custody.' 
And he placed the hostages under guard until he had his right)
Just as in the prior conflict between Charlemagne and Baligant, Tierry 
prevails, though only by the grace o f God. Thus, the power o f God is 
demonstrated among men; but also, in this delicate matter o f Christians 
destroying Christians, divine mediation disinculpates those who participate in 
this mortal judgement. The reader is shown that both Charles and Tierry 
begin the judgement by ordeal in assigning to God responsibility for its 
outcome:
“E! Deus," dist Carles, “le dreit en esclargiez!” 
('Oh, God’, said Charles, ‘make clear the right!’)
(I. 3891)
Deus facet hoi entre nus dous le dreit!' (I. 3898)
(‘May God establish between us two the right!’)
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The conflict having been ‘miraculously’ decided in Tierry’s favor allows the 
Franks to concur with Charles and Tierry that this is indeed the work of God:
Escrient Franc: "Deus i ad fait vertut!
Asez est dreiz que Guenes seit pendut
E si parent, ki plaidet unt pur lui." (II. 3931 - 34)
(The Franks cry out Through God virtue has prevailed!
It is fitting that Ganelon should be hanged
Together with his kinsmen, who pledged themselves for him.')
The Franks themselves give precision to Charles’ demand made at line 3751. 
Charles’ dreit prescribes that Ganelon and all his kinsmen should undergo 
complete destruction. The Franks respond: ‘It is wrong that a single one o f 
them should live!’ (Respundent Franc: “Ja m aren vivrat uns!, ” I. 3951). This is 
a broad extension o f God’s ‘judgement’ used to sanction the slaughter o f an 
entire group, whose only fault is that they continue to recognize and abide by 
the old law. There is something suspicious about this justice, which in the text 
works progressively toward the profane. At line 1733, Oliver uses the word 
jui'se to refer directly to the last judgement; at line 3368 jufse, which occurs 
here for only the second time within the text, refers to a divine grant o f 
authority to wreak destruction upon the enemy. When the text uses the word 
for a third and final time, it is used to sanction the destruction of Christian by 
Christian. The last two laisse begin with the strangely proprietary use of both 
vengeance and justise:
Quant li empeceres ad faite sa venjance... (I. 3975)
(When the Emperor had made his vengeance...)
Quant I’emperere ad faite sa justise... (I. 3988)
(When the Emperor had made his justice...)
128
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Vengeance and justice correspond to and translate the prior institutions of afe 
and counseill. These institutions (a/e and counseill), which had served to bind 
the feudal peers one to another, now give way to Charlemagne’s own 
vengeance and justice.
In both title and function, the distinction is made between Marsile li reis 
and Baligant I’amiralz, and the distinction is maintained throughout the text. 
The same cannot be said, however, for Charlemagne, to whom the reader is 
introduced as both mis and empemms at once10:
Cartes ii reis, nostre emperere magnes... (1.1)
(Charles the King, our great Emperor...)
As king Charles is wholly ineffectual, hollow, failing completely to guarantee 
honur among his men or to protect them from shame (hunte). On the other 
hand, Charlemagne, the emperor, gains vitality in the pursuit of vengeance 
and power in the justice granted him by God. Whereas the Saracen king and 
the Frankish chevaliers divert all their energies to the maintenance of a state 
of homeostasis between honor and hunte, maintaining the one and averting 
the other, the emperor distinguishes himself by turning from the external 
conflict between Saracens and Franks to one that is internal. Ending the 
ongoing cycle of violence that kept the balance between honor and hunte 
always in play Charlemagne instead finds authority and power, even the 
power o f destruction, in the word —'De Guenelun car me jugez le dm itl" In a 
single occurrence the trial of Ganelon demonstrates before all the chevaliers 
o f the realm the power o f the word and that le dm it belongs solely to the 
emperor.
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Some comfort can be taken at the moment o f death with the knowledge 
that a continuum of one’s existence will be maintained. The refusal to pursue 
that continuum is a choice Charles makes in turning a deaf ear to Ganelon’s 
plea fo r the guarantee of property and family, just as the latter departs on 
what promised to be a fatal mission to the Saracens (II. 310-18). In 
consequence, the cyclical alternation between living and dying, between 
honor and hunte has been replaced by a being that knows no respite. When 
Charles laments at Roland’s death:
“Si grant doel ai que jo ne vuldreie estre!" (I. 2929)
(‘So great is my sorrow that I do not wish to exist!')
“Si grant dol ai que ne vuldreie vivre...” (1.2936)
(‘My sorrow is so great that I do not wish to live!’)
Charles expresses a wish for a cessation o f being, a wish that will not be 
granted. For Roland, Oliver and Turpin, death means, among other things, 
liberation from the never ending struggle to balance honor and hunte. 
Charlemagne never attains that respite.11 Though he has put to rest the 
dynamics o f the opposition between honur and hunte, he has replaced them 
with a balance between death and his own right juTse. Charlemagne envelops 
within his single person the authority to determine both life and death. 
Though he has silenced the external conflict, he has done so by incorporating 
it into his own person and at the cost of great and irremediable anguish:
“Deus,” dist li reis, “si penuse est ma vie!” (1.4000)
(‘God!’, cried the King, 'how painful is my life!’)
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\/EIRE PATE(R)NE
Circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit, not the letter...
Romans 2:29
The topics o f this chapter’s two previous essays have indicated a 
particular approach, one that privileged reading the Roland in the fashion o f a 
linear narrative. In the first o f these essays —”M-Monjoie”~  we followed the 
progress o f Monjoie, the ‘sign’ o f Charlemagne, from general war cry to 
material emblem of state. Our inquiry examined scenes from across the 
length of the text from beginning to end, demonstrating the linear progression 
that was involved in transforming this war cry into the material sign of 
Charlemagne's political authority. In the second essay —"Outlaws”— we 
discovered in the text’s earliest moments a paradigm that would radically alter 
social and political relations. Our argument went the way o f this paradigm’s 
progress as it permuted through successive scenes until, at last, a realization 
o f Blancandrin’s grand scheme, the adoption o f the paradigm altering social 
and political reality for Saracen and Frank, is achieved at the conclusion o f the 
Roland. Yet these essays were constrained to take notice o f the text’s central
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gap; the break between laisse CLXXVI and laisse CLXXVII, where two 
imperfectly connected narrative movements are deftly sewn together. The 
gap between the text’s two principal narratives takes on profound importance 
as a void at the center o f the story, a void across which one social and 
political order is translated into another. In the chapter’s third and final essay 
we set out to explore this same central gap in terms of both its structural and 
its substantive aspects.
The compositional arrangement o f the arguments o f the two prior 
essays conforms to the supposed linear narrativity o f the text they critique; the 
argument o f those essays follows the ‘progression’ of the narrative from 
beginning to end. The following essay, however, attempts an examination of 
the text’s material center -th e  void between laisse CLXXVI and laisse 
CLXXVII— and, to the extent to which such considerations can be termed 
relevant, attempts to provide the reader with another place o f beginning and 
ending for the Roland. Initially, we examine two ‘prayers’, one delivered by 
Roland and the other by Charlemagne, each treating the theme of 
resurrection. At the moment o f his death, a moment coterminous with the 
ending o f the first and the beginning o f the second narration, Roland prepares 
his own apotheosis, evoking the Biblical examples of resurrection given in the 
stories o f Daniel and Lazarus. But, as we shall see, Roland encodes his 
personal resurrection with mundane signs, signs that mark his death as the 
end of the geste. In this way, Charlemagne’s prayer, borrowing from Roland’s 
own in both form and in content, seeks a resurrection not only of personal 
authority and of the strength of his forces, but o f a lapsed narrative as well;
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Charlemagne resurrects the geste in the form of renewed narrative. This 
leads us to next consider what are ostensibly the text’s two modes o f narrative 
production, that o f the geste, the recounting o f ‘actual’ events, and that of 
fiction. Roland produces narration with the sword-blow and he chooses Aide, 
the unblemished virgin who awaits word o f his exploits in far o ff Aix, as the 
destinataire o f the geste. Charlemagne, somewhat at cross-purposes with 
Roland, intervenes with what we might call (borrowing the rhymed pair from 
the 268*h laisse) an estrange eschange; the substitution of one mode of 
narrative production for another. Outwardly, the estrange eschange occurs as 
Charlemagne proposes to replace the dead Roland with his (living) son 
Loewis as the groom in a marriage arranged prior to Roncevaux. Be that as it 
may, the true strange exchange has not to do with altered marriage plans, but 
with the transformation o f the ‘historical’ geste into a fiction, a transformation 
with significant social and political import. Finally, we return to the center of 
the text as that place at which the text’s two narratives join. It is in the space 
of this absence, in the operations o f the textual hiatus, that Roland and 
Charlemagne, and so the narratives they produce, stand as figures of 
competing authority. We shall see how the geste and the fiction run like 
countercurrents from one end o f the Roland to the other, and how, far from 
being mutually exclusive, they overlap to create, at the center o f the text, a 
negative presence that functions as both beginning and ending.
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Pate(R)ne
From the moment within the narrative that it becomes clear that no Frank will 
escape the surrounding slaughter at Roncevaux, Roland begins to prepare for 
‘resurrection’ in a style that is as studied as it is methodical. Firstly, he 
prepares for the resurrection o f li franceis in the recitation o f their eulogy (I. 
1854 - ff.), before preparing for his own resurrection in a last act that consists 
in placing the bodies of the fallen Franks in a symbolically arranged order.1 
Although the term resurrection applies to each of these instances, the 
intended results o f the resurrection o f fi franceis and that o f Roland are widely 
at variance with one another. We can adduce as much by recalling that 
whereas Roland’s mortal remains, along with those of Olivier and Turpin, are 
deposited at Blaye in the church of Saint Romain, the remains o f li franceis, as 
we have already noted, are laid to rest in the fields of Roncevaux at the 
bottom of a nameless pit (cf.: II. 2953-61). In a later passage, somewhere well 
into the second narrative o f the Roland, Charlemagne plots yet a third 
resurrection, a resurrection o f personal authority, o f the order o f armed forces, 
and a resurrection of state drawn up from the ruins of defeat. We shall see in 
this third act o f resurrection how Charlemagne completely subverts those 
earlier ‘acts' o f resurrection as they have been carried out by Roland.
Together, the three resurrection passages alluded to above form a loosely 
articulated whole. Their cohesion, the interlacing of a common theme of 
resurrection, can be made evident by citing three verses o f remarkable 
similarity, one verse from each o f the three passages in question:
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‘Alt vos Deus, ki unkes ne mentit!”
(‘May God, who never lied, have/help you!')
(1.1865)
'Veire Patene, ki unkes ne mentis... (I. 2384)
(True Father, who never lied.')
“Veire Pateme, hoi cest jor me defend... 
(True Father, defend me on this day...’)
(I. 3100)
In a purely formal sense these lines provide us with a thematic imbrication. 
The second hemistich of verse 1865 is repeated with near exactitude in the 
second hemistich o f verse 2384; the first hemistich of verse 2384 reappears, 
again with near exactitude, as the first hemistich o f verse 3100; and finally, 
coming full circle, the second hemistich o f verse 3100 re-presents itself as a 
‘translation’ of line 1865, as Charlemagne is able to ‘pro fif from Roland’s 
having consigned the French to God { ‘A it vos Deus)  by, in turn, soliciting 
God’s help in defending the French that have now become God’s own {‘hoi 
cest jo r  me defend). Stylistic affinities join these three moments of 
resurrection by the similarities and the slight, though highly significant, 
variance o f their syntagmatic structures. The near perfect circularity o f these 
lines, as the ‘tail end’ of verse 3100 rejoins the beginning of verse 1865 and 
so forth, is in itself suggestive o f the process o f resurrection and cyclical 
rebirth that will be the focus o f inquiry o f the opening segment of this essay. 
We will continue to refer to these three verses as textual signposts that will 
guide us as we enter into a discussion o f strategies of resurrection employed 
by Roland and Charlemagne and, as will be made clear, as signs o f a strategy 
of resurrection utilized by the text itself.
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These three verses bear this further peculiarity, that only here and 
nowhere else within the Roland do their syntagmes ‘k i unkes ne m ent-is/-it 
and ‘Veire Pate(r)ne' appear. This fact o f coincidence, which may at first seem 
a mere textual accident, lends yet another reason in favor o f treating these 
three lines and the passages o f which they are a part as though they were 
pieces of a single though loosely articulated cohesive structure. In examining 
and comparing these three passages, it may surprise the reader to discover 
that the difference of a single letter -a s  the text moves from ‘menti t  (I. 1865) 
to ‘mentis ’ (I. 2384) or from ‘Pate()ne’ (I. 2384) to ‘Pate(r)ne‘ (I. 3100)— signals 
a shift within the narrative which bears profound political import.
With the words ‘May God have/help you. He who never lies...' {“A it vos Deus, 
ki unkes ne m entit) Roland loosens the feudal bond between Charlemagne 
and the French by consecrating the latter into a direct service to God. In the 
previous section we have seen how in Roland’s oration, beginning with line 
1854, the vassal allegiance of the French devolves from Charlemagne (I. 
1860), to Roland (I. 1863) an finally to God himself (II. 1864 - 65). This, as 
Roland tells it, was all in consequence of the fact that neither he nor 
Charlemagne have been either willing or able to fulfill the principle obligations 
of vassal allegiance: [Roland speaks] ‘I am neither able to protect nor to
defend you’ (“Jo ne vos pois tenser ne guarantir,” I. 1864) - i t  being
understood that the Emperor is and has been no less culpable in this regard. 
Is Roland admitting failure in these lines? Is he placing the French in the 
hands of a ‘lord’ who can meet the obligations to which both he and 
Charlemagne have proved inadequate, or is he simply liberating himself o f a
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certain culpability? We can reasonably suspect the disingenuousness o f a 
Roland pretending to this moment o f piety and humility, especially where the 
lament concerns the loss o f the French at Roncevaux and he is pretending as 
though that event were sadly beyond his control.
The irony o f Roland’s implicit claim to innocence for the slaughter o f his men 
is redoubled by Olivier’s assignation o f blame just ‘moments’ p rio r
‘Franceis sunt morz par vostre legerie.
Jamais Karfon de nus n’avrat servise.” (ii. 1726 - 27)
“Vostre proecce, Rollant, mar la velmes!
Kartes li Magnes de nos n'avrat ale.’ (II. 1731 - 32)
(The French are dead because of your senselessness.
Charles will never again have us at his service.’
'Your prowess, Roland, would that we had never been witness to it!
Charles-the-great will never again have our service.')
Nowhere does Roland, either directly or indirectly, refute Oliver’s accusations 
of blame. To the contrary, from the very first he responds to Oliver by 
restating his complicity -a lbe it somewhat cryptically- in the dismal outcome of 
events even, as those events are about to unfold. At line 1058, just prior to 
the joining o f the Saracens and the French in battle, Roland states: ‘I swear to
you, all are judged to die ’ ("Jo vos plevis, tuz sunt jugez a m ort); and just
a few lines further (I. 1069), he makes the same pronouncement using
virtually the same words ‘I swear to you, all will be delivered into death’ (Je
vos plevis, tuz sunt a morz livrez). If by ‘ail’ (tuz) the reader has cause to 
understand not just Saracen but Saracen and French alike, then the words A it 
vos Deus o f line 1865 become the signal for an act o f abandonment. 
Following the lines of this argument, we find the verbal ‘act’ whereby Roland 
abandons all responsibility for the protection of the French at Roncevaux has
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occurred in yet an earlier passage,2 in laisse 63, at the moment in which he 
out and out refuses the emperor’s offer o f ‘salvement:
‘Demi mun host vos lerrai en present 
Retenez !es, ?o est vostre salvement’
Go dit li quens: ‘Jo n'en ferai nient
Deus me cunfunde, se la geste en desment!” (1.785 - 88)
(‘I will leave you at present with half of my men.
Keep them, it will be your salvation.’
Roland then said: ‘I will do no such thing.
May God confound me, if I so betray the geste.)
This passage presents evidence that both Roland and the Emperor are to 
blame for the impending tragedy: Roland for his action in refusing aid where 
aid is needed, Charlemagne for passively allowing what he recognizes as a 
disaster-in-the-making to move unimpeded toward its terrible realization. 
How, then, is the reader to make sense o f this ‘legerie’ - imprudence, folly, 
ruse- as Oliver calls it? How could Roland and Charlemagne have possible 
wished for the demise of the French a t Roncevaux?
Roland and Charlemagne each sketches out a response to our query 
that are both pithy and remarkably sim ilar in form. First we have it from 
Roland:
‘Barons franceis, pur mei vos vei murir...” (1.1863)
(‘Noble Frenchmen, I see you dying for me.')
Roland describes himself watching the French as they die (murir) pur m ei —
’for me/because of me.’ There is little, if any, evidence coming from the
French themselves to suggest that they die fo r Roland; however, we have
already seen Oliver make the plain accusation that they die because o f what
Roland has done —par vostre legerie (I. 1726). Roland deftly turns failure to
his advantage, as the magnitude o f the combined sacrifice o f the French
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serves only to enhance the glory o f his name. Then there is another, not 
altogether different, logic supporting the idea o f the ‘willed’ sacrifice o f the 
French: that by their deaths the French, and so the geste itself, should come 
to be seen as Roland’s creation and his possession. Already the text has 
provided us with signals to indicate that Roland and Charlemagne compete for 
the allegiance o f the French: [Roland] The emperor has nourished you for
naught!’ (Li empereres tant mare vos nurrit!/  I. 1860); [Roland] ‘Charles
will never again have us in his service....’ (“Jamais Karlon de nus n ’avrat 
serv ise ...” 1.1727); there will be yet more such signs of calculated betrayal.3
We might compare the destruction of the Franks at Roncevaux with 
Roland’s attempt to destroy Durendal, the sword given him by God. Clearly, 
Roland is at pains to ensure that Durendai's destruction is coincident with the 
end of his own existence. The comparison becomes all the more valid once 
we recognize that Durendal is the metonymic representation not only o f 
Roland but o f the Franks themselves. In his recitation o f the catalogue o f his 
conquests, line 2316 ff., Roland attributes powers to Durendal that might just 
as easily have been attributed to the Franks. They, after all, were as much 
responsible for the successes to which Roland attaches his name as was 
Durendal for not just the divine powers attributed to his sword, but also the 
sturdy if mundane service of the Franks, served loyally as the instrument of 
his will. When Roland claims that, by its destruction, he would remove 
Durendal from the hands of the Saracens, there is something not quite right 
about the circumstances in which this assertion is made. The Saracens, after
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all, have fled and will certainly not return before the arrival of a quickly 
advancing Charlemagne. It is the emperor himself from whom Roland wishes 
to ‘save’ Durendal, just as Roland has, likewise, ‘saved’ the Franks from 
further service to their emperor. Roland fails in the attempt to destroy the 
sword, Durendal, so that it might remain singly his. In a like vein, so will he fail 
in the attempt to secure the Franks for the glory o f his own name, though as 
he gazes upon the Franks dead and dying on the field o f Roncevaux, he 
states: ‘pe r mei vos vei muriY (I see you dying for me).
The Emperor’s claim to the Franks is of a slightly different nature from 
that of Roland, as in the scene below Charlemagne laments those who have 
fallen and whom he is about to bury:
‘Si grant dol ai que ne voldreie vivre,
De ma maisnee, ki pur mei est ocise!” (II. 2936 • 37)
('So great is my anguish, I no longer wish to live.
Because of my household, who have been killed for me!')
Comparing the syntagme taken from Roland’s oration (‘I see you dying for
me ’ [“pu r mei vos vei murir”]) with that from Charlemagne’s (‘who have
been killed for m e...’ [k i pur mei est ocise]), we detect a nuanced difference 
signaled by the choice o f verb: m urir (to die) or occire (to kill). The implied 
difference is one of volition, or the absence thereof, a difference Roland 
himself will play upon at line 1867:
‘De doel murra, s'altre ne m’i ocit" (1.1867)
('I will die of grief, if another does not kill me first’)
Addressing Oliver Roland declares that with the death o f this, his closest
companion, he himself will loose the will to live -de doel murra- unless, by
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chance, some other should kill him (ocit) first. We are now in a position to 
revisit line 1863 and to appreciate that Roland, by the choice of the word murir, 
communicates through insinuation something he dare not speak forthrightly: 
that the French have ‘willingly’ given to him their lives. We need not search 
long or far to find evidence to the contrary: at lines 1515 - ff., Turpin must 
literally shame the French back into battle once they realize that there is no 
hope o f leaving the field o f battle alive and victorious. The Franks meet their 
end not as a matter of deliberate choice, but as the victims o f a trip le ’ legerie - 
that of Roland (I. 1726), of Ganelon (I. 300) and, as will be made clear, that of
the Emperor himself. In declaring: “I have seen you die for me” ( ’pu r mei
vos vei murir), Roland attempts to claim the Franks for himself, to usurp 
Charlemagne’s position within the feudal hierarchy as ‘first among peers’. 
Although Charlemagne will find a way of turning things to his own advantage, 
Roland, at least at the conclusion o f the first narration, does succeed in ‘taking’ 
the lives of the Franks as his own.
Charlemagne’s interest in the death of the Franks is related to, 
although distinguished from, Roland’s own interests. As Roland tells it, the 
Franks willingly die (murir) for him; in the Emperor’s words, however, these 
men, whose allegiance has meanwhile fallen to another, are plainly killed 
(ocis). It is not altogether impossible to divine Charlemagne’s intent in this 
matter. When the Emperor presides over the burial o f the French, throwing 
their corpses into the anonymity o f a common pit (“Ad un earner sempres les 
unt portet), he effectively evacuates the body for the sake of retaining the
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
name. We will see the French of the post-Roncevaux text taking the ir place in 
the first ranks of the Emperor’s command, as Charlemagne arranges his 
forces in preparation for the upcoming battle against Baligant (II. 3026 - ff.) 
There a new body o f men, the French, will be assembled under the rubric o f 
an old and now glorious name, that o f Roland.
“AH (avoir) vos Deus” (‘God have you’); with these words Roland gives 
the French over to death. But, also, we have not neglected to point out that 
the one who affords to another the guarantee o f protection can, by rights, 
have the other as his man. Certainly this anticipates the new order, the new 
dispensation, in which the French, preceding the trial o f Ganelon, are saved 
solely by means o f a divine intercession (cf: Naimes in combat with 
Canabeus, I. 3439; Tierry in combat with Pinabel, I. 3923; and Charlemagne in 
combat with Baligant, I. 3609). As Charlemagne puts it, the law itself will 
ultimately determine who will survive the final confrontation between ‘pagan’ 
and ‘Christian’:
“Tutes (or leis un dener ne iur valt
S'ii unt grant gent, d’igo, seignurs, qui calt?” (II. 3338 - 39)
(All their laws are not worth a penny.
Though they are a great race, what, my lords, does it matter?')
Death or survival in this conflict ceases to be a matter of human effort rather 
survival is a sign that reflects judgement on the validity o f competing laws. 
The law that fails to protect the Franks at Roncevaux cannot be the same law 
that will cause Charlemagne to triumph over a ll his enemies. Although Roland 
might consign the French to God’s keeping, Charlemagne, over the course of 
the second narrative, is certain to resurrect them as his own.
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We proceed from the passage in which Roland effects the ‘resurrection 
o f the Franks’ to that passage in which Roland enacts his own resurrection. 
There, with an eye for the cynical, we noted that in ‘delivering’ the French from 
the ties of human (feudal) obligation and into the protecting hands o f God, 
Roland does little more than to wash his hands in an act o f treachery and 
abandonment. When at lines 2384 - ff. Roland administers his own passage 
into the nether world, he does so while undercutting still further the system o f 
obligatory ties that characterizes the feudal social organization. We remark 
the considerable progress in this direction by comparing the last line in his
obsequies for the French (‘May God, who never lies, have/help you’ [“Art
vos Deus, k i unkes ne mentit..."]) with the first line of the prayer in which 
Roland recommends himself directly to God (‘True Father, who never lies...’ 
[“Veire PateQne, ki unkes ne mentis..."]). There is little doubt that Roland 
refers to the One God o f heaven and earth, when at line 1865 he confers on 
Him the ‘future’ care o f the Franks; the epithet ki unkes ne mentit only 
underscores the fallibility o f the previous guarantors (both Roland and 
Charlemagne) of French safety. The noun phrase Veire PateQne, by contrast, 
proves significantly less exact. Whereas at line 1865 Roland distinguishes 
God (who never lies) from men (who presumably do), at line 2384 Roland 
makes his appeal to that father among all possible fathers who is True. The 
rejection of Charlemagne as unworthy o f his office is now furtively remarked.
Even more disturbing than the veiled accusations against the Emperor 
are the implications calling into doubt the validity of existing feudal law. W e 
have noted with open parentheses the absence of the ‘R’ from PateQne; by
143
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the abstraction of this single letter Roland is removed from the now 
emasculated name of the father. It is none other than his own name, 
‘R ’(oland), that has been withdrawn.4 PateQne, literally ‘an open space’, no 
longer designates the figure o f authority, 'father', who either embodies or is 
positioned as authority within the law; rather, PateQne indicates an absence of 
law, a void in the sphere o f public authority. PateQne is an open field, cleared 
by the evacuation o f the Franks, le ft open by Roland’s desire that the geste 
should end with the end o f his own existence; a gaping wound in the fabric of 
a society,5 the fabric of a geste, that have seemed the direct creation o f his 
own proGcce. Whatever may follow, Roland has effectively demonstrated, 
and to Charlemagne above all others, the far reaching power o f his name.
Roland departs from life with telling reference to Biblical figures of 
resurrection, his is a self appointed apotheosis. He weaves into the final lines 
of his dying prayer a rebuke against the emperor, evidence o f the widening 
gulf of disagreement rising up between them:
“Veire Patene, ki unkes ne mentis,
Seint Lazaron de mort resurrexis 
E Daniel des leons guraresis,
Guaris de mei I'anme de tuz perilz
Pur les pecchez que en ma vie fis!" (II. 2384 - 88)
(True father (PateQne), who never lied,
Who raised Saint Lazarus from the dead 
And protected Daniel from the lions,
Keep my soul from all perils
Due to the sins which in my life I have committed!’)
We can summarily conclude that God’s judgment has been harsh; unlike 
Lazarus, Roland will not be returned to the living; unlike Daniel, Roland will not 
be rescued from death’s jaws. Of the two Biblical references, that of Lazarus 
is, within this context, by far the more problematical (For the moment we
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reserve consideration of the reference to Daniel until its reappearance in the 
prayer of Charlemagne, lines 3100 - ff., the text’s third and final ‘resurrection 
passage’). Lazarus brought back to life from death is out o f John, 11:1-4. 
This is the more renowned o f the two Biblical stories concerning one named 
Lazarus, though not necessarily the one most appropriate to Roland’s 
situation at the moment of his death. We have just mentioned the irony 
implicit in this evocation: there is no one, neither Charlemagne returned to 
Roncevaux nor God through divine intercession, who will return Roland to the 
living. We do not dismiss the all too obvious reference to Lazarus as symbol 
of spiritual resurrection and life everlasting; in fact we insist upon it. 
Nonetheless, this story of Lazarus from the gospel o f John merely serves as a 
cover for the story taken from Luke; the other Biblical tale involving one 
named Lazarus.
In the Lazarus of lesser renown, that taken from the parable spoken by 
Jesus in Luke, 16:19 - 31, we find a more suitable analogue to Roland at the 
conclusion o f the ‘first1 narration. The text does not fail to imitate the tale 
related by Luke in having Roland borne into heaven in the arms of angels. 
Compare:
When the poor man (Lazarus) died, he was carried away by angels
to the bosom of Abraham. Luke 16:22
Deus tramist sun angle Cherubin 
E seint Michel del Peril;
Ensembl’ od els sent Gabriel i vint
L’anme del cunte portent en pareis. (II. 2393 - 96)
(God sent His angel Cherubim 
and Saint Michael of the Peril,
And together with him came Gabriel.
They carry the soul of the count (Roland) into heaven)
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The importance o f this parable from Luke to the recounting o f Roland’s death 
at Roncevaux is hardly obscure. A  rich’ man, because of his neglect, is 
blamed for the death o f Lazarus. When he too dies and is then cast into hell 
he turns to Abraham begging that Lazarus should descend to help alleviate 
his torments. Abraham responds by noting the unbridgeable distance 
between them:
“Moreover, between us and you a  great chasm is established to prevent
any one from crossing who might wish to go from our side to yours or from
your side to ours." Luke, 16:26®
Nothing comes closer to illustrating the desires implied in so many of Roland’s 
actions, both overt and clandestine, than this tale from Luke. From his refusal 
of Charlemagne’s offer o f ‘salvem enf (I. 784 - ff.) to the invalidation o f the 
name of the father by the extraction o f the letter ‘R’ {Veire PateQne), Roland 
has fixed ’a great g u lf between Charlemagne and himself. By this gap 
marking Roland’s death, Roland attempts to create an unbridgeable narrative 
void that would effectively exclude Charlemagne from the geste; Roland's final 
actions before dying threaten the continuance of narrative. Roland will be 
disappointed, posthumously, in this avenging wish; not only will Charlemagne 
find the means to revive and to prolong narrative, he will do so, ironically, by 
returning Roland to its center.
There exists no better proof o f Roland’s ‘avenging wish’ than its remedy 
attended to by Charlemagne beginning at line 3100. There, Charlemagne 
undertakes a resurrection that is at once worldly and divine, a hypostatic union 
that is signaled in the opening words o f his prayer: T rue father, protect me on 
this day1 {Veire Pate{R)ne, hoi cest jo r  me defend). As Charlemagne
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recovers the missing letter ‘R’ {Pate(R)ne), all the potential force and latent 
violence from the massacre of Roncevaux is again imparted to the name of 
the father. But we should recall that the revival o f the emperor’s potency 
depends upon a mingling o f divine and human will; Charlemagne goes on to 
avenge the losses at Roncevaux only after having been given permission to 
do so by an angel from God (cf.: II. 2454 - 56).
Solely by the use o f the words he speaks the emperor accomplishes 
the formidable task o f ferrying Roland’s presence across the gap separating 
the first narration of the Roland from the second. We also find that 
Charlemagne is able to ‘speak’ his new-found potency into existence through 
a continuation o f and an elaboration upon Roland’s earlier prayer
“Veire Pateme, hoi cest jor me defend,
Ki guaresis Jonas tut veirement 
De la baleine ki en sun cors I’aveit 
E esparignas le rei de Niniven 
E Daniel del merveillus turment 
Enz en la fosse des leons o fuz enz,
Les .III. enfanz tuten un fou ardant!
La tue amurs me seit hoi en present!
Par ta mercit, se tei plaist, me cunsent
Que mun nevoid poisse venger Rollant!" (II. 3100 - 09)
(True father, protect me on this day.
You who, indeed, kept Jonah from 
the whale that took him into his body,
And you who spared the King of Nineveh 
And Daniel from the terrible torment 
When he was thrown into the den of lions,
And the three children burning in a fire so hot!
May your love be present with me today!
Through your mercy, if it pleases you, grant 
That I may avenge my nephew Roland!’)
Charlemagne chooses the story o f Jonah and the King of Nineveh to begin his 
prayer; it is a variation on the theme o f the ‘beggar and the rich man’ 
introduced by the parable of Lazarus from Luke. But in this biblical account, 
Charlemagne seems to turn the tables on Roland; for it is Jonah the
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beggar/prophet who rebels against the word of God (1:13) and the ‘rich man,’ 
the king of Nineyeh, who is shown as heedful and repentant:
When the news reached the king of Nineveh, he rose from his throne, laid aside his 
robe, covered himself with sackcloth, and sat in the ashes. Jonah 3:6
When God saw by their actions how they turned from their evil way, he repented of the 
evil that he had threatened to do to them; he did not carry it out Jonah 3:10
Though Jonah’s resurrection, being rescued from the belly o f the whale, was 
the more dazzling and hence the more commemorative o f the two acts of 
divine salvation, we should recall that this was only a first step on the road 
leading to the conversion o f the king and of the whole nation of pagans whom 
Jonah was told to admonish, instructing them the right course of the law. Too 
apt to be merely accidental, the story proves an informative analogue to the 
struggle between the emperor and Roland.
“It displeased Jonah exceedingly" that the King o f Nineveh and the 
people under him should go unpunished, though they strayed from the course 
o f the law; so much so that, in willful protest against God’s wishes, Jonah asks 
that his own life be taken (4:1 - 3) rather than he should have to witness the 
salvation of the pagan Ninevites. Once the law has been abrogated, Jonah 
insists that Nineveh and its king be brought low. The restoration of city under 
the new law will call for a humility singularly lacking in Jonah, though found in 
abundance in the repentant king of Nineveh. In the Biblical story, the king of 
Nineveh acknowledges his sin with the outward signs o f sackcloth and ashes; 
in the Roland the Emperor recognizes his sin, his peccez, through an outward 
sign, namely, circumcision. The loss o f a ‘palm and more o f flesh’ is a sign of 
the Emperor’s conversion/submission to the new law:
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Prent de la cam grant pleine palme e plus:
lloec endrert remeint li os tut nut (II. 3606 - 07)
(He took a piece of flesh as large as the palm and more: 
at this spot the bone of his skull was altogether exposed.)
This occasion o f physical marking, o f personal humility, contrasts with Roland 
who dies intact without broken bone, without violation of his body’s outer 
covering.
The story o f Jonah and the king o f Nineveh concludes with the 
following verse where God speaks to a chastised Jonah:
And should I not be concerned over Nineveh, the great city, in which there are 
more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who cannot distinguish their 
right hand from their left, not to mention the many cattle? Jonah 4:11
Unable to ‘discern between their right hand and their left,’ the Ninevites are 
destined to continue in a narrative o f deeds that are both lawful and unlawful. 
The image of blind imperfection is apt to the resurrection of state under 
Charlemagne. Not only is the Emperor unable to escape the shame of having 
failed to protect the Franks at Roncevaux, this shame carries over into the 
post Roncevaux narration. The work o f the right hand and of the left is the 
work of betrayal and repentance; the continuation o f narrative depends upon 
the integration of these two modes o f narration, which is to say, the integration 
of these two narratives into one text.
The second Biblical story to which Charlemagne alludes is that of 
Daniel and the .III. enfanz who are, in fact, Daniel’s brothers Shadrach, 
Meshach and Abednego. The story of Daniel proves an exceedingly rich 
quarry for the post-Roncevaux narrative; it introduces a resurrection motif that 
is announced by Roland and then greatly exploited to Charlemagne’s own
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advantage. The book of Daniel provides not one, but two, tales generally 
analogous to that of Jonah and the King o f Nineveh. When the three infants 
(les .III. enfanz) undergo trial by fire, they escape unscathed, with the result 
that Nebuchadnezzar, ‘King unto all people, nations, and languages’ (4:1), 
converts to the law o f Daniel’s God. We might then say that the three infants 
{.III. enfanz) were given over to danger by God for the sake o f redeeming the 
King and his people. Let us examine, for the moment, the differences 
between death and resurrection in the Roland and in this Biblical analogue, 
the story of the ‘three infants’ to which Charlemagne alludes. Firstly, though 
Charlemagne prays that God deliver him from the danger to which he is 
exposed, in going into battle against Baligant it is not Charlemagne, but the 
Franks at Roncevaux, who were most in need of miraculous salvation. 
Furthermore, a puzzling irony arises from the fact that the role of God in the 
Biblical account, to rescue the three infants from imminent death, is the same 
role to which we assign Charlemagne in the episode at Roncevaux. However, 
the difference in outcome is obvious: God carries the infants unharmed 
through the fire; the Emperor, for whatever reason we might wish to assign, 
leaves the French to die at Roncevaux.
Similarly, there is the case of Daniel and the lions. Darius, ruler over 
‘all people, nations and languages’, sends Daniel into the den o f lions, 
knowing full well that he would not perish, but would be saved by his God. 
Darius will use the event o f Daniel’s salvation to augment his power and to 
crush those who are in opposition to his rule. I cite extensively from the book 
o f Daniel:
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The king was deeply grieved at this news and he made up his mind to save Daniel; 
he worked till sunset to rescue him. But these men insisted. “Keep in mind,
O King,’ they said, “that under the Mede and Persian law every royal prohibition 
or decree is irrevocable.” So the King ordered Daniel to be brought and cast into 
the (ions' den. To Daniel he said, “May your God, whom you serve so constantly, 
save you.” Daniel 6:15-17
The King rose very early the next morning and hastened to the lions’ den. As he 
drew near, he cried out to Daniel sorrowfully, “O Daniel, servant of the living 
God, has the God whom you serve so constantly been able to save you from the 
lion?” Daniel answered the king: “O King, live forever!” Daniel 6:20 - 22
The King then ordered the men who had accused Daniel, along with their children 
and their wives, to be cast into the lions’ den. Before they reached the bottom of the 
den, the lions overpowered them and crushed all their bones.
Then King Darius wrote to the nations and peoples of every language, wherever 
they dwell on the earth: “All peace to you! I decree that throughout my royal domain 
the God of Daniel is to be reverenced and feared:
“For he is the living God, enduring forever; 
his kingdom shall not be destroyed, 
and his dominion shall be without end.
He is a deliverer and savior,
working signs and wonders in heaven and on earth,
and he delivered Daniel from the lions’ power.” Daniel 6:25 - 28
Three things are accomplished for Darius as a result of Daniel’s ordeal: 1. 
The ‘law of the Medes and the Persians' is supplanted by the law o f Daniel, 
servant of the living God; 2. Darius achieves unity among ‘all people, nations 
and languages’ under the banner of this new law; 3. Darius is able to identify, 
isolate, and destroy those who prove themselves to be enemies to the new 
law and so enemies of his rule. Again we note the dissimilarities between 
Daniel's rescue and the fact that Roland is left to die at Roncevaux.
Those Biblical tales (Lazarus, Jonah, Daniel, les III enfanz) become a 
point of accusation against the emperor; nevertheless, the emperor turns to 
these tales precisely to justify those otherwise unjust actions against Roland 
and the Franks at Roncevaux. Charlemagne, like Darius with Daniel, 
purposely places Roland and the Franks in harm’s way 1) for the revival o f his
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authority (now fully coincident with the authority of the law), 2) for an 
integration and unification o f state, 3) for the destruction o f old enemies and 
the threat of destruction against any new enemies that may arise. Darius 
recognizes Daniel as the lawgiver Charlemagne, however, would prefer to 
obscure any direct link between Roland and the ‘justice’ (jui'se) he will 
ultimately attain upon his return to Aix.
Comparing the struggle between Roland and Charlemagne with that 
between Darius and Daniel, we recognize that the Roland provides a more 
elegant and comparatively more stable solution to internal conflict. Despite 
Daniel’s ‘generous’ blessings to Darius (’O King, live forever*), the account 
ends with the Biblical prophet distancing himself from the power o f Babylon, 
as the state is seen splintering into the fragments of smaller semi-autonomous 
kingdoms. Daniel and his brothers retain for themselves the power o f God’s 
law; divine law, however, does not succeed in bringing harmony and 
endurance to the secular state. The Roland, however, successfully melds 
divine and mundane law and it does so by collapsing one into the other at the 
point where the text's two narratives meet.
Unlike the account in the book of Daniel, where the reforming law 
comes to the state from the outside, from the ‘stranger1 Daniel, the 
transformational struggle within the Roland is internal. Matters are resolved 
by the subsumption o f one law by the other. When Roland and the Franks 
perish at Roncevaux, this becomes a judgement not on them but on the old 
law (one based on auxilium  and concilium) that fails to protect them. The 
Emperor’s judgment upon the law o f the Saracens might well have been
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applied, in retrospect, to the Franks at Roncevaux: ‘The whole o f their law is 
not worth a penny...’ (“tute lo r leis un denier ne lu r valt,” I. 3338). Though the 
old (feudal) law can not save Roland’s person, his spirit continues in that his 
name will find a place at the heart o f the new law governing the state. In the 
very last verse o f the Emperor’s prayer o f resurrection, he pleads with God 
that in the course o f battle against the Saracens Roland might be avenged:
“That I might avenge my nephew Roland” (uQue mun nevoid poisse
venger, Rollant!, ” I. 3109). Venger has the sense o f ‘to avenge’ but it might 
also mean ‘to repurchase’, or ‘to redeem’. Above all else, the emperor’s 
mission upon his return is to reclaim the force lost to him at Roncevaux, to 
recuperate the fallen letter, and to graft it once again onto the momentarily 
impuissant body of the law of the Veire Pate(R)ne.
Eschange estrange
It is necessary to acknowledge one important implication of 
Charlemagne’s re-appropriation and reinsertion of the letter ‘R’ into Veire 
Pate(R)ne. ' Not only is it the act of a reclaimed potency for both Emperor and 
geste, it is also a dissemination o f that potency from the center outward, from 
the central gap marked by Roland’s death to all parts o f the narration. In this 
way not only is Charlemagne able to redeem the French, and so the post- 
Roncevaux narrative, but also to give cause for a return to the text’s first 
narrative. This journey back through the narrative leads to new insights into 
the role o f the Emperor in the first half o f the text. In retrospect, we find that in 
his apparent passivity, Charlemagne is, to the contrary, calculating and every
153
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
bit as ‘ambitious’ as Roland in his attempts to manipulate the ultimate political 
and social implications of the geste. Roland and the Emperor both strive 
toward a common destination though with singularly different intent. The 
separate trajectories o f their respective ambitions coincide briefly at the 
moment where Aide, Roland’s betrothed, enters the text. The second part o f 
this essay traces the parallel quests o f both Roland and Charlemagne in 
pursuit o f Aide, the feminine ‘destinataire’ and the ultimate site o f inscription 
for the geste.
It is instructive to compare Roland with Charlemagne as the text first 
presents them in the opening scene o f the Frankish council. The portrait o f 
Roland at lines 196-213 derives from his response to Blancandrin's proposal 
(II. 38 - ff.) Earlier we demonstrated how in this passage Roland effectively 
dismisses all notion of the institution of council (consilium, II. 205 - 09), and 
that he supplants the life protecting social equilibrium inherent to the institution 
of vassal aid and protection (auxilium) with the urgings of a relentless pursuit 
o f vengeance (II. 210 - 13). He does not deign to calculate the price o f his 
proposed bargain in terms of its cost in loss o f life or in human suffering. 
Roland, in these lines, augurs a new alignment of the relations between 
subject and state, one where the authority o f an abstracted and all 
encompassing law is enhanced at the expense of individual protections. From 
its first moment we detect in Roland’s speech at II. 205 - 213 the outline of a 
mode o f narrative production that soon become recognizably his own. Roland 
spurns Blancandrin’s offer of a negotiated settlement, choosing instead to 
proceed against the Saracens with the sword-blow by which the geste comes
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into being; in a manner o f speaking, it is a choice to give precedence to the 
deed over the word.
The Emperor, on the other hand, dearly prefers word over deed, and 
as such he operates within the first half of the text in the mode of master 
signifier. The following passage illustrates the considerably greater value of 
the word, as opposed to the deed, in the text’s determination of 
Charlemagne’s ‘identity’:
Sur palies blancs siedent cil cevaler.
As tables juent pur els esbaneier 
E as eschecs li plus saive e li veill,
E escremissent cil bacheler leger.
Desuz un pin, delez un eglenter,
Un faldestoed i unt, fait tut d’or men 
La siet li reis ki dulce France tienL 
Blanche ad la barbe e tut flurit le chef,
Gent ad le cors e le cuntenant fier
S'est kil demandet ne I’estoet enseigner. (II. 110-19)
(The chevaliers are seated upon carpets of white silk,
They are playing at table games for their amusement 
The most wise and elderly at chess,
The agile youth are at swordplay.
Beneath a pine, beside an eglantine.
There is a throne made of pure gold:
There sits the King who holds sway over sweet France 
His beard is white and his hair a flowering mass,
His body well formed his countenance proud:
If anyone comes asking, there is no need to point him out)
An analysis o f this scene produces surprising incongruities. The game of 
chess serves as a readily apparent metaphor for the placement and 
manipulation o f young warriors on the field o f battle; the ground coverings of 
white silk —Sur palies blancs— are so many squares of an expansive open- air 
chess board upon which they move and are moved. The agile young men — 
cil bacheler leger— busily engaged in fencing are pieces in play; the old and 
wise men —li plus saive e li veill— are the strategoi contemplating the 
positioning o f forces and the plan o f attack. This image o f warfare as an
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orderly and contemplative affair will soon be disrupted by the surprise o f 
Roland’s rude and wholly unconventional urgings to vengeance (II. 196 - 213). 
Roland is about to alter the rules o f the game in such a way that they become 
virtually indecipherable to all except him, o f course...and the emperor. The 
text illustrates this sudden ‘incomprehensibility’ in the example of Oliver, who 
will fail to grasp, much less to act, in accordance with the logic motivating 
Roland’s actions at Roncevaux. Or, an even better example might be found in 
the failured communication between the Emperor and Ganelon, as the latter 
sets o ff on his mission to the Saracens; Ganelon’s demands, perfectly in 
accordance with feudal law,7 are put forward and subsequently dismissed as 
though he and the emperor were enmeshed in what had all too gradually 
become two distinct and mutually incommunicable structures of discourse.
Charlemagne, as we first encounter him, is presented to the reader as 
an auto-nymous (self-naming) sign, one that both defies interpretation and 
renders it superfluous —S’est k il demandet, ne I’estoet enseigner. Like 
Roland, neither does he have a place at the board  (cf.: I. 111) among th e  old 
and the wise.’ Here Charlemagne is situated in a discourse apart from that in 
which his erstwhile ‘peers’ are busily engaged, the scope o f his intellectual 
imagination ranging far beyond the parameters o f those placed before him in 
this scene. In a later passage, Bramimunde, the Saracen queen who 
converts to the ‘law of the Christians,’ makes this observation concerning 
Charlemagne: ‘Under the heavens there isn’t  a king whom he does not regard 
as anything more than a child...’ (“Suz d e l n ’ad re i qu'il prist a un enfant...,” I. 
2739); this holds true in relation to ‘kings’ that are both external and internal to
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the realm of the Franks. Nonetheless, over the course o f the first narrative, 
Charlemagne continues to signify from a position o f absence, while Roland 
maintains an active presence, writing the geste with blows struck with 
Durendal. A t the moment o f Roland’s death, these positions will reverse 
themselves: Charlemagne will ‘revive’ the lapsed narrative by taking charge of 
his forces against the Saracens; Roland, in turn, replaces Charlemagne as the 
‘sign’ o f textual authority with the reassertion o f the letter ‘R’ into the center of 
Veire Pate{R)ne. In the remainder o f this brief segment, I want to point out 
the ways in which this reversal o f roles is earned out in the process o f an 
exchange.
Our characterization of Roland has until now been especially 
dependent upon the manner in which he has ‘executed’ narrative; I return to 
these lines, referred to earlier, for their description o f the geste as an economy 
of narrative that translates the deed (of warfare) into narrative:
“Or guart chascuns que granz colps i empleit,
Que malvaise can?un de nus chantet ne seit!
Paien unt tort e chrestiens unt dreit
Malvaise essemple n’en serat ja de mei." (II. 1013-16)
‘“For everyone take good care to strike hardy blows,
That no one will be able to sing an unflattering song about us!
Pagans are in the wrong, Christians in the right
There will be no bad example from me.')
Remarkably, these lines already hint at the subsumption o f all the actions of 
the Franks at Roncevaux to the sign under the inscription ‘R’(oland); 
remarkable, because until the post-Roncevaux world, until the restitution of 
authority under the Veire Pate(R)ne, there is no sign ‘R’ under which their 
actions might be subsumed. When Roland exhorts the Franks to strike hardy
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blows ‘that no one will be able to sing an unflattering song about us!,’ he 
immediately reminds them that their deeds and their sacrifice will ultimately be 
reflected back into his own name: There will be no bad example from m e...’ 
(°Malvaise essample n'en serat ja  de mei...") So, in this sense, we can say 
that an ‘exchange’ has already been initiated prior to Roland’s death; the 
Franks have given their lives in order that the name Roland might augment in 
value.
The text demonstrates that the Franks are clearly less interested in this 
ultimate sacrifice than is Roland. When for a second time they are reminded 
that the production of ‘song’ (geste, narrative) depends upon the loyal 
execution of their vassal duties, we see patently that this notion of a pending 
ultimate sacrifice comes to the Franks as something unexpected and new to 
their understanding. There is nothing to indicate that Turpin is having 
anything but a hard time of it, as he coaxes the French to remain steady in the 
choice between certain death and shameful desertion:
“Seignors barons, n’en alez mespensant!
Pur Deu vos pri que ne seiez fuiant,
Que nuls prozdom malvaisement n’en chant 
Asez est mielz que moerium cumbatant 
Pramis nus est fin prendrum a itant,
Ultre cest jum ne serum plus vivant;
Mais d’une chose vos soi jo ben guarant 
Seint parels vos est abandunant;
As Innocent vos en serez seant” (II. 1515 - 23)
(‘Noble lords, don’t go thinking wrong thoughts!
For God’s sake I pray that you don’t go fleeing,
So that no worthy fellow sing anything bad about it 
It is far better that we should die in battle.
Our end is near, we have been promised that,
By the end of this day we shall no longer be alive;
But of one thing you can be certain:
Blessed paradise now stands open before you;
You will be seated there among the innocents.’)
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Apparently the French do not share In Roland's unadulterated enthusiasm for 
approaching death (cf.: 1008 - ff.; 1088 - ff.; 1712 and passim). One could 
argue that intuition serves them well and they stand ready to bolt; as fortune 
prepares to bring renown to Roland, the Franks will reap only oblivion. Turpin 
manages to hold them in check not with the promise o f glory, which is 
reserved for Roland, but with the threat o f infamy (I. 1517) and the rather 
weak palliative that though forgotten on earth, they will at least be 
remembered in heaven. The French will be seated among the innocent. But 
innocence, in this case, connotes ignorance, an inability to perceive the 
manipulations that have led, for them at least, to the disasters o f Roncevaux.
IV
In terms of earthly remembrance, their innocence will not serve them well.
As he lists all conquests from Constantinople to Scotland as his work 
and the work of the divine instrument Durendal, Roland reveals to us the truth 
o f the matter. Significantly, as he calls up these victories one by one, Roland 
is in the middle o f two separate attempts to make the destruction of Durendal 
coincident with the end of his life. Chagrined that he is unable to take down 
the sword, to be, in effect, the author o f his own castration, Roland must 
realize, finally, that deed and word, body and name, signifier and signified do 
not occupy the same textual space. If they did, no further ‘exchange’ would 
be possible, or even necessary. We had earlier determined that both the 
‘French’ and Durendal are metonymic representations that join in the name 
Roland; however, as Roland proves unable to make the destruction of 
Durendal coincident with his own death, we now see them as distinct and 
separable entities. ‘Possession’ of Durendal allows for a position o f privilege.
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This privilege survives Roncevaux as Durendal is transferred back to the 
‘French’, that is to say, the post-Roncevaux French as that ‘body1 o f men 
reconstituted by the emperor prior to the battle with Baligant (II. 3015 - 17). 
But even as Charlemagne reclaims Durendal as an instrument by which war is 
waged, and hence narrative is written, the validity of that narrative will 
henceforth derive from another source.
An exchange takes place between the emperor and Roland a t the 
event of the tatter’s death. As Charlemagne becomes engaged in battle 
following the death o f Roland, he effectively continues the narration that had 
been left off; from that moment onward, Roland assumes within the narrative 
the position of absent signifier. The transition from first to second narrative 
effects a reversal in positions, whereby Roland is now the passive, absent 
signifier, and Charlemagne the agent o f an ongoing narrative. With this we 
are not abandoning our prior observation that Roland’s mode o f operation is 
from deed to word, from sword-blow to geste, or that Charlemagne operates 
primarily through the word. To the contrary, Charlemagne’s narrative is 
dependent upon Roland’s creation of the geste, upon the narrative hammered 
out by sword-blows; Charlemagne’s narration is merely the continuation o f 
what has already been written. If Charlemagne has, in the meanwhile, 
become an agent in the production of a continuing fiction, the geste is both 
that fiction’s source and place o f final inscription. The first chosen destinataire 
o f the geste, the one who waits in anticipation o f the ‘word’ o f Roland’s 
exploits is Aide, Roland’s designated bride and the sister o f Olivier. Well
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before the conclusion o f the battle at Roncevaux, however, Olivier makes 
clear that Roland will never live to receive Aide’s embrace:
Dist Oliver ‘Par ceste meie barbe,
Se puis veeir ma gente sorur Aide,
Ne jerreiez ja mais entre sa brace!’ (II. 1719 - 21)
('Oliver said: ‘By this beard of mine,
If I am able to every see my dear sister Aide,
I swear, you will never lie in her embrace!')
Given the numerous passages in which Roland recognizes the inevitability of 
death at Roncevaux, this threat would, on the face o f it, appear to carry little 
weight; and yet Oliver’s threat is not without pertinence or force. If Roland 
must relinquish the instrument of inscription, the sword Durendal, to 
Charlemagne, he also forfeits to the Emperor the designated ‘receptrice’ of 
the geste. The destinataire of the narrative created by sword-blows is Aide -  
(Aide -white; blanc; virg inal)- and it is her lot to perish upon the news of 
Roland’s death.
Arriving at Aix, the Emperor immediately seeks out Aide who inquires 
after Roland:
Qo dist al rei: “O est Rollant le catanie,
Ki me jurat cume sa per a prendre?" (II. 3709-10)
(This she says to the King: ‘Where is the captain Roland, 
who promised to make me his wife?')
To this the emperor responds:
“Soer, cher* amie, d'hume mort me demandes.
Jo ten durai mult esforcet eschange:
Qo est Loewis, mielz ne sai a parler
II est mes filz e si tendrat mes marches.’ (II. 3713 -16)
(Sister, dear friend, you ask me for a man who is dead.
I will offer you a very worthy exchange:
Here is Louis, I don’t know what else to say;
He is my son and will hold my marches.')
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Then Aide again:
Aide respunt “Cest mot mei est estrange.
Ne place Deu ne ses seinz ne ses angles 
Apr6s Rollant que jo vive remaigne!”
Pert la culor, chet as piez Cartemagne,
Sempres est morte. Deus ait mercit de I’anme!
Franceis barons en plurent e si la pleignent (II. 3717 - 21)
(Alda replies: ‘This word seems strange to me.
May it not be pleasing to God, his angels and his saints 
That I should remain alive after Roland!’
She loses her color she falls at Charlemagne’s feet,
She died on the spot, may God have mercy on her soul!
The brave French barons weep over this and lament her.)
Eschange/estrange - it is this word (cest mot) eschange that strikes Aide as so 
foreign, strange, un-interpretable.8 Aide finds this word strange, in part, 
because she anticipates the word o f Roland, word o f the geste for which there 
can be no true substitute. The proposed exchange o f one ‘lord’ for another, 
as though they were commodities of near equal value, is alien to feudal 
sensibilities, though not without precedent within the text. We recall 
Blancandrin’s proposal of an equally facile substitution of one long absent 
lord, Baligant, for another, Charlemagne (II. 38 - 39). That exchange, like this 
one, comes only after a tremendous bloodletting marking not merely the 
transition from one figure of authority to another, but from one political, social 
and narrative structure to another. In Blancandrin’s proposal we saw that the 
exchange o f Baligant for Charlemagne implied a profound alteration in the 
nature of subject allegiance: from a subjectivity to an individual lord -w hether 
Roland, Charlemagne, Baligant, or Ganelon— to a subjectivity to an abstracted 
law (dreiture). A  definitive exchange occurs as the allegiance o f the Franks 
shifts from the person o f Roland to a metonymic representation in the guise of 
the letter ‘R’ found at the heart o f the name of the father. This exchange
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signals a first step in the constitution of state. A  second exchange occurs as 
Charlemagne offers Aide real estate in place o f narrative. Louis is 
recommended to her as the future inheritor o f the Emperor’s land holdings —“II 
est mes filz e s i tendrat mes marches.” Roland, to the contrary, came 
recommended as providing a lasting synonymy between his name and the 
geste - “Que malvaise changun de nus chantet ne seit.” (I. 1014); “Male 
changun n ’en deit estre cantee” (1.1466).
Charlemagne arrives at Aix to intercept the Geste at precisely its 
intended point o f destination. At news o f the loss o f Roland, the loss o f the 
attended word, Aide looses her color -p e rt la culor— thus signaling the effect 
of erasure. Intercepting the geste ‘intact’, prior to inscription, the Emperor can 
now direct the geste to another awaiting destinataire. Charlemagne, in fact, 
carries out the exchange of Bramimunde for Aide. Bramimunde becomes a 
receptacle for the new law:
Quant I'emperere ad faite sa justise 
E esclargiez est la sue grant ire,
En Bramidonie ad chrestientet mise... (II. 3988 - 90)
(When the Emperor had procured his justice 
And his great anger dissipated 
He has Bramidonie made a Christian.)
Here Aide is exchanged for Bramidonie and the geste, created by Roland, is 
exchanged for the emperor’s fiction. The geste, then, is no longer simply an 
historical accounting of the events at Roncevaux, but a new structure of 
discourse. This most clearly defines the opposition between Roland and 
Charlemagne in terms of their relation to writing. Roland creates the geste by
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means o f the deed, sword-blow by sword-blow, Charlemagne creates the 
narrative engine whereby word gives rise to deed.
Li ber Gilie
Charlemagne has intercepted the geste, directing it to a new 
destination, a destination unintended by Roland. And yet Roland is not 
altogether the loser in the Emperor’s exchange o f destinataires. Charlemagne 
transforms the name Roland into a symbol o f power and authority that goes 
infinitely beyond anything that might have been commanded by Roland the 
person. Just as the name Roland has been made an integral part and central 
element o f the new law governing the resurrected state - Veire Pate(R)ne~, it 
will also be made central to the production and diffusion of the narrative now 
presided over by Charlemagne. We begin by turning to that paradoxical 
moment within the text where the reader is informed that in this battle 
(Roncevaux) without survivors, a scribe appears to record the action o f the 
geste from the perspective of direct eye-witness:
Qo dist la Geste e cil ki el camp fut 
Li ber Gilie, por qui Deus fait vertuz,
E fist la chartre el muster de LoQm.
Ki tant ne set ne I’ad prod entendut (II. 2095 - 98)
(Thus says the geste and he who was on the field:
The noble Giles, whom God has made virtuous,
He set it down in the charter for the monastery at Laon.
Who does not know this has understood little.)
There is a circular nonsensicality to the proposition that, though Roncevaux 
left no survivors, we can be assured o f the authenticity of the geste because it 
is written from an eye-witness’ point o f view. Though the text implicitly credits 
the survival of the geste, in other words its own sun/ival, to an act o f
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miraculous intervention, that is to the appearance o f a reliable witness out o f 
nowhere, it also holds out the prospect o f another less preternatural 
explanation for how the geste might have been recorded and preserved.8 The 
developing conundrum explains itself in the pun on the phrase L i ber Gilie (the 
noble 'G ilie’)  which, however, may also be read as liber ‘gilie’ or ‘the cunning 
o r guileful book’ cunning in that, among other things, it does not, as it pretends 
to do, directly witness the events that transpire at Roncevaux.9 The writing of 
the geste necessarily entails transcription, a transcription o f events as they are 
both seen and recounted in speech by those who have seen. Designating Li 
ber Gilie as the recording witness of events as they unfold at Roncevaux 
effectively creates a direct linkage between deed and the written text. This, of 
course, means that the author of the geste passes directly from the sword- 
bearer to the bearer o f the pen.10
From this passage, the reader can infer that a distinction is being made 
between two types o f narrative: the first, a narrative that is the direct creation 
o f the deed, or o f the granz colps spoken of by Roland at line 1013, and the 
second, a narrative that finds its genesis in a prior narrative. This accounts for 
the writing of Li ber Gilie, which amounts to a fictionalizing of the geste. The 
extraordinary power of this authorial tour de force lies in the fact that the 
Roland claims for its fiction a validity and a truthfulness that reaches beyond 
the scope of mere historical narrative.11 The geste (histories) is the result of 
the deed made word, and its greatest claim to truthfulness would come from 
the fact that a direct witness speaks o f events seen. L i ber Gilie (fiction), on
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the other hand, is derivative, being once removed from the deed and 
dependent not upon oral accounts, but upon another writing. The text as 
much as acknowledges the absence o f the oral witness who knows because 
he has seen by appealing to God as its author who gives fiction its validity, its 
virtue —Li ber Gilie, porqu i Deus fa it vertuz.
But the relation between fiction and history, that is to say between Li 
ber Gilie and la Geste, is one o f interdependence and mutual reinforcement 
Fiction reports to an exterior reality by ‘resurrecting’ the name Roland within 
the charter o f the monastery o f Laon - la  chartre e l muster de Loum. For 
without Roland, without the ‘R’ placed once again at the center o f the text, the 
cha(R)tre of the monastery o f Laon would be nothing more than the open 
field, the virginal space, the absolute absence that Roland attempts to impose 
at the moment of his death. L i ber Gilie heals that wound, implants the 
missing member at the center o f the body, redeems the inanity o f castration 
applying the force of the letter ‘R’ to the cha(R)tre.
In the first segment o f this essay we examined how fiction — 
Charlemagne’s evocation o f Jonah and the king of Nineveh, are Daniel and 
the .III. enfanz, -a s  well as Roland’s evocation of Lazarus and Daniel issues 
forth from fiction, accordingly, we have considered ‘resurrection’ in terms o f a 
continuance of narrative. For Roland, resurrection emphasizes closure, 
coinciding with the termination o f the geste; all deeds having been done, all 
conquests having been made, Roland turns to Holy Scripture for examples of 
figures who demonstrate a need to transcend earthly concerns.
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Subsequently, Charlemagne also draws from the same or similar Biblical 
allusions to rewrite Roland’s resurrection not as an ending, but as a beginning 
again. The resurrection theme, then, shows writing (the ‘resurrection prayer1 
o f Charlemagne) emanating out o f writing (the ‘resurrection prayer* o f Roland) 
emanating out o f writing (the Biblical sources from which they each draw 
examples). But even this succession o f narrative derived from narrative 
ultimately arrives at the historical deed; who, a t the time that the Roland was 
written, would have questioned the historical existence o f Daniel or Jonah, 
much less the trials they underwent and from which they were rescued 
through the grace and the will o f God? The assumption that these stories are 
based on historical fact lends validity to these Biblical accounts. One appeals 
to God to perform again and again the same miracle or a similar miracle o f 
resurrection. Certainly this is the premise upon which the fiction o f the Roland 
is fashioned; in the beginning is the deed (Roland’s) from which all 
subsequent narrative derives.
In the second segment, we examined two narrative axes: one leading 
from Roland to Aide that we termed geste, the other leading from 
Charlemagne to Bramimunde which we can now term the axis of fiction. We 
concluded with a passage that differentiates, covertly, between geste and 
fiction (L i ber Gilie). In the concluding segment, we look to the text for 
evidence that demonstrates the crossing o f these two axes for the intersection 
o f the geste and of the fictional narrative.
The writing o f the Roland ultimately reveals its origin in what the text 
indicates (obliquely) are ‘pagan sources’, in what Charlemagne refers to at
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verse 3338 as ‘lo r le is’. To pursue this topic, we turn our attention for the 
remainder o f this essay to the exploration o f the text’s two narrative 
beginnings, the beginning of narrative at the opening o f the text and the 
narrative in recrudescence immediately following the death o f Roland. Each 
of these beginnings, we shall see, is marked by crisis. Significantly, the 
Roland opens not with the council o f Franks but the council o f the Saracens. 
Here, in the form o f Blancandrin’s proposal, is provided a paradigm for the 
‘work’ to be carried out over the course o f the text, namely, the sacrifice o f the 
sons o f our wives, a harsh dictum which proves equally applicable to Frank 
and Saracen alike, and the transfer o f allegiance to the Emperor. 
Blancandrin’s proposal has as its aim to lead the Saracens out o f desperate, if 
not impossible, circumstances. We recall that they 1) have lost all o f Spain 
excepting Saragossa, 2) their forces are so greatly diminished that they can 
no longer go head to head with the forces under Charlemagne, and 3) their 
one hope for driving the Franks out o f their land, a plea to the emir Baligant for 
re-enforcements, has gone wholly unanswered. The Saracens have recourse 
to no other means o f ‘salvation’ than that which can be provided by the 
workings of their own imaginations. And though, ultimately, the Saracens fail 
in their attempt to ward off the invading Franks, their imaginations, 
nonetheless, will prove to be a collective resource of extraordinary power. It is 
under these uncertain circumstances, during the first council of the Saracens, 
that Blancandrin responds to Marsile’s desperate appeal for help. Marsile’s 
appeal is given as follows:
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“Cunseilez mei cume mi saive hume.
Si me guarisez e de mort e de hunte!" (II. 20 - 21)
(‘Counsel me like wise men.
Keep me from death and from shame!’)
Though at first it may seem somewhat unwarranted, a wealth o f evidence 
gleaned from the text will be introduced to justify a rearrangement of these 
lines through chiasmus. Exchanging the first with the second hemistich of 
lines 20 - 21 we arrive at these lines:
Si me gurarisez / cume mi saive hume,
Cunseilez mei /  e de mort e de hunte
(If you can protect me / like wise men.
Counsel me /  in death and in shame)
This seemingly absurd formulation suddenly becomes less baffling as the 
reader takes into account that the first narration delivers just that: ‘death’ and 
‘shame’ in uncertain terms for both Marsile and Baligant. Death and shame 
will be visited upon the Franks as well, though not with such great severity; for 
the Saracens, this judgement will be as swift as it is unmitigated.
We have already encountered a vatic Bramimonde, as she senses the 
coming ‘revival’ and supreme dominance o f the post-Roncevaux Charlemagne
(‘Under the heavens there is not a king that he does not treat like a child......
[aSuz d e l n’ad re qu’it prist a un enfant ” I. 2739]). It is likewise fitting that she 
should indicate the moment when Marsile’s sibylline ‘request’ attains its full 
realization, that is, the demise o f both Marsile and Baligant in a peculiar 
marriage o f death and shame. Firstly, she declares o f Marsile:
E Bramidonie vient curant cuntre lui.
Si li ad dit “Dolente, si mare fui!
A itel hunte, sire, mon seignor ai perdut!”
Chet li as piez, li amiralz la regut;
Sus en la chambre ad doel en sunt venut (II. 2822 - 24)
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(And Bramidonie comes running to him.
She said to him: ‘Oh, sorrow, such grief!
Such shame, sir, I have lost my lord!’
She falls at his feet the Emir caught her 
They went up to the room grief-stricken.)
Hunte and perdut {mort) -  Marsilie is fallen victim to his own narration. In a 
subsequent passage Bramimonde —now Bramidonie— delivers a like 
judgement upon the now fallen Baligant:
A halte voiz s’escrie: “Aiez nos, Mahum!
E! gentilz reis. ja sunt vencuz noz humes,
Li amiralz ocis a si grant hunte!” (It. 3641 - 43)
(She cries out in a loud voice: ‘Help us, Mohammed!
Ah! gentle King, our men are vanquished,
The Emir has been killed in such great shame!')
There is a circular irony that even goes beyond similarity o f content in joining 
these two passages. At lines 2822-24, Bramidonie announces Marsile’s 
death {perdut) and shame {hunte) to the arriving Baligant, although at that 
very instant Marsile is not yet dead, but only dying. He will live long enough, 
though not a moment longer, to have Bramidonie recount to him the death 
{ocis) and shame {hunte) that are to be Baliganfs own eventual lot (II. 3641 - 
47). The narrative sleight of hand that goes into having announced to Marsile 
the death and shame of Baligant and in announcing to Baligant the death and 
shame of Marsile underscores the degree o f thoroughness with which the 
conditions of the ‘request’ at lines 20 - 21 have been earned out. Death and 
shame are end products of the first narration; we will see shame projected 
well into the second half o f the text.
Mention has already been made o f the fact that, strictly speaking, death 
and shame come not only to the Saracens but to the French as well. Death 
has its own certain finality. Shame, on the other hand, becomes the principle
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legacy left to the post-Roncevaux narration, a legacy with which Charlemagne 
must immediately contend. The emperor does this in a highly paradoxical 
fashion, remembering that he is destined to first contend primarily with shame, 
by immediately setting out honur and dreiture as the goals o f the second 
narration. He does so by the use o f phrasing that is a virtual caique of the 
verse by which Marsile has opened the council of Saracen:
‘Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honur;
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur.” (II. 2430 - 31)
(‘Counsel me both my right and honor
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.’)
Whereas Marsile has launched the action o f the first narrative in the pursuit o f 
death and shame, Charlemagne launches that o f the second in pursuit o f 
dreiture and honur. Now if we place lines-20 and 2430 one above the other a 
certain syntactical symmetry plainly emerges:
Cunseilez mei e de mort e de hunte 
Cunseillez mei e dreiture e honor
(Counsel me in death and in shame 
Counsel me in my right and in honor)
We have already established (in the previous segment o f this chapter) that 
honur and hunte are in functional opposition to one another, an opposition 
that drives the action of the geste, so that the pursuit o f honor, particularly 
within the second half o f the Roland might easily be defined as the repulsion 
o f shame. The geste itself is ‘situated’ on the axis that runs between these 
two terms; which can be explained in this way: each ‘song-generating’ sword- 
blow -th e  gram  colps o f line 1014— brings honor while repelling at least
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potential shame. Yet, when an account of the events at Roncevaux is brought
to a close, ‘death is on the ledger1 and ‘shame* carries over into the second
narration like a spill o f indelible ink.
When Charlemagne conjures up dreiture and honur as the long-range
goals of the second narration, in mirrored antithesis to Marsile’s conjuration
„  of mort and hunte (I. 20/21), the second term, honur, proves especially
elusive. This is because the emperor himself has been personally shamed
by events that have transpired at Roncevaux. Yet in his plea at lines 2430 -
31, the Emperor feigns virtual innocence, his words suggesting that blame fall
wholly to the Saracens, and that it would be sufficient to wreak vengeance
upon them in order to secure the desired dreiture and honor
UE! Deus!” dist Carles, “ja sunt il (Saracen) ja si luinz!
Cunsentez [Cunseillez 1921] mei e dreiture e honur;
De France dulce m’unt tolue la flur.” (II. 2429 - 31)
(‘Oh, God!” said Charles, ‘they are indeed so faraway!
Counsel me in my right and in honor;
They have taken from me the flower of sweet France.’)
It isn't long before Charlemagne receives God’s word through the disposition 
of angels;
‘Charle, chevalche, car tei ne fait ciartet 
La flur de France as perdut, go set Deus.
Verger te poez de la gent criminel.”
A icel mot est I’emperere muntet (II. 2454 - 56)
(‘Charles, ride, for the light has not left you.
You have lost the flower of France, God knows this.
You may wreak vengeance on that criminal race 
At this word the Emperor mounted up.')
This gives the first indication that vengeance must be waged against more 
than just the Saracens before order and authority will be returned to the realm. 
In response to Charlemagne’s facile accusation o f blame against the
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Saracens (De France dulce m'unt tolue la flur), God speaks to the Emperor, 
reminding him of the part he has played in the massacre at Roncevaux -L a  
flur de France as perdut, go set Deus (You have lost the flower o f France, 
God knows this). Numerous signs appear throughout the remainder o f the
text that will substantiate this charge against the Emperor.
Charlemagne will not speak out directly concerning his own shame, but 
speaks instead o f a loss o f honor.
“La mei honor est tumet en declin." (I. 2890)
('My honor has turned in decline.')
“N’en avrai ja ki sustienget m’onur." (I. 2903)
(‘I will have no one who can sustain my honor.’)
Likewise, Baligant connects the loss o f Roland with the diminution of
Charlemagne’s honor:
Dist Baligant 'Oil, car mult est proz.
“En plusurs gestes de lui (Charlemagne) sunt granz honurs.
II n’en at mie de Rollant, sun nevoid:
N’avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus.° (II. 3180 - 83)
(Baligant said: ‘Indeed, for he is most worthy.
'Several gestes attribute great honors to him.
But he no longer has his nephew, Roland:
He will not have the strength to hold up against us.')
We have already noted in an earlier segment that the maintenance o f honor is 
contingent upon the presence of Roland, and that his loss has not only the 
practical effect of weakening the Emperor’s strength in arms, but also 
impinges upon the merit of the geste: those reports in several (plusurs) gestes 
o f Charlemagne’s ‘honor' loose validity in the absence of Roland. W e find the 
most overt, if not to say caustic, accusation o f blame, however, in the 
unequivocal words o f Ogier, which are ail the more potent in that they are
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mere paraphrases o f that insinuation o f blame spoken by God through an 
angel (of.: II. 2454 - 56):
Mult fierement Carlun en araisunet
“Veez paien cum ocient vos humes!
Ja Deu ne placet qu’el chef portez corone,
S'or n'i ferez par venger vostre hunte!” (II. 3536 - 39)
(He spoke to Charles most forthrightly:
‘You see how the pagans are killing our men!
May it never please God that your head should wear a crown,
If you do not strike to avenge your shame!’)
These are very strong words, suggesting that the Emperor has acted in a 
manner deserving of censure. Oddly, there is nothing we know o f the 
Emperor’s conduct in the battle against Baligant that would merit shame 
(vostre hunte). Certainly it does not appear that he has been cowardly or 
even unenthusiastic, so as to merit this rebuke. His shame must then apply to 
that earlier event, to Roncevaux, when the Saracens killed his men, while he 
did nothing to protect them. We recall his own self-reproach from lines 2936 - 
37: ‘My grief is so great that I do not wish to live / It is my household that is 
killed for m e...’ (aSi grant dot a i que ne voldreie vivre/D e ma maisnee, k i pu r 
m ei est ocise!” ) There is no act o f vengeance that will allow the Emperor to 
regain honor following his shameful absence at Roncevaux.
Shame is visited upon Charlemagne and the Franks through their 
principals o f authority during three engagements o f hand-to-hand combat, 
scenes that distinctly recall the ritual o f circumcision. We list them in order o f 
succession, the first involving a struggle between Naimes and the Saracen 
Canabeus:
Trenchet (Canabeus) la coife (de Naimes) entresque a la char,
Jus a la tere une piece en abat
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Granz fut li colps, It dux en estonat
Sempres calst, se Deus ne li aidast (II. 3436 - 39)
(He cuts through the coif down to the skin.
He knocks a piece of it down to the earth.
The blow was great the Duke was stunned by it 
He would have fallen had not God come to his aid.)
We note the piece of flesh excised from the scalp and the revival of Naimes 
through an act o f God; Charlemagne submits to a remarkably similar ritual 
during combat with Baligant:
Prent (Baligant) de (a cam grant pleine palme e plus: 
lloec endreit remeint li os tut nut 
Carles cancelet, por poi qu’il n'est caut;
Mais deus ne volt qu’il seit mort ne vencut (II. 3606 - 09)
(He took from his flesh a piece the size of your palm and more:
At the spot the bone was fully naked.
Charles wavers, and he almost fell;
But God did not want him either vanquished or dead.)
This is a clear example of the truth o f Charlemagne’s earlier observation 
concerning the Saracen:
“Tutes lor leis un dener ne lur valt
S’il unt grant gent d’igo, seignurs, qui calt?" (II. 3338 - 39)
(‘All their laws are not worth a penny.
My lords, even if they have a great army what does it matter?’)
Neither the strength nor the prowess of the individual combatant determines 
the outcome o f battle, simply the validity o f the law. This applies not only to 
the Saracens, but also to the contention between Frank and Frank with which 
the struggle concludes, the internal factious conflict that was determined from 
the moment the emperor deigned not to safeguard the inheritance and the 
heritor o f Ganelon’s legacy (cf.: II. 310 -  ff.).
The final ’circumcision’ is that o f Tierry who has taken up the sword in 
defense of Charlemagne’s cause; he is the third in succession to have the 
marks of honor’s demise inscribed in the scalp:
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Desur le faint li ad faite descendre.
Em mi le vis............................
La destre joe en ad tute sanglente,
L’osberc del dos josque par sum le ventre.
Deus le guarit, que mort ne I’acraventet (II. 3919 - 23)
(He brought is down upon his forehead.
in the middle of his face........................
His right cheek is all bloody now.
His hauberk to, from his back to the top of his stomach.
God protected him that he should not succumb to death.)
Shame (hunte) is written into the new order side by side with dreiture. When 
Charlemagne demands o f his barons, “Judge me my right against Ganelon” 
( ’De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit), shame or full submission o f individual 
volition to the dictates of the law is the price exacted by this exchange, the 
exchange o f the old law for a new dispensation. We can now see that 
whereas the Emperor sought ‘both right and honor1 (e dreiture e honor) he 
receives ‘both right and shame’ (e dreiture e hunte) in its stead (a piece of 
Marsile’s legacy -h u n te -  having been implanted in the second narrative). 
Conversely, if there is any sense in which it can be said that honor has been 
reclaimed, it is in having resuscitated, posthumously, the honor o f Roland and, 
at least nominally, o f all those who met their death at Roncevaux. Their 
honor, supreme irony, derives from Roland’s rejecting Charlemagne’s offer of 
salvement (cf.: II. 784 - ff ), as blindly they follow after Roland’s insatiable 
hunger for vengeance. Taking Roland’s death as the event dividing the text 
into two narrative panels, we now submit that on the one side o f this gap is the 
narrative marked by death (mort) and honor (honor), and on the other side a 
narrative marked by right (dreiture) and shame (hunte). Now the workings of 
this inter-reflection o f the text, the mirroring into one another o f the text’s two 
narative panels, should be discernible to a greater degree. Finally, we can
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say that the text operates on two axes that cross one another just at the 
moment o f Roland’s death, at the text’s dehiscent center. One of these is the 
axis of fiction (dreiture~(^n9erB)-m orf); the other, the axis of the Geste 
(,honor-(9ererB)-hunte ). We end our study with a brief examination o f their 
overlap, which we lay out in graphic representation.
These axes have already been discussed in a previous segment: 1) 
honor-hunte as the binary opposition that propels the spiral o f violence driving 
the action o f the first narrative; and 2) mort-dreiture as the polarity that 
establishes the social order and political stability that becomes the impress o f 
the second narrative. That the geste plays out along the axis honor-hunte 
can be inferred from verses 1013 - 14:
“Or guart chascuns que granz colps i empleit,
Que malvaise cangun de nus chantet ne seit!" (II. 1013-14)
('Now let each see to it that he employ great blows.
So that no taunting song be sung about us!’)
(‘Each one take care to strike great blows,
That no bad song will they know to sing against us!’)
Though neither word is mentioned here we can nonetheless deduce from 
other passages within the text that the opposition honor-hunte is critical to our 
understanding of these verses. We again call to mind the words spoken by 
Baligant o f Charlemagne:
Dist Baligant 'Oil, car mult est proz.
En plusurs gestes de lui sunt granz honurs.
II n’en at mie de Rollant sun nevoid:
N'avrat vertut ques tienget cuntre nus." (II. 3180 - 83)
(Baligant said: ’Indeed, for he is most worthy.
‘Several gestes attribute great honors to him.
But he no longer has the service of his nephew, Roland:
He will not have the strength to hold up against us.’)
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Honurs equates with vertut in these lines, and virtue is at once the ability to 
prevail in battle and the marks that transport the presence o f Roland into the 
second narrative. Though many gestes ascribe honurs to Charlemagne, they 
do so not because of his own qualities, but because o f those qualities which, 
properly speaking, belong to Roland alone. Now that Roland is absent, so, 
too, is honor absent. Needless to say, these words spoken by Baligant could 
not be more accurate in his assessment. And yet the French under 
Charlemagne's command w ill prevail, despite the absence o f honur, due not 
to the prowess of particular combatants, but rather because o f divine will. But 
these post-Roncevaux circumstances are found only after the making of the 
geste. In the first narration, the deed (the sword-blow) guarantees honor and 
wards off shame, and it is in terms of the continuous struggle between honor 
and hunte that the creation o f the Geste is best described - “Que malvaise 
cangun (read geste) de nus chan te tne seit!”
The case for the polarity dreiture-mort as the axis o f fiction can be 
determined from more general evidence. The first thing to be noted is that by 
the end of the trial o f Ganelon, dreiture has been defined in the negative; all 
those, whether they be Saracen or Frank, who have refused the preeminence 
of dreiture, which is the preeminence of the new law, meet with death. They 
are the Saracens who refuse conversion at the conclusion o f the battle (II. 
3669 - 70) and the clan obstinately supporting Ganelon against the Emperor’s 
call for dreit against him (I. 3751). Death is then defined as the wages of 
those who do not know or recognize dreiture. There is ultimately no narration 
of struggle, at least no ongoing and overt struggle, in the polarity dreiture- 
mort; either one is in conformity with the law or one is eradicated, by 
‘universal’ consent, from the new social and political order. But we can go one
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step further in saying that this eradication has already begun at the slaughter 
o f Roncevaux. Yet we find that Roland, dying intact without the puncture o f a 
single wound or the breaking o f a single bone, suffers no submission to 
dreiture, to the new law offered him by Charlemagne (I. 786); Roland remains 
free of the marks of circumcision cut onto the crowns of Naimes, Tierry and 
Charlemagne. For Roland (II. 787 - 88), safety in the strength o f numbers was 
repugnant, devoid of honor and tantamount a betrayal o f the geste. This 
says the count: ‘I will do no such thing / may God confound me, it I betray the
geste!’  (£o dit li quens: ‘Jo n'en ferai nient /  Deus me cunfunde, se la
geste en desment!"). Roland refuses the emperor’s salvement for his own 
person and for all the Franks under his command. The price of honor is 
death, and Roland pays the price in full awareness of the choice he has 
made; that he is less than candid with the Franks, leading them uninformed 
into oblivion, is a matter already taken up elsewhere in this chapter.
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Let us now take briefly into consideration those things that, as Marsile and
Charlemagne have indicated, the first and the second narratives seek, namely, 
e de mort e de hunte and e dreiture e honor. Death {mort), especially now that 
we have defined death as the absence of dreiture, is clearly to the left of the 
textual gap signaling the absence of Roland, dreiture is to the right. This in 
accordance with the prescriptions set out by Marsile and the Emperor. By 
contrast, honor, insofar as it has been recuperated by the actions of the 
second narrative, is a quality that has been returned to Roland and to the first 
narrative through the actions of the second. In avenging Roland, the Emperor 
recuperates Roland’s honor, though he fall short of repurchasing his own. 
Honor, as does death, belongs to the first narrative; the Emperor’s lot, to the 
contrary, is continuing shame. Thus honor and hunte switch ‘narrative fields’ 
so that 'honor and mort become the hallmark of the first narration, dreiture and 
hunte that o f the second. Again, we can represent this graphically in fixing the 
death of Roland at the point of intersection between the axis of the Geste and 
the axis of fiction:
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Dreiture D re iture
In addition to representing mort by dreiture and hunte by honor this graph 
draws new ‘letters’ onto the axes: R = presence, R = absence of Roland; Ch = 
presence, Ch = absence of the Emperor. By this we wish to recall that in the 
first narration Roland’s ‘kinetic’ presence contrasts with the emperor’s fatal 
passivity; he is absent from Roncevaux, and absent from his role as executor 
of the law (in particular, during the frequently noted exchange with Ganelon, II. 
310 - ff.). Likewise, whereas Roland is now ‘absent’ from the post-Roncevaux 
text, in other words absent from the second narration, Charlemagne takes on 
presence as an agent and executor of the (new) law.
One surprising and seemingly contradictory surmise can be drawn from this 
diagram: fiction and geste are no longer divided by the text’s open center. 
Taken separately, the action of the first narration is governed by the axis 
honor-hunte, the second by the axis dreiture-mort; but as these two narratives 
join hunte is projected into the second narrative mort into the first; the two 
narratives, that is the “historicar and the “fictive’’, overlap at every point This 
is the work of Charlemagne, who places R(oland), reduced (by his own doing)
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to the ‘marrow1 of the geste, back into the center of fiction, to the open, 
uncultivated fields o f the blank page -Pate(R)ne. Likewise, we have seen the 
‘cunning book’ fill up the center of the open wound that is the cha(R)tre o f Laon 
with the re-found presence of R(oland). Although they are no longer separate, 
the first and second narratives still remain distinguishable by the 
presence/absence of Roland/Charlemagne. In the first narrative, 
Charlemagne, whom we now designate as the author of fiction, is present as a 
noted absence; in the second narrative, Roland, author of the geste, is made 
present as the commemoration of loss. The absence of Roland is dedicated 
as the gap separating the text’s two narratives. This is also the space wherein 
'lor /e/s', that is, the failed law, accuses both Saracen and Frank alike; 
something ‘pagan’ disseminates from the center throughout all passages of the 
text. The third diagram illustrates this in what is recognizably the full 
elaboration of a semeiotic square:
verite




lor leisD re iture H onur
faussete
The first divide, that between first and second narrative is vertical, an open field 
[PateQne] cleaving the Roland into two narratives. The divide itself, this gap, is *
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the scar marks (eft from the incision where geste and fiction cross. So it is that 
in taking the text as ‘two parts joined’ we are now able to see how in the first 
narrative the opposition honor-hunte (the axis upon which the Geste is 
produced -gerere) is replaced by the non-operative pairing honor/dreiture or 
honor/death. This I have given representation in the initialing letters RCh -th e  
presence of Roland being the guarantor o f honor within the geste (cf: Baligant 
at II. 3181 - 83), the absence of Charlemagne assuring that death will be the 
order o f the day at Ronceveaux (cf.: Roland’s refusal o f Charlemagne’s 
salvement at II. 783 - 91). Roland is the law (honor) of the first narrative; 
measuring the catastrophic events at Roncevaux against Charlemagne’s 
observations at lines 3338 - 39, we can now say that Roland’s law (honur) is 
none other than tor leis, that is, the law from which the second narration 
attempts to distance itself. Charlemagne is not eclipsed by Roland, and in 
particular not eclipsed by Roland’s honur, rather his is the occulted presence of 
a new and emerging socio-political order, in short, the emergence of a new 
law. Thus, tor leis (honur) becomes the mirroring pendant of the ‘true law1 
(dreiture) with this difference: whereas tor leis (honur) depends upon the 
presence o f the man, i.e. the deed, for its validity (virtut -cf: again Baligant at 
lines 381 - 83), the validity of the ‘true law* (dreiture) is, contrariwise, 
independent o f man’s deeds, being determined solely by its consonance with 
the word o f God.
In the second narrative, the polarity dreiture-mort is replaced by the 
pairing dreiture/honor that is, by dreiture/hunte. This we represent with the 
initialing letters C hR - the presence of Charlemagne invoking the advent of 
dreiture, the absence of Roland a reminder o f the shame that becomes a 
permenant fixture of the post-Roncevaux order. Unlike Roland, who is honor,
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who carves honor out with the sword, Charlemagne is at best a semblance o f 
dreiture; he can call for le dreit to be judged against Ganelon (cf.: I. 3751), but 
only the hand o f God, using Tierry as its instrument, can execute that order. 
We now have this understanding of the text’s two narratives as they transverse 
its open center: in the workings of the first narrative (RCh), death subtends 
honor -th e  absence of Charlemagne serves only to prove the invalidity o f /or 
leis; in the workings o f the second narrative (ChR), shame is the constant 
undercurrent of dreiture. But what does this reveal about the interrelation o f 
the text’s two narratives, if not the fact that they interpenetrate one another? 
The axis o f the geste is thrust into the second narration as Charlemagne 
becomes the inheritor of shame, and the axis o f ‘fiction’ projects into the first 
narrative as death, understood as the absence of dreiture, comes, 
retrospectively, to illuminate the true nature o f the events that have unfolded at 
Roncevaux.
We can now call attention to a second narrational divide, one that bisects the 
Roland laterally. We can see from the third graph (p. 160) that the pair 
Honor/Dreiture defines the upper field which we have named the field o f 
Chrestientet; similarly, the field below center, defined by the pair 
Dreiture/Honor, is designated as the field o f lo r leis. To put this in terms 
perhaps more easily intelligible to the reader, one could argue that there are 
two currents, hence two distinct approaches that one might take in reading the 
Roland. One reading associates christientet strictly with the Franks, lo r leis 
strictly with the Saracens; here the Frankish presence is represented by 
Roland in the first narration and by Charlemagne in the second. In another 
kind of reading, we place emphasis on the absence o f Roland and 
Charlemagne; this is the dark undercurrent o f death and shame which
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indicates to us that the difference between lo r leis and christientet (read: 
dreiture) is really a difference internal to the Frankish camp. Lor leis, then, is 
not the law o f the Saracens, rather it is a substratum of the text defined by 
death and shame. There is not a moment within the text where, either in a 
positive or in a negative representation, chretientet (dreiture/dreiture) and lo r 
leis (honor/honor) are not inextricably intertwined. There is also a single 
instance at the moment o f the death of Roland, at the gap between the text’s 
two narratives, where lo r leis and chrestientet merge. The text's center, we 
may recall, is the locus where Charlemagne refills the void left by Roland’s 
death -Pate(R)ne- where L i ber Gilie heals the wound found in the Cha(R)tre.
The notion that ‘factual’ narrative, one that recounts the deed or the geste, 
and ‘fictional’ narrative, one where word motivates word, might ever exist 
wholly apart is an illusion, though one necessary to the process o f writing. The 
geste, here the first narrative of the Roland, refers to something exterior to 
itself, something from which, putatively, it takes its origin. Looking to the 
second narrative o f the Roland, we see that ‘fiction,’ on the other hand, finds its 
origin not in the deed -w e  recall that neither Tierry nor Naimes nor even 
Charlemagne vanquishes the enemy but only the hand o f God— but in the 
already written word. The source o f the second narrative o f the Chanson de 
Roland is the first narrative of the Chanson de Roland. There is something 
paradoxical in the relation between the two. Once the geste has been created, 
there is need o f no other, and Roland, in desuetude, can find a well-merited 
rest in death; this is how the seemingly interminable cycle o f violence finally 
ends. On the contrary, the second narration though it brings the spiral of 
violence to conclusion calls for an endless repetition, an endless reenactment 
in similitude o f the violence original to the geste. Thus, at the conclusion, of
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the Roland, the emperor is sent out very much against his will, in fact in 
obedience to the will o f Another, to continue in an interminable narrative o f 
battle against the enemy.
Why the anguish? Why do we find Charlemagne crying and pulling at his 
beard? Because the narration begun with the geste will never find its ending; 
and the glory o f conquest will no longer in any way, either directly or indirectly, 
reflect back upon the honor o f the Emperor. Charlemagne has vacated his 
role as the embodiment o f authority, he is no longer the law merely the law's 
chief agent. The law is silent, a hidden text, known only through acts o f 
transgression. The text concludes with the illusion o f ‘wholeness,’ i.e., 
existence without the presence o f shame, shattered. Charlemagne cannot 
escape the loss: the loss of Roland, the loss o f his own position of authority at 
the center of the text. The endless repetition o f unwilled narration is a 
concession to writing. The writer (author) must write interminably in his futile 
attempt to cover the gap at the center o f the text, to fill in the open space o f the 
Veire Pate(R)ne, and to heal the wound of castration that strikes the Cha(R)tre 
at its center.
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ICH-VERLUfST
L’gcrivain appartient d I’oeuvre, mais ce qui lui appartient, c'est 
seulement un livre, un amas muet de mots steriles, ce qu'ii y a 
de plus insignifiant au monde. (Blanchot L'espace Iitt6raire)
The story o f the last day in Virgil’s life seems perfectly suited to 
Hermann Broch's near lifelong literary project. The poet Virgil had, after all, 
lived on the cusp o f two ages and his work on a grand scale, the Aeneid, is 
arguably the principal literary pathway through which antiquity attains to the 
modern age. Broch, in a sim ilar fashion, situates his own writings at what he 
perceived to be the end of an age. His writings describe the W est in decline 
from the Romantics through the first half o f the twentieth century, and they 
characterize what Broch perceives to be an era o f social and political anomie. 
Some of his works, such as The Sleepwalkers (Die Schlafwandler), chronicle 
the decline in detail, attempting to comprehend the mechanisms by which an 
age unravels toward its end. The Death o f Virgil (hereafter cited as T.D.V.), 
on the other hand, sets itself apart as the only one o f Broch’s works that 
indicates a way out o f the chaos by its attempt to supplant an old ‘reality’ with 
one newly recreated.
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Though Broch had revised and rewritten the basic story repeatedly 
from Spring 1936 to Spring 1945, we attribute the ultimate shape o f the novel 
published as The Death o f Virgil to an event that occurred in the life o f the 
author in mid-March, 1938. During the time at which the politics and the 
m ilitary force of Nazi Germany were spreading their way into neighboring 
Austria, Hermann Broch, under circumstances which remain obscure, was 
taken into custody in the provincial town o f Alt-Aussee. It is not dear that his 
captors knew of his Jewish identity. S till in all, Broch had every reason to 
believe that he would probably not escape this imprisonment alive. For a 
period o f two and a half weeks, from the thirteenth to the thirty-first o f March, 
1938, expecting that these were the last days and hours of his life, Broch 
wrote obsessively and with a singular concentration upon the story o f Virgil’s 
last day. Consistent with these circumstances, he later describes these 
writings, the basis for what was to become T.D.V., as a “literary will.”
How odd, indeed, that Broch, who exercised his talents in such diverse 
literary forms as the philosophical treatise and the cultural, social and political 
essay, should choose to write his way toward death through a medium of 
fiction. The choice, however, reveals a great deal concerning the value Broch 
places upon fiction as a purveyor o f ‘truth’1 and the ‘real’ (Wahrheit und 
Wirklichkeit), terms that claim an important place in the philosophical thought 
with which his works are infused. In a letter to Aldoux Huxley, dated May 10, 
1945, Broch implies that the T.D.V. was written as a form of ‘witness;’ he 
suggests that the event of death could itself be made present to the reader 
through the medium o f the text:
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For mich gait es, mein Material, mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu 
Obermitteln. Ich muBte den Leser nachleben lassen. wie man sich der 
Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und SelbstauslOschung annahert2
(For me it was important to convey my material, my cognition-material, to the 
reader. I had to have the reader to live through the experience of how one 
approaches the knowledge (cognition) of death through a process of contrition 
and of self-dissolution).
Here Broch finds it necessary that the reader should not simply know 
something about his, Broch’s, experience but that each reader should be 
'made to  live through' (nachleben lassen) a confrontation with death not unlike 
his own. Extending the ‘death experience’ to the reader becomes the express 
purpose for writing T.D.V., and in this light we can say that Broch does ‘w ill’ to 
the reader not just the description o f his encounter with death, but death itself; 
he wills to the reader, through fiction, the immediate experience of death3. 
Furthermore, death and fiction stand together in a relation of mediated 
exchange. The death experience and the reading experience translate one 
into the other through the pages of T.D.V. Broch make this clear in the 
following excerpt taken again from the letter to Huxley:
 wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch Zerknirschung und
SelbstauslOschung annahert (mag man sie auch als noch Lebender niemals 
erreichen). Mit bloft rationalen Mitteilungen ist dies nicht zu bewerk- 
stelligen, vielmehr muBte der Leser dazu gebracht werden, genau den 
gleichen Prozess, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun seinerseits genau so 
durchzugehen.
( how one approaches a knowledge (cognition) of death through a process
of contrition and of self-dissolution (may one who is yet alive never reach 
this experience). This cannot be brought about through purely rational means, 
rather the reader must be brought to this cognition (of death) through exactly 
the same process that I myself worked through (durchgemacht habe), only 
the reader must go through it on his/her own).
Broch attempts to realize in fiction the experience o f ‘death-approaching’ so 
that what happened in Alt-Aussee, what realty happened, might be
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experienced again and again, and not just by Broch, but by any reader able to 
enter into the process of the unfolding fiction of T.D.V.
The experience at Alt-Aussee changed in a fundamental way what 
Broch had earlier intended as a mere sketch of the last hours o f Virgil’s life. In 
the text, as it is reshaped following that death experience, Broch conflates the 
death of an age with the death of the subject, the anguish of a particular 
individual with the anguish of a world in the maelstrom o f political and social 
chaos. Virgil’s death (unless otherwise noted Virgil will hereafter refer to 
Broch’s Virgil) and Broch’s death and the death o f the reader all join in a 
temporal simultaneity within the pages o f this lengthy and stylistically arduous 
novel.
T.D.V. is offered to the reader as a crucible into which the subject might 
enter in order that the subject and the age in which he lives should undergo 
significant transformation. No matter how ambitious or unrealistic the idea, 
Broch pursues a commonality between T.D.V. and Virgil’s Aeneid. Emulating 
what had apparently been the transformative effects o f the AeneidL Broch 
wishes that his T.D.V. should serve as the portal into a ‘real’ beyond his then 
present reality, a ‘real’ that will likewise be constructed from a work of fiction. 
Broch sensed that his world was in a state o f moral, political and cultural 
collapse. Through the T.D. V., Broch attempts to allow his reader to fall to an 
absolute nadir from where the new ‘real’ o f his fiction would well up, 
supplanting an old, corrupt and fallen state of human existence. The following 
takes account of the Brochean subject as situated in the cleft between those
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two opposing realities: the one emergent, the other in a state o f precipitous 
decline.
A Child’s Name
Broch opens the T.D.V. with a description o f the sea upon which glide 
the squadron o f Roman ships carrying Virgil home to the Italian shore. The 
Adriatic is a glistening surface, stahlblau und licht:(steel-blue and light), its 
mirror-like waters reflecting the story of life a t the heel o f the Italian peninsula. 
At the approach of Brindisi the once ‘death-like loneliness o f the [barren] sea’ 
is transformed into a picture of bustling human activ ity :
 und jetzt, da die sonnige, dennoch so todesahnende Einsamkeit der See
sich ins friedvoll Freudige menschlicherTatigkeitwandelte, da die
Fluten, sanft Obergianzt von der Nahe menschlichen Seins und Hausens,
sich mitvielerlei Schiffen bevdlkerten  (p. 11)
(.......and now, here the sunny yet death-like loneliness of the sea had
transformed itself into the peaceful joy of human activity, here the 
floods, softly shimmering with the reflection of nearby human existence 
and of human shelter, the sea teeming with many kinds of ships )
Broch describes Brindisi’s coastal waters, teeming (bevdlkerten) with the 
various sorts o f seagoing vessels, as ‘softly shimmering in the nearness to 
human beings and human habitations’. Broch, moreover, further elaborates 
upon the imagery of the sea as a shimmering reflective surface in calling the 
water ‘mirror-like’ (spiegelglatt) and capturing in its reflected surface an idyllic 
picture of Roman life:
 da war das Wasser beinahe spiegelglatt geworden; perlmuttem war
darOber die Muschel des Himmels geOffnet, es wurde Abend, und man 
roch das Holzfeuer der Herdstatten, so oft die TOne des Lebens, ein 
Hammem oder ein Ruf von dort hergeweht und herangetragen wurden.
(p H )
( here the water had become nearly as smooth as a mirror's surface;
the arching muscle-shell of the heavens had opened and it was mother-of- 
pearl, it became evening and there was wood fire smoking in the hearth
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place, so often the life-sound a hammer or a call being wafted here, borne 
here from afar.)
Here is Rome in its Golden Age, much as it is described in Virgil’s own 
Georgies. The problem with this picture, as with V irgil’s depiction o f Roman 
life in the Georgies themselves, is that this representation o f the ’Golden Age’ 
is true to an age already removed far into the past, at least as fa r removed as 
the now defunct Republic for which it was both example and inspiration. The 
Rome contemporaneous with Virgil no longer resembles the idyllic past 
described in the Georgies. The significance of this opening passage, then, is 
two-fold: firstly, it introduces the reader to a Rome which, as a figment o f the 
Virgilian imagination, is untrue to the circumstances o f Virgil’s later life; 
secondly, the reader o f T.D.V. is first introduced to Virgil not as person but as 
text; that is to say, we first encounter Virgil not addressed in name, but in the 
form of a fiction that is identifiably his by its style.
The above scene taken from T.D.V,ls first page, bears Virgil’s signature 
only in that from the style o f the passage we can recognize Virgil within it. As 
Virgil’s ‘name’ is so recognizably inscribed into the above fictional idyll, so the 
‘truth’ or untruth o f the name finds itself implicated in the veracity o f the 
fiction. As the squadron o f ships nears shore and Virgil sees at first hand the 
squalor o f the city and the repulsive habits and the nauseating physical 
appearance o f its population (pp. 28 - ff.), the incongruity between the idyll 
and the actuality o f state calls into question the veracity o f V irgil’s very name. 
Hence, the fiction portrayed in the above citation bears no resemblance to the
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truth of Brindisi as Virgil witnesses it; and the truth o f the fiction and the truth 
of the name appear to Virgil to be sadly and inextricably intertwined.
The idea o f the interchangeability o f the name-of-the-author for the 
fiction itself is brought into play throughout that lengthy passage which 
describes Virgil’s movement toward the state palace in Brindisi, the palace 
that will be Virgil’s residence during the final hours of his life. Virgil is earned 
ashore to find himself at the center o f a procession that is about to wind its 
way through the city’s narrow streets. Leading the procession is Lysanias the 
imaginary boy-com panion whom the reader finds carrying the cloak and the 
manuscript; two highly significant aspects Virgil’s material being:
Dad der Knabe mitgekommen war, erwies sich da als unverhoffte
Erleichterung; als ware ihm, und dies war auOerst seltsam, von
irgendwoher Kenntnis um die Wicktigkeit des Manuscriptkoffiers
geworden, achtete er darauf, da& dessen Trager sich stets knapp neben
der Sanfte hieften, und wahrend er, immerzu selber daneben und den
Mantel Qber die Schulter geworfen, keineiiei Abdrangung zulieft,
blinzelte er manchmal mit helldurchsichtigen Augen belustigt und
verehrungsvoll herauf. (pp. 29 - 30)
(That the boy had come along proved to be an un-hoped for lightening of 
Virgil's burden, as though from some indeterminate source the boy, and 
this was exceedingly strange, was apprised about the importance of the 
manuscript chest he was attentive to see to it that the manuscript's earner 
held it close against the litter and while he is constantly near, the cloak 
thrown over his shoulder did not allow himself to be driven aside, he 
now and again winked impishly and reverently upon the manuscript chest 
with his clear bright eyes.
Appropriate to this passage, Lysanias is the creature o f Virgil’s imagination 
who strives to reconcile conflicting aspects of Virgil’s being. In later passages 
(p. 179 et passim), he will call Virgil ‘name-giver,’ implying that all things 
Roman have been named anew through the writing o f the Aeneid; and 
throughout T.D.V., Lysanias will assiduously defend the Aeneid against all 
attempts by Virgil to destroy it. Lysanias carries the manuscript in his hands
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and the cloak over his shoulder, protecting them not only from inadvertent 
loss. The rough handling of the surrounding crowd, but also from Virgil’s 
intent to destroy two outward aspects o f his own identity, namely, name and 
text.
The T.D.V. invents an ingenious metaphorical device for bringing name 
and text under close critical observation. As the procession that has Virgil at 
its center wends its way upward toward the state palace that is a last ‘resting 
place’ for the dying author, a night moth suddenly lights on the handle o f the 
bier upon which he is being earned:
 ein Nachtfalter verirrte sich auf die Sanftenlehne und blieb daran
haften; sachte wollte sich neuerlich MQdigkeit und Schlaf melden, sechs 
Beine hatte der Falter und sehr viele, wenn nicht gar unbestimmbar viele 
das Tragergespann  (p. 39)
( an errant night moth lighted upon the litter handles and remained
clinging there, softly sleep and weariness called anew; the moth had six 
legs and the porters of the litter had a great many if not a countless number 
of legs )
This is the same procession which has Lysanias carrying in his hands the 
manuscript o f the Aeneid and, over his shoulder, Virgil’s cloak; it is also a 
procession marching inexorably toward fire.
Fire is the element which lends its name to the subsequent Book o f 
T.D.V. (Book II); fire also surrounds the palace toward which Virgil is being 
bome as though he, along with the moth on the handle of his bier, were being 
transported to a funerary pyre (p. 39). W hat is remarkable about this passage 
is that the night moth so perfectly epitomizes the circumstances of Virgil’s 
physical position within the procession. The six legs of the night moth 
replicate the legs of the nameless servants bearing the litter upon which he
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rests. The texture o f the moth’s wings recall the textuality o f cloak and of 
manuscript. The image o f the moth, which is little other than a soft, shapeless 
body buried in a magnificent fold o f wings, is the very image o f Virgil as he lies 
apart from the enfolding cloak and manuscript earned by Lysanias. As if to 
hide the ‘naked body* beneath the cloth, the reader is given no physical 
description o f Virgil whatsoever; he is present only in name and in ‘text;’ and 
the legs that carry him forward remain without identity as though these 
invisible servants truly were torsoless.
W ith a recognition that the procession is moving toward fire, there is 
another significance to which the night moth alludes; like V irg il threatened with 
the loss o f name and text, the night moth, too, is drawn toward a fire that will 
consume it whole. As Virgil seems to be steadily moving toward some 
unnamed and unknowable destruction the correlative image of the moth 
drawn to the flame adds something that immeasurably enriches the 
significance of this scene. The moth whose body is covered with a fold of 
wings and from which innumerable legs protrude “a great many when not a 
countless number” (sehr viele, wenn nicht unbestimmbar viele), projects, in 
this context, the image o f the body o f state enveloped by the materiality o f the 
text. This is to say, Rome is wrapped in a fiction that, one way or another, 
depending on whether the manuscript is preserved or consumed by fire, will 
have significant bearing upon the fate o f state. The fiction o f the Aeneid and 
so Rome’s probable history, as well as its imaginary past, come together at 
the precarious moment o f V irgil’s ascent to the palace o f Brindisi, which is an
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ascent into fire. Here Virgil’s text and Virgil’s name become synecdochically
Rome; and the text, the name, and the state become inextricably one.
As if to emphasize the historico-fictional aspects of the Aeneid^ Virgil 
progresses through the streets o f Brindisi, moving backward through the 
chronology of his fiction; it is as though he were realizing in the brief moment 
o f this procession all the events of his own fiction only in reverse order. 
Brindisi, first glimpsed Trom the sea (p. 11), conjures up scenes from the 
Georgies and the Golden Age of Rome; Virgil’s climb through the steep and 
narrow passageways of the city distinctly recalls Aeneas’ travails during his 
journey toward Italia. More to the point, Virgil’s encounter with the shrill and 
howling voices o f the women of Brindisi recalls Aeneas’ passage through 
narrow straits o f the Scylla and Charybdis. Here is the scene that describes 
Virgil’s progress as he moves toward the state palace of Brindisi:
 und wenn auch langsam, man kam trotzdem vorwSrts -Stufe um Stufe
ging es die Elendsgasse hinan—, nein, nicht diese Behelligungen waren arg, 
sondem die Weiber waren es, sie waren das Argste, sie, diese aus den 
Fenstem herausgeiehnten Weiber, brustzerquetscht auf den BrQstungen, 
herabbaumelnd schlangengleich ihre nackten Arme mit den zQngelnden 
Handen daran, und waren es auch nur irr keifende Schimpfworte, in die 
ihr Geschwatz umkippte, sowie sie des Zuges ansichtig wurden, es war 
zugieich ein keifendes Irresein, groR wie jedes Irresein, Qbersteigert zur 
Anklage, Qbersteigert zur Wahrheit da es Schimpf war. (p. 40)
( and even though slowly they still came forward -one step after the other
the procession climbed the misery-streets—, no, these vexations were not so 
bad, it was the wenches, they were the worst they were, these wenches leaning 
overhead from the windows, breasts squashed against the railings, their naked 
arms swaying like branches, serpent-like, with their hands flickering like 
signing tongues and though their chatter toppled into mere piping blame-words 
so soon as the procession was sighted it was nonetheless a carping insanity, 
great was that insanity which did swell to reproach, which did swell to truth 
since it was disgrace.)
The women (W eiber -wenches) lean downward toward the procession, their 
breasts quashed against balconies, their arms swinging like branches
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(herabbaumelnd), that transmogrify into serpents (schlangengleich), their 
hands flickering like serpents’ tongues. This aural attack proclaims loudly the 
anxieties associated with the perceived threat o f annihilation. Additionally, the 
multitude o f breasts and swaying arms make claim to Virgil; touching him with 
their voices, signing him with their hands (zungelnden Hein den). Their words 
strike hard. Their ravings well up into a cacophony of accusation, and 
accusation wells up into pitiless truth (Qbersteigert zur Wahrheit). These shrill 
accusations blame Virgil for the untruth of his text and for the lies of his fiction, 
and they ultimately make the demand that the texts be destroyed and that 
Virgil, if only in name, be destroyed along with them.
The voices of the women of Brindisi continue to fly at Virgil as the 
accusations, however incomprehensible they may be, proceed to attain their 
effect. They are cries from the ‘heart which tear into the text, which is 
branded factitious and untrue. The women’s voices strip away at the integrity 
of the author as well as at the falsity o f the cloth of his fiction:
-rsinnlos war der Hagel der Schimpfworte, der auf ihn niederprasselte, 
sinnlos, sinnlos, sinnlos, dennoch berechtigt, dennoch Mahnung, dennoch 
Wahrheit, dennoch zur Wahrheit ubersteigerter Irrsinn, und jede 
Schmahung rift ein Stock Gberheblichkeit von seiner Seele, so da& sie 
nackt wurde, so nackt wie die Sduglinge, so nackt wie die Greise auf ihren 
Lumpen, nackt vor Finstemis, nackt vor Erinnerungslosigkeit, nackt vor 
Schuld, eingegangen in dieflutende Nacktheitdes Ununterscheidbaren— (p. 41)
(—:senseless was the hail of blame-words that drizzled upon him, senseless, 
senseless, senseless yet justified, yet warning, yet truth, yet insanity welling 
up into truth, and every shameful insult tore a piece of arrogance from his soul, 
so that the soul became naked, as naked as a suckling babe, as naked as 
the grizzled old men laying on their rags, naked with darkness, naked with 
the absence of memory, naked with guilt, moving into the spreading nakedness 
of the realm void of all differentiation—)
Though ‘nonsense’ (Irrsinn), the voices are nonetheless ‘true,’ and they rip at 
the arrogance of Virgil's soul (n'R ein StQck Oberbeblichkeit von seiner Seele).
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But Virgil’s arrogance is nothing other than an attempt at attaining, through
fiction, an alternate reality, a ‘real’ unlike the one into which he was bom. Like
the night moth, the texture o f whose wings will be consumed in fire, Virgil’s
own body is to be stripped o f its covering, rendering him ‘ naked as the
newborn, so naked as those who in grizzled old age lie bare on their rags.......
The movement is toward ‘truth revealed’, one that would lie on the nether side
of death, a truth that would be revealed as the cloth o f fiction is stripped from
the body like flesh from the bone. But this attempt at an immediately
perceptible truth comes at the sacrifice of clear memory and at the price o f a
lapse into an undifferentiated reality: ‘ naked before darkness, naked
before the loss o f all memory, naked before guilt, entered into the spreading
nakedness o f the undifferentiated-’ (so da& sie nackt wurde, so nackt wie die
Sauglinge, so nackt wie die Greise a u f ihren Lumpen).4 This is Virgil’s first
encounter with death within T.D.V. and the encounter demands that
everything bearing the signature o f recognition and of individual identity —
name and text— be dissolved from his being.
For the moment, Virgil succumbs to the dissolution o f identity, to a
mode of death that entails a stripping away o f name and o f text:
 eraber, entkleidet des Namens, entkleidet seiner Seele, entkleidet
jeglichen Liedes, entkleidet der liedhaften Zeitlosigkeit seines Herzens, 
zurQckfalle ins nachtlich Unsagbare und in den Humus des Seins, 
emiedrigt zu jener bittersten Scham, die der letzte Rest eines 
erloschenen Geddchtnisses ist—iwissende Stimmen der Zeit, ihr Wissen 
um die Unentrinnbarkeit und um die unentrinnbaren Fange des 
Schicksals! (p. 43)
( he, however, stripped of the name, stripped of his soul, stripped of the least
song, stripped of the song-filled timelessness of his heart, he falls back into 
the nightly-ineffable and into the humus of being, brought low to that most 
bitter shame which is the fast remnant of an extinguishing consciousness 
-iknowing voices of time, their knowledge of the ineluctability and of the 
inescapable clutches of fate!)
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Virgil 'falls back into the ineffable night and into the humus o f being.’ He is 
stripped o f name (Namen), o f soul (Seele) and o f song (Lied), the last 
remnants of memory dissolving (erloschen), so that death becomes a 
dissolution o f self, an Ich-Veriu&t. We have a hint from Broch’s letter to 
Aldoux Huxley dated October 5, 1945, that this is precisely the kind of death 
from which he has attempted to deliver both himself and his reader through 
the writing of T.D.V.: a death that so completely extinguishes memory, that the 
memory o f dying is itself lost to a hoped for later readership. For Broch 
relates explicitly to Huxley that while in prison in Alt-Aussee, the writing of 
T.D.V. becomes a manner of remembering death, o f relaying the encounter 
with death to the future reader, so that death can be experienced again and 
again. Rather than revealing some truth about the death experience, writing 
enfolds the phenomenon o f death within itself, preserving its memory, death’s 
memory, side by side with the memory, in name, o f the author.
Especially relevant to Virgil’s struggle (—which, we should be reminded, 
is Broch's struggle—) in the face o f death is the notion, expressed in the last 
words o f the above citation, o f being snared by fate (—die unentrinnbaren 
Fange des Schicksals!). Here Broch’s Virgil is faced with the choice of either 
being ‘snared by fate,’ o f being extinguished from existence by fate's dictum, 
or o f escaping the snares of this fate by means of inscribing his name into the 
text o f the Aeneid. Elsewhere, this active resistance to becoming fate’s 
captive and victim is expressed in the phrase Schicksal-auf~sich-nehmen (to 
take fate upon oneself) (p. 144). This Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen refers to the
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author’s ability, through fiction, to reshape fate by altering the ‘real’ by which 
fate itself is determined. A glimpse o f this power comes as Virgil returns to his 
own fiction, reclaiming the role o f Anchises and writing into his personal 
‘fiction’ a fiction o f the struggles o f Rome:
 und es warTroja, das um ihn brannte, es warder niemals verkischende
Weltenbrand, doch er, derOberden Branden schwebte, er war Anchises, 
blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis gleichzeitig kraft unsdglicher 
Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultem des Sohnes, er selber Wetten- 
gegenwart, getragen von des Atlas Schultem, von den Schultem des 
Riesen. Und so ging es Schritt for Schritt dem Paiaste zu. (p. 50)
( and it was Troy burning around him it was the never extinguishing world
conflagration, yet he who floated above the flames, he was Anchises, blind and 
seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled old man thanks to the 
unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son, he himself 
was ‘world-presence’ borne on the shoulders of Atlas, on the shoulders 
of the giant And so it went one step after the other right up to the 
palace.)
Here, in contradistinction to the passage from page 41, Kind und Greis do not 
relinquish but reclaim the cloth of fiction. Here it might be asked, “Who is the 
child, and who is the wizened old man?” Is Virgil the child o f Anchises or is 
Anchises the child of Virgil? The question, at least, suggests an ongoing 
circularity between ‘text’ and ‘name’, between author and authored whereby 
Kind und Greis, like the ‘last’ link in a chain, are merely tangent extremities. 
Virgil’s death and his name are already memorialized in the death of 
Anchises; Broch's death and name are, likewise, memorialized in this 
fictionalized account of the death of Virgil. One fiction envelops the other so 
that the names Broch, Virgil, and Anchises become tangent links in a textual 
chain of self referencing circularity.
Name, death and text exist in a circularity that is relevant to the 
fundamentally circular relation between father, child and name during the act 
o f name-giving. The name is borrowed and, as Virgil proclaims in the 
subsequent passage, it covers the nakedness of our being:
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‘Der Name ist wie ein Kleid, das uns nicht gehdrt; nackt sind wir unter
unserem Namen, nackter noch ais das Kind, das derVatervom Boden
aufgehoben hat, um ihm den Namen zu geben. Und je mehr wir den Namen
mit Sein erfoilen, desto fremder wird er uns, desto unabhangigerwird er
von uns, desto verlassener werden wir selber. Erborgt ist der Name, den
wir tragen, erborgt das Brot, das wir essen, erborgt sind wir selber, nackt
hineingehalten ins Fremde, und nur derjenige, der alien erborgten Flitter
von sich abgetan hat der wird des Zieles ansichtig, der wird zum Ziele
gerufen, auf daft er sich mit seinem Namen endgQItigvereinige*. (pp. 59 - 60)
(“The name is like a cloth that does not belong to us; naked are we under our 
names, more naked than the child that the father has lifted from the floor in 
order to give it the name. And the more we fill the name with being the more 
foreign it becomes to us. the greater its independence from us, the greater 
our abandonment Borrowed is the name we carry, borrowed the bread we eat 
we ourselves ‘borrowed’, held out naked in an alien realm, and only the one 
who had taken from himself all the borrowed clutter, only he will come into 
sight of the goal, he is called to the goal so that he might finally come 
to unite with the name.)
The name is a sort of l/r-text, that primal fictive cloth with which our otherwise 
naked being is draped; and it is a cloth that serves as the ultimate veil o f 
separation between ourselves and death. Here it is said not that we are ‘as 
naked as’ but that we are ‘more naked than’ (nackter noch) the child whom 
the father lifts from the floor to give it its name. Placing the child in his lap the 
father ‘claims’ the child and it is the name that carries that claim forward. The 
name, therefore, is not a covering o f the body, not a sign that points to some 
visible presence, but something that is draped over the uncertainty of 
something unknown, over the void that continues to exist at the center o f our 
beings. At the same time, the name is the only remnant o f the father that we 
have for certain as our own. That void at the center of our being becomes an 
ever present death within us, under the wrap of the name, waiting always to 
be revealed; it is that vast ‘nightly ineffable’ (das nSchtlich Unsagbare; p. 43) 
which, during the course o f our lives, we attempt, hopelessly, to fill with being. 
In giving the child his name, the father tears a piece of the cloth from which
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the fiction o f his own life has been fabricated, in order that a new fiction might
begin, one that will play itself out through the existence o f the child or, in
the case o f the author, through the existence of the text. But even the act o f 
continued regeneration will not fill the void covered by the name. The claim to 
full authorship, authorship of one’s own name, is infinitely deferred as the 
name is handed o ff from one generation to the next. In T.D.V., Virgil clearly 
seeks a means whereby he, the author o f the Aeneid, might become at once 
author o f and authored by the name, a Virgil that might become the ‘author’ 
not just o f the text but of Anchises as he in turn is authored by him.
Virgil, whom the wenches o f Brindisi would render nameless (cf.: pp. 43
- ff.), is himself repeatedly referred to as a giver o f names (cf.:  du gabst
den Dingen ihre Namen; sie sind in deinem Gedicht p. 179 et passim). It is 
Virgil who has given a ‘name’ —name in the broader sense of a memorialized 
fic tion - to Anchises; and yet Anchises stands to Virgil in a relation of forebear. 
Such is the circularity of fiction and o f the given name, that fathers become 
the sons o f their sons, and so Anchises the ‘offspring’ of Virgil. This is the 
fiction to which the women of Brindisi in pages 39 and following object; the 
fiction from which yet additional fiction is bom. It is an affront to the ‘truth’ 
(Wahrheit) that we hold at the center o f our being, that truth which fiction 
obscures and which the voices of the women promise ever to reveal as they 
promise, likewise, to reveal the nakedness that is ‘more naked than the naked 
child.’
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In Paternal Succession
The issue o f Ich-VeriuBt (dissolution o f self) in T.D.V. touches directly on 
Virgil’s decision to destroy not ju s t die manuscript o f the Aeneidt but to destroy 
all his writings, hence, to destroy his name:
 oh, es war das Gebot alies Getane zu vemichten, alles, was er je
geschrieben und gedichtet hatte, zu verbrennen, oh, alle seine Schriflen 
muftten verbranntwerden  (p. 166)
(oh, it was the command to obliterate all that had been done, to bum 
all that he had ever written, had ever put into verse, oh, all his writings 
had to be burned )
Destruction o f the writings would disrupt the circularity that places Virgil in the 
position o f being ‘father o f fathers,' of being author to the narrative that most 
powerfully relates the story which makes present to Rome its forebears. 
Augustus’ own authority as name-giver is menaced by Virgil’s decision to 
essentially break the circle tying the present to a fictional past, a fiction that 
otherwise greatly enhances Caesar’s own ‘authorship’ o f state. A t the close of 
this section, I will address in greater detail the role that Augustus himself 
plays, surreptitiously, in the circulation of the name of ‘father.’ He, too, has a 
part in granting validity and bringing into the present the name of Rome’s 
fictional forebears.5
Virgil seeks out a position within the ‘unending succession o f fathers' 
(cf.: p. 178) by revisiting the Anchises of his Aeneid (cf: p. 50). He seeks to 
recover from within his own fiction the prophetic future that is revealed when, 
at the close o f book VI, Aeneas descends into Hades to confer with Anchises. 
Instead, the ‘recovery’ fails, Anchises reveals nothing, and Virgil finds that in
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place of a glimpse into the future, he is left only gazing ever further into the 
past:
 er war Anchises, blind und sehend in einem, Kind und Greis
gleichzeitig kraft unsdglicher Erinnerung. getragen von den Schultem
des Sohnes, er selber Weltengegenwart, getragen von des Atlas Schultem,
von den Schultem des Riesen. (p. 50)
(he was Anchises, blind and seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled 
old man thanks to the unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son, 
he himself was *worid-presence’ borne on the shoulders of Atlas, on the 
shoulders of the giant)
The Age o f Giants here mentioned is an Ur-zeit belonging, metaphorically 
speaking, to the reign o f Chronos, ante-dating the new order established by a 
rebellious Zeus, whether we understand ‘Zeus’ to be Augustus or Virgil 
himself. It appears that Virgil's foray into the Aeneid leads him only further 
away from the possibility of a newly established order for Augustan Rome. 
The order of paternal succession into which Augustus and Virgil would find 
their places shifts into a mode o f regress, receding into an ‘historical/fictional’ 
distance away from the otherwise inevitable devolution o f the name ‘father1 
upon Augustus.
There are many indications within the T.D.V. o f Virgil’s mistrust of 
Augustan authority, primarily, though not exclusively, in Book III, which 
represents the imaginary encounter between Virgil and Augustus. The 
mistrust that Virgil harbors toward Augustus, and so the initial reluctance to 
yield to Augustus the manuscript, lead Virgil to consider an action, destruction, 
whereby the Aeneid would begin and end only with himself, would bear his 
‘name’ and no one else’s. The manner in which Virgil ‘visits’ Anchises (cited 
from page 50) suggests a certain exclusivity of proprietorship; the fictional
205
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
chronology described in that passage seems to begin w ith the Age of the 
Giants and to end with the name Virgil. An oddly incestuous relation is 
suggested by this passage, in which Virgil is both father and son, Anchises 
and Aeneas, creator and created. The desire o f the author to completely 
possess his work, to find a place for his own name to the exclusion of any 
other is a jealous claim, rooted in mistrust, aimed at securing control over and 
the manipulation o f the fictional events recorded. Virgil would guarantee his 
own complete authority over the text by the act o f destroying it. In a sense, 
Virgil is in accord with the women of Brindisi, who see the ‘outer garments’ o f 
the text as personal appendages (Lumpen, p. 41); Windeln, p. 42) that might 
easily be stripped from the body at the moment o f death. Already authorship 
is framed in terms o f an ethical question: does any fiction belong to a single 
creator? or does the text, like the name given by the father, circulate so as to 
continue to be reclaimed by others: others within positions o f authority, the 
authors and the political forces of succeeding generations?
There are moments within T.D.V. where Virgil’s reveries on childhood 
speak, albeit with great ambiguity, to the above question. In the following, 
Virgil revisits not Anchises but another paternal forebear o f his fiction, the here 
unnamed father of his childhood:
 und er erinnerte sich des Vaters, der erst mit der Heiratzum
richtigen Bauem hatte werden kOnnen und dessen einstmaliger 
Tdpferberuf dem Sohn gering gedeucht hatte, obwohl es sehr schdn 
gewesen war den abendlichen Erzahlungen von der Arbeit an den 
bauchigen Weinfdssem und edelgeschwungenen OlkrOgen, die der Vater 
verfertigt hatte, zu lauschen, den Erzdhlungen von dem lehm-fbrmenden 
Daumen, von den Spachteln und von der surrenden Drehscheibe, und von 
der Kunst des Brennens, schOnen Erzahlungen, unterbrochen von manchen 
alten TOpferlied. (pp. 37 - 38)
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( and he remembered his father who at the time of his marriage first had
been able to become a genuine farmer and whose earlier potter’s trade had 
little impressed the son, although he, the son, was very pleased to attend 
the telling of the work stories in the evening, stories of the large-bellied 
wine urns and of nobly fashioned vessels for holding oil, works that the 
father had done, he was pleased to listen intently to the stories of the clay-
fashioning thumb beautiful stories interspersed with many an old potter’s
song.)
Even this father, like Anchises, is portrayed as author and authored. Virgil’s
own gifts are the stories which are themselves passed down from anonymous
father to anonymous son until arriving at his own, Virgil’s, gift. The anonymity
of the father allows a place fo r Virgil to enter into a tradition without time so
that the web of fiction that Virgil weaves again into the Aeneid is the work of
the countless unnamed fathers that precede him. The namelessness o f the
father works as an act of authorial suppression which allows only Virgil’s name
to be inscribed into the manuscript o f the Aeneid. But then even Virgil is in
turn threatened with namelessness as it seems that Augustus is only waiting
for Virgil’s death as an occasion to lay claim to the Aeneid.
Each of these threats are alternately alive in the single passage within
T.D.V. that speaks explicitly o f the ‘unending line o f fathers’:
Denn Opfer und Begnadung sind eines, sie folgen nicht aufeinander, 
sondem gehen auseinander hervor, und nur derjenige ist wGrdig Vater 
genannt zu werden, der begnadet ist hinabzusteigen in den Schatten- 
abgrund, damit er, selber zum Opfer gebracht, die Priesterweihe seines 
opfemden Amtes empfange, damit ereingegliedert werde in die erhaben 
unendliche Reihe der Vater, die zu der ertiabenen Unzugdnglichkeit des
Anfangs fOhrt. unabiassig die Kraft unendlichen Neubeginns erhait,
den Segen des menschlichen Seins fOr immer, segenspendend der Ur-Ahn, 
der StadtegrQnder jenseits der Erstarrung, der Namengeber, der das 
Gesetz gehoben hat, enthoben jeglichem Anfang und jeglichem Ende, 
enthoben der Geburi ewig enthoben dem Ablauf. (p. 178)
(For sacrifice and absolution are one, they do not follow one another but, to the 
contrary, come forth out of one another and only he is worthy to be named father 
who has the given gift which allows him to climb down into the shadowy abyss 
in order that he himself, who has made of himself a sacrifice, should receive 
the priestly consecration of his own sacrificial office, so that he might 
become ‘membered’ into the exalted unending line of fathers, the line that 
leads to the sublime inaccessibility of the beginning.......the indefatigable might
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of unending new-beginnings, the blessing from mortal beings forever, the 
benefice of the first forebear, of the founders of cities beyond petrifaction, 
the name-givers, he who has raised high the law, exempted every beginning 
and every ending, exempted birth, eternally exempt from the concluding 
moment)
The names o f both Virgil and Augustus, fathers of state and o f fiction, are 
lurking in this multivalenced passage. Only he who is worthy of the name 
'father1 has the power, the talent, the gift (is t begnadet) to descend into the 
shadowy abyss (der Schattenabgrund) o f the past. Antiquity’s most prominent 
examples of figures who had made the descent and returned from the past 
(death) are Orpheus and Aeneas, who, are like Virgil and Augustus, 
respectively, are poet and founder of state. But as forebear not only is 
Aeneas, like Anchises before him, the author o f both Augustus and Virgil, he 
has also, again like Anchises, been authored by them. He is largely the 
creation o f Virgil’s fictive imagination, but he is also in some measure 
Augustus’ creation. Anchises' prophesies o f conquest and o f monument, like 
all the deeds o f Aeneas, serve only to point the way toward the Augustan age. 
W ithout Augustus' triumphs and his role in the creation o f the Roman state, 
Aeneas would be rendered an ‘inconsequential’ figure. Virgil's, and so 
Aeneas,’ ultimate mandate was, after all is said and done, to glorify the reign 
of Augustus.
The phrase hinabgesteigen in den Schattengrund (to climb down into 
the shadowy abyss) ostensibly refer to the journey into Hades but it could just 
as well refer to the author -Aeneas/Virgil/Broch— as he recedes from the 
memory o f authorship, as he falls out o f authorship and into namelessness. 
Virgil fears the prospect o f relinquishing to Augustus the title o f father o f Rome
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and of placing in him all the power and the authority which that title confers. 
Equally unsettling, perhaps even more so, would be the prospect o f leaving 
behind the name and the text, Virgil’s mortal remains, leaving them to be 
claimed by some as yet unnamed other. Should he not elect to destroy the 
Aeneid at the moment o f his death, thereby leaving behind the name and the 
text, Virgil would in effect bequeath to posterity an enduring, material sign o f 
his own incompleteness, his own inability to complete the circle, to become 
both father and son of his own life’s work. Virgil is inclined to take the text 
with him, to immolate the name so that he and all his works might go out 
whole, consumed in full, like the night moth, into death’s consuming flame. To 
destroy the Aeneid would be a way o f claiming exclusivity for this work in the 
same way that authors will sometimes claim exclusivity for their letters by 
requesting that all their correspondence and their private journals be 
destroyed in a posthumous act. This request is often ignored or denied by the 
author’s executors, and Virgil’s request is specifically denied by his old 
companions Plotius and Lucius (pp. 224 - ff.), who recognize, and rightly so, 
that Virgil’s work no longer belongs to Virgil but to Rome:
[So Lucius] "Wenn du sterben willst, so ist das deine eigene
Angelegenheit, wirwerden dich nichtdaran hindem, aberdie Aneis ist
schon langst nicht mehr deine eigene Angelegenheit; daft schiag dir also
aus dem Kopf. ” (p. 225)
( if you wish to die that’s your own affair and we will not try to hinder you;
but has been a long time since the Aeneid was yours to do with as you will; 
so get this idea (of destroying the manuscript) out of your head )
The otherwise punctilious Lucius states the case with brute clarity: Virgil’s 
person is disposable; the work, however, will remain.
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We can, for a moment, revisit the case o f Broch and the circumstances 
surrounding the writing o f T.D.V. We remember not only the circumstances 
under which T.D.V. was first written, but those under which it was transformed 
into the most significant and the most intimate work o f Broch’s writing career 
W hat had been little more than an elaborate sketch of a story concerning the 
final day in Virgil’s life becomes a personal testament to death from the time 
during which Broch is held prisoner a t Ait-Aussee. W e have Broch’s own 
testimony regarding the highly personal nature o f that writing, and we can 
speculate that Broch was writing with no prospect o f any future reader in mind; 
yet this is a work written to and for an age. It would seem probable that had 
Broch’s captors executed him, they would have destroyed whatever works 
they might have happened to find on his person. This evident fact did not 
deter Broch from inscribing his name furiously and repeatedly into the germ of 
what was to become T.D.V.
Here is a text initially written not fo r others but for an audience of one. 
Initially, the purpose o f this writing was to embody what is at one and the 
same time the most intimate and the most elusive experience o f one’s person, 
the experience o f death. Death, an exquisitely intimate experience, is the 
thing which in T.D.V. is called only more naked than the child (p. 59). As the 
following makes clear it is only after the fact that Broch considers bequeathing 
the experience o f death to his readership:
 Der Vergil ist aus Zufallsanfdngen gewachsen; ich bin damit in eine
Zeit echter Todesbedrohung (durch die Nazi) geraten, und ich habe ihn 
daher ausschliettlich fOr mich -teilweise sogar im GefSngnis— 
gewissermaOen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicheriich also nicht for
Publikationszwecke geschrieben  FOr mich gait es, mein Material,
mein Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu Qbermitteln. Ich muBte den Leser
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nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch
Zerknirschung und Selbstausldschung anndhert (mag man sie auch
als noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit blo& rationalen Mitteilungen
ist dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen  (An A. Huxley. 5.10.45)
(..... The Virgil grew out of an accidental occurrence. I had fallen upon a time
where I was genuinely threatened by the menace of death (from the Nazis) and, 
under the circumstances, I had written the T.D. V. for myself exclusively -in  
part, no less, while in prison— and to a certain extent had written it as 
a personal preparation for death; certainly I had not written it for the purpose
of publication  For me it was critical that I should convey my material,
my cognition-material; to the reader (in the same form that circumstances 
had dictated). I had to allow the reader to live through the way in which one 
approaches this experience of death, namely, through contrition and the 
dissolution of self (may no living person ever arrive in such circumstances as 
these). This (approach to death) could not be brought about through a merely 
rational medium )
And yet it is significant that Broch spends years with this manuscript before 
finally turning it over for publication. He turns the work over for publication not 
when he deems is finally complete, but in order that he might find time to 
devote to other projects. To the end of his life, Broch continues to insist that 
given just so many additional months or years, he might have made T.D.V. a 
perfect, that is to say, a complete thing6 -som ething that would give complete 
expression to the name. Broch stubbornly adheres to the notion that truth can 
be revealed through fiction, as if to insist that somehow name and text could 
finally be lifted to reveal that state o f being described only as more naked than 
the child.
It is interesting to note that Broch senses that there is always 
something missing from the text and that this elusive something is always just 
about to be found. In a letter to an anonymous correspondent Broch writes;
 Ich weitt heute ganz genau, wo das Buch echte Todeserkenntnisse
vermittelt, wo es tatsachlich “nackt” ist, aber ich weiB auch, wo die 
hypnotische Konzentration abgerissen ist um wiederdem Literarisch- 
Pathetischen Platzzu machen. (16.8.43)
(......Today I know precisely where the book (i.e., T.D. V.) presents a true
knowledge of death, exactly where it is ‘naked’; but I also know those 
places where the hypnotic concentration is broken in order to make room 
for literary bathos )
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Broch himself substitutes the word “naked” for the ‘almighty ineffable.’ It is 
always ‘there’ but where it is supposed to appear, the reader finds only, from 
Broch’s admittedly disappointed perspective, ‘literary-bathos;’ where one 
would expect to find truth, that is to say death, one finds only fiction. And so 
somewhere beneath the wrap o f the text and the cover of the name is that 
thing o f which Broch, and that thing of which the Virgil o f his T.D.V., are 
hopelessly in search. Turning back to the pages of T.D.V. ,we discover as 
close an approximation of what Broch and Virgil are looking for as can be 
offered. Though they cannot be revealed (rendered ‘naked’), truth, death, and 
the ‘real’ can at least, however indirectly, be placed at the reader’s disposal 
through the medium of fiction.
The Augustus who stands before the crowds of Brindisi receiving their 
(self) adulation (cf.: p. 21) presents to the reader an image of death. In a 
passage that borders on the obscene for all its resemblance to events coeval 
to the actual writing of T.D.V., Augustus is shown to present himself to the 
crowds at Brindisi in the likeness o f an idol:
 da freilich war der Augenblick gekommen, den das dumpf brutende
Massentier erwartet hatte, um sein Jubelgeheul ausstoften zu kdnnen, und 
da brach es los, ohne Pause und ohne Ende, sieghaft, erschOttemd, 
ungezQgelt, furchteinfldOend, gro&artig, geduckt, sich selbst anbetend in 
der Person des Einen.
Dies also war die Masse, fOr die der Casar lebte, for die das Imperium 
geschaffen worden war  (p. 21)
( clearly the moment had arrived, the one for which the dumb brooding
animal masses had been waiting, for the moment when they could let loose 
a howl of jubilation, and then it erupted, without pause and without end, 
quaking, victorious, unrestrained, fearsome, sublime, cringing, praying in 
a mode of self adulation to the ‘Person of the One.’
These, then, were the masses for whom Caesar lived, for whom the Imperium 
had been created )
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The idol represents the lawlessness o f tyranny, the terrible freedom o f 
absolute self authoring power the image is one o f se lf reflecting into self. The 
temptation for Augustus, as it was for Virgil, is to allow oneself to be seduced 
by the illusion o f a ‘perfect authority’, the illusion o f a perfect ‘name’. The 
alternative is to submit to becoming one in ‘the unending line of fathers’ (p. 
178) so that one’s voice, the voice o f authorship, becomes not one’s own, but 
the voice o f a succession of others. Authority so contextualized is as 
transitory as life itself, is renewed a t the cost o f a certain degree o f self­
alienation, and is given its validity by the transforming power of death.
The supreme irony o f T.D.V. is that it is Augustus, not Virgil, who 
strives to save the manuscript o f the Aeneid. The motivation for this 
seemingly historical fact is not as self evident as it may at first appear. After 
all, the Aeneid was commissioned by Augustus and does flatter his reign as 
the absolute pinnacle o f Roman culture and state. But it also creates a fiction 
whereby Augustus’ Rome becomes situated within ancient tradition going 
back to the Golden Age. Augustus’ reign is thereby placed within the context 
o f an acknowledgeable, ‘legitimate’ law and custom. The law and custom to 
which the Aeneid alludes were in the process o f undergoing profound 
transformation even as Virgil wrote. Virgil, therefore, stands self-accused of 
playing the role of lawgiver/name-giver to an Augustus flirting with the limits o f 
absolute power.
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Plotia
The name is a portal through which every subject enters into language 
and so, consequently, into the ‘real’ embodied therein. Thereafter, the name 
continues to function as a frame which over the course of our lives we fill with 
being (cf.: p. 59). And yet, as something that is ‘given,’ the name is and 
remains forever foreign to us. On page 59 of T.D.V., we find the enigmatic 
statement: T h e  more we fill out names with being, the more alien to us it
becomes ” ( ’Und je  mehr w ir den Namen m it Sein erfullen, desto fremder
wird e r uns ') .  That aspect o f the name, which from the beginning is
alien, only becomes more so with the increasing passage of time. We can 
come no closer to explaining this paradox o f the name, that it should remain at 
once so intimate and so alien, than to say that the name initiates us into 
language; the name casts us outside ourselves, and causes us to see the 
image o f ourselves reflected back to us from the outside. In the name we 
recognize the void of something left behind, something to which, however 
much we try, we are never able to return. Within T.D.V., the figure o f Plotia 
emblematizes that ineffable and never to be attained something left behind.
To the extent to which she is described, Plotia is given to the reader o f 
T.D.V. as the outward reflection of something immanent to Virgil. She is not 
representation itself but, as the following passage indicates, that to which 
representation alludes, the meaning filled void covered by the name:
Und als sollte diese Unerreichbarkeit sich auch hier widerspiegeln, als 
mQ&te allOberall alles zum Bild seines Selbst werden  (p. 36)
(And as though this inapproachableness should mirror itself again here, 
as though everything everywhere should become an image of his (sic) self..... )
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Though in this passage the unattainable refers to memories from Virgil’s 
youth, in other passages within T.D.V. that same something-left-behind is 
identified with a resonance o f the voice o f the mother. In the following 
exchange between Virgil and Lysanias, an imaginary figure who appears to 
accompany Virgil on the last day of his life, the question is asked “For whom 
are you searching?”:
[Vergil] *Wen suchst du?“
[Lysanias] “Dich.”
Der Knabe irrte sich. Was wir suchen ist versunken, und wir sollen 
es nicht suchen, da es mit seiner Unauffindbarkeit uns nur verhflhnt.
“Nein, mein kleiner FOhrer, du hast mich gefQhrt, doch nicht gesucht*
([V] “Whom are you seeking?"
[L] “You."
The boy was in error. That which we seek is buried deep and we ought not 
to search for it, because it together with its inattainability only shames us.
“No, my little guide, you have not led me, you have sought me.")
Lysanias answers “You” as though it were Virgil for whom he is searching. 
Virgil observes that his voice and that o f Lysanias appear to be one and the 
same, both, curiously, of the mantuan dialect. Lysanias’ answer carries 
Virgil’s question one step further in that the ‘you’ o f his response indicates not 
only that it is Virgil that he seeks, it indicates an inter-reflective identification, ‘I 
am You,’ Lysanias is Virgil. Lysanias makes known that his voice and Virgil’s 
voice are one and the same:
Wiederum Idchelte der Knabe: “Es (meine Sprache) ist deine Sprache."
“Die Sprache meiner Mutter.”
“Zum Gesang wurde die Sprache in deinem Munde.” (p. 58)
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(Again the boy smiled: "It (my voice) is your voice.”
“The voice of my mother.’
“Her speech turned to song in your mouth.”)
And just a bit further within the same passage Virgil muses:
“.....meine Mutter war damals gestorben, nur der Kiang ihrer Stimme war
geblieben " (pp. 58 - 59)
(“ my mother died then, only the sound of her voice remains")
The ‘remaining voice of the mother1 exists as nothing more than a trace within
the mantuan ‘shared dialect*, spoken by Virgil and echoed by Lysanias. The
voice of the mother is a third ‘unattainable' element floating within the echo of
their speech. Plotia personifies that voice inflected into language’s double
inscription. The mother (as voice) is said in a later passage to be inevocable -
-die Mutter bleibt unerrufbar (p. 66), hidden beneath the double inscription of
language. Entering through the name into language, we leave behind
something that can never again be attained and to which language can no
more than indirectly refer, namely, the Teal’; in a similar manner, language
conceals a truth that it cannot represent.
Truth is indicated in T.D.V. as a sort o f Ur-speech, one that precedes
naming; it is a speech forsaken by the subject from the moment he enters into
language. Thus truth is a language from which all other language is set apart.
Virgil speaks of this ‘speech-outside-of-speech’ in a passage where he
explores the Brindisi night from out the window o f his palace room:
 ein paar Worte aus dem kehligen Bad des Hinkenden, ein und das
andere Mai seine bellende Lache, zuletzt nur noch ein Dammerfluchen, 
beinahe femwehhaft, beinahe zart geworden und eingegangen in die 
Qbrigen Gerausche der Nachtfeme, eingesponnen und einsgeworden mit
jedem Ton, mit jedem letzten Tonrest, der sich der Feme entiOst.......zart
auch dies, obwohl es vermutlich zu einem lachenumbrOllten obzOnen 
Matrosensang aus weinstinkender Taveme gehOrte, zart und femwehhaft,
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als sei das starr Jenseitige in ihr der Ort, an dem die stumme Sprache des 
Lachens und die stumme Sprache der Musik, beides Sprache auQerhalb 
der Sprache, unterhalb und oberhalb der Grenze menschlicher Gebunden-
heit, sich zu neuer Sprache verbtindeten zurstummen Sprache der
AuGermenschlich-erstarrtesten Feme und Veriassenheit, zur Sprache 
auQerhalb jeglicher Muttersprache, zur unerforschlichen Sprache der 
vollkommenen UnQbersetzbarkeit, unverstandlich in die Welt 
eingegangen, unverstandlich und unerforschlich die Welt mit ihrer 
eigenen Feme durchdringend, notwendig in der Welt vorhanden ohne sie 
verandertzu haben, und eben darum doppelt unverstandlich, unsagbar 
unverstandlich als die notwendige Unwirklichkeit im unverandert 
Wirklichen! (pp. 110-11)
(......a pair of words from the throaty bass of the cripple, here and there
this barking laugh, and finally only a vague cursing, nearly a yearning 
for something remote, having become almost tender and then disappearing 
among the other sounds of the nocturnal distance, spun into, having become 
one with every tone, with every remnant of a tone that dissolves into the
distance tender also this sound, although probably a sound that (first)
belonged to the bellowing laughter of some obscene sailor's song that pouring 
out of the wine-stinking tavern, tender and yearning for the distant as though 
the benumbed other world bound in this place, the place to which the mute 
language of laughter and the mute language of music, each language 
outside all language, a language above the border of human language, had
joined to form a new speech.......to the mute language of the most benumbed
distance and abandonment, unspeakably removed from human kind the voice 
outside any mother’s voice, to the inscrutable speech of complete incommuni- 
cability, gone inarticulate into the world, penetrating the world inscrutably 
and unintelligibly with the sense of its own remoteness, necessarily at hand in 
the world without having altered the world and precisely for this reason doubly 
incomprehensible, unspeakably unintelligible as the necessary unreality within 
the unaltered ’real!’)
This disquisition on language begins as Virgil hears a last remnant (Tonrest) 
o f a single word spoken by a drunkard, a word dissolving into night. Virgil is 
able to detect, even in the distant bellowing laugh (seine bellende Lache) o f a 
hobbling drunk, a ‘tender1 (zarf) sound that he calls femwehhaft. Femweh is 
in oppositional complementarity to the Heimweh, a sort o f longing fo r that 
which is at once distant (fern) and familiar. Heimweh, like the ‘name given by 
the father1 evokes that which is at once near (heim) and strange, that which is 
at once ours and foreign to us. That which Virgil encounters as femwehhaft is 
described as ‘woven into a tone’ (eingesponnen und einsgeworden m it jedem
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Tone) so that it is perceptible yet not to be deciphered, like the irretrievable 
voice o f the mother veiled by language.
The language spoken by the drunk leaves traces that are woven into
and become one with the ‘whispers o f the fa r n ig h t  dissolving into the
distance.' The speech-sounds receding into the distance resemble Virgil’s 
own moment o f dying, as he listens (lauschen) fo r some unattainable truth, a 
truth that seemingly lies just beyond death’s threshold. Penetrating death's 
veil is Virgil’s singular way of attaining truth; it is the search for an immutable 
‘real’ that can only be attained through the experience of death. Virgil 
observes in an earlier passage:
 nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt vemnag den Ring im Irdischen zu
schlieSen.......nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht nicht zu
flQchten  (p. 78)
( only he who takes death upon himself is capable of closing the earthly
cycle only he who listens intently to death, only he need not flee )
The voice o f the mother is finally described as unintelligible and inscrutable 
(unverst&ndlich und unerforschlich), it is the necessary ‘unreality* in the 
unaltered ‘real’ (die notwendige Unwirklichkeit im unverSndert Wirklichen!). 
This difficult passage, taken from page 111, reminds the reader that the name 
continues to bear that something which on page 59 is referred to merely as 
more naked than the child. That something ‘more naked than the child’ is a 
truth which ‘weaves itself into and makes itself one with’ (...eingesponnen und 
einsgeworden... p. 110) fiction. In T.D.V., Plotia is the imaginary guarantor o f 
the truth; ironically, she is also the figure luring Virgil toward a destruction o f 
the Aeneid.
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Plotia urges Virgil to shed the materiality o f language, to destroy the
written word in order that only a pure and naked truth should remain. It would
be an attempt at death to dissolve one’s subjectivity, reducing one’s identity to
some essential, if inexpressible, ’truth.’ Through death Plotia seeks a way o f
returning Virgil to that aspect o f self which language has always kept distant.
Language is limited by representation, whereas truth is said to be naked, and
without mediation. The mirroring effect o f language offers the hope of
reflecting truth onto some visible plane, where truth might at least be
glimpsed, if not attained. A brief passage from page 164 states this explicitly:
 von Spiegelung zu Spiegelung, um am Ende alter Enden im Bildlosen sich
zu letzten Nacktheitzu enthOllen  (p. 164)
( from reflection to reflection in order to unveil itself in ultimate nakedness
at the image-less end )
Here is a language that strips away language leaving behind only naked truth. 
The example of the two drunks (pp. 110-111), however, indicates that truth 
lacks a credible contextualizing medium.7 The linguistic ’currency’ in which 
their voices circulate is described as an ‘obscene sailor’s song that flows from 
the wine-stinking tavern.’ Particularly telling is the register o f their expression 
when addressing Caesar: “dancing and singing and fucking and whoring can 
he, the lord Caesar, but otherwise nothing else” ( ’tanzen und singen und
huren kann er, der Herr Casar, aber sonst kann e r nix ' p. 108). W hat is
missing is a credible medium into which the voice o f the mother, Plotia’s 
‘naked truth,’ can be woven.
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In the very last moments o f the second Book of T.D.V., an ‘angel's' 
voice makes itself known to Virgil and instructs him in an oblique way on the 
nature of truth in the language o f his (Virgil’s) own text:
 dort stand ein Engel vor ihm, fast kein Engel, eher ein Knabe,
trotzdem ein Engel und seine Stimme war nicht jene, die als
verkQndende Tat sinnbildhaft das All erfoilt, nein, sie war wohl 
eher ein ganz femes Echo des darOber schwebenden sinnbildlichen
Urbildes “Tritt ein zur SchOpfung, die einstmals war und wieder ist;
du aber sei Vergil geheiOen, deine Zeit ist da!” Dies hatte der Engel 
gesprochen, furchtbar vor Milde, trOstlich vor Trauer, unerreichbar vor 
Sehnsucht, so hatte er es aus dem Munde des Engels vemommen, hatte es 
gehOrt als Sprache innerhaib der Sprache in all ihrer irdischen 
Einfachheit, und es hOrend, zum Namen gerufen und dem Namen 
vereint  (p. 218)
( there before him stood an angel who was very nearly not an angel, rather
a boy, though nonetheless an angel and his voice was not one which as
the announcing deed symbolically filled the universe, no, it was much more
the entirely distant echo of the symbolic first-image hovering overhead......
“Step into creation which once was and which again is; you are called Virgil, 
your time is come!'' This the angel spoke, fearsome in gentleness, comforting 
in sadness, unattainable in its yearning, such at least had he understood from 
the mouth of the angel, had heard the language within language in all her 
earthly simplicity, and hearing it (was) called to the name and united to 
the name )
The angel is ‘more youth than angel’ (eher ein Knabe) and its voice an 
‘entirely distant echo.’ The voice instructs Virgil to enter into creation (Tritt ein 
zur Schdpfung), his own creation; the truth and reality Virgil seeks are to be 
found within his own work. Now Virgil attains the unattainable, hears the 
‘language within language’ and as such he is called to and united with the
name (  zum Namen gerufen und dem Namen vereint). Now Virgil has
achieved that which was first announced on page 60 as the final human 
destination, to ‘unite with the name’: der wird des Zieles ansichtig, der wird 
zum Ziele gerufen, aufdaR ersich m it seinem Namen endgGltig vereinige” (p. 
60). To join with one’s name has here the meaning of finding Truth’ within the 
materiality o f one’s own language, to encounter the voice within one’s own
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voice. The angel in this passage, a youth (ein Knabe), is Lysanias in another 
manifestation; the angel’s voice, a distant echo (ein ganz femes Echo), 
echoes Virgil’s own; the call to creation (Tritt ein zur SchOpfung) is a call to 
infuse the inter-reflective language o f the text with the voice o f the mother. 
Though Plotia seeks to unveil truth, to reveal the voice o f the mother, this can 
be done only in the context o f the lettered manuscript, in context o f the name 
of the father.
For Plotia, death becomes the final refuge from the name, the escape 
from the context upon which the subjective relation depends. Plotia attempts 
to lure Virgil at the moment o f his death out o f language, out of the chain of 
interreflecting images and the thereby created meanings that inhabit the text. 
W ithin T.D.V., Plotia embodies for Virgil the urge, at the moment o f his death, 
to destroy the Aeneid. Virgil’s confusion and uncertainty regarding the surety 
of his o f subjective identity is recorded in the following:
War es noch der eigene Leib, den er fOhlte? oder war es nur mehr 
Spiegelbild seines Leibes Oder gar nur Spiegelbild seines FGhlens? wo
war die Wirklichkeit dieses Seienden schwebend zwischen Urbild
und Abbild, weder das eine noch das andere berGhrend, vielmehr 
Sinnbild beider, schwebend zwischen Ehnnertem und Sichtbarem, ihrer 
beider Spiegel und friedlich einsgeworden mit beiden, die athergleiche 
Gegenwart, und auf dem Grunde des Spiegels, auf dem Grunde des 
Friedens, tiefversenkt in Gegenwart und Wirklichkeit  (p. 272)
(Was this still his body that he felt? or was it rather the reflection of his 
body or perhaps even only the reflection of his sensibility? where was the
reality of his being hovering between primal image and representation,
touching upon neither the one nor the other, more the symbol of both; hovering 
between the remembered and the visible, both are mirrors and peaceably 
reconciled to both, the ether-like present; and on the depth of the mirror, in 
the depth of the peace, deeply sunk into the present and into the ‘real’ )
Here the body is not undergoing etherialization; to the contrary, Virgil’s body is
becoming something dense and indecipherable as ‘Urbild’ and ‘Abbild,’
memory and representation, collapse into death’s inalterable present. Plotia
221
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
seeks to retrieve from language and to infuse into Virgil's death that 
something (Sinnbild) which arises out o f the inter-reflection between memory 
and representation. It is a way of ‘leaving the world with meaning,’ a way of 
extracting one’s subjectivity from the vagaries and manipulations that are 
inherent to the constructions of text.
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SCHICKSAL
The T.D.V. explores two distinct ‘beginnings' that involve its narrative 
subject Virgil. One of these beginnings describes Virgil as he enters through 
the ‘name’ (pp. 59 - 60) into a pre-existing symbolic order of language. A 
passage taken from page 59 epitomizes the alienation associated with the
journey of which naming is merely the first step:  .je m ehrw ir den Namen
mit Sein erfullen, desto fremder wird e r uns ( the more we fill the name
with being, the more alien it becomes to us ). The Name signals its
bearer’s acceptance of the unaltered continuity of order into which he or she 
has been bom. In the case o f Virgil, however, writing in the political and social 
chaos during and immediately following the collapse of Republican Rome, the 
value of the name and hence, the symbolic order which the name continued to 
signify had fallen into desuetude, being without effect and without there being 
any replacement by way of a new political or social order. Though one might 
object that a single name could hardly signify so much, surely, the name 
‘Virgil’ could be taken for an exception.
The dissolution of the name is concurrent in T.D.V. with the destruction 
of the text. On page 179 and elsewhere the dissolution o f the name is
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described as part and parcel o f Virgil’s intended destruction o f the Aeneid: the
name is enclosed in the sacrifice nameless is the being, nameless is the
place where the mother calls der Name ist im Opfer
einbeschlo&en Namenlos wird das Sein, namenlos wird es, wo die Mutter
ru ft  The ‘sacrifice’ of name and text indicate a refusal on the part o f Virgil
to in any way acquiesce to the new order springing into existence during the 
reign of Augustus. Virgil attempts instead to seek out a state o f pre-existence, 
to escape the name and all it signifies, responding to and then retreating to
the place which is called, s im p ly, wo die Mutter ruft (where the mother
calls). Ironically, it is while in pursuit o f this first beginning, the beginning that 
entails birth and subsequent naming, that Virgil encounters that other life 
event with which things would commence anew, namely, the event o f his own 
death. Death in T.D.V. is a return to a place unknown, to a place referred to
by the text as the ‘unknown familiar1 ( das ungekannt W iedererkannte.......
p. 36). When first confronted with death, Virgil, in this novel, attempts to 
escape it by drawing so completely out o f life as to leave no identifying trace 
behind, no trace o f either name or text. Gradually, Virgil discovers the will and 
the courage not to escape, but to confront death, and in so doing to embrace 
the destiny that he had heretofore fled. In T.D.V., Vergil’s eventual willingness 
and ability to embrace death causes a reconfiguration of the relation between 
author and text, a phenomenon that in T.D.V. is referred to as Schicksal.
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Feuer
A t the opening o f T.D.V., it is fate (Schicksaf) that is driving Virgil
arbitrarily toward his life’s ending: ‘He had allowed himself to be driven by fate,
and fate drove him to the end ’ (E r hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben
lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu, p. 12). Fate, in this
instance, is a purely accidental force over which the author o f the Aeneid
exerts neither control nor influence; it is as though the Aeneid itself were some
literary entertainment with no prospect o f altering the course o f Roman
culture, politics, or civilization. In light o f these circumstances, T.D.V. depicts
Virgil as being driven not toward death but toward dying:
 da hatte das Schicksal mit seinen Gewalten sich nochmals seiner
bemachtigt hatte ihn rQckgezwungen zu dem Obel, das sein ganzes Leben
Oberschattet hatte, ja es war als hatte das Schicksal nur noch eine einzige 
Schlichtheit for ihn Gbrig -  die Schlichtheit des Sterbens. (p. 13)
( for fate’s mighty force had once more overpowered him.had forced him
back to the evil, the evil that had overshadowed his whole life; yes, it was 
as though fate had just one lone moment of simplicity left for him —the simplicity 
of dying.)
Dying (das Steiben) as opposed to death (der Tod) is a slipping anonymously,
if not quietly, out o f existence. Death, on the other hand, demands an
encounter o f sorts, a reckoning with and o f one’s life at that moment of
supreme personal crisis.
It is with pointed irony that Virgil muses to himself as if unawares..........
Warum hatte ihn das Schicksal gezwungen, hierher zurOckzukehren?! Hier
war nichts als Tod, nichts als Tod und Abertod! (p. 23)
(Why had destiny forced him to return here?! There was nothing here 
but death, death, and yet again, death.)
Here fate suddenly reveals itself to be something not wantonly arbitrary, but 
rather, as something that forces a choosing. Although Virgil references 
Brindisi where he declaims ‘here is nothing but death, death and more death,’
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certainly the reader should consider the reference in its more immediate vein; 
namely, that fate has not in this passage forced a return merely to Brindisi, it 
has forced a return (zuruckkehren) to death. In this sense, zuriickkehmn as a 
‘return’ to death would indicate not a place revisited, but a confrontation with 
something that by definition is unknowable.
While death makes its presence fe lt not solely at the moment o f agony, 
but can also be evoked by circumstances during various moments o f one's 
life, it is during the moment o f dying that the recognition o f death’s presence 
becomes most ineluctable. And yet even here, while dying, Virgil would at first 
more readily elect to slip out o f life, taking name and text quietly into the 
proverbial ‘unknown Familiar1 (ungekannt Wiedererkannte) than to confront 
and explore death directly. In T.D.V., it is fate (Schicksal) that positions Virgil 
in such a way that the encounter with, or the avoidance of, death becomes a 
matter of personal struggle, a struggle from which issues much of the 
narrative drama. The narrative o f T.D.V. follows something o f an 
autobiographical script in that Broch faced a similar moment while prisoner 
during Nazi occupied Austria. While in a prison cell anticipating imminent 
death, Broch recognized and acted upon the unscheduled choice which 
circumstances had suddenly thrust upon him. Acting upon the belief that 
death was imminent, Broch chose to write his way into death, rather than to 
recede voiceless into the silence o f oblivion. In so doing, Broch reaffirms the 
significance of the name and the power of the text; his death was not to be 
one in which he is swept anonymously out of existence; instead, it was to be 
an act in which Broch elects to affirm the name boldly.
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The prisoner Broch chooses to embrace death by inscribing it into a
text,1 so that death remains as an entombed event one into which he and a
later reading audience could find themselves reflected. By way o f contrast,
Virgil, at the very beginning o f T.D.V., finds his text is without significance
largely because the Aeneid has failed to assimilate a ‘true’ experience o f
death into its narrative. Ironically, the Aeneid at first seems distant and
irrelevant during the process o f his Virgil’s own dying. As fate drives Virgil
haplessly on to his end, he is able to recognize that the event of death has not
in any way been monumentalized within the manuscript o f the Aeneid:
Er hatte sich vom Schicksal treiben lassen, und das Schicksal trieb ihn 
demEndezu. (p. 12)
(He had allowed himself to be driven by fate and fate drove him to the end.)
A subsequent passage makes plain, however, that the air of seeming
resignation proves only a thin disguise for profound inner conflict:
 erwar zu einem Ruhelosen geworden, den Tod fliehend, den Tod
suchend, das Werk suchend, das Werk fliehend  (p. 13)
( he had become one who was restless, fleeing death, seeking death, seeking
his work and fleeing his work )
The twin impulse o f the search for, and the flight from, death accompanies a 
simultaneous search for, and flight from, the text; and death and the text are 
intertwined early on in T.D. V. Flight from death and text promises stony and 
implacable oblivion, whereas a search for death and text, a search for death 
within the text, indicates a potential for eternal renewal. Fate seems for the
moment to have overcome Virgil in this regard:
 da hatte das Schicksal mitseinen Gewatten sich nochmals seiner
bemachtigt hatte ihm nochmals die Einfachheit und den Ursprung und
das Innen verwehrt, hatte den RQckweg ihm wieder abgebogen  (p. 13)
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(......since fate’s mighty force had once more overpowered him, had once more
barred him from the simplicity and the origin and the inner life, had 
again once more deflected him from his back reaching journey.......)
So long as Virgil chooses to flee death and the text, he is condemned to an 
ending that holds no promise o f subsequent beginnings.
Virgil first attempts to evade the encounter with death by way o f a 
return to earliest memory; he turns away from death to seek the ‘bright eyes
and the always nearly-smiling, slightly sun-blushed face o f the mother.......
(  e r erinnerte sich der hellen Augen in dem immer lachbereiten stets ein
wenig sonnverbrannted Gesicht der Mutter.  p. 37). The return to the
mother is physically enacted at the beginning o f Book II, where Virgil curls
himself up ‘ his legs drawn up just slightly he had rolled to the side, his
head rested on a cushion, his hips pressed into the mattress, his knees
resting upon one another (  Die Beine ein wenig hochgezogen, hatte e r
sich zur Seite gerollt, sein Kopfruhte au f den Kissen, die Hufte druckte sich in
die Matratze ein, die Knie waren aufeinander geschicktet p. 71 ).2 From
this physical re-enactment o f earliest memory, dying seems a passive state o f 
remembrance and observation, a reclaimed state from which Virgil 
auscultates the world (p. 71). Soon Virgil is confronted by the 
substancelessness of the world that he is observing, and remembers, 
attempting to look out upon the world without recognizing that the world, past 
and present, is gazing back upon him:
Fast schien es unmdglich, mehr, noch, fast schien es unstatthaft daft 
unsere letzterreichbare, wirklichste Wirklichkeit sich darauf beschrdnkte 
bloGes Erinnerungsbild zu sein! (p. 72)
(It seemed almost impossible, more than this, it seemed inadmissible that 
the realest of the ‘real’, that which lay at our furthest reach should be limited 
to a simple image out of memory!)
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Reality exists in a substance that is not immediately sensible. The ‘realest of 
the Real’ is not an image in the mind’s eye nor in the eye o f memory, rather, 
the ‘real’ exists as an encounter o f self with self.3 This second self, self as 
other, is found reflected in memory, in text, or in death. No matter how 
accurate in detail, the memory (iErinnerungsbild) representation without the 
act of inter-reflection is mere phantasm; a discovery o f the ‘real’ demands 
something in excess o f even perfect representation.
In dying Virgil initially seeks out the ‘realest of the Real’ (die wirklichste 
Wirklichkeit) either through perfect memory or through the agency of 
immediate and unobstructed observation. Virgil is soon led to concede that 
the ‘real’ is at best something glimpsed only through an experience with death:
 nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im irdischen zu
schlie&en, nur wer des Todes Auge sucht, dem bricht nicht das eigene, 
wenn es ins Nichts schauen soil, nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht 
nicht zu flQchten, der darf bleiben  (p. 78)
( only the one who takes death upon himself is able to bring the earthly
cycle to its close, only the one who seeks death’s eye, that one does not 
shatter his own eye when it is necessary to gaze into the void; only the one 
who auscultates death has no need to flee, that one may remain )
Virgil wishes to attain the elusive ‘real’, particularly during this moment of 
dying. The phrase ‘death’s eye’ (des Todes Auge) illustrates how death 
returns the subject’s gaze, and that the ‘real’ exists only in the interplay 
between observer and observed. The ‘real’ lies hidded beyond death’s veil, 
behind the veil of the text, and is only glimpsed in the reflection of self peering 
into self.
As Virgil tells it: ‘only he who seeks (out) death’s eye need not
flee, he may remain (der darf bleiben): The phrase ‘he may remain’ refers to
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the reality to which Virgil might attain through the encounter with death. 
Virgil’s position is such that the ‘real’ to which he attains becomes something 
immanent to his own subjectivity; as death is written into the text, so the ‘real’ 
enters into the name. The phrase ‘der darf bleiben’ indicates that the one 
about whom it is spoken, ‘the one who may remain’, may do so by having 
implicated him-/herself into that same ‘real.’ Reference to a subsequent 
passage secures this interpretation:
 wem es veriiehen worden ist die flQchtige FIQchtigkeit der
Todesgestait zu erhaschen, wem es im unabiassigen Lauschen und Suchen 
gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat mit deren Echtheit auch die 
seiner eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet und 
damit sich selbst zur Gestalt gebracht  (pp. 80 - 81)
( to the one to whom it has been granted that he should capture the fleeting
phantom of death's form, to the one who through assiduous listening and searching 
succeeds in bringing death into form, this same one has by virtue of his own 
authenticity found his own form, he has given form to his own death and with 
this given even himself form.......)
By capturing (erhaschen) death’s ‘form’, we capture our own form (seiner 
eigener Gestalt), and in the process our own death is ‘formed’ (sein eigen 
Tod gestaltet). From this passage it becomes clear that the subject realizes 
itself (sich selbst zur Gestalt bringen) through a process o f inter reflection and 
that death is the great mirror into which the subject casts its own reflection.4 It 
is in this sense that, in seeking to imbue the text with the ‘real,’ Virgil must 
seek to imbue the text with death, a place from which the subject can find him- 
/herself reflected in all o f his or her possible aspects.
The reader begins to recognize that Virgil’s passivity at the beginning of 
T.D.V. is grounded in a failure or an unwillingness to choose; fate will dictate 
Virgil’s ‘end’ only so long as Virgil fails to act, to choose for himself —’fate 
drove him to the end’ (  das Schicksal trieb ihn dem Ende zu). By the
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beginning of the second book, the act o f choosing, o f taking sides, takes on 
importance as a central issue:
 doch die grofte Linie seines lebens war nicht eigene Wahl nach freiem
Willen, sie war ein MOssen gewesen, ein MQssen befehlend, da& er
seine eigene Gestalt in der des Todes suche, um hiedurch der Seele Freiheit 
zu gewinnen; denn die Freiheit ist ein MQssen der Seele, deren Heil und 
Unheil stets auf dem Spiele steht, und er hatte sich dem Befehl gefOgt, 
gehorsam seiner Schicksalsaufgabe. (pp. 81 - 82)
( yet the great line of his life was not of his own choosing according to
a free will, it had been rather a compulsion, a compulsion.......commanding
that he seek his own form in that of death in order to thereby win the 
freedom of his own soul; for freedom is a compulsion of the soul whose 
redemption of damnation remains always in play and he had heeded the 
command, obedient to the task assigned him by fate.)
Here the text entertains a pair o f contrarieties: Freedom arises out of 
constraint; fate is the construct of individual effort (Schicksalsaufgabe). One 
recognizes that ‘free w ill' is not, in and o f itself, something o f one’s own 
choosing; it simply is, meaning that it exists and is available to us. The 
exercise of free will is another matter. To gain freedom  for the soul’ (free 
will), the individual must confront the lim it that death places on all human 
movement and action; he is constrained to seek his/her own form in death, he 
is compelled to search out reality in the ‘unknown familiar1 o f death’s own 
province. Where the text states that Virgil has ‘given himself over to the 
command’ -th a t he seek out his own form in death and that he be ‘obedient to 
the task set before him by fate’-  it is Virgil finally shaping destiny, rather than 
the other way around.
For Virgil, the arbitrariness of fate and the arbitrariness of the text are 
simultaneously overcome; the ‘real’ attained by the encounter with death is a 
reality that can be situated within an individual subjectivity, as well as a reality 
that can be rediscovered within the text:
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 die SchOpfung aus der Starke des todeserkennenden Wortes  (p. 81)
( creation issuing from the strength of the death-recognizing word..... )
Where the individual is able to discover in death an available reality from 
which ‘form ’ can be given to one’s life, the word (text) imbued with a 
cognizance of death (todeserkennendes Wortes) is one through which reality 
itself might be reshaped. In the experience with death, as in the experience 
with the text, there is a hidden ‘real’ that can be attained, though never 
revealed. The Aeneid is one such text that has profoundly transformed the 
reality o f the world to which it was introduced.5 The Virgil o f T.D.V. harbored 
serious doubts about the effects which ‘his’ text would work upon the world 
and so hesitates to accept the responsibility of authorship. Until the 
confrontation with Augustus Caesar in Book III convinces him to do otherwise, 
it is Virgil’s intent to go out o f the world leaving behind neither name nor 
written word.
Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen
Virgil’s eventual encounter with fate (Schicksal) is not something to 
which the mere circumstance o f his dying propels him; rather Virgil 
purposefully elects fate as oblivion’s alternative. It would be easier fo r Virgil to 
slip quietly into death, taking all trace o f a previous existence with him as he 
goes. Instead, he chooses a return to the ‘unknown Familiar’ and a 
confrontation with what T.D.V. refers to as the ‘realest of the Real’ (die 
wirklichste Wirklichkeit). The ‘real’, according to T.D.V., is always with us, 
always available to our discovery, though the act o f discovering the ‘real’ is
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seldom exercised. The following locates the ‘realest o f the Real’ at the
inchoate stage of our existence:
 in der Kette der Erinnerung, in die wir geschmiedet sind, die ersten
Glieder die gewichtigsten sein sollten, als waren sie, gerade sie, die 
wirklichste Wirklichkeit (p. 72)
( in the memory chain into which we are forged the first link should be
the greatest as though it just exactly it were the realest of the ‘Real’ )
This *wirklichste W irklichkeit, this ‘first link’ in the memory chain, actually 
precedes memory, suggesting that it, the ‘real’, were a hidden prerequisite 
necessary to all existence. To elect one’s fate, in the T.D.V., is nothing less 
than to return to memory’s first link, to return to this ‘realest of the Real.’6
It is telling that, when in search of earliest memory Virgil first inclines 
toward memory of the song o f the father, the father’s potter’s song (Tdpferiied) 
that the father had once sung while laboring as a potter and later, during 
Virgil’s childhood, songs that the father sang as an interlude during long bouts 
o f storytelling:
 und er erinnerte sich des Vaters, der erst mit der Heirat zum richtigen
Bauem hatte werden kdnnen und dessen einstmaliger TOpferberuf dem 
Sohn gering gedeucht hatte, obwohl er sehr schfln gewesen war den 
abendlichen Erzahlungen von der Arbeit an den bauchigen weinfassem 
und edelgeschwungenen OlkrQgen, die der Vater verfertigt hatte, zu
lauschen, den Erzahlungen, von dem lehmformenden Daumen schonen
Erzahlungen, unterbrochen von manchem aiten Tdpferiied. (pp. 37 - 38)
( and he remembered his father who at the time of his marriage first had
been able to become a genuine farmer and whose earlier potter's trade had 
little impressed the son, although he, the son, was very pleased to attend 
the telling of the work-stories in the evening, stories of the large-bellied 
wine ums and of nobly fashioned vessels for holding oil, works that the 
father had done; he was pleased to listen intently to the stories of the clay-
fashioning thumb.......beautiful stories interspersed with many an old potter's
song.)
Initially, this apparent ‘first link’ in the chain o f memory promises to be the 
Urbild that will grant access to the ‘realest of the Real’ (die wirklichste 
Wirklichkeit). The text implies a continuum of song from ‘father to son to
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father to son,’ as though the Aeneid were an accumulation of song occurring
at some point in the heretofore mentioned ‘unending line of fathers' (die
unendiiche Reihe der VSter p. 178). The Aeneid, however, is the
‘accumulation’ o f song with the addition o f something singularly new; with the
advent of the Aeneid'L all the ‘father's’ stories, o f which it is the ‘composite’,
suddenly undergo a radical alteration of meaning. The change is due to the
replacement o f one Urbifd fo r another; the Aeneid begins with a change in
what from the beginning is real. This new ’element with regenerative force is
the thing which Virgil resists encountering at the time o f his dying; it is an
element that not only has the power to renew a traumatized post-revolutionary
Rome, it also has the potential to reshape the social, cultural and political
configuration of Rome. The Urbild inscribed by Virgil into the Aeneid has the
power to redefine the ‘real’ for Rome.
The chain’s first link is nothing so ‘tangible’ as childhood’s earliest
memory, nor is it traceable to some yet earlier version of the story (the
Aeneid) now being told; rather the transformative element within the Aeneid
appears on the scene as something previously unknown. Here in the passage
taken from pages 37-38 ,  the Urbild of which Virgil is in search appears in the
guise of Maya, the presence of the unremembered mother (pp. 37 - 38):
 er spQrte sein Blut, er spQrte die Erinnerungstiefe seines Kdrpers er
erinnerte sich der hellen Augen in dem immer lachbereiten stets ein wenig 
sonnverbrannten Gesicht der Mutter  (p. 37)
( he traced his blood, he traced the memory depths of his body he
remembered the bright eyes and the always nearly-smiling, slightly sun burnt 
face of the mother.......)
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Unlike the memory o f the father that is particularized by the representation o f 
the remembered Tdpfertied, memory o f the mother remains general and 
undefined, by virtue o f the absence o f particular detail. Maja is present in the 
form of this pair o f bright and lucid eyes. The first link in the memory chain is 
to be discovered hidden behind the eyes of the mother. Her eyes, like 
‘Death’s eye,’ defer and withhold the moment o f Virgil’s return to death. 
Nonetheless, something behind the eyes o f the mother and beyond Death’s 
eye remains present, if unseen. W hat remains is that element o f the ‘realest 
o f the Real’ which precedes (t/r-bild) and gives meaning to all representation. 
Retrieving that element hidden beyond Death’s eye offers Virgil the promise of 
an integrated text and an integrated existence at the moment o f his dying:
 nur wer den Tod auf sich nimmt, vermag den Ring im Irdischen zu
schlie&en, nur wer des Todes Auge sucht, dem bricht nicht das eigene, 
wenn es ins Nichts schauen soil, nur wer zum Tode hinlauscht, der braucht 
nicht zu flQchten, der darf bleiben  (p. 78)
( only the one who takes death upon himself is able to bring the earthly
cycle to its close, only the one who seeks Death's eye, that one does not 
shatter his own eye when it is necessary to gaze into the void; only the one 
who auscultates death has no need to flee, that one may remain )
‘Closing the ring’ (der Ring im Irdischen schlie&en) amounts to acheiving 
validity for the narrational elements within the Aeneid by means of integrating 
those narrative elements into a larger cultural context. The ‘stories’ passed on 
from ‘father to son to father to son’ that are woven into the text o f the Aeneid 
are made valid by re-embracing those elements in the ‘world’ (im Irdischen) 
from which they spring. By closing the circle with those elements from which it 
originates, the Aeneid is able, ultimately, to alter the ‘real’ from which it 
springs.
235
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The above passage states somewhat enigmatically ‘only he who takes
death upon himself only he who auscultates death need not flee, is
allowed to remain.' The act o f taking death upon oneself (Tod-auf-sich- 
nehmeri) occurs not just at the time o f one’s dying, but at any moment that 
one is able to ascertain the ‘real.’ The act o f Taking-death-upon-oneself,’ in 
the case o f Broch's T.D.V., implies an ethics whereby the author (Virgil/Broch) 
recognizes, and thereby accepts, responsibility for the power o f the text to 
transform the world into which it is written. The dictum wer zum Tode
hinlauscht der darf bleiben indicates that a recognition of the ‘real’ beyond
representation involves one in a subjective relation with the ‘real;’ text alters 
subject alters text in such a way that a transformation in the ‘real’, and hence 
the world, is being effected by the relation between subject and text and 
between text and the world it represents.
The formula Tod-auf-sich-nehmen, taken from the above passage, is 
synonymous with the formula Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen found on page 144; 
each implies a relation of inter-reflection between text and the individual 
subject leading to a creation o f the ‘real.’ The ‘real’ is not something absolute 
and apart from the subject, rather the ‘real’ exists only in the context o f an 
inter-reflective engagement between an individual subject with something 
outside itself. That relation is defined on pages 113 - 114 in terms o f its 
antithesis:
 dieses Nichtwissen wurde ihm vom ganzen Rund des Erschaubaren
zusammen mit der Schonheit zugestrahlt, zart und dabei fast damonisch als 
Verlockung, als die Qberhebliche VerfOhrung der Bedeutungsgleichheit, 
damonisch von der auOersten Grenze her zugeflQstert, zur innersten 
hindringend ein schimmemdes ozeanisches FIQstem, monddurchstrOmt 
ihn durchstrOmend, gleichgewichtig wie die schwebenden Gezeiten des
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Alls, deren flGstemde Gewaltdas Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare 
ineinandervertauscht, die Dingvieffalt in die Einheit des Selbst die 
Denkvielfalt in die Einheit der Welt bindet beides aber zur 
Schonheit entwirklicht Wissenlosigkeit ist das Wissen der SchOnheit 
Erkenntnistosigkeit ist ihr Erkennen, jenes ohne Vorsprung von Denken, 
dieses ohne OberschuQ von Wirklichkeit und in der Erstarrung ihres 
Gleichgewichtes, erstarrt das flutende Gleichgewicht zwischen Denken und 
Wirklichkeit  (pp. 113-14)
( this absence of cognition was radiated to him from the full round of the
visible world together with the beautiful, it was a gentle and therefore almost 
demonic temptation, like the arrogant seduction to an indifference to meaning, 
the demonic whispered home from the outermost fringes, a whisper of shimmering 
ocean penetrating to the most internal self, this whispering shot through with 
moonlight a moonlight continuing to stream in, balanced like the floating tides 
of the universe whose whispering authority interchanges the visible and the 
invisible, binding the multiplicity of the thing in the unity of self, binding 
the multiplicity of thought in the unity of the world, each, however, undone 
as they are transformed into beauty: the knowledge of beauty is a knowledge 
without knowledge, its percipience is without perception, this without an 
origin in thought this without the surplus of the 'real' and in the lifelessness 
of its balance, stiff is the floating balance between thinking and the ‘real’ )
Here the text describes a state o f beauty (Schdnheit) in which knowledge of 
truth (das Wissen) and perception of the real (die Erkenntnis) are vitiated to
the point of being rendered completely ineffectual ‘ a knowledge of beauty
is a knowledge without knowledge, its percipience is without perception......
(  Wissenlosigkeit is t das Wissen der Schonheit, Erkenntnistosigkeit ist ihr
Erkennen). Here the text takes up the argument that Broch makes with 
consistency throughout his writing not against beauty per se, but against 
beauty as it is expressed in the notion of ‘art for art’s sake.’ In terms of the 
Virgil o f T.D.V. and o f his relation to the Aeneid, a text devoid of truth and 
devoid of the ‘real’ is at best an idle amusement. The greater threat, however, 
is that unless the text should allow its reader to arrive at some notion of truth 
and o f the ‘real’, then the text lends itself, as in the case o f Augustan Rome, to 
the manipulation of political forces. Much of the Aeneid’s narrative, 
particularly those elements reinforcing the legitimacy o f Augustus’ political
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heritage, could be used to shape the political and cultural reality of Rome 
according the wishes and aspirations o f Augustus and his successors.
In T.D.V., Virgil fears that subsequent to his death the text, perversely, 
will become an instrument by which Augustus will tighten control over the 
people and the destiny o f Rome. Whereas Virgil fears the nightmare, 
illustrated on page 21, in which the faceless masses respond in unison to the
will o f a master -th e  dumb brooding mass animal self adulating in the
Person o f the One  ( das dempf brutende Massentier. sich selbst
anbetend in der Person des Einen )— the Aeneid is set out as the antidote
to such numbing obsequiousness. The text attempts to establish the anitdote 
through the interchange between thing’ and ‘self,’ between ‘thought1 and 
‘world’, binding the multiplicity o f the thing with the unity o f self,7 binding the 
multiplicity o f thought with the unity o f the world die Dingvielfalt in die Einheit
der Selbst, die Denkvielfalt in die Einheit der Welt bindet  Dingvielfalt is
the incomprehensible manifold nature o f the real, the manifold nature o f truth 
that reaches beyond language’s capacity to represent. The paradox of a text 
such as the Aeneid is that it enables its reader to encounter the impossible, 
not perfectly completely, but to the extent that truth can be Known and that the 
‘real’ can be perceived. The process whereby this occurs is one through 
which the reader’s subjectivity is defined in relation to the world and the world 
in relation to the individual subject.
The idea of the subject defined in relation to the ‘world’ is further 
explored in this subsequent passage:
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und so wuGte er auch, daG in soicher Wahrheit die Pficht alien
KQnstlertums liegt, die Pflichtzur selbsterkennenden Wahrtieitsfindung
und WahrheitsauGerung, dem KQnstlerzur Aufgabe gesetzt, damit die
Seele, gewahr des groGen Gleichgewichts zwischen dem Ich und dem All,
sich im All wiederfinde, damit sie das, was dem Ich durch die
Selbsterkenntnis zugewachsen ist wiedererkenne als Seins-Zuwachs im
All, in der Welt ja im Menschentum Qberhaupt  (p. 133)
(and so he also knew that the duty of all artistry lay in such a truth, the duty 
to a self enlightening discovery of the truth and of that truth’s expression, 
before the artist is set out the task of rediscovering the great balance between 
the T and the ‘All,’ so that the soul might recover herself in the ‘All’ recognizing 
that what increases in the ‘I’ by virtue of self-cognizance also results in an 
augmentation of the ‘All,’ an increase for the world, indeed, an increase 
for mankind overall )
T.D.V. posits the soul (die Seele) as an observer between the 1’ (das Ich) and 
the ‘AH’ (das All) something vastly more general than the ego and from within 
which ‘truth’ may be perceived. It is significant that the point o f observation is 
situated not at the locus of the ‘I,’ rather it is suspended somewhere between 
the ‘I’ and that place in which, for all practical considerations, truth is 
contextualized. There is nothing new in describing the subject, die Seele in 
this case, in terms o f a relation, it is the relation between the ego (das Ich) and 
something else that defines individual subjectivity. Because psychoanalytic 
parlance locates that ‘something else’ within the realm of the Unconscious, let 
us equate the Unconscious with what T.D.V. refers to as das All. In so doing, 
we move to within a step o f understanding what T.D.V. offers as the definition 
for ‘truth.’ Truth is a point in the Unconscious to which the ego (das Ich) 
connects to form a radically altered subjectivity. The alteration of subjectivity, 
described here as ‘Augmentation o f Being’ (Seins-Zuwachs), effects the 
introduction of something heretofore unknown. Truth, by this definition, would 
be an exceedingly rare thing, a phenomenon that alters the nature o f the 
‘real.’ T.D.V. spells out clearly this result in s ta ting :...... what increases in the
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‘I’ by virtue of self-cognizance also results in an augmentation o f the
‘AH’ (  was dem Ich dutch die Selbsterkenntnis zugewachsen ist,
wiedererkenne als Seins-Zuwachs im A ll ).8 If the Aeneid should be a
truth bearing text, then it is one that has the potential to alter the ‘real’ for both 
the individual reading subject and the world at large. Though Virgil protests 
that he wishes to destroy the Aeneid because it is an inane text, his real 
reason for wishing to take the text with him into Death's oblivion is precisely 
because he fears what it might effect upon the world.
One thing is certain to the Virgil o f T.D.V.: that should his text be 
allowed to exist subsequent to his death, an alteration o f the ‘real’ would be 
effected, a change that would implicate his own person. That change is 
described as one which would transgress already established frontiers, would 
redraw the customary boundaries o f being:
 wenn es also auch immer nur sinnbildhafte Erkenntnis bleibt, sie ist
gerade infolge solcher Sinnbildhaftigkeit imstande, die unQberschreit- 
baren innersten und au&ersten Grenzen des Seins trotzdem zu neuen 
Wirklichkeiten auszudehnen, eineswegs bloB zu neuen Formen, nein, zu 
neuen Inhalten der Wirklichkeit, weil sich eben hierin das tiefste 
Wirklichkeitsgeheimnis, das Geheimnis der Entsprechung auftut, die 
gegenseitige Entsprechung von Ich-Wirklichkeit und Welt 
Wirklichkeit  (p. 133)
( even if it were to always remain only a symbolic perception, it is by
virtue of such a quality of symbolization capable of expanding to new 
realities the infranchisable inner and outer borders of being, in any 
case of expanding to new forms, no, even to new content for the 'real' 
since herein the deepest secret of the ‘real’, the secret of the correlation 
came to the surface, the mutual correlation of T-reality and ‘worid’- 
reality )
Elsewhere in T.D.V. it is stated that ‘genuine art breaks through boundaries’ 
(;Echte Kunst durchbricht Grenzen p. 239); in the above passages taken from 
page 133 the reader is informed that that transgression is accompanied by an 
‘enlargement o f Being’ (Seins-zuwachs) with the addition of new content to the
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‘real’ (zu neuen Inhalten der W irklichkeit...). Reality’s most profound ‘secret1 
(das tiefste Wirklichkeits-geheimnis) is the effective correspondence between 
the ‘real’ for the individual subject and the ‘real’ for the world as a whole; a 
change for the former has the potential for effecting a change in the latter. 
Though he may pretend otherwise the dilemma for Virgil in T.D.V. is not 
whether he should find the courage to look ‘beyond death’s eye’ but having 
done so, having discovered some terrible truth that has been inscribed into 
the text o f the Aeneid does he now, at the moment o f death, have the courage 
to bequeath this truth to Rome as part o f a literary legacy.
Virgil seeks to elude the necessity of claiming responsibility for his text 
by attempting to derisively declare it merely ‘beautiful,’ to call it an amusing 
diversion that does little to effect change in the Rome for which it was written. 
The most obvious refutation of this pretense lies in the fact that the Aeneid 
clearly establishes for Augustus a right to political legitimacy; the point is not 
lost on Augustus who in Book III will use every means of persuasion to 
prevent Virgil from destroying the text critical to the reshaping o f political order 
under his rule. Virgil seems intent on self deception in this passage, in which 
he all but declares himself incapable o f the sort of virtue necessary to creating 
an effective work of art:
 denn wer zur Liebe unfShig ist wer unfShig ist zu ihrer Gemeinschaft
der muR aus der BrQckenlosigkeit seiner Vereinsamung sich in die 
SchOnheit retten  (p. 143)
( for whoever is incapable of love, whoever is incapable of love's communion
he must turn to beauty to rescue himself from unbridged aloneness.......)
Beauty (Schdnheif) in this instance, defines the quality of a work that defies 
subjective interaction; it is a quality that denotes the absence of truth as it was
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defined in the above passage taken from page 133. The one who is
incapable of love is by definition incapable o f establishing the subjective
interrelation that has the recognition o f truth as its end.
Virgil concludes his musings by assigning to love this somewhat
improbable mission:
 [die] Liebe, obwohl zur Schdnheitsschaffung begnadet, nimmermehr auf
Schdnheit, sondem einzig und allein auf ihre ureigenste Aufgabe gerichtet 
ist, auf jene menschlichste ailer Aufgaben, die attzeit und ausschieGlich 
Schicksal-auf- sich-nehmen heiBt; oh, dies aiiein ist Liebe, doch es hatten 
die Toten keinertei Gemeinschaft untereinander, sie haben einander 
vergessen— (p. 144)
( though graced with the power to create beauty love has never had beauty
as its aim, rather singular and alone the primary task to which love aims is that 
of the most human of all tasks, the eternal and exclusive task that is called 
taking-fate-upon-oneself; oh, this alone is love, yet the dead have no 
communion among one another, the dead have forgotten one another—)
Love leads to the taking-fate-upon-oneself (Shicksal-auf-sich-nehmen) which 
we have already seen is analogous to taking death upon oneself (Tod-auf- 
sich-nehmen)-, either leads to a certain circularity between the individual 
subject and the ‘real’ (see: p. 78). When Virgil states that ‘the dead have 
forgotten one another1 he speaks with circumspection to imply that the ‘truth1 
of the Aeneid will die with him, as though without his presence as guarantor 
thereof truth itself would vanish from the text. Of course, Virgil is not 
altogether mistaken in this regard, in that even truth is subject to the grossest 
sort of distortions and manipulations.
Within the text o f T.D.V., a precise moment occurs where Virgil 
enunciates a desire to ‘take fate upon himself.1 There Lysanias, Virgil’s 
imaginary boy companion, declares auspiciously:
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*Ewig ist der Widerhall deines Gedichtes”. (p. 171)
(“Eternal is the echo of your poem’.)
To which Virgil counters:
“Nein, ich will den Widerhall meiner Sb'mme nicht mehr hOren; ich
erwarte die Stimme, die auBerhalb der meinen ist”. (p. 171)
(“No, I no longer want to hear the echo of my own voice; I await the voice 
that is outside my own.”)
Lysanias predicts that through the Aeneid, Virgil's own voice will continue to 
speak forever. Virgil, on the other hand, awaits a voice that is ‘outside his 
own’ (die au&erhalb der meinen ist). This personal declaration on the part of 
Virgil carries forward the general theme of Sprache au&erhalb der Sprache 
(cf: p. 167 et passim) developed systematically over the course o f Book II. It 
also points to a duality in language that is shared by both text and subject; 
though Virgil has authored the Aeneid it is not his own voice but that o f 
another that calls to him from the text; the echo (die Wiedertialf) o f which 
Lysanias speaks is no longer the voice of its creator. W e recounted from 
page 133 the mirroring relationship between subject and world expressed in
the phrase ‘the corresponding opposition between the ‘real’ o f the 1’ and
the ‘real’ of the world (“...d/e gegenseitige Entsprechung von Ich-W irklichkeit 
und Welt-Wirklichkeit’) . Subjectivity is the phenomenon that mediates 
between these two realms so that the voice with which one speaks and the 
voice which one ‘hears’ as one speaks are not the same; they have differing 
points o f origin, so that what is spoken by the subject is ‘spoken twice, once 
from a point of origin from within the speaking subject and again from a point 
of origin somewhere else within the world.’ On page 171 it is revealed that
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this second voice, this altered echo, has its origins nowhere else in the world 
but in the context of language; the ‘real’ is in language and only within 
language; the ‘real’ for Virgil is that point within the text o f the Aeneid from 
which he hears his own voice calling back to him. This other voice is not 
precisely ‘his own voice’ but something vaguely like it, something that T.D.V. 
elsewhere describes as the ‘unknown Familiar’ (die ungekannt 
Wiedererkannte).
Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit
Virgil’s embrace o f fate (Schicksal) entails a patient waiting and 
listening, and at the beginning of Book II, the reader finds him preparing in just 
this manner to scrutinize the silence that promises to release its abundance of 
hidden truth:
 nichts war dringficher als allein zu bleiben, urn nochmals und
nochmals alles Sein in sich zu versammeln  (p. 71)
( nothing was more pressing that to remain alone and to again and
again gather into oneself all being )
Although this passage depicts Virgil ‘gathering into himself all being’ while in 
pursuit o f truth, suggesting an inward scrutiny, other passages show him 
turning outward toward the realm of the gods. In this later passage, for 
instance, he speaks of an exterior zone that resists his entry and yet beckons 
with the familiar if not intimate quality o f Wiedererkanntheit
 die Sterne brannten groB in ihrem gro&en Wandelgang, trOstlich und
stark und ruhefiimmemd vor beruhingender Wiedererkanntheit als
ware zwischen ihrem Raum und dem der untem Welt mittendurch eine
gleichsam hart-undurchdringliche, gerade noch fOr den Blickdurch-
lassige, trobkristallene WOlbungeinverspannt.  (p. 91)
( the stars shone large in their great circuit, comforting and strong and
quietly shimmering with reassuring familiarity as though between the
realm of the stars and the realm of earth below there were interposed
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a hard-impenetrable, cloud-troubled crystal firmament though which one 
could glimpse to the other side )
Virgil seeks passage here through the ‘hard-impenetrable’ barrier between 
himself and what is designated as ‘the already known but forgotten’ (die 
Wiedererkanntheit). Comparing these two passages taken from pages 71 and 
91 respectively we discover that Virgil’s search for truth and his discovery of 
the ‘real’ entail an inter-penetration of what is intimate -w here all being is 
gathered into oneself- and o f what is foreign -th a t which exists ‘on the other 
side o f the moon’. This zone beyond the firmament, like death itself, yields to 
Virgil's scrutiny through a process o f inter-reflection. Recalling the alluded-to 
experience o f the gaze into ‘Death’s eye’ (p. 78), the break into the ‘hard 
impenetrable’ requires that Virgil observe himself observing. Introspection 
leading to a discovery o f truth and the ‘real’ requires that one turn one’s gaze 
outward for the purpose o f scrutinizing what lies within.
The difficulty o f the task faced by Virgil in T.D.V. is not so ‘simple’ as to 
discover and render into words some ‘divine’ precept called truth; rather 
Virgil’s task is to create a text such that those mirroring aspects o f language 
which might be called ‘divine and human’, ‘true and real’, ‘self and other1 inter- 
reflect through the medium of its words. In this sense, Virgil strives through 
the medium of the text to cause the inter-reflection o f the fate o f man with that 
of the gods:
-:oh, es ist das Gottesschicksal des Menschen und es ist das menschlich
Erschaubare im Schicksal der Gdtter, es ist ihrer beider unabdnderiiche
Bestimmung, stets aufs neue zum Wege der Wiedergeburt gelenkt zu
werden, es ist ihrer beider untilgbare Schicksalshoffnung, nochmals den
Kreis ausschreiten zu dQrfen, damit das Nachherzum Vorher werde und
jeder Punkt des Weges alle Vergangenheit und alle Zukunft in sich
vereinige  (pp. 44 - 45)
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(-:oh, it is the divine fate of man and it is what is perceptibly human 
in the fate of the gods, it was their mutual unalterable destiny to be 
again and again newly placed upon the path of rebirth, it is their 
mutual indestructible hope within their fate once again to be able to 
break through the cycle, so that what is to follow becomes what has already 
been and that at every point in the cycle all past and all future unite 
as one )
The divine and the human, the true and the real are two aspects o f one fate 
which are never joined, never form a ‘complementary whole’ but, instead, they 
circle one another like points on inter-reflecting, though distinctly separate, 
planes. In the scenario suggested by the above passage human perception 
(das menschlich Erschaubare) effects powerful and consequential changes, 
enough to transgress the limits circumscribed by a given reality. The claim 
here is that making truth available to the reader through the text has the effect 
o f reshaping the ‘real.’
Virgil describes the relation between truth and reality in terms of an
ongoing dynamic between ‘the expenditure of being’ and death:  denn in
unaufhdrlichem Wechselspiel m it dem Seinsablauf steht der Tod (p. 78).
In this dichotomy, the expenditure of being pertains to human death pertains 
to the divine. The instance o f ‘death’ broadens the field of play from the 
particular to the general, from an inward gazing to an outward reflecting 
subjectivity. Thus, the Virgil o f T.D.V. does not assert that the text ‘reveals’ 
truth, rather that the text provides the outward medium of silence through 
which truth can be searched:
 wem es verliehen worden ist, die flQchtige Fluchtigkeit der Todes-
gestalt zu erhaschen, wem es im unabldssigen Lauscben und Suchen geiingt 
den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat mit deren Echtheit auch die seiner 
eigenen Gestalt gefunden, er hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet und damit 
sich selbst zur Gestalt gebracht.  (pp. 80 - 81)
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( when it has been granted that one should capture the swift fleetness of
death’s form, to the one who succeeds through tireless listening and searching 
in bringing death into form, that one has also found the form of his own death, 
he has given shape to his own death and therewith realized the form of his own 
being )
Here it is stated that Death’s form can be no more than glimpsed (die fluchtige 
Fluchtigkeit der Todesgestalt zu erhaschen), yet this fleeting perception of 
Death’s fleeting form results, according to this passage, in the altered 
configuration o f an individual subjectivity.9 The altemance between the 
passive and the active mode is significant: wem es im unablassigen Lauschen
und Suchen gelingt den Tod zur Gestalt zu bringen, der hat ....... seiner
eigenen Gestalt gefunden, e r hat seinen eigenen Tod gestaltet  To see
‘Death's form’ is to ‘see’ the echo of one's own (altered) subjectivity peering 
from the text; this perception, the perception o f self in the reflection of 
death/text, results from a process of change that can be defined as the 
working o f the ‘deed’ within the word.
The transformative power o f the word, one of T.D.V.’s fundamental 
themes, is formulated in numerous passages as a process by which truth is 
translated into the ‘real’ and the ‘real’ into truth. Broch’s Virgil insists that this 
in not a process whereby word is translated into word, representation into 
representation; truth and reality in T.D.V. are not indistinguishable, not 
indifferently interchangeable. Virgil specifies that the interchange ‘doubles 
world-form’:
 das Wechselspiel der verdoppelten Weltgestaltung, Wirklichkeit zur
Wahrheit umgestaltet, Wahrheit zur Wirklichkeit  (p. 95)
( .the exchange of the doubling world-form, the real transformed into
truth, truth into the real )
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This process o f exchange between truth and the ‘real’ indicates the general 
manner in which one constructs the other. Critical to an understanding o f this 
process, as it is defined in T.D.V., o f the exchange between truth and the ‘real’ 
is the phrase verdoppelten Weltgestaltung (doubled worfd-form). The phrase 
obliquely accuses the inanity o f the text that is self-enclosed, that bears 
reference to nothing ‘outside’ itself, that effects no exchange between the 
human and the divine, between Tod (Death) and Seinsablauf (events as they 
unfold in the course o f (human) existence). The inane text does nothing to 
translate events as they unfold in one’s life into a larger cultural, social and
political context. The image of the ‘masses self adulating in the person of
the One (cf.: p. 21)’ is a caution against the existence which has no larger 
context in which to observe itself being reflected. The Aeneid succeeds as a 
‘doubler o f world-form’ to the extent that it reflects the Roman populace (die 
Menschengemeinschaff) not in a mere representation of itself, but in the 
fiction of the ‘unending line o f fathers’ (p. 178), translating the intimate truth of 
personal existence into a larger historical Teal.’
Virgil analyses the process o f ‘world-doubling’ in a passage that treats 
not specifically o f truth and the real, but rather o f ‘Sprachwelf and ‘Dingwelt,’ 
their respective fields of play. The passage is cited at length below:
 eigentlichster Auftrag der Dichtung ware, die Namen der Dinge zu
heben, ja, selbst wenn es ihr im Aufklang ihrer grO&ten Augenblicke 
geiungen ware, einen Blick in das Niemals-Erstarrende der Sprache zu 
werfen, unter deren Tiefenlicht unberOhrt und keusch das Wort der 
Dinge schwebt, die Keuschheit der Namen auf dem Grunde der Dingwelt 
sie vermag im Gedicht wohl die SchOpfung im Worte zu verdoppeln, 
hingegen vermag sie nicht das Verdoppelte wiederzur Einheitzusammen- 
zufassen, sie vermag es nicht weil die Scheinumkehrung, weil die Ahnung, 
weil die Schdnheit, weil all dies, was sie als Dichtung bestimmt und sie zur 
Dichtung macht ausschlie&lich in der Weltverdopplung statthat, es 
bleiben Sprachwelt und Dingwelt getrennt zwiefach die Heimat des Wortes, 
zwiefach die Heimat des Menschen, zwiefach der Abgrund der Wesenheit 
zwiefach aberauch die Keuschheit des Seins und damitverdoppeltzur 
Unkeuschheit die gleich einer Wiedergeburt ohne Geburt alle Ahnung wie 
alle Schdnheit durchtrdnkt und den Keim der Weitenzersprengung in sich
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tragt, die Ur-Unkeuschheit des Seins, wetche von der Mutter gefQrchtet
wird; unkeusch ist der Mantel der Dichtung  (pp. 179 -80)
( the truest work of poetry would be to evoke the name of things, yes, even if
when its greatest moment sounds it were able to cast a glance into perpetually- 
fluid speech, under whose profound light, untouched and chaste, the word for 
things lingered, the chasteness of the name on the grounds of the ‘thing-world’, 
speech, through the poem, is well able to double creation through words, although 
poetry is never able to refashion unity from the doubled creation, poetry is 
not able to do so because the seeming return, because the intuition, because the 
beauty, because all these things that are determined by poetry and that are 
thus made into poetry take place exclusively in the doubled world; speech-world 
and thing-world remain separate, two-fold the sphere of the word, two-fold the 
home-place of man, two-fold the abyss of being, two-fold the purity of being and 
being thereby becomes impure, like a rebirth without an initial birth it seeped 
through all divination and through all beauty and it carries within it the kernel 
of all world-splintering, namely the primal impurity of being that had been the 
fear of the mother; impure is the mantel of poetry....... )
The initial concept is one seemingly easy to hold in thought: “the proper task
of poetry would be to raise up the name of the thing” (die Namen der Dingen
zu heberi). But then the reader discovers that ‘naming’ is a process as
complex as it is arcane; the sounding o f the name gives a view (sic) into ‘ever-
fluid' (Niemals-Erstarrende) language where the word (the name) hovers pure
(keusch) and untouched. The shift from sound to sight is not accidental and
elsewhere Virgil states Dein Auge ist Deine Stimme (p. 253), meaning that
although truth is ‘perceived’ through the ear, we ‘see’ truth’s form by listening
in silence. In poetry, the audible ‘klang’ o f the word should evoke for the
listener’ something true about the nature of the thing to  which it refers. These
vague precepts give way to something more specific as the passage
develops.
In clear, albeit complex, exposition, Virgil claims for the power of poetry 
the ability to double creation through the word (die Schopfung im Worte zu
verdoppein ). Continuing, he states that creation, once doubled, has no
power to reclaim unity; world-doubling leads to a world irrevocably split into 
Sprachwelt (Languageworld) and Dingwelt (Thing-world). This irreconcilable 
divide emblematizes the original fa ir that is traditionally associated with the
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advent of language, where language effects a separation from the real and a 
distancing from any immediate contact with truth. And yet this passage 
affirms the presence o f both truth and the real, in that creation is doubled into 
Sprachwelt and Dingweli, into the domain o f the intimate and the domain o f 
alienating abstraction.
We conclude with reference to the passage on naming found on page 
59, specifically the phrase nackt sind w ir unter unserem Namen, nackternoch 
als das Kind, das de r Vater vom Boden aufgehoben hat, um ihm den Namen 
zu geben. There Virgil alludes to the helplessness o f the child as its ‘true’ 
form is forever altered by ‘the gift o f the name’. Through the use o f the word 
in poetry {Dichtung), Virgil, who finds himself in the role o f both father and 
son, alters the name and, in so doing, alters within himself that intimate 
interior space which can only be referred to as the thing ‘more naked than the 
child'. The act o f creation in language (world-doubling) begins with a 
recognition o f the split subject negotiating between truth and the real; as he 
alters one {Sprachwelt), so the form o f the other {Dingwelt) is also changed. 
Lysanias declares to Virgil on page 171: ‘Eternal is the echo o f your poem’ 
{Ewig ist der W iderhall deines Gedichtes). Virgil responds: ‘I no longer want to 
hear the echo o f my own voice; I await the voice that is outside my own.' 
Virgil auscultates the silence, listening for the voice that is ‘not his own,’ the 
voice that speaks o f a new reality, o f a new fate for both himself and for 
Rome.
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ROME
La mattrise est toujours le fait de I’autre main, celle qui n’6crit pas, 
capable d’intervenir au moment oQ il faut, de saisir le crayon et 
de I’gcarter. (Blanchot L’espace Iitt6raire)
The reader o f T.D.V. is invited to witness the otherwise personal 
encounter between Virgil, the novel’s principal protagonist, and imminent 
death. From the novel’s earliest scenes until the point at which Virgil is swept 
into the confines o f Brindisi palace (p. 51), T.D.V. represents death as an 
engine of radical destruction. The experience is necessarily daunting and, so 
long as Virgil remains incapable o f directly confronting death, of looking into 
‘Death’s eye’ (cf.: p. 78), death remains the uncompromising barrier, the other 
side of which promises nothing more than perfect oblivion. With the beginning 
of the novel’s second book, however, Virgil turns toward the experience of
death in a mode o f searching auscultation:...... nichts war dringlicher als allein
zu bleiben, um nochmals und nochmals alias Sain in sich zu versammeln, urn 
lauschen zu konnen; dies war das Dringlichtste -(nothing was more urgent 
than to remain alone, in order to again and again collect all being into oneself, 
in order to be able to listen; this was the thing of greatest urgency). This 
passage marks the onset o f Virgil’s exploration o f death’s realm; far from
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being the zone o f oblivion initially anticipated, Virgil discovers through keen 
listening and subtle observation a realm rich in those elusive and enticing 
qualities known as ‘truth’ and the ‘real.’1
Death proves to be a reflecting m irror offering to Virgil a refracted 
image of his own subjectivity. Virgil peers into death and death returns the 
gaze in a phenomenon which the text refers to as ‘Death’s eye’ (des Todes 
Auge p. 78). Through the exploration o f death, Virgil discovers an ongoing 
process which is that of an exchange between ‘truth’ and the ‘real’ 
(W irklichkeit zur Wahrheit umgestaltet - the ‘real’ transformed into truth p. 95). 
Situating himself on the axis of this exchange, Virgil discovers a potential to 
alter the real, an act which T.D.V. labels ‘taking-fate-upon-oneself (Schicksal- 
auf-sich-nehmen p. 144). The ongoing process o f exchange between ‘truth’ 
and the ‘real’ and the indicated potential to alter the ‘real’ are integrally bound. 
Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen is a phenomenon, mediated through language, 
whereby in extraordinary instances, the authoring subject is able to alter the 
real by an alteration of the subjects relation to truth. Certainly the Aeneid is 
one such extraordinary instance; it is a text which irrevocably alters the self­
view of its readers, the citizens of Rome and their subsequent cultural 
legatees. The Aenied establishes for its reader a fictional past from which 
Rome’s very real future emanates.
Yet, the drama of T.D.V. derives from Virgil’s great struggle to accept 
the Aeneid as anything more than an idle fiction. Virgil’s reluctance to 
acknowledge the tremendous cultural and political import of his work is one o f
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the supreme ironies o f this novel. V irgil protests against the possible public 
import o f the Aeneid when stating that it was a work created above all else for
and out o f personal need: ‘ only, I allow myself to maintain that I wrote it
(T.D.V.) not fo r the reader but, to the contrary, first and foremost for myself
(  allein, ich darf behaupten, dad ich es nicht nu rfQ rden  Laser, sondem
zuerst fu r mich geschrieben habe   p. 292). One o f the lessons to be
gleaned from T.D.V. is precisely that th is work, which would significantly after 
the ages, begins within the narrowly restricted confines o f personal drama, 
one in which a particular subjectivity discovers the means o f altering its own 
relation to truth. This third and concluding segment in the chapter on The 
Death o f Virgil retraces Virgil’s route to the discovery that, through the 
intermediary o f the text, a change in the configuration of a individual subject 
can, and in the case of the Aeneid does, result in a lasting reconfiguration of 
the real.
Gleichnis, Erkenntnis, Wirklichkeit
There is little doubt that Virgil is stating the ideal —one o f which he 
clearly despairs o f achieving— when on page 74 he declares ‘Denn prall von
W irklichkeit sind die Bilder ' (For the representations are bursting with the
‘real’). The language of poetry (Dichtung) does not merely represent reality; 
rather, it offers to its reader a version o f the ‘real’ open to exploration. Were 
his poetic ideal to be realized, V irgil’s search for the ‘real’ through an 
auscultation o f death would be not the mere representation o f experience, but 
a repeated contact o f the reader with the ‘real’. The Aeneid’s textual
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representations, ‘bursting with the ‘real’ (prall von W irklichkeit), would carry the
reader into the context o f his or her own fictionalized past and future. The
Aeneid's fictional representations would alter the reader’s memory o f the
‘historical’ past, placing the reader into a newly created context o f the ‘real’. In
T.D.V. , Virgil determines to destroy the manuscript o f the Aeneid and o f all
his writing (p. 167) for the ostensible reason that these works lack any sense
o f the real. The unfolding of the story recounted in this novel leads the reader
to the near opposite conclusion, namely, that Virgil fears the ‘real’ that his
works threaten to bring into existence.
Consistently, the Virgil o f T.D.V. speaks o f representation in terms not
o f an object reflected, but in terms o f inter-reflecting subjectivities. The
following gives an example typical o f the sort o f ‘presentation’ o f the real within
language that Virgil would hope to achieve in his Aeneid:
 da es sich ihm nun, wie unter einer zauberhaft piotzlichen zweiten
Beleuchtung, als das Sinnbild seines eigenen Bildes zeigte, bei alter
Uberfeme, so deutlich als ware es von ihm selber geschaffen,
die Versinnbildlichung des Ichs im All, die Versinnbildlichung des Alls
im Ich, das ineinanderverschrankte Doppelsinnbild des irdischen Seins...; (p. 114)
( because it pointed out to him as though from under a sudden magical
second illumination, the symbolic representation of his own representation, 
surpassing all, as clear as though it were he himself who created the symbolic, 
it was the symbolization of the 1' in the ‘All,’ the symbolization of the ‘All’ 
in the ‘I,’ the shrunken into itself double-symbolic representation of earthly 
being )
Contrary to the notion that symbolic representation (Versinnbildlichung) 
occurs, in any absolute sense, strictly within the confines o f the text, Virgil 
describes the symbolic representation o f the real as occuring on an axis 
limited at one extreme and the other by das Ich and das All. The reader does 
not stand at a distance from the ‘real’ symbolized by the text; rather, the text
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situates the reader within the ‘real’ that it makes present. The text ‘echoes’
back to Virgil, its reader/author, a voice other than his own (cf: p. 171) from a
locus that the passage from page 114 refers to simply as das AH and
elsewhere as wo die Mutter ruft. What, then, is das AII, similar to death in all
its aspects, if not a place from which to witness 'the absence of one’s own
presence.’ Das A il is death’s unrestricted range, a place from which the
subject is ‘echoed’ without name. Death, like das AH, is the place of which it is
said, referring to the apothegm from page 179, ‘ namenlos wird es, wo die
Mutter ru ff ( nameless is the place [from] where the mother calls). We
enter into death, and likewise into the real, without name.
This ‘voice of the mother1 is Virgil's own altered voice, as it echoes back
to him from the text. It is the voice o f a second inscription, that which rewrites
the ‘real’, an inscription which, oddly, seems to occur only as an aftermath to
the text. Virgil is filled with trepidation by the power of this voice, which is as
much his own as it is the voice of another. While discussing with Augustus
the fate of the Aeneid, whether it is to be kept or destroyed, Virgil indicates
that he wrote largely unawares o f the often-cited ‘second voice’:
“Ungeduldig war ich nach Erkenntnis...und darum wollte ich ailes
aufschreiben...... denn das ist Dichtung: ach, Ungeduld nach Erkenntnis ist
sie, dies ist ihr Wunsch, und darQber hinaus vermag sie nicht zu
dringen " (p. 300)
("I was impatient for knowledge (cognition)...and for this reason I wanted to 
write down everything...for this, alas, is poetry; poetry is a craving for cognition,
this is poetry's wish, and poetry is not capable of penetrating beyond that point ”)
This passage gives to the reader an instance in which Virgil confuses the real
with a representation of the real. Virgil tells how, in the effort to fill the text
with ‘meaning’ (Erkenntnis -th e  hallmark o f verity-), he attempts to write all:
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 [ich] wollte ailes aufschreiben. The irony inherent to this pretended claim
is that even if by some superhuman gift Virgil were, as he says, able to write
down ‘all’, ‘all’ would always be mere representation and never the
presentation of the ‘real’ within language. Virgil’s attempt to attain the Teal’ by
‘writing down everything' (alles aufgeschrieben) betrays the notion that the
‘real’ could somehow be contained within the limits o f the text. Whereas the
text is representation, die ‘real’ extends beyond the confines o f the text into
the greater realm o f language.
Because they are the fruit o f the second inscription, o f the echoing
altered voice o f the author, the text is not capable o f revealing ‘truth’ and the
‘real’; the text can only indicate them to its reader. The truth and the real are
rendered by the text through the interchange between das Ich and das All,
through the exchange that occurs between the reading subject and the altered
reflection o f the reading subject’s own voice. Virgil refers to the phenomenon
of altered reflection as that of the second ‘I’ (das zweite Ich):
 wenn mit dem Wunder des zweiten Ichs, das wir durch die BrSnde
tragen, uns die zweite Kindschaft beschieden wird, gewandelt und dem 
Vater gehOrend, Erkenntnis, erkennend und erkannt, Zufall, derzum 
Wunder geworden ist, da er alle Erkenntnis, alles Geschehen, alles Sein 
umfaBt hat, SchicksalsQberwindung, noch nicht und doch schon, oh 
Wunder  (p. 200)
( when with the miracle of the second ‘I’ which we carry through the flames,
and the second childhood is granted us, transformed and belonging to the father, 
(cognitive) perception, perceiving and perceived, the accident that have become 
the miracle, since it has embraced all cognition, all that occurs, has embraced 
all being, it is fate-overcome, not yet and yet at hand, oh, miracle )
This ‘second I’ traverses time and space, travelling from child to father and 
father to child und die zweite Kindschaft beschieden wird, gewandelt und dem 
Vater gehdrend (and the second childhood is granted us, transformed and
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belonging to the father. ). That the second T should belong to the father
implies that the second inscription has been subsumed by the name, by the 
word o f the text. The sign of the father, as innumerable passages within 
T.D.V. demonstrate (cf.: p. 59 et passim), is that o f name-giver; to say that the 
second ‘I’ belongs to the father is to say that the ‘real’ has been named by the 
text. The voice that calls back to us as readers o f the text has displacement in 
space, in the sense that it emanates from the text, and displacement in time, 
in the sense that it speaks to us from memory, albeit altered memory. But this 
‘second I’ also bears the quality o f being without locus in either time or space. 
This ‘second I’ exists only on the imaginary axis connecting father and son, 
where father and son are just other designations for the reflecting antipodes at 
either extreme o f the imaginary axis upon which subjectivity is constructed. 
The significance of these traversing chronological axes, from father to son and 
from son to father, is that memory, history, and the ‘real’ within the text are all 
made present through the sort o f intrasubjective activity whereby language is 
rendered articulate.
The fact o f this ‘second I’ reaffirms the notion of a ‘real’ that inhabits the 
realm of language which is not limited to the confines of the text. The 
following is just one example o f the numerous passages within T.D.V. that 
imply or speak directly to an unfolding succession of images that lead to an 
unfolding succession o f ‘realities':
 Wirklichkeit stets nur wieder durch Wirklichkeit versinnbildlicht
wird—, Bilder und AberbikJer, Wirklichkeiten und Aberwirklichkeiten,
keine wahrhaft wirklich, solange sie alleine steht  (p. 74)
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( the 'real' always symbolized only through the 'real'-, representations and
representations of representations, the ‘real’ and the ‘real’ reduplicated, none 
of them truly real so long as they stood alone (without copy).......)
The reader can begin to understand that the production and replication o f the 
real entails something more than the abstract mirroring within language o f one 
representation into another.2 Any production of the ‘real’ implies an 
introduction of the reading subject into the unending succession of 
representations mirroring within the text. The reader, listening for (lauschen) 
and oscultating the echo of its own altered voice, enters into the realm o f the 
real.
This introjection of the subject into the representations o f language 
(Wirklichkeit versinnbildlicht [reality symbolized]) effectuates an action within 
the word and causes a translation of the word into deed. As its story unfolds, 
the thematics of ‘word as deed’ takes on an increasing prominence within 
T.D.V. The following gives a particularly rich instance of the workings o f the 
deed (Tun) within the mirroring images of representation as the real is 
constructed:
 es wird die Sinnbildkette immer wieder geschlossen, so oft das
Unerreichbare sich selber ins Erreichbare verwandelt. und sie sich
zum Kreise schlie&e, zum Wahrheitskreis, zum ewigen Sinnbildkreis, 
wahr in jedem seiner Bilder, wahr durch das immerwdhrende Kreis- 
gleichgewicht, das um die geOffhete Grenze spielt, wahr im ewigen 
Austausch der gOttlichen und der menschlichen Tat, wahr in ihrer beider 
Sinnbildhaftigkeit und im Sinnbild ihrer gegenseitigen Spiegelung, wahr 
weil darin die SchOpfung sich fQr immerdar emeuert, eingegangen in das 
Gesetz, in das Gesetz der steten Wiedergeburt  (p. 204)
( again and again the symbolic chain is closed, closed as often as the
unattainable transposes itself into the attainable and the chain closes
itself into a circle, to the circle of truth, to the eternal symbolic cycle, 
true in each of its representations, true by virtue of the perdurable balance 
of the circle that plays along the open border, true in the eternal exchange 
between the divine and the human deed, true in both their symbolic quality 
and in their mutual, mirroring (symbolic) representation, true because 
creation renews itself repeatedly and forever therein, entering into the law, 
into the law of eternal rebirth.......)
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The passage cited affirms the possibility o f attaining the real by the 
manipulation of symbolic structures (die Sinnbildkettey, the unreachable (das 
Unerreichbare) comes within the reader’s grasp by means of subtle perception 
(lauschen). Truth folding itself into fiction (wahr in jedem seiner Bilder), the 
‘unreachable’ (truth) translating itself into the ‘reachable’ (lettered text), is the 
consequence of an intra-subjective experience involving reader and text. The 
passage describes this experience in terms o f an interchange between the
human and the divine ‘deed’: .......truth is the eternal exchange between the
divine and the human deed (  wahr im ewigen Austausch der gdttlichen
und der menschlichen Tat ).3 The deed here referred to is not the simple
act of perception o f an observer looking in, but o f a change effected within the 
subject, as it perceives that its own voice reflected back to it from the text has 
become something different from itself. Not all reading implies the act o f 
discovering the real; not all texts elicit alteration in the reading subject 
engaged. In point of fact, T.D. V. speaks o f a text that offers the reading 
subject a point of entry into the real and the means of effecting change within
i t : ....... it is true because creation renews itself repeatedly and forever therein,
entering into the law, into the law of eternal rebirth (eingegangen in das
Gesetz, in das Gesetz der steten Wiedergeburt ). That, according the
logic put forward by T.D.V., only the rare text allows for the possibility o f a 
reconfiguration of the real (Wiedergeburt) can be inferred from Virgil’s 
decision to destroy the Aeneid precisely because he judged it was untrue, 
precisely because, in Virgil’s estimation, it failed to do more than offer up
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images that were devoid o f truth and devoid of the real (cf: p. 22 et passim  
where Virgil laments the inherently false quality o f the Aeneid and o f all of his 
writing). The law (das Gesetz) is the prescription for the ordering of the 
symbolic structure, for a change (Wiedergeburf) in the configuration of the
‘real’.
Virgil seeks within his epic an encounter with death, a death which is 
not merely represented by the text, but which is immanent to  it. Shortly after 
Virgil reveals to Augustus that in the writing of the Aeneid he has attempted to 
write down all (damm wollte ich alles aufschreiben, p. 300), he amends this 
assertion with something that is very nearly the contrary of writing-all-down 
(alles aufschreiben). Below is an exchange begun by Augustus and to which 
Virgil responds:
[A] "So mu& ich dich nochmals fragen, Vergil, zu welchem Ziel du mit 
deiner Dichtung gestrebt hast nachdem es die Erkenntnis des Lebens 
nicht sein sollte".
[V] “Die Erkenntnis des Todes." (p. 301)
([A] “So I must ask you again, Virgil, toward what goal had you striven with 
your poetry if it was not supposed to have been toward a cognition of life.*
[V] ‘The cognition of death.")
The word Erkenntnis (cognition) carries a particular value in Broch’s T.D.V. It
is a form o f knowledge that, while perceptible, remains hidden under the veil
o f language; it is also the only suitable substitute for the impossible das All.
Like truth and the real, the reader perceives Erkenntnis through the interplay
of textual representations; die Erkenntnis des Todes and die Erkenntnis des
Lebens occur within the reader’s field o f perception as two contrary sorts of
‘knowing’ that reflect into one another. Virgil is not speaking in mysteries
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when he declares that a knowledge o f life and a knowledge o f death operate 
in a process o f interchange; one illuminates the other. For the Virgil o f T.D.V. 
,die Erkenntnis des Todes, which either may or may not be found within the 
text, is that field from which emanate the echo of the reading subjects altered 
voice.
An examination of T.D.V. reveals that ‘death' in the Death o f Virgil is 
not so much a terminus as it is a reflecting field. Virgil searches (the verb 
lauschen is primarily used to convey the idea o f oscuitating death) his own 
Aeneid for evidence within it o f that same mirroring quality; that is to say, Virgil 
seeks evidence of the presence o f death within his written work. By the 
presence o f death within the work is meant the presence o f that quality which 
causes the reader’s own voice to echo back from the pages of the text and to 
do so in such a way that the reader is changed, we could say ‘renamed’, by 
the experience. That echoing voice is denoted on page 218 as Sprache 
innerhalb der Sprache (voice within the voice) and its discovery, the discovery 
of the “’second I’” (cf: pp. 200, 241), brings one to a confrontation with the 
‘unknown familiar* (das ungekannt Wiedererkannte p. 36). The encounter with 
the ‘unknown familiar’ indeed describes the function of the deed within the 
word;4 the ‘deed’ is the occurrence within memory (Wiedererkannte) of 
something previously unknown (ungekannt). This encounter with the 
‘unknown familiar’ is precisely the encounter with truth, the encounter with 
something that is ‘familiar’ and yet ‘unknown,’ the encounter with one’s own 
voice as it echoes back altered from the text. Truth comes in the guise o f the
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fam iliar presenting itself as irrevocable change. One could thus say o f the 
Aeneid, or o f any other work o f art, science, or fiction that, subsequent to its 
introduction, it alters the real in a permanent way. The truth o f the Aeneid, a 
fiction in the guise o f a history, can be measured to the degree that the reality 
o f Rome, Rome's inhabitants, and Western culture have been altered by its 
appearance. As a text, the Aeneid remains a bearer o f truth to the degree to 
which it continues to  speak to its reader, to the degree to which it continues to 
impinge upon the ‘real.’
That the presence o f the real within the text is dependent upon the 
concurrent presence and workings of the transforming power of death can be 
inferred from this observation made by Virgil to Augustus:
Nur im Gleichnis ist das Leben zu erfassen, nur im Gleichnis ist das 
Gleichnis auszudrQcken; endlos ist die Gleichniskette, und gleichnislos 
ist bloB der Tod, zu dem sie sich hinspannt, als ware er ihr letztes Glied, 
dennoch schon auBerhalb der Kette  (p. 336)
(Life is to be grasped only in the metaphor, only in the metaphor is ‘metaphor’ 
to be expressed; never ending is the chain of metaphor, and plainly death is 
bereft of the metaphor toward which it stretches, as though it were the (chain’s) 
last link, yet death lay already outside the chain )
Virgil describes death as being the last link therefore, since the chain is
elsewhere described as circular (p. 72), death is the first link in the chain of 
representation, the last link in a chain being likewise the chain’s first link. 
Thus, Virgil declares that only the representation that encompasses the 
presence of death can be a valid representation o f life. Just prior to this 
declaration of the necessary presence o f death in the valid representation of 
life, Virgil announces to Augustus:
“Oh, Augustus, das Oberirdische im Irdischen erkennen und Kraft 
solchen Erkennens es zu irdischer Gestalt bringen, als geformtes Werk,
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als geformtes Wort und eben auch als geformte Tat, dies ist das Wesen des 
echtes Sinnbildes '  (p. 334)
(‘Oh, Augustus, to recognize the divine (present) in the earthly and by virtue 
of such recognition to achieve earthly form for the divine, as formed work, 
as formed word and even also as formed deed, this is the essence of the true 
symbol ")
Genuine representation (Sinnbild) exists when one takes cognizance o f that 
which is beyond the concrete (Irdischen) and, by the force o f this cognition 
(Kraft solchen Erkennens), the divine (Uberirdischen) is rendered in visible, 
tangible form. This tangible form is the form o f the ‘work’, the form o f the 
‘word’, the form o f the ‘deed.’ Virgil makes clear the mark o f the ‘genuine 
representation’ (das echte Sinnbild): it is the text where the ‘deed’ is wrought 
into the lettered word of the text.
Togapurpur
In T.D.V., Virgil gradually awakens to the power o f the word to 
transform ‘truth into the real and the real into truth’ (Wirklichkeit zur Wahrheit 
umgestaltet, Wahrheit zur Wirklichkeit -th e  ‘real’ transformed to truth, the true 
to the ‘real’ p. 95); simultaneous to this awakening, Virgil becomes aware o f a 
profound malfunction in the 6pist6me of his time.5 The recognition of this 
malfunction is iterated in the middle of Book III, just as Augustus is about the 
enter the narrative scene. There the reader finds a variation on the verse 
sometimes applied as a brief introduction to the Aeneid:
Stille empfing den Geheiligten und femdrau&en, dort wo die Faune
getanzt batten, blies einer von ihnen weiter sein Lied, als wOrde es ihm 
nichts anhaben, dad die Genossen ihn verlassen batten; fireilich, seine 
Flote klang zerbrochen. (p. 284)
(Silence embraced the holy one and far in the distance, there where the
Fauns had danced, one of them still blew his song, as though it were nothing 
to him that his companions had abandoned him, truly his flute gave forth a 
broken sound.)
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The original verse emphasizes a harmony between nature and song as 
though they were one. To the contrary, the disharmony indicated by the 
verse taken from T.D.V. (seine FI6te klang zerbrochen) reminds the reader o f 
the perennial disjunction between art and nature. Notation o f the disjunction 
reminds the reader that the ‘real’ is not ‘natural’ and that art is something more 
than accuracy in representation. The T.D.V. takes measure o f the art o f the 
Aeneid in terms o f its potential to fix  what is profoundly broken with the world it 
purports to represent.
The novel places Augustus Caesar at the center of a world disharmony, 
a disharmony o f which he is neither the cause nor the solution. The reader’s 
first glimpse of what has been called ‘the flute’s broken clang’ (p. 284) comes 
early as swarms gather in adulation around Caesar as he enters Brindisi:
 da freilich war der Augenblick gekommen, den das dumpf brOtende
Massentier erwartet hatte, um sein Jubelgeheui ausstoBen zu kfinnen......
sich selbst anbetend in der Person des Einen. (p. 21)
( certainly the moment had arrived, the one the dumb brooding mass animal
had awaited in order to be able to belch out its jubilation-howl self adulating
in the Person of the One.)
By informing the reader o f an absence of ‘language’ (das dumpf brutende 
Massentier), the text indicates a corresponding absence o f the real. The 
formula ‘in adulation o f oneself (sich selbst anbetend) denotes a state of 
perception in which the concrete is mistaken for the real; Augustus becomes 
the idol o f a deluded people who attempt to capture in his image an unaltered 
representation of themselves. In this passage, Augustus and the people and 
Rome are perceived as an undifferentiated mass that is ‘the person o f the 
One’ (in der Person des Einen).6
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The ‘person of the One’ is an idol to the masses and a barrier to the 
discovery o f the ‘real’ in Roman social, cultural, and political life. Communal 
identity is the product of narrative fiction, a fiction that provides a context, the 
place o f the ‘real,’ into which the subject o f state might situate him/herself. As 
‘idol’, Augustus is unable to produce the context o f the ‘real’, instead he is 
reduced to an ahistorical figure, one that provides security and provisions, but 
not communal identity. Inevitably, it is the word that binds a people together, 
and as Augustus becomes cognizant o f this fact, he attempts by whatever 
available means to save the Aeneid from Virgil’s intent to destroy the work. 
Lesser characters, as in the three wastrel drunks from the mid-section o f Book 
II, though not immediately aware o f the power o f the word to create social, 
cultural and political cohesion, express themselves, nonetheless, in a 
language that has lost this re-creative power. In the citation below, they 
express themselves in a language grown sterile, having been reduced to little
more than code. One cries out (p. 107 - ff.): “Heil dem Augustus! heil ihm”
(Hail Augustus hail him”), and further along he gives the basis for this
praise: “Wein,” schrie er, “kriegst dein Wein, Dicker, Wein fu r alle, Wein aufs 
Wohl vom Casar!” (“Wine," he cried, “grab your wine, fa t one, wine for 
everyone, wine to toast Caesar with!"). Again, further along in the same
passage, he exclaims “Mehl vom Cesar, hast es selbst gehdrt Heil ihm!”
(“Flour from Caesar, you heard it yourself. hail him!") Caesar distributes
provisions o f wine and grain, and for this the Roman populace remains at 
least nominally beholden; he does not, however, have it within his power to 
provide the fictional context in which his subjects might discover and inhabit a
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common ‘real.’ The above passage defines what it means to be Roman in
terms of a relationship o f mutually requited exchange; the distribution o f grain
and wine wins Augustus a commensurate measure o f loyalty. The limited
terms of this relationship o f ‘exchange' affects the tenor o f public life in ways
made evident by the subsequent passage where, once again, the topic is the
form of public largess upon which loyalty to Caesar is based. Below are two
characters assessing the import of Caesar's ‘generosity':
“Jawohl, morgen wird’s ausgeteilt, morgen m iter's austeilen...kostdich 
gamix!", da rid ihr die Geduld: “Ein Dreck wird austeilt”, -sie kreischte
 “einen Dreck gibt der Casar her...ein Dreck is dein Cdsar, ein Dreck
ist er, der Casar; tanzen und singen und ficken und huren kann er, der 
Herr Casar, aber sonst kann er nix, und ein Dreck gibt er her!’’
—“Ficken...ficken ficken... (pp. 107 -08)
(“Yes, indeed, it’ll be doled out in the morning, in the morning he’ll see to it
that its distributed cost you not a damned thing!,” then her patience gave
way: “Garbage will be given out,’ -she shrieked ‘Caesar gives garbage... and
your Caesar is garbage, garbage he is, the Caesar; he can dance and sing and fuck 
and whore, the mighty Caesar, but besides that he can’t do a thing, and he hands 
out garbage!” — “Fuck fuck fuck )
By the estimation of the second character in this crude verbal parry, Caesar’s 
act of public assistance equates to little more than the likes o f a sterile 
copulative grunt. He ‘fucks...fucks...fucks’ [ficken...ficken...ficken), but has 
nothing more than the barren rhythm o f a bankrupt language to show for it. 
More directly than any other passage in T.D.V., this one accuses Augustus, 
the ‘father of Rome’, of ruling over a state without meaning, one in which 
social, political and cultural intercourse produces nothing new, in which 
nothing is altered by the general medium o f public exchange.
This description o f Augustus, shortly after he enters the narrative o f 
T.D.V. toward the middle of Book ill, emblematizes the arid and unfruitful
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nature of public life as it threatens to be, should Rome be denied the 
rejuvenating powers o f the Aeneid:
 [es] wurde zur erkannten Einheit, so dad Mittag und Abend zu einem
einzigen Licht-Sein hatten zusammenflie&en dOrfen, allein nun war 
nichts mehr hievon vorhanden, und sogar die in der unendlichen Ober- 
Feme ruhenden NachthQgelketten hatten sich zur leerheit
aufgelOst. stumpfer und stumpfer wurden da die Farben der Blumen,
schwarzviolett wurde des Cdsars Togapurpur in diesem Lichte, das
trocken war wie angesengtes Papier, aufierst unverwoben war dies alles,
geradezu zusammenhanglos und bar jeglicher Gegensicht, unverwoben
infolge der strengen Einseitigkeit, die von der schmalen Gestalt dort am
Fenster ausging, unverwoben vor Strenge, vor Harte, vor Scharfe,
unwirklich schier trotz ihrer sehr handgreifiichen Oberflachenwirkung,
und auch das Menschliche, ach, selbst die menschliche Beziehung schien
dieser Einseitigkeit einer geheimnisvoll freischwebenden, nichts
-Qberdeckenden Oberflache verfallen  (pp. 297 -98)
( it became a perceived unity, so that mid-day and evening had been
able to flow together into a single light-being, only none of this was any 
longer at hand, and even that peaceful chain of night-mountains off in the
remoteness of the never ending distance had dissolved into emptiness......
...there the color of the flowers became more and more faded, Caesar’s 
toga-purple became a black-violet color, utterly unraveled was all this, 
altogether disjointed and without any counter perspective, unraveled 
following the strict one-sidedness that emanated from that small figure 
(Caesar) there at the window, unraveled because of the severity, the 
harshness, the sharpness, sheerty unreal despite the very palpable yet 
superficial efficacy, and even the humanity, alas, even the ties of human 
relationships seemed to have fallen subject to the one-sidedness of a 
secretive, free-floating superficiality that covered nothing at all )
This description, which has midday and evening melding into ‘one light-one 
being’ (zu einem einzigen Licht-Sein), carries overtones o f the turning o f an 
age. Likewise, the infinite expanse o f ‘evening-hills’ (NachthQgelketten) 
dissolving into ‘emptiness’ (Leerheit) signals to the reader that an historically 
critical moment is at hand. The description o f Augustus’ toga gives a clue as 
to the ways in which the suspense o f the moment might ultimately resolve. 
‘Inked’ with the color o f evening (schwarzvioletf), the toga is simultaneously 
‘as dry as singed paper1 (das trocken war wie angesen0es Papier). Next, the 
passage declares that all of this was ‘unraveling to the utmost1 (SuRerst 
unverwoben war dies alles). What was unraveling? These several things: 1)
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Augustus’ attempt to preserve the manuscript o f the Aeneid; 2) the political 
and social cohesion o f the Roman state; and 3) by dint of proximity, the very 
fabric o f the toga worn by Augustus in this scene.
The toga, whether the toga virilis, toga picta, or toga Candida, is an 
emblem of status, and the ‘purple’ toga is the emblem of supreme authority in 
Rome. Hence, the purple toga unraveling signals the dissipation of Augustus’ 
authority over Rome. The above passage complicates the image o f the 
dissolution o f Augustus’ authority by indicating decline by means of a ‘sign’ 
that is textual. The outward sign of Augustus’ power, and the loss thereof, is 
rendered ‘substantive’ by identification with Caesar’s toga, which is said to be 
‘as dry as singed paper.’ Like the light of this scene, which is a meld o f 
‘midday and evening,’ Augustus’ toga is at once dry-singed and ink-soaked 
(schwarzviolette). The issue of whether Augustus’ authority is either shriveling 
or rejuvenescent hinges on what becomes o f the Aeneid, on whether it is 
burned in accordance with Virgil’s wishes or published as both a ‘history’ o f 
Rome and a directive for Rome’s future, as Augustus so desperately would 
prefer. The purple that signs Augustus’ toga with authority is the same black- 
violet substance with which the Aeneid is inked.
In the dialogue that issues from this encounter Augustus and Virgil 
come to agree that Rome itself is a fiction. Virgil at one point spells out to 
Augustus that it is ‘his’ state from which is formed a representation o f the 
Roman spirit:
“Dein Werk, Augustus gewitj, ja, es ist Gleichnis..... es ist dein
Staat er ist Sinnbiid des rOmischen Geistes ” (p. 308)
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(“Your work, Augustus certainly, yes, it is a metaphor.......it is your
state it is a symbolic representation of the roman spirit ”)
By praising the newly established order o f the Roman state as the true 
representation o f the Roman spirit, Virgil moves in the direction o f overtly 
recognizing that the ‘real’ resides in fiction. In discussion with Augustus 
concerning the merit o f the Aeneid, Virgil had previously disparaged the 
Aeneid as sheer illusion compared with the ‘real’ and tangible Rome of 
Augustus’ own making; now Rome itself is conceded by Virgil to be an order 
of fictional representation (Gleichnis).
If Virgil continues to find Augustus’ work, the Roman state, an effective 
and admirable fiction, what is it that continues to separate the fiction ’ o f state 
from the fiction o f the text? In fact, Virgil is moving toward the collapse o f one 
into the other, toward a recognition that the ‘real,’ whether of state or o f text, is 
based in an elaboration of the word into fiction. Virgil transcends the barrier 
between political and textual fiction with this observation:
Dort im raumlosen Raum des Wortes erhob sich die Stadt, und sie war 
selber nichts als ein Wortgebilde  (p. 323)
(There in the ‘realmless’ realm of the word the city arose and it (the city) 
was itself nothing other than a word-image )
Though the ‘city1 referred to in this passage is the quasi-fictional Athens which 
comes down to Virgil through the writing of Plato, it is nonetheless a ‘real’ city 
that continues to exist both as a geographical location and as a place in the 
fictional setting of the Platonic dialogues. Yet even here, Virgil disparages the 
Athens of Plato’s Republic, constructed out of the context o f fiction and which 
is ‘nothing but’ a representation in words (nichts als ein Wortgebilde).
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Given that city (of Rome) and the text (of the Aeneid) are two types o f 
fiction each of which represents the body politic (des r&mischen Geistes) 
Augustus discovers that which connects them to a common ‘reality.’ Virgil first 
addresses Augustus in the passage below:
‘Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast,
Casar.”
“Rom ist die Tat der Ahnen, und die Wirklichkeit, die sie setzten, reicht
weit uber das bioB Sinnbiidhafte hinaus.” (p. 333)
(“Rome is the metaphor, Rome is the symbol that you have created, Caesar.*
“Rome is the deed of the forebears, and the ‘real’ that they have put into 
place; it exceeds by a wide margin the simply symbolic.......*)
Virgil remarks that Rome is ‘representation’ (Gleichnis), a symbol created by 
Augustus. Augustus responds by saying that ‘Rome is the deed o f the 
forebears (die Tat der Ahnen);’ not his own creation ‘made present through 
representation.’ ‘The deed of the forebears,' Augustus continues, ‘puts into 
place a reality (die Wirklichkeit die sie setzen) that exceeds all form of 
representation.’ 7 The paradox inherent to Augustus’ argument that the ‘reality 
of the forebears’ exceeds any form of symbolic representation lies in the fact 
that the ‘representation’ to which he here refers is that o f the physical state of 
Rome. The tangible works o f Caesar Augustus and the physical state of 
Rome are referred to as symbolic representations (das bloR Sinnbiidhafte), 
whereas the ‘real’ set in place by Rome’s forebears is something inherent to 
Virgil’s fiction. The ‘deeds’ o f the forebears are present in the fiction o f Virgil's 
Aeneid; the ‘reality1 ‘set into place’ by these same ‘deeds’ are an inscrutable 
element o f that same fiction. The fiction o f the Aeneid continues to make
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present, valid and true the deeds o f the forebears from which Rome's reality 
derives.
The deeds o f the forebears can be made ‘present,’ can continue to 
‘validate’ the reality o f Rome, precisely because it is a fiction. These deeds 
are deeds of Virgil’s own creation, a fact to which Augustus implicitly attests 
when he states:
“Rom ist die Erkenntnis des Ahnherm gewesen. Rom war die Erkenntnis
des Aneas, und niemand wieS dies besser als du, Vergil.’ (p. 338)
(“Rome has been the cognition of the forebears; Rome was the cognition 
of Aeneas, and no-one knows this better than you, Virgil”.)
No one knows better than Virgil that ‘Rome is the mental construct o f Aeneas 
precisely because Aeneas is the fictional creation of Virgil. The Aeneid, then, 
is not so much a written account o f things done in the past as it is a rendering 
present o f deeds drawn from ‘historical’ memory. Rome is bom of a fiction, as 
Virgil more or less recognizes in this portion o f the exchange with Augustus:
lm Gleichnis der Erkenntnis ist Rom gegrondet worden; es tragt die
Wahrheit in sich, es entfaitet sich zur Wirklichkeit mehr und
mehr allein im Wachsen und Werden ist die Wirklichkeit’ (p. 338)
(Rome has been founded in the representation (Gleichnis) of the cognition: 
this representation of the cognition bears truth within it it unfolds into 
the ‘real* more and more the ‘real’ is only increase and becoming )
Rome has been founded on the representation o f an imaginary concept (Im  
Gleichnis der Erkenntnis), the creator o f which is none other than Virgil. 
Virgil’s second voice (das zweite Ich) is the Urahn who alone makes possible 
the creation of the Roman state to which Augustus aspires. Virgil’s 
conception, woven into the cloth o f the Aeneid, is the source o f the ‘real’ 
sought by Augustus.
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The Aeneid, which through the fictionalized ‘deeds o f the forebears’ 
shares with the Roman state a common reality, becomes not the portrait o f a 
people, but a mirror into which Rome is reflected and sees itself reflected:
Der Staat in seiner Doppelwirklichkeit hat nicht nur die GOtter zu
versinnbildlichen, es genOgt nicht, daft er zu der GOtter Verherrlichung
sich die Akropoiis baut, er hat nicht minder dem Voike, das seine zweite
WirklichkeitshOlfte ist das Sinnbild zu setzen, das starke Sinnbild, wie
es das Volk sehen will und begreift, das starke Bild, in dem es sich
selber wiedererkennt das Bild seiner Eigenmacht, unter die es sich
beugen will und beugen darf, ahnend, daB Macht im Irdischen, wie es das
Beispie! des Antonius zeigt stets dem Verbrecherischen zuneigt und daB
bloS ein MachttrSger, der zugleich Sinnbild der ewigwahrenden
Wirklichkeit ist solche Gefahr ausschlieBt (p. 350)
The state in its double-reality has not only the gods to represent symbolically, 
it is not enough that he (Pericles) built the Acropolis in order to honor 
the gods, he had no-less to place into the symbolic representation the people 
who constitute the other half of the ‘real’, a powerful symbol that the people 
will see and understand, a powerful symbol in which the people see them­
selves mirrored, an image of their own power to which they may and will bow, 
sensing that earthly power forever inclines toward the criminal as in the 
example of Antonius, and that only the bearer of might who is at one and the 
same time a symbol of the everlasting ‘real* excludes such a danger.)
The T.D.V. here splits the ‘double-reality’ o f state into the divine and the 
human. The medium of this ‘double-reality’ is neither textual, as in the 
Aeneid, nor is it some purely abstract notion of state; rather, it is a reality 
expressed in architectural form. The sublime style and design of the Acropolis 
reflect back to the citizens o f Athens something about themselves which, 
again, falls into the category of the ‘unknown fam iliar.’ The divine is not so 
alien to the viewer of this state architecture that he or she is unable to 
recognize some aspect of his or her own subjectivity reflected back. W hat one 
sees is the image o f oneself seeing. ‘The human’ and ‘the divine,’ those two 
positions at the extremes of the axis upon which subjectivity is produced, are, 
respectively, self and self as other, Roman subjects and their progenitors the 
Urahnen. The median plane defined as the locus where the human and the
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divine ‘gazes’ meet constitutes the ‘real’ imbedded in the text o f the Aeneid. 
The reader is reminded of the already cited passage taken from page 21 o f
T.D.V. which describes the ‘dumb brooding beast self adulating in the
Person o f the One;’ with the publication and promulgation o f the Aeneid, 
Rome would gaze not into self, not into Caesar as idol, but into Caesar as the 
continuing presence of the forebears.
The passage from page 350 suddenly brings into view the example of 
Antonius, and the reader’s line of vision is caused to shift from architecture to 
language, from the form of the stone mass to the subtle shape of the letter. 
Unlike the immediacy of the visually present forms of the Acropolis, Antonius 
can only be present as memory, can only signify within the context of an 
articulated past. Antonius is then both a reminder and a warning to Augustus, 
the speaker of this passage, of what he might become without the benefit o f 
the Aeneid. The Aeneid contextuaiizes Augustus within a fictional ‘historical’ 
past, and places him into the ‘unending line of fathers’ (die unendliche Reihe 
der Vater p. 178) o f which, ironically, he is the first. This Antonius, the ‘bearer 
of naked might1 (der bloR ein Machtrager ist), again recalls for the reader the 
image of Augustus where it is said that the people see themselves reflected 
and adulate themselves through the medium of Augustus’ own image (das
dumpf brutende Massentier sich selbst anbetend in der Person des
Einen -the dumb brooding mass animal self adulating in the Person of the
One). The weakness and danger o f the idol, o f the reflection of oneself as 
one wishes to see oneself, as opposed to the reflection of oneself as other, as
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the ‘unknown fam iliar,’ is that it is non-critical representation. This passage 
states explicitly that Antonius, like the figure o f Augustus taken from page 21, 
is the mere example o f the populace o f Rome gazing into a representation o f 
self that is delusional: das starke Sinnbild, wie es das Volk sehen will and 
begreift, das starke Bild, in dem es sich selber wiedererkennt, das Bild seiner 
Eigenmacht, unter die es sich beugen w ill and beugen darf, ahnend, daQ> 
Macht im Irdischen, wie es das Beispiel des Antonius zeigt, stets dem
Verbrecherische zuneigt (a powerful symbol that the people will see and
understand, a powerful symbol in which the people see themselves mirrored, 
an image of their own power to which they may and will bow, sensing that 
earthly power forever inclines toward the criminal as in the example o f 
Antonius). Augustus longs for a power and an authority that is placed not in 
his person, but in fiction of the unending line o f fathers, the stabilizing power 
and authority immanent to the structure o f fiction.
Dein Werk ist Rom
In the opening pages of the novel, Virgil imagines himself to be 
Anchises, carried along upon the shoulders o f one designated as the  son’:
 und es warTroja, das um ihn brannte, es warder niemals verioschende
Weltenbrand, doch er, der Qber den BrSnden schwebte, er war Anchises, 
blind und sehend in einem. Kind und Greis Gleichzeitig kraft unsaglicher 
Erinnerung, getragen von den Schultem des Sohnes  (p. 50)
(......and it was Troy burning around him, it was the never extinguishing world
conflagration, yet he who floated above the flames, he was Anchises, blind and 
seeing in one, simultaneously child and grizzled old man thanks to the 
unutterable recollection, borne on the shoulders of his son )
Although the reader might expect Virgil to opt for a clear identification with
Aeneas, the exemplary hero and model Roman, we instead find here a
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somewhat more complex identification. This figure borne over the flames o f a 
burning Troy is at once child and ancient, father and son, Aeneas and 
Anchises, by the grace o f the uncanny power o f Virgil’s memory. This self­
designation as both father and son places Virgil in the perversely incestuous 
position o f naming oneself, of begetting oneself o f oneself - Anchises begets 
Aeneas who begets Anchises. As creator o f the Aeneid Virgil is, after all, as 
much the Urahn o f Anchises as Anchises is the Urahn o f Virgil. In a later 
passage, the imaginary figure o f a slave issues this warning to Virgil: “W er
selber den Namen sich wShlet, der lehnt gegen das Schicksal sich auf. ”
(p. 250). This act o f self-naming is described as ‘leaning-against-fate’. In the 
case o f the individual, it is certainly a re-writing o f oneself, and in the case of 
the Aeneid, for which Lysanias, the imaginary boy-companion, calls Vergil the  
father who gives all things their names' (p. 179), it is a re-writing o f the ‘real’ 
for the Roman world.
T.D.V. does not suggest that Virgil has created his epic out o f a will to 
restructure an already functional reality; rather, it makes clear that Virgil, only 
with great reluctance and apprehension, attempts to reconfigure a reality that 
has fallen into chaos and lacks significance. (In this way, Virgil's dilemma 
mirrors Broch’s own, since he began writing T.D.V. in the political and social 
chaos o f mid-twentieth century Europe). Virgil’s project of reconfiguring the 
real begins with the personal recognition that his own ‘I,’ like the toga of 
Augustus (cf.: p. 297), is brittle, shrunken and impoverished. In one o f the 
several ‘elegies’ to be included in T.D.V., Virgil makes note of this recognized
diminution o f ‘se lf:
erkenntnisverlustig und verloren in Erkenntnislosigkeit
das emQchterte Ich,
seine Armut—, (p. 118)
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(destitute of cognition and lost in a cognitionless state 
the sobered '1/ 
its poverty—,)
Consistent with the precept that the ‘real’ is a construct o f language is the 
notion that any alteration in the ‘real’ would have its most profound 
reverberations in the individual subject, which is the sole articulator o f 
language. This sense o f the diminishing T is given in the example o f the three 
wastrels (cf.: pp. 107 - 108), whose language o f expression is impoverished to 
the point of hardly existing as language, borders on code, and whose crude 
utterance Virgil characterizes as a disintegration o f the social bond:
 es war die Furchtbarkeit des Sachlichen, das sich nicht mehr an
den Menschen wendet, weder an ihn, der es hier am Fenster gesehen
und vemommen hatte, noch sonst an irgendeinen Menschen, gleichsam
eine Sprache, die nicht mehr BrOcke zwischen Menschen ist  (p. 109)
( it was the fearsome of mater-of-factness that no longer concerned
itself with the human, neither with him here at the window who looked on 
and comprehended, did not concern itself with any man like a language 
that is no longer a bridge between men )
The Aeneid is to become a new matrix o f language in which the already 
existent ties that bind one subjectivity to another would be re-set; it would 
become the medium through which to realign the set of social, political and 
cultural relations from which the ‘real’ is defined.
For Augustus who stands in relation to Virgil as son to father —through 
the Aeneid Virgil effectively ‘names’ Augustus into the unendliche Reihe der 
Vater (p. 179)— and o f father to son —Virgil remains the state’s, hence, 
Augustus’ most glorious ‘client’ -th e  inter-dependence of their two projects of 
text and state remain inextricable. Augustus spells out the mutuality of their 
interests clearly and simply:
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 wohibegrQndet in meiner Leistung, in der Wirklichkeit Roms und
seines Geistes, ohne die niemals die Aneis hatte entstehen kOnnen, das
ist zu viel fQr dich  (p. 367)
( well founded in my works, in the reality of Rome and of her spirit
without which the Aeneid would never have come into existence, that is 
too much for you.......)
Augustus in his accusation is certainly right in the implication that his own 
works provide the basis upon which Virgil constructs his epic; he is 
misleading, however, in suggesting that the reality and the spirit (Geist) of 
Rome emanate from the works o f his own hands and not from that o f Virgirs 
text; clearly, the deed springs from the word and not, as Augustus would have 
it, vice versa. Augustus says as much, contradicting the statement from page 
367 in an earlier passage. Here, to the contrary, Virgil would willingly concede 
that Rome is the work of Augustus:
‘Rom ist das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast 
Cdsar."
‘Rom ist die Tat der Ahnen, und die Wirklichkeit die sie setzten, reicht 
weit Qber das blofi Sinnbiidhafte hinaus.”
“Und Rom ist auch wiederdeine Tat, Augustus, die rdmische Ordnung 
im rOmischen Staat" (p. 333)
(“Rome is that metaphor, Rome is that Symbol that you have created, Ceasar.'
“Rome is the deed of the forebears and the reality that they put into place 
reaches far beyond symbolic representation.”
“And Rome is also your deed, Augustus, the Roman order in the Roman state.’)
It is a peculiarly remarkable exchange, one in which Augustus and Virgil both 
insist that the other is the father o f Rome.8 Virgil attributes representation 
(Gleichnis) and symbol (Sinnbild) to Augustus, further stating that the order o f 
the Roman state is Augustus’ own ’deed’ (Tat). To the contrary, it is the case, 
as Augustus clearly states it, that Rome is the ‘deed’ of the forebears (Ahnen)
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and Rome’s reality is a reality ‘set by their deeds’ (die Wirklichkeit, die sie
setzten ). The Aeneid does not record, rather it creates, the deeds o f the
forebears; and within the context o f its language, those deeds, the deeds
emanating from Virgil’s imagination, set the reality and the spirit o f Rome as it
exists under Augustus. The ‘Roman order in the Roman state’ which
Augustus brings into existence has as its source the ‘deeds o f its forebears,’
deeds which spring into existence by means o f Virgil’s stylus.
Virgil’s imaginary companion Lysanias lays out with the greatest
succinctness the paradox of Virgil’s position, the fact o f being at once father
and son, the creator of a reality which in turn creates its creator
“Du sahest den Anfang, Vergil, bist selber noch nicht der Anfang, du
hOrtest die Stimme, Vergil, bist selber noch nicht die Stimme, du ftihltest
das Schdpfungsherz pochen, bist selber noch nicht das Herz, du bist
der ewige FOhrer, der selber das Ziel nicht erreicht; unsterblich wirst du
sein, unsterblich als FOhrer, noch nicht und doch schon, dein Los an
jeder Wende der Zeit. " (p. 253)
(“You saw the beginning, Virgil, you yourself are not yet the beginning, 
you heard the voice, Virgil, you yourself are not yet the voice, you felt 
creation’s heart beating, you yourself are not yet the heart, you are the 
eternal guide who never himself reaches the goal; immortal will you be, 
immortal as guide, not yet and already at hand, your lot is at the turn 
of every time.')
This somewhat cryptic message is T.D.V.’s fullest exposition, however 
oblique, o f the meaning of the often-cited phrase noch nicht und doch schon 
(not yet and yet already past). It proclaims the impossibility o f situating the 
subject in an absolute present; it is that unspeakable memory (die unsSgliche 
Erinnerung, cf.: p. 50) which constructs the subject in the interstices between 
child and father (Kind und Greis, p. 50), creator and created (das Erzeugte 
und das Erzeugende, cf.; p. 135), divine and human.9 Elsewhere in T.D.V.,
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Virgil decries as ‘anti-art (die Unkunsf) that which attempts to substitute the 
thing created for the process o f creation:
 die [Unkunst] das Erzeugte an die Stelle des Erzeugenden setzt, das
Spiel an die Stelle der Gemeinschaft, das Erstarrte and die Stelle der
lebendig fortwirkenden Schdpfung, das SchOne an die Stelle der
Erkenntnis  (p. 135)
( denatured art places the created in the place of creating, places the game
in lieu of the society, places the lifeless in the place of living, onward forging 
creation, places beauty in place of cognition )
In terms o f art, this argues against favoring effect over process, the beauty of 
the finished object over engagement on the part o f the viewer/reader leading 
to the discovery o f otherwise intangible truths.
In the above paragraph, two phrases are brought together that 
explicate the meaning of one another, noch nicht und doch schon and das 
Erzeugte an die Stelle des Erzeugenden. The former speaks to the 
impossibility of an absolute present, the latter to the (false) illusion of 
mistaking the concrete for the ‘real.’ To paraphrase the passage taken from 
p. 253, Virgil sees the beginning but is not the beginning, he hears the voice 
but is not the voice; Virgil is at once creator (as author o f the Aeneid) and 
progeny (as citizen of Rome) of Anchises (compare once again the passage 
from p. 50); he is at once ‘name-giver’ and ‘named’ (cf.: p. 59 - 60). As 
author, the phrase noch nicht und doch schon comes to describe Virgil’s place 
in existence, a place of everlasting process and never-ending incompletion. In 
naming all things —Du, mein Vater, du weiRt sie alle, du gabst den Dingen ihre
Namen  (p. 179)— Virgil loses his own name, succumbs to the
phenomenon of Ich-Vertu&t, relinquishes his own ‘present’ for a place 
somewhere between past and future, and becomes a figment o f his own
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prodigious power of imagination, a figment of his own fiction, a figment of 
memory of ‘die unsdgliche Ennnerung.’
As the novel moves toward resolution -resolution o f the conflict 
between Augustus and Virgil as to whether the Aeneid is to perish or remain 
following Virgil’s death, and resolution o f the concurrent conflict as to the 
‘origin in fiction’ o f state authority— VirgiTs position and that o f Augustus move 
toward a state o f uneasy accommodation. Speaking to Virgil, Augustus 
proclaims:
“Rom ist die Erkenntnis des Ahnherm gewesen; Rom war die Erkenntnis 
des Aneas  (P- 338)
(“Rome has been the cognition of the forebears; Rome was the cognition 
of Aeneas )
To which Virgil responds:
“Die Ahnen haben den Keim der Erkenntnis gelegt, da sie die rdmische 
Ordnung schufen......." (p. 338)
(“The Forebears have laid the kernel of cognition thereby creating the Roman 
order )
The deeds of the forebears of Rome have created the Roman order, have 
determined the ‘real’ for the Roman state. The reader has only to turn back a 
handful of pages, reading ‘forward’ toward the beginning of the text of T.D.V., 
to find Virgil effectively situating the ‘deeds’ of the forebears within the text of 
the Aeneid. Virgil observes to Augustus the following regarding the nature of 
writing:
“Oh Augustus, das Oberirdische im Irdischen erkennen und kraft
solchen Erkennens es zu irdischer Gestalt bringen, als geformtes
Werk, als geformtes Wort und eben auch als geformte Tat dies ist
das Wesen des echten Sinnbildes; innen und auBen pragt es sein
Urbild aus  (p. 334)
(“Oh, Augustus, to recognize the divine (present) in the earthly and by virtue 
of such recognition to achieve earthly form for the divine, as formed work,
280
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as formed word and even also as formed deed, this is the essence of the true 
symbol, inward and outward it forms its original image *)
Das Qberirdische im irdischen is simply the ‘deed o f the forebears’ woven into
a cloth o f fiction; what is designated as divine is simply the ongoing efficacy o f
the deed within the word. True representation (das echte Sinnbild) is power o f
the word within the work o f fiction to continue the exchange between the true
and the real as it is expressed on page 95 o f T.D.V. This translation o f the
truth into the real is the deed o f the Urahn; it is the inherent power o f fiction to
speak back to the reader in altered voice o f the ‘second I.’
Though at one point in his disputation with Augustus Virgil insists that
the writing o f the Aeneid was firstly a personal effort - ic h  darf behaupten, daB
ich es nicht nur fur den Leser, sonder zuerst fur mich geschrieben habe —(I
allow myself to maintain that I did not write for the reader, but I wrote firstly for
myself  p. 292)— the public implications of this work would always
ultimately come to bear. Virgil more than hints at the inevitable public import:
 dumpf fOhlt das Volk, da& eine neue Wahrheit sich vorbereitet, dumpf
fQhlt das Volk, daQ die alten Formen bald sich erweitem werden  (p. 362)
( the populace vaguely senses that a new truth is being prepared, the
sense vaguely that the old forms will soon be extended )
Virgil writes to reconstruct firstly for himself a ‘real’ to replace that which had 
been lost with the collapse of political, social and cultural order; but it is a 
given that the ‘real’ acquires validity only insofar as it is a shared ‘real’. 
Explaining to Augustus what that ‘real’ entails, Virgil does not miss the point 
that it entails a realignment o f the order o f the Roman state:
“Denn das Reich der Erkenntnis, zu dem dein Staat erbiuhen wird, das 
Reich der wahren Wirklichkeit, wird nicht ein Reich der Volksmassen 
sein, ja, nicht einmal ein Reich der VOIker, sondem ein Reich der 
Menschengemeinschaft, getragen vom Menschen, der sich im Wissen
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befindet, getragen von der menschlichen Einzelseele, von ihrer WOrde
und von ihrer Freiheit, getragen von ihrer gOttlichen Ebenbild-
haftigkeit" (p. 345)
(“For the realm of cognition into which your state will bloom, that is the realm 
of the true ‘real’, it will not be the realm of the folk masses, yes. not ever the 
realm of the folk but a realm of human community, community supported by 
people who are knowing, supported by the unified soul of the people, from 
their honor and from their freedom, borne from their divine likeness.")
The distinction Virgil makes between die Voiksmassen and die 
Menschengemein-schaft is not one that differentiates between qualities innate 
to one group or the other; rather, Voiksmassen and Menschengemeinschaft 
refer to a distinction in terms o f the relation o f subject to state. Die 
Voiksmassen have already been presented (page 21) as the “dumb, bellowing 
‘mass-animal’ " that ‘self-adulates’ in the ‘Person o f the One,’ ‘the One’ being 
Caesar Augustus as idol. Die Menschengemeinschaft, by contradistinction, is 
a relation to state in which the subject comes not en masse, but as a 
particular member o f a larger group (Menschengemeinschaft), and for whom 
the edifice of state offers not a prescriptive representation o f subject, but an 
occasion fo r encounter with the ‘unknown familiar.’ The passage states that 
the subject o f the Massengemeinschaft discovers that the state (der Reich) is, 
in fact, an ‘internal realm’ in which knowledge o f one’s own subjectivity is not 
prescribed but discovered. Since human subjectivity does not lend itself to 
deixis -except for a symbolic presence through the mediation of the name, 
there is no absolute presentation of ‘se lf — the subject experiences at most an 
illusion of self through an encounter with the ‘real’ language, in fiction.
The subject o f state, like the subject of fiction, is a construct o f 
language, and the construct is a set o f relations established between a
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fictional past (das Kind) and an imagined future (der Greis). The position of 
the subject is well described by the phrase that is often cited as this novel’s 
statement on the relation between the author (Virgil/Broch) and his work: noch 
nicht und doch schon (p. 253). The implied ‘non-presence o f being,’ the 
asymptotic deferral of subjective presence, applies not only to the author of 
the Aeneid and, likewise, the author o f T.D.V.., but to the subjects that are to 
be subsequently constructed by that text.
A t the very finish o f that contest between Augustus and Virgil that 
determines the continuing existence o f the Aeneid, it is stated that the text is, 
in actuality (eigentlich), a coffin:
 nachgeschickt dem Manuskriptkoffer, der da zur TGre hingetragen
wurde und eigentlich ein Sarg war, ein Kindersarg, ein Lebenssarg. (p. 376)
( sent after the carrying case for the manuscript that was taken there
by the door and was, in fact, a coffin, a child’s coffin, a life coffin.)
In what sense, indeed, is the manuscript holder a sarcophagus, a child’s 
sarcophagus and for whom? The text o f the Aeneid ‘renames’ the subject, 
destroys the old and replaces with the new. In doing so, the subject is 
constructed as part of a fictional relation, a ‘non-presence’ of being that is 
situated somewhere along the axis that runs from the point of the fictional 
‘forebear’s deed’ and the realm of the ‘unknown familiar’ which is the realm of 
death. Firstly, the kindersarg/Lebensarg is Virgil’s in the sense that this is his
death —Ich bin allein niemand is t fu r mich gestorben” (I am alone no
one has died for me; p. 188)— but it is also a death that he succeeds in 
making present in fiction. In a letter written to Aldoux Huxley, Broch says of 
his own encounter with death from which the fiction of T.D.V. stems:
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 Der Vergil ist aus Zufallsanfdngen gewachsen; ich bin damit in eine
Zeit echter Todesbedrohung (durch die Nazi) geraten, und ich habe ihn 
daher ausschlieBlich fOr mich —teilweise sogar im Gefangnis— 
gewissermassen als private Todesvorbereitung, sicherlich also nicht fOr 
Publikationszwecke geschrieben. Es war ein Versuch, mich imaginativ 
mdglichst an das Todesertebnis heranzutreiben, und da dies in auBerster 
psychischer Konzentration vor sich ging, hatte ich das von Ihr diktierte 
Material, einschlie&lich der Form und demnach auch der des langen
Satzes zu akzeptieren Fur mich galtes, mein Material, mein
Erkenntnismaterial dem Leser zu Qbermitteln. Ich muBte den Leser 
nachleben lassen, wie man sich der Erkenntnis des Todes durch 
Zerknirschung und Selbstausldschung annShert (mag man sie auch als 
noch Lebender niemals erreichen). Mit bloB rationalen Mitteilungen ist 
dies nicht zu bewerkstelligen, vielmehr muBte der Leser dazu gebracht 
werden, genau so den gleichen ProzeB, den ich durchgemacht habe, nun 
seinerseits genau so durchzugehen.
(.......The Vrgil grew out of an accidental occurrence. I had fallen upon a time
where I was genuinely threatened by the menace of death (from the Nazis) and, 
under the circumstances, I had written the T.D.V. for myself exclusively —in 
part no less, while in prison— and to a certain extent had written it as 
a personal preparation for death; certainly I had not written it for the purpose 
of publication. It was an attempt to propel myself through the agency of my 
imagination as close to the death experience as possible and because this 
effort took place only with the greatest mental concentration I had to accept 
the form and even the lengthy sentences that the material for this story dictated
under the given circumstances  For me it was critical that I should convey
my material, my cognition-material to the reader (in the same form that 
circumstances had dictated). I had to allow the reader to live through the way 
in which one approaches this experience of death, namely, through contrition and 
the dissolution of self (may no living person ever arrive in such circumstances as 
these). This (approach to death) could not be brought about through a merely 
rational medium, rather the reader must be brought to the experience through 
exactly the same process that I myself had worked through; the reader would 
have to work through precisely the same process only on his or her own terms.
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CONCLUSION
In both the Roland and in the T.D.V., the reader finds that death is the 
dark generator of writing. The example in the Roland is seemingly patent: 
Roland urges his men to ‘strike hardy blows/that no one would know to sing 
bad songs about us!’ (II. 1013 - 14); and at line 2338 Roland is shown using 
Durendal to ‘strike at a dark stone.’ In each instance, whether upon the 
bodies o f the Saracens and the Franks or upon the surface o f the dark stone, 
the battle at Roncevaux is monumentalized in an initial blood writing.1 The 
writing in blood is then translated into a writing in black ink putatively by St. 
Giles, the sole remaining witness to the scene o f death at Roncevaux. 
Roland’s perfectly preserved body, without a single broken bone or a cut to 
mar the integrity of his outer mortal remains, serves as a vessel from which 
flows the dark ink o f narrative (cf.: II. 1763 and 1785); one can almost imagine 
St. Giles dipping his stylus into the blood-filled mouth, as into a well o f ink.
If in the Roland narrative flows out of death, narrative in the T.D.V. 
flows into death. Firstly, there are the already recounted circumstances o f its 
genesis; Broch in prison in A lt Aussee using the T.D.V. as a vehicle for writing 
his way into death. Truly remarkable is the fact that Broch continues to
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pursue an ever elusive death as the source o f validation for his work. His 
correspondence is filled with promise o f soon attaining death, the impossible 
goal; and o f course he never does. The relevant passage in the T.D. V. is that 
in which Virgil crops the hair to prepare for immolation (p. 268); death will be 
choreographed into a sacred event that will bring validity to his writing. The 
validity Broch/Virgil seeks is one premised upon the desire to construct the 
subject. The narrative following the death o f Roland and the Franks is one 
that largely constructs the subjectivity o f the post-Roncevaux French as in the 
example o f Tienry.2 The narrative o f the Aeneid, as a text within the text o f the 
T.D.V., is ‘untried’ in the sense that no construction o f any particular subject 
had yet been determined. Until the Aeneid has been put to the public, its only 
subject is Virgil himself.
A t least one can substantiate this view in reference to specific 
passages within the text, namely, at line 89: The fate o f Aeneas is his own
fate, incomplete’ ( ' das Schicksal der Aneis, sein eigenes Schicksal,
unvollendef); and at line 139: T h is  was the goal o f the journey, the now
visible goal of the fall, namelessness itse lf ( ‘ dies war das Ziel der Fahrt,
das nun sichtbare Ziel des Absturzes, das Namenlose selber). The writing o f 
the text remains intensely personal; the subjectivity reflecting back to its 
author is its ‘author1 (as other), creator and created are one; the narcissistic 
impulse is to integrate with the text completely, to fall into the text as one falls 
into death. Recalling that as Aeneas’ fate and Virgil’s fate are one and 
incomplete, likewise, Virgil’s fate and Broch’s fate are also one and moving 
toward a goal at which they will not arrive. Broch observes in a letter to
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Huxley dated May 10, 1945: ‘I wrote it (i.e., T.D.V.) exclusively for
myself to a certain degree as a private preparation for death, certainly it
was not written for the purpose o f publication' ( ‘ ich habe ihn (T.D.V.)
daher ausschlie&lich fur mich gewisserma&en als private
Todesvorbereitung, sicheriich also nicht fu r Publicationszwecke geschrieberi). 
Broch, in fact, is reluctant to surrender the manuscript, and he delays and 
delays its release. Just as rumor from antiquity onward has it about Virgil, so, 
too, with Broch there is the assumption that the work remains incomplete and 
so never quite ready for the public. Even Broch hawks about this notion. But 
the truth of the matter is this: incompietion is just a round about way of 
expressing the author’s impossible urge to merge with his own text. The 
glimmering surface of the text through which Plotia moves with such fluidity (p. 
274) will not yield a perfect image of its author Broch/Virgil.
We have come across similar ‘authorial’ frustrations in the Roland, 
particularly in the first narrative which ends with Roland’s death. Roland 
establishes that sword-blows are for the sake of creating the ‘song’ (II. 1013 - 
1014) and that at Roncevaux all valorous deeds are done in his own name: 
‘for me I see you die' (purm ei vos vei murrir, I. 1863). In this way Roland, like 
Broch at A lt Aussee, attempts to lay exclusive claim to the narrative ‘written’ 
while in progression toward the event o f his own death. Roland, it could be 
argued, is even less naive than Broch in his desire to possess the text 
completely. Just at the moment when death is pending and there isn’t  another 
Saracen to slay, Roland grabs Durendal and attempts to shatter the 
‘instrument o f his writing’ (II. 2338 -  ff.). W hat great sadness he expresses,
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that some ‘pagan’ might pick up the divine instrument Durendal to continue 
the narrative in Christian blood. The narrative beyond Roncevaux is, o f 
course, continued by none other than Charlemagne.
A paradox of the practice o f writing is that no matter how intimate the 
experience, it can never be wholly, to use Broch’s word, ‘private;’ there is 
always another writer, always another reader already in play. Once committed 
to the page, Broch’s death, no less than Roland’s death, becomes an affair for 
the public domain. In the Roland, the example is explicit; the continuation o f 
narrative beyond Roland’s death is by the hand of ‘another1 author. The 
author of the ‘continuation,’ however, is also the one to ’transcribe’ Roland’s 
geste, and, in the process, manages to integrate the two narratives into one 
text. Roland writes a representation of self; St. Giles places that 
representation within a public context.3
Roland’s inability to shatter Durendal is, in practical terms, his inability 
to terminate the geste; completion precludes continuation. Broch’s inability to 
bring his own narrative to an end is, similarly, a recognition of that same mark 
of incompletion. It is as though the author wishes to meet himself in the form 
of two perfectly matched inter-reflecting images; what the author encounters 
instead is self disguised as ‘other1. The ‘other1, that ‘zweite Ich’ to which 
T.D.V. refers, is the product o f an un-deliberate second writing. A t one 
passage in the T.D.V. it is stated: ‘The mother remains beyond our call’
( ‘ die Mutter bleibt unerrufbar’)-, and in another ‘Nameless is the place
from which the mother calls’ ( ‘...namenlos wird es wo die Mutter ru ft...’, page
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153); and in another ‘He is called to the goal, that he might finally be reunited
with the name’ ( ‘ der wird zum Ziele gerufen, au f da& e r sich m it seinem
Namen endgultig vereinige). Virgil, Broch, Roland are all in search o f the 
‘name,’ in search o f perfect union o f self with that tantalizing ‘other se lf that 
remains elusive and in circulation within the text.
Self as ‘other1 is by definition that aspect o f one’s subjectivity that is
reflected back to  us out o f the cultural, social and political that is to say,
out of the public sphere. Roland’s attempt to destroy Durendal is the attempt 
to be remembered by one’s own unadulterated and so ‘private’ narrative o f 
self. Interestingly, this is by and large the position supported by those who 
continue to regard the first narrative of the Roland as a kind of Ur-text, as a 
narrative that hews closest to the ‘original’ story as it had been passed down 
through oral tradition. In this reading, the second narrative, beginning with 
Charlemagne’s return to Roncevaux, is a later addition that appends itself to a 
original ‘true’ story, that o f the battle o f Roncevaux as it was remembered by 
eye witness and commemorated through oral tradition. An opposing view, 
one that receives its first great impetus from B&Jier’s editorial decision to 
accept the Oxford manuscript as an integrated text, suggests that one 
narrative translates into the other, that the Roland of the first and second 
narratives are one subjectivity twice inscribed; inscribed once as self and 
again as self as other.
The Roland of the first narrative is a Roland remembered as in the 
catalogue o f feats in battle and conquest o f countries listed in laisse CLXXII 
and elsewhere. The Roland o f the second narrative, to the contrary, is one
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publicly commemorated, his heart veiled in silk in a public ceremony and 
placed in the white sarcophagus (II. 1965 - 66). The sarcophagus, literally the 
eater o f flesh, consumes the ‘old se lf leaving the new, public, commemorated 
self available, though only through a veil of fiction. The ‘public’ construct o f 
Roland’s subjectivity emanating from the second narrative is, o f course, 
vulnerable to manipulation. That manipulation begins where Charlemagne is 
able to commemorate Roland in the ‘name’ o f his own cause, as though 
Roland had died for the sake o f attaining Charlemagne’s own claim to right 
(dreiture). One has only to consider Tierry, the champion in Charlemagne’s 
cause, to understand that this proposition is as preposterous as it is 
successful.
Unlike the Roland, whose narrative flows out o f death (Roland’s), the 
T.D.V. writes its way toward death (the author’s); in this way it remains 
intensely ‘private.’ But writing toward his own demise, the author, Broch/Virgil, 
is still faced with the same impossibility as was Roland at Roncevaux: there is 
no way, short o f destroying the manuscript, of terminating the narrative 
absolutely. Broch/Virgil/Roland all seek to have the perfection o f the narrative 
coincide with the moment o f their deaths. In terms of their production of 
subjectivity, one striking difference between the Roland and the T.D.V. is that 
the former constructs the subject out o f death the latter in movement toward 
death. The importance of this distinction between these two types of subject 
construction is that the one (T.D.V.) attempts, however in vain, to inscribe the 
author’s subjectivity into the text; Virgil is ever conscious of the need and 
desire to place his name -and  that o f Augustus— into the ‘sublime and
290
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
unending line o f Fathers' ( ‘die erhaben unendliche Reihe der VSter' p. 178). 
In the other text, Roland’s efforts to end the geste with the complete 
appropriation o f all narrative, to his name only, fails; the true subject o f the 
narration is not Roland himself but rather the ‘post-Roncevaux’ subject that is 
not so much inscribed into, as produced by the text.
Roland, Broch, and Virgil all share a similar anxiety regarding the 
continuation o f narrative. Although Virgil and Broch choose, at some point, to 
‘die with the text,’ Roland chooses instead to destroy Durendal, the instrument 
of narrative inscription. Yet, the Roland gives the clearest example o f how the 
narrative is transformed subsequent to its creation. Charlemagne returns not 
only to continue the battle against the Saracens, but also, and especially, to 
continue the narrative abruptly left o ff by Roland. The continuation is not 
merely an extension o f narrative, but a rewriting o f what Roland has already 
written. When Roland dies, he dies as a conqueror of nations, but he is 
commemorated as a force granting validity to a social and political order quite 
alien to the feudal warrior ideal. Roland is commemorated into an order of 
social and political organization that is premised upon the recognition of, and 
absolute obedience to, Charlemagne’s monarchical right, his dreiture.
Likewise, Virgil fears for the posthumous manuscript. Subsequent to 
Virgil’s death, Augustus will effect those manipulations which render the 
Aeneid subservient to his own political will and ambitions. More than just an 
instrument of state propaganda, the Aeneid will be used to redefine the 
Roman subject in terms favorable to Augustus' conception of state. In the 
lengthy chapter, Book III of T.D.V., in which Virgil and Augustus argue over
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the survival o f the Aeneidt Virgil insists repeatedly upon the inefficacy o f the 
text. Virgil laments to Augustus ‘I have not reached my goal’ ([Ich habe mein 
Ziel nicht erreicht, p. 299); and in another passage Virgil attempts to reassure 
Augustus that Rome is its own creation, independent of any text: ‘Rome is the 
parable, Rome is the symbol that you yourself have created, Caesar1 ( ‘Rom is t 
das Gleichnis, Rom ist das Sinnbild, das du geschaffen hast, CSsar', p. 333). 
Virgil deprecates the text in an attem pt to minimize its ‘public’ value, 
suggesting that Caesar has created ‘parable’ and ‘symbol’ in the building o f 
the city itself.
As the passage on page 297 clearly illustrates, Augustus’ need for the 
text is desperate. There Caesar wears the toga - ‘that was as dry as singed 
paper1 ( ‘das trocken war wie angesengtes Papier)— that is thirsty for V irgil’s 
ink. As the text is transferred from the parchment, that is described as being 
‘as white and smooth and tender1 as Plotia’s body (cf.: p. 388), to the toga with 
which Augustus cloaks himself, there can be little doubt that transcription 
entails translation. To the extent that we can speak o f two aspects of 
subjectivity immanent to the text, o f ‘das Ich1 and of ‘das zweite Ich,’ both are 
already in place at the moment o f the text’s creation. Self as other, the so- 
called ‘second I,’ issues from the text a t the moment it leaves its author’s 
hands. In the case o f the Roland and o f the Aeneid* the alterity o f authorial 
‘se lf proceeds to replicate itself in the public to which it is presented; its 
readers and hearers perceive themselves in the text in ways that were 
previously unknown to them.
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Once the work is released, it becomes the appropriation o f the other 
self. So much is revealed to us in Broch’s account o f how he attempts to 
claim the subject even after the manuscript has found its way out into the
world. He writes to Huxley on May 10, 1945: ‘ rather, the reader must be
brought to exactly the same process that I have gone through, and for his part
work through it in exactly the same way* ( ‘ vielmehr muRte derLeserdazu
gegracht warden, genau den gleichen ProzeR, den ich durchgemacht habe, 
nun seinerseits genau so durchzugehen’). This is Broch’s Durendal, his 
attempt to end all narration once the pen has been put to rest. Broch would 
have the reader relive the same death that he has experienced, he would 
have the reader assume the very 1’ that he himself had inscribed into the text.
Broch's terror at letting go the text seems a tacit acknowledgement o f 
the sentiment Maurice Blanchot expressed when, in L ’espace Utt6rairex he 
observes:
L’6crivain appartient d I’oeuvre, mais ce qui lui appartient, c’est 
seulement un livre, un amas muet de mots st6riles, ce qu’il y a 
de plus insignifiant au monde. (p. 16)
(The writer belongs to the work, but that which belongs to him is 
merely a book, a mute heap of sterile words; that which is the least 
significant thing in the world.)
The writer, whether Roland or Virgil or Broch, is never able to attain that o f
which he is in search. Each agonizes in the knowledge that not he, but some
other, will find in this ‘mute heap o f sterile words’ the subject that remains
hidden from him, hidden within the text.
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I’approche du premier conflit mondial, Bgdier dgpeint dans la C.R. un des 
premiers fleurons de notre literature: I’origine ne peut qu’en §tre frangaise, 
savante, et individuelle. De quelques donn£es I6gendaires, d iffu se s  par les 
sanctuaires de la route de Compostelle, un po6te de g£nie a fa it une oeuvre 
forte, errant du meme coup le genre 6pique. Le plus remarquable dans la 
th£orie de Joseph B6dier est qu’elle aligne le Roland sur la conception 
modeme de I’oeuvre litteraire. Cette chanson de geste se voit ainsi attribuer 
un auteur, Turold, lequel participe de cette promotion, et, surtout, I’unicite” (p. 
42).
12. Paul Michael Lutzler, Hermann Broch, eine Biographic, Frankfort 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985. The most comprehensive biography to 
date though others such as Ernestine Schlant’s Hermann Broch, Boston: 
Twayne, 1978, and in particular Manfred Durzak's Hermann Broch, Der 
Dichter und seine Zeit, help piece the life together. The biographical detail 
from outside the correspondence remains, however, of little use in
understanding the subjective relation between author and work.
13. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘Der Tod des Vergil, p. 216.
14. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘Der Tod des Vergil, pp. 233
-239.
15. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘Der Tod des Vergil, p. 221
-228.
16. Aniela Jaffe, “Hermann Broch: ‘Der Tod des Vergil’. Ein Beitrag 
zum Problem der Individuation,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der 
Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 
135-176.
17. Gundi Wachtler, “Der Archetypus der GroOen Mutter in Hermann Brochs 
Roman Der Versucher,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. 
Manfred Durzak, Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 231 - 250.
18. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis, 
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978.
19. Erich Kahler, “Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann 
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, 
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370.
295
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
M  -  MUNJOIE
1. Peter Haidu, The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. See the passage page 87 beginning “The Franks 
shout out Charles’ sign "
2. La Chanson de Roland, ed. Joseph B6dier, Paris: L’6dition D’art H. 
Piazza, 1927. (All translations are my own).
3. Douglas D. R. Owen, “Beards in the Chanson de Roland,” Forum 
for Modem Language Studies 2 4 :2  (1988) pp. 175 -179.
4. Ernst Robert Curtius, EuropSische Literatur und Lateinisches 
Mittelalter, Bern und Munchen: Franke Verlag, 1948.
5. David Hult, “ 'C/ fa it la geste’: Scribal Closure in the Oxford Roland,” 
Modem Language Notes 97:4 (1982) pp. 890 - 905. Hult remarks upon the 
textual implications or Turpin’s reference to a ‘prior’ geste: “Turpin’s allusion to 
a written geste is particularly intriguing, inasmuch as it necessarily precedes 
the actions which are taking place; the concept o f the written geste would thus 
not limit itself to a documentary source for the present poem. In other words, 
the documentary nature o f the events and heroes is already incorporated into 
the narrated action, effecting at the very least a subversion of the normally 
intuited relationship between action and narrated account: if the present poem 
is based on (a) previous geste(s) guaranteeing the historicity o f the events, 
the latter are in turn predicated upon earlier written accounts. This perceptual 
layering, a confusion of act and document (already inherent in the word 
geste), will prove central to the poem at hand” (pp. 896 - 897).
6. For the source of the incestuous birth o f Roland see: Alina Clej. “Le 
Miroir du Roi: Une reflexion sur la Chason de Roland,” Romance Philology 
XLIV: 1 (1999) pp. 36 - 53.
OUTLAWS
1. Peter Haidu, The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. Haidu correctly recognizes that the failure to 
guarantee protection in the Roland is systemic: “The failure o f the garant, the 
absence o f protection from the feudal superior, in spite o f the vassalic 
contract, is thus not a personal phenomenon but one that is generalized: it is 
not just a particular actor who is aimed at, it is the role (in the semiotic sense) 
that is inculpated. Roland, Charles, Baligant, all fail to fu lfill their contract o f 
protection with their social and military subordinates.......................” (p. 93).
2. See: Haidu. In examining Blancandrins’ proposal it becomes clear 
that the alterity Saracen/Frank undergoes erasure. Haidu remarks upon the
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collapse o f one polity into the other “Insofar as the alterity o f ‘Saracen’ has no 
substantive consistency, the figure of the “Saracen” in the Roland becomes 
merely another representation o f the essential problematic which is at work in 
(the representation and reality of) the Frankish polity. We will see, in fact, that 
the same pattern of complex political relations and (non)fulfillment o f contracts 
obtains within the figure of the Saracens as within the Christian camp” (p. 38).
3. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, trans. Willard R. Trask, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1968. Auerbach points out that the epic is  history 
not in that it recounts ‘actual’ events but that it performs a ‘historico-political 
function’: “It is only about the year 1200 that the first vernacular chronicles 
are composed, but they do not relate the past, they are eye-witness accounts 
o f contemporary events, and even so they are strongly influenced by the epic 
style. And indeed, the heroic epic is  history, at least insofar as it recalls actual 
historical conditions -however much it may distort and simplify them —and 
insofar as its characters always perform a historico-political function” (p. 122). 
Through the manipulation and alteration of the sequence of narrative -events 
Roland gives the reader a brilliant example o f how fiction ‘creates’ history: by 
putting into place forces (vengeance) that will result in an alteration o f the 
historico-political reality.
4. Albert G6rard, “L'axe Roland-Ganelon : valeurs en conflit dans la 
Chanson de R o la n d Le Moyen Age : Revue d’histoire et de Philologie 76 
(1969) pp. 445 - 466. Charlemagne’s unmitigated abrogation o f vassal 
obligation clearly points to the privileging of the ‘royal person’. G£rard 
connects this moment with the shift toward the privileging o f the nation state: 
“Si I’&pisode de la mort de Roland met en question le primat de la gloire 
personnelle sur I’interet de la nation, le proems de Ganelon met en relief, de 
fagon paraltele et complementaire, I’absolue supr£matie de la personne royale 
sur les droits et privileges des vassaux” (p. 460).
5. Brigette Cazelies, “Outrepasser les Normes : L’invention de soi en 
France Medieval,” Stanford French Review XIV (1987) p. 69 - 92. Roland’s 
status as ‘other1 provokes a societal instability that mitigates against his 
continued existence. Cazelies speaks of the destabilizing desires that 
‘otherness’ can evoke: “Outrepasser les normes permet au h6ros de d£passer 
ses rivaux; I’admiration que suscite cette singularity ne va pas sans jalousie, 
sans d£sir d’etre comme I’autre, d’etre I’autre, d’etre autre” (p. 88).
6. G£rard. Ganelon’s situation contrasts starkly with that o f Roland in 
terms o f their open and furtive, respectively, betrayals o f those in their charge:
“  Ganelon n’a pas trahi : il a annonce sa vengeance ouvertement,
clairement et loyalement (laisses XX £ XXIV), il a respects les obligations du 
code de I’honneur traditionnel” (p. 454).
7. G6rard. G£rard describes the hesitancy o f the French thus: “Les 
barons ne refusent pas d Charlemagne le droit de r£clamer vengeance : il est
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assez Evident qu’il a 6t£ I6s6 ; mais Ganelon avait agi selon son droit et dans 
le respect des formes. On se demandera, d6s lors, pourquoi les barons ne 
d6clarent pas formellement que Ganelon n’a pas trahi. C’est que leur 
perplexity porte prycis6ment sur ce concept de trahison, dont la polyvalence 
les trouble” (p. 455). The view that the French in this scene are perplexed by 
the question o f Ganlon’s treason is a common one. I contend, however, that 
the French initially judge ‘correctly' according to feudal law and that only then 
does Charlemagne confront them with the fact that the old law has fallen and 
largely by merit o f the doings o f the Franks themselves. Charlemagne 
introduces the French, in an incontrovertible manner, to their own culpability in 
transgressing the ‘old law1.
8. Haidu. The fact that the text describes the social structures o f the 
Saracen in terms identical to those o f the Franks makes Blancandrins 
manipulation o f the same all the more plausible: “The fact that the Saracens 
are portrayed as feudal lords and vassals makes them reliable judges o f 
feudal obligations” (p. 91).
9. Kari-Heinz Bender, Kdnig und Vassal, Untersuchungen zu Chanson 
de geste des XII. Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 1967. The 
execution o f Ganeion’s kin indicates that a far greater ‘victory’ has been won 
than mere dominance over his vassals. Charlemagne’s dreit impinges upon 
all aspects o f feudal society: “Ein Zweikampf bringt die Entscheidung 
zwischen Pinabel, dem Reprdsentanten der Sippe Ganelons, und Tierri, dem 
Vorkampfer der lehnsherriichen Gewalt. Mit dem Sieg Tierris uber Pinabel 
triumphiert die Autoritdt des Lehnsherm nicht nur uber das unbeschrankte 
Fehderecht der Barone, sondem auch uber die Macht der Sippe. Ganelon 
und seine drei&ig Verwandten, die dem Ideal der Feudalgesellschaft 
zuwiderhandelten, werden auf BeschluB aller anwesenden Vasallen 
hingerichtet” (p. 35).
HONUR EDREITURE
1. Clej, Alina. “Le Miroir du Roi : lin e  reflexion sur la Chanson de 
Roland,” Romance Philology XLIV: 1 (1990) pp. 36 -53. Clej recounts the 
tradition that assigns to Charlemagne the sin of incest: “Seule parmi les ecrits 
de rypoque, la Kariamagnus Saga r£digee vers 1230 - 50, mais fond le  sur 
des textes plus anciens, d£crit ce p6che terrible ” (p. 40).
2. Peter Haidu, Peter The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. Charles' behind the scene manipulations are noted by 
Haidu: “Because the nomination is made by Roland, it is at Roland that 
Ganeion’s anger can be vented. But that nomination would not have had the 
meaning for Ganelon it does have, had it not been preceded by Charles's 
exclusion o f the peers. It is Charles’s active narrative role in the deliberations 
that produces the insulting meaning o f Roland’s nomination of his stepfather” 
(p. 93).
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3. William Paden, “Tenebrism in the Song o f Roland,” Modem 
Philology, 86: 4 (1989) pp. 339 - 356. Paden assigns the spirit o f vengeance 
principally to Ganelon: “Ganelon is the enemy o f Christians and pagans alike. 
It is he who stages the battle o f Roncevaux, which is a defeat for both sides 
and a victory only for his unfathomable rage for vengeance” (p. 352). To the 
contrary, Roland is clearly the one to call for vengeance in the text and it is a 
clever Charlemagne who manages to turn the workings of that vengeance 
upon Saracen and Frank alike.
4. Bernard Cirquiglini, “Roland k Roncevaux, ou la Trahison des 
Clercs,” Literature 42 (1981) pp. 40 - 56. In a profoundly subtle reading 
o f Ganeion’s response to this excess o f orguille Cirquiglini notes that as 
Ganelon manipulates circumstances so the author o f the text manipulates 
narrative to ensure the elimination o f Roland. Not just Roland but the social 
and political order which he emblematizes is purposefully overturned by the 
narrative: “L’orgueil de Roland, qui le fa it inconsidgrement s’exposer au 
danger, va lui porter malheur : Dieu le punire” : ce discours nous est fam ilier. 
Dans la C.R., c’est, par trois fois, Ganelon le traitre qui le prononce (devant 
les pai'ens, puis devant Charlemagne). L’interpretation cl£ricale c’est, en 
somme, cede de Ganelon” (p. 49).
5. Karl D. Uitti, “Alexis, Roland, and French ‘Pods/e National’, ” 
Comparative Literature Studies 32: 2 (1995) pp. 131 - 150. The geographic 
nomenclature dulce France is one o f the surest indicators that this text is as 
much as anything about the struggle to establish a ‘royal ideology’ in eleventh 
century Capatian France: “But to what, geographically speaking, does the 
term apply? “France,” within the Carolingian framework, is an
anachronism In fact, it turns out that Roland and the “dulce France” it
so frequently calls to mind, reflect closely the Capetian, or French, royal 
ideology of the eleventh century” (p. 137).
6. George Jones, “Friendship in the Chanson de Roland”, Modem 
Language Quarterly 24 (1963), pp. 88 - 98. “To appreciate personal 
friendships and hatreds in the Middle Ages, we must liken medieval 
individuals to modem sovereign states. Now that the state protects its citizens 
or subjects, private individuals are no longer in such constant fear o f 
aggression as they were in the Middle ages, when every free man was 
responsible for defending his own life, property, and honor. Kings and other 
rulers protected their subjects from foreign enemies but not from each other, 
since all free men had the right to settle their own disputes by feud” (p. 90). If 
we accept Jones’ definition of ‘ami’ as such then we are able to glimpse the 
perverse nature of the relationship Charlemagne/Roland: Roland is Charles’ 
protector! Furthermore, Charlemagne sacrifices not just ‘un ami’ in sacrificing 
Roland, rather he sacrifices this defining paradigm of feudal organization.
7. Paul Zumthor, Essai de Poktique Mkdikvale, Paris: Seuil, 1972. It 
is interesting that Zumthor should see in Charlemagne a figure emblematic o f
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the ‘collectivity’: “Moins que reflet d’une r6alit6 ou d’une experience pass£e, la 
chanson est conscience de soi. Elle compense la rupture survenue entre le 
reel et I’imaginaire. Elle exploite moins un souvenir qu’elle ne le projette en
prophetie En ce sens, le sujet reel de Taction, c’est la collectivity mSme
: ces pluriels interchangeables, Francs, Frangais, Chretiens, barons, rythmant 
et glosant de leurs exclamation p£riodiques le r6cit du Roland; tout 
Charlemagne, figure imp£riale qui les englobe et les repr6sente” (p. 336). In 
fact, I would argue that the prophetic nature of the Roland is not in its 
representation but in its creation o f a future subject. The Roland gives the
reader not a tableau o f ‘Francs, Frangais, Chretiens, barons  as
Zumthor suggests but the outline o f subjectivity determined by its relation to 
the newly emerging nation state.
8. Emmanuel J. Mickel, “Ganeion’s Defense,” In Romance Epic: 
Essays on a Medieval Literary Genre, ed. Hans Erich Keller, Kalamazoo: 
Medieval Institute Publ. (1987), pp. 163 - 172. uln his speech Ganelon 
emphasizes that he loves France and would never betray Charlemagne. 
Roland had wronged him, he argues, and he had defied his stepson, Roland, 
in open court. As everyone knows, once formal ties o f fealty had been broken 
openly, a man could no longer be accused o f oath breaking, and hence 
treason, if he were to kill his adversary in a subsequent confrontation” (p. 
163).
9. Karl-Heinz Bender, Kbnig und Vassal, Untersuchungen zu Chanson 
de geste des XII. Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg: W inter Verlag, 1967. The 
opposition reis/emperere is read as a reflection of the increasing power o f the 
Capetian dynasty: “Wenn nun Charlemagne bereits im ersten Vers der 
Chanson de Roland als: Carles li reis, nostre imperere magnes
eingefuhrt wird, dann entspricht die Verwendung dieser beiden Titel nicht nur 
der Uberlieferung von Karl d. Gr., sondem auch der staatsrechtlichen 
Konzeption der kapetingischen Monarchie am Ausgang des XI. Jahrhunderts” 
(P- 27).
10. Eugene Vance, “Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics o f 
Illumination,” Olifant 6: 3 - 4 (1979) pp. 213 - 225. “Though Charlemagne 
languishes to be conjoined with Roland and the twelve peers in heaven —to a 
point where he is ready to jo in bodily in the grave— he remains a prisoner of
his role of emperor o f this world, a prisoner o f both language and history ”
(p. 222). Vance is quite right in suggesting that Charlemagne’s anguish 
derives from the fact that, unlike Roland, he cannot escape this existence; 
unlike Roland Charlemagne cannot cease to be. As ‘prisoner o f language and 
of history’ Charlemagne is condemned to the sisyphean torment o f having to 
endless sustain narrative.
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VEIRE PATE(R)NE
1. Peter Haidu, The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. Haidu notes how in that scene Roland is depicted as 
author within the text: “Part o f the extraordinary quality o f the death scene is 
that Roland is not only arranging a scene but disposing his own body and 
Adjuvants into a message. The Destinator uses himself as the signifier to 
transcend his own death as meaning to be apprehended by those dear to him 
who survive. There is a self-conscious semiotic manipulation of self as object 
that is remarkable, even if it is recounted briefly and receives little emphasis in 
the narration. But this mise-en-scene of the process o f semiotic production 
has an unexpected secondary effect: the assertion that is produced by the 
semiotic message (it is stressed by the text) is  that o f the Destinator in the 
text, not by the text as Destinator. The text, by deploying this structure, does 
not take it upon itself to say that Roland died a conqueror; it merely cites 
him as saying so ” (pp. 29 - 30).
2. Leopold Peeters, “Le ‘faire’ et le ‘dire’ dans la Chanson de Roland," 
Revue des Langues Romanes 81 (1975) pp. 377 - 93. The ‘deed’ and the 
‘word’, as Peeters points out, are largely one: “La parole, au moyen dge, n’est 
pas seulement designation ni expression ou communication, elle est 
essentiellement manifestation. Elle n’est pas du tout surajoute aux choses 
existant en soi (par le terme choses je  d6signe tout ce que la parole peut 
m anifester: objets, sentiment, id§es) mais ce par quoi tout se manifeste, ce 
qui est incarne dans le monde. Le verbe appelle les choses & I’existence. II 
n’y a pas de solution de continuity entre le dire et le faire, entre le verbe e t le 
reel, mais le dire est le manifestation du faire” (382).
3. Haidu. “The issue of Roland’s innocence or culpability is inversely 
related to that of Charles’s innnocence or culpability” (p. 92).
4. See Bedier’s note (Roland, p. 339) on the abreviation of the name 
Roland in the Oxford manuscript: “Le nom du heros est le plus souvent ecrit 
en abrege: R. une seul fois (au v. 2118), Roll’ 171 fois.”
5. Clej, Alina. uLe Miroir du Roi : Une reflexion sur la Chanson de 
Roland,” Romance Philology XLIV: 1 (1990) p. 36 -53. Charlemagne supporte 
la blessure du royaume par delegation, dans le coips de Roland qui s ’immole 
e sa place” (p. 49). Though I disagree with Clej’s general thesis that the 
Roland moves toward the reestablishment of a lost equilibrium her remarks 
concerning Charlemagne’s willingness to sacrifice Roland are astutely 
perceptive.
6. The Holy Bible. Old and New Testaments in the King James 
Version, Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1972.
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7. Brigette Cazelies, “Outrepasser les Normes : L’invention de soi en 
France M6di6val,” Stanford French Review XIV (1987) pp. 69 - 92. The act o f 
transgressing the law is essential to the act o f artistic creation, as Cazelies
well point out: “Ces considerations ont surtout pour but de poser la
probiematique du sujet dans le contexte de la creation artistique. Dire que 
I’invention et imitation sont synonymes, ceci revient e signifier I’impossibilite
de toute initiative et originalite personnelles au contraire la
transgression est, des les debuts de la production vemaculaire medievale, au 
coeur de I’acte cr6ateur” (p. 75). Charlemagne’s move toward inventing a 
new social and political order begins with a transgression o f the old.
8. Haidu. The refusal of exchange marks a rupture in the social fabric, 
as Haidu correctly observes: “Not only is the ideal hero of the society dead 
[...]; the basic principle of social organization -th a t o f exchange— has been at 
least interrupted and suspended. This is the ultimate significance of Aude’s 
refusal. If the normal pattern of exchanges encoded in the laws and 
conventions o f the society no longer hold, if the damage to the social fabric is 
so grievous that its system of compensatory awards is refused by those whom 
it should benefit, then the very principle o f sociality has been suspended” (p. 
62).
9. Alexandre Leupin’s article (critique 1994) first brought this 
observation to my attention. Speaking o f the ‘miracle o f the witness’ he 
states: “£tonnant miracle, en effet! D’ou vient ce baron fdodal survivant, qui 
existe sans exister, pure fiction don’t la Chanson souligne de fa it la vacuity? 
Et pourtant, de la chartre qui lui est Ii6e, texte qui authentifie la Chanson de 
Roland elle-m£me, le destin du sens semble dependre: sans la connaftre, 
nous n’y entendrons rien, nous dit le texte. En fait, par la reference au 
tgmoignage de visudu baron Gilles (un nom qui signifie aussi “tromperie” en 
ancien frangais) qui n’gtait pas £ la bataille, pure “fiction qui av6re la v6rite,” la 
geste s'authentifie elle-m£me, circulairement, en renvoyant du m§me coup & 
sa propre fictionnalite.”
10. Eugene Vance, “Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics o f 
Illumination”, Olifant 6: 3 - 4 (1979) pp. 213 - 225. I fully concur with Vance’s 
thesis that it is Roland who initiates the process of inscription: “Thus, the two 
halves o f the Roland clearly convey to us two opposed notions o f 
monumentaiity, one oral, one textual. Roland, one will recall, died with the 
certainty that the memory of his legend would live on in good songs that would 
be sung by future bards. Charlemagne, by contrast, whose army now teems, 
we are suddenly told, with “bishops, abbots, monks, canons and tonsured 
priests” (CCXII), after uttering his oral planctus lamenting the loss of Roland, 
immediately proceeds to make plans for supplementing that memory with 
monuments of stone that is, with inert signifiers that belong to the world o f 
tablets, inscriptions and of the letter” (p. 223).
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11. Hans Aarsleff, “Scholarship and Ideology: Joseph Etedier’s 
Critique o f romantic Medievalism,” IN Historical Studies and Literary Criticism, 
ed. Jerome J. McGann, Madison: University o f Wisconsin Pr., 1985, pp. 93 - 
113. In a sim ilar fashion B6dier, too, makes the distinction between history 
and fiction as AarslefF here summarizes: “B6dier could not accept the principle 
‘that nothing could be fictive in a chanson de geste and that no one could be 
so deprived o f imagination as a poet.’ He was baffled by a ‘method of 
investigation, which, beginning with a simple fictive work, knew how to restore 
the dignity o f history to apparent fictions and discover the themes o f lost epics 
with surprising precision.’ The best epics were the creations o f good poets, 
for ‘a masterpiece begins and ends with its author,’ not with the ‘collective, 
unconscious, anonymous forces’ that were used to replace the individual 
poet” (p. 103).
ICH-VERLUBT
1. Harald Binder, “Die Idee ist ewig”, In Hermann Broch - Der Denker, 
ed. Harald Binder, Zurich: Rhein Verlag, 1966, pp. 9 - 29. For Broch truth 
cannot be grasped but only experienced; and yet Broch does clearly insist 
upon the existence of truth. Cognition (Erkenntnis), therefore, is not a 
‘knowledge’ o f truth but a process o f subjective inter-reflection wherein the 
subject perceives itself ‘perceiving’ truth. To illustrate cognition as process 
Broch alludes to Hegel’s preface to the Phenonmenology o f Spirit and in 
particular to the example o f the bud and the rose bush. Where Hegel refers to
bud and rosebush Broch refers to fruit and tree respectively: “  Der Weg
zur Erkenntnis fSllt mir mit der Erkenntnis selbst zusammen. Von 
Endergebnissen la&t sich da wohl uberhaput nicht sprechen —so wenig als 
man FrQchte Endergebnisse des Baumes nenne kann" (p. 9)
2. Paul M. Lutzler, Materialien zu Hermann Broch ‘Der Tod der Vergil’, 
Frankfort am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976, pp. 221 - 228.
3. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis, 
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. Broch hopes to leave an experience 
of death, which is an experience o f the ‘real’, as a literary legacy. Broch 
projects this received ‘real’ into the experience o f the reader so that this ‘real’, 
Broch’s own cognitive construct, should find its place in the world. Compare 
Durzak’s observations on the ‘real’ and the Brochean ‘experience’: “Die 
Struktur der W irklichkeit -und das hei&t von Brochs Kantianischer Basis aus: 
die Erfahrung der W irklichkeit- und die Form des Gedichtes sind aufeinander 
bezogen” (p. 21).
4. W alter Hinderer, “GrundzQge des Tod des Vergils’,” In Hermann 
Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 89 - 134. Hinderer puts forth an argument for 
Brochean mysticism and his argument can be summed up in this one 
sentence: “Der Mensch mu&, um das gottliche Wunder zu erfahren, seines
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ganzen Selbstes und aller Dinge ledig warden” (p. 94). The passage from 
T.D.V. p. 41 indicates not a movement toward the ‘mystical’ through the 
spuming o f material existence but, to the contrary, a state o f trauma wherein 
Vergil is forceably stripped o f all material support. As the novel continues 
Vergil resituates himself within ‘the things o f this world’ (Dingwelf) (compare 
T.D.V., pp. 179-180 et passim).
5. Erich Kahler, “W erttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann 
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, 
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. The authority o f the 
forebears, consolidated in the fiction o f the Aeneid, would put in place an 
ethical framework out of which the individual subject would function. The 
absence o f such a framework results, according to Broch, in the ‘autonomous 
system of values’ exemplified by such expressions as “Art for arts sake”, 
“Business is business”, and “W ar is war”. The choice for Broch is one of 
situating the ‘deed’ -th e  creative impulse that determine one’s actions— either 
within the direct actions of the ‘autonomous subject’ or within the ‘word’, i.e. 
within the larger fiction of the text. Kahler points out the path to which the 
purely rational logic of the ‘autonomous subject’ may lead: “Da nun der 
Mensch, wenn in ihm die V em unff Aufddmmert und Befriedigung veriangt, 
seine Beweggriinde zu rationalisieren sucht —'was immer er tut, es ist ihm in 
jedem Augenblick plausibel, er motiviert es sich mit Grtinden, die ihm 
W ahrheit sind, er stellt es unter eine logische Beweiskette’-  so entwickelt sich 
mit jedem autonom funktionellen Wertsystem, das aus dem Tun der 
Menschen erfolgt, und dem sie folgen, allmahlich eine zugehorige funktionelle 
Logik: es bildet sich eine ‘Logik des Militdrs’, eine ‘Logik des 
W irtschaftsfuhrers’, eine ‘Logik des Malers’, einen ‘Logik des Revolutiondrs’, 
eine ‘Logik des burgeriichen Faiseurs’, usw.” (p. 354).
6. Maurice Blanchot, Le Livre a Venir, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1959. 
Blanchot describes a Broch who ‘awakened to die’ (s'eveiUe pour mount) 
cannot seem to exit death's realm, who continues to write his way into death
without ever attaining that end:“  C’est dans la prison ou il vient d’dtre jet£
et lorsqu’il est promis d une fin toute proche que Broch commence son oeuvre 
centrale, un recit qu’il ne peut esp6rer mener d “bien” que dans cet espace de 
la mort qui s’ouvre £ lui, mais aussi par des ann6es de survie et de calme 
travail. Celui qui s’6veille pour mourir, 6crit done la premiere page d’une 
oeuvre dont l’ach£vement lui demandera dix ans. D6fi merveilleux, confiance 
presque effrayante” (p. 159).
7. Richard Brinkmann, “Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann 
Broch,” In Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, 
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 35 -68. The passage from pages 
110 -111  introduces the concept o f ‘mute language’ (die Stumme Sprache) 
and the three ‘wastrels’ illustrate this concept well. In Broch Die Stumme 
Sprache is a babelization o f language a fragmentation and subsequent 
dissolution of the ‘real’ constituted by language: Hier und immer wieder bei
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Broch ist von der Stummheit die Rede. Es ist in der Tat einsichtig, daft in 
einer W elt des Wertzerfalls einer den anderen nicht mehr versteht und einer 
dem anderen sich nicht mehr verstdndlich machen kann; denn es gibt keine
gemeinsame Sprache mehr.............. Sie besagt im Grunde nichts mehr; es
entspricht ihr keine W irklichkeit mehr; sie ist ein Arsenal entleerter Symbole.
 diesem Problem gilt im Grunde Brochs gewagtester und groOartigster
Versuch: ‘Der Tod des Virgil’" (p. 59).
SCHICKSAL
1. Hermann Broch, “Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur 
Psychoanalyse,” In Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, 
Frankfort am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp. 173 - 194. The ‘entombment* of 
death becomes necessary as Broch concedes that death cannot be
experienced directly: “ einem Fremdling gleich ftih lt sich das Ich in den
Zeitstrom hineingehalten, und von da aus ist es wohl auch zu verstehen, daS 
das Ich vollkommen unfdhig ist, sich eine Vorstellung vom eigene Tod zu 
machen” (186).
2. Hermann Broch, “Logik einer Verfallenden W elt,” In Hermann Broch, 
Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, Frankfort am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp.
156 - 172. Compare this passage from T.D.V. with the following: “  das
Bewu&tsein in seiner solipsistischen Einsamkeit befindet sich im Zustand 
maximaler Wahrheit” (p. 158).
3. Richard Brinkmann, “Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann 
Broch", In Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, 
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 35 -68. Brinkmann states succinctly
the blurring of the line between observed and observer in Broch: “  Der
Beobacktungsakt hat selbst Anteil am Beobachtungsresultat, er wird selbst 
mit in das Beobachtungsfeld introduzierf ” (pp. 55 - 56). I would only add that 
Broch carries this one step further so that not only are ‘subject’ and ‘object’ 
mutually implicated in the moment o f observation, ‘subject’ and ‘object1 
become inter-reflecting positions that constitute a single subjectivity. In this 
sense, the subject gazing at the observes sees himself observing himself from 
the 'object* within his view.
4. Maurice Blanchot, Le Livre it Venir, Paris: Editions Gailimard, 1959. 
Blanchot describes death as an indeterminate space reflecting the ‘dying poef
and his son g :...... II n’y aura pas de communication veritable, ni de chant, si
le chant ne peut pas descendre, en degd de toute forme, vers I’informe et vers 
cette profondeur ou parte la voix exterieure d tout langage. C’est done cette 
descente -descente vers I’ind6termin6— que le po&te mourant cherche d 
accomplir par sa mort. L’espace du chant et I’espace de la mort nous sont 
ddcrits comme li£s et ressaisis I’un par I’autre” (p. 169).
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5. Manfred Durzak, “Hermann Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen,” In 
Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 
1978. On a larger plane the ‘death-recognizing word’ (das todeserkennenden 
Wort) is the word (text) that encompasses not only the rational but the 
‘irrational’ as well. For Broch the ‘real’ embedded in the text is an ‘irrational’, 
opaque real. Literary Kitsch, by way of contrast, presents reality as something 
completely rational and transparent. Below, Durzak notes the difference: 
“Broch hat den ProzeB des Dichtens als Rationalisierung eines Irrationalen, d. 
h. als sprachliche Formung konkreten Erlebens gesehen, wobei das 
Irrationale als Kem bewahrt bleiben soil. Totale rationale Durchsichtigkeit war 
ihm, ob im Roman oder im Gedicht, ein Zeichen von Kitsch” (p. 302).
6. Paul Micheal Lutzler, “Die Kulturkritik des jungen Broch. Zur 
Entwicklung von Hermann Brochs Geschichts- und W erttheorie,” In Hermann 
Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 329 - 352. Broch, in repudiation of the rationalist 
philosophy of his age, locates the ‘real’ in the irrational, in the ‘unknown 
familiar’ o f subject relation. Lutzler’s presents Broch’s position vis-d-vis
rationalism in an instructive light: “ Unter dem Einflud der vielfdltigen
Stromungen der damals herrschenden Lebensphilosophie betrachtet er als 
die Denkweise der abendllndischen Kultur den Rationalismus, der ihr 
“Generationengeddchtnis” gegragt habe. Agens des rationalistischen 
Wissensdurstes und der “geographischen Neugierde” sei die ‘Furcht vor dem 
Unbekannten’, die zu einem Sich-selbst-Beruhigen-mussen, zum Willen, alles 
£ tout prix erkldren zu wollen, gefuhrt habe” (pp. 330 - 331).
7. Erich Kahler, “Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann 
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, 
Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. The ‘thing’ (das Ding) 
attains reality only to the extent that it ‘receives’ the human subject; the 
human cognition constructs the ‘real’ within the *thing’. Kahler summarizes 
this Brochean concept: “Der ‘Setzung der Setzung’ introduziert das intelligible 
Ich in alle Dinge der Welt, denn die Dinge kdnnen nur durch das Eingreifen 
eines Wertsubjektes erfaftt werden, ja  durch die einheitsstiftende Auslese des 
Wertsubjektes erhalten sie uberhaupt ihren Dingcharakter” (p. 362).
8. Hermann Broch, “Leben ohne Platonische Idee," In Hermann Broch 
- Der Denker, ed. Harald Binder, Zurich: Rhein Verlag, 1966, pp. 31 - 37. In 
“Leben ohne Platonische Idee” Broch speaks o f the hero who is tragic by 
definition in that he is left to accomplish the impossible deed, otherwise 
assigned to religion, o f overcoming death. Religion overcomes death by the 
promise of an afterlife the tragic hero, on the other hand, must complete his 
task through a process ‘rebirth’ that occurs within the confined o f the earthly 
sphere. Vergil/ Broch, is the potential ‘hero’ who would ‘overcome death' in 
reshaping the ‘real’, in refashioning the ‘System o f values’ (Wertsystem) that 
no longer obtains within the political and social context in which the author 
finds himself living. Broch’s hero is discovered by substituting the word
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‘author1 for ‘hero’ in the passage here cited: “Der Held ist immer tragisch. Das 
ruhrt nicht nur davon her, daG e r -seinem  irdischen Charakter gemaG— 
auGerhalb des umfassenden religidsen Wertsystems steht, dad er also immer 
innerhalb eines kleineren Wertsystems wirken muG und sein Streben nach 
Allgemeingeltung von vomeherein zum Scheitem verdammt ist, er ist auch mit 
der Verpflichtung zur Freiheit belastet. Die religidse Aufgabe der 
Uberwindung des Todes ist ihm, dem Irdischen aufgelastet worden” (p. 48).
9. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis, 
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. ‘Discovering' death's form, i.e. 
experiencing the ‘real’, leads to a ‘self-realization’, or to the location of self, o f 
one's proper subjectivity within the ‘real’. Durzak outlines the progression: 
“Die Frage nach dem Urgrund der W irklichkeit wandelt sich also fGr den 
Menschen zur Frage nach der Wahrheit, die zum Orientierungszentrum all 
seiner Erkenntnis wird. Die W ahrheit wird zum ‘Erkenntnisgrund’ des 
Menschen. Durch die Realisierung dieser haltung verwirklicht der Mensch die 
Idee seiner selbst, er hat Anteil am ‘Jetzt seines eigenen Sinnbildes,’ d.h. an 
der Zeitlosigkeit der Platonischen Idee seines Ichs. Daraus erwdchst als 
letzte Konsequenz, daG die ‘Erkenntnisaufgabe,’ m it der der Mensch an alles 
Wirkliches herantritt, ihn gleichzeitig zur Selbstverwirklichung fuhrt. Gestaltet 
ist also in der Tat ein Druchbruch zu einer Erkenntnis, die Qber das 
BewuGtsein Vergils hinausreicht, die aber im folgenden wieder ihm 
zuruckfuhrt” (pp. 100 -101).
ROME
1. Hermann Broch, “Zur Erkenntnis dieser Zeit,” In Hermann Broch, 
Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, Frankfort am Main: Surkamp Verlag, pp. 
11 - 80. ‘Truth’ and the ‘real’ are to be understood in Broch’s writing as 
‘cognitive-content’ and ‘cognitive-acf respectively. These terms speak to the 
interrelation, the exchange, between the cognitive values with which a work is 
imbued and the effect these values exercise upon, the way in which they work 
themselves upon the world. Subjectivity prominently exhibits this exchange 
between ‘cognitive-content’ and ‘cognitive-act’. Compare the following: “Die 
Situation andert sich erst, wenn auch das Subjekt des Erkennens objektiviert 
wird. In dieser objektivierten Gesamterkenntnis laGt sich einwandfrei eine 
Grundscheidung, namlich eben die [in] Subjekt und Objekt, aufweisen: es 
ergeben sich aus ihr die bekannten Zerspaltungen in Erkenntnisakt und 
Erkenntnisinhalt ” (p. 20).
2. Hermann Broch, “Qber syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten”, In 
Hermann Broch, Philosophische Schriften 2: Theorie, Frankfort am Main: 
Surkamp Verlag, pp. 246 - 299. Broch speaks o f symbolization as an 
‘irreversible’ process o f representation whereby surplus (das 
InhaltsuberschuR) is produced. This surplus, which he calls the ‘indicated 
unknown’ (das angedeutete Unbekannte), is the material out of which the 
‘real’ constructs itself. “Symbolisierungen sind irreversible Abbildungs-
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prozesse. Zwar ihne ln  sie den reversibien, da sie gleichfalls mit Hilfe eines 
Abbildes ein Urbild ‘reprasentieren’, aber es wird nun dieses hier nicht mehr 
wie dort als vollkommen ‘bekannt’ angenommen, gestattet nicht mehr eine 
Punkt fur Punkt isomorphe (eben reversible) Abbildung, sondem erfordert 
kraft seines ‘Inhaltsuberschusses’ eine andersgeartete, eine 
‘andeutungsweise’ Representation. Ooch damit erhebt sich schon die 
verzweifelte Frage: wie soil etwas Unbekanntes angedeutet werden?” (p. 
268).
3. Jean-Paul Bier, Hermann Broch et ‘La Mort de Vergile’, Paris: 
Librairie Larousse, 1974. The ‘divine’ and the ‘human’ unite definitively in 
death. However, these two qualities, the divine and the human, exist side by 
side in the brochean subject. It is the supposition that both are immanent to 
the suject and the presumption o f their perpetual ‘internal conflict upon which 
Broch bases his theory that an alteration o f the ‘real’ begins with a movement 
within the individual subject. ‘Death’, as in the Death o f Vergil, is a 
symbolization of the resolution of this conflict in the production of previously
unknown ‘real’. “ [.’existence humaine est congue par lui (Broch) comme
un mouvement perp6tuel et circulaire entre I’gclatement de I’harmonie 
pr£6tablie du sujet et de I’objet, entre le moi et le monde, et le retour d6finitif £ 
I’lntemporel initial, l’£veil £ I’unit6 retrouv6e que constitue la mort” (p. 126).
4. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch: Dichtung und Erkenntnis, 
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978. The ‘deed’ can be defined as the 
agency of the ‘irrational’ within the ‘rational’ word as Durzak explains below: 
“Broch hat den ProzeB des Dichtens als Rationalisierung eines Irrationalen, d. 
h. als sprachliche Formung konkreten Erlebens gesehen, wobei das 
irrationale als Kem bewahrt bieiben soil. Vollige rationale Durchsichtigkeit war 
ihm, ob im Roman oder im Gedicht, ein Zeichen von Kitsch” (p. 23).
5. Bier. In citing Broch’s use of the term ‘epistemological novel’ Bier 
indicates that such a ‘genre’ would, to the extent that it were possible, reveal 
the 6pist6m& of its time. I agree with this, however, with respect to Broch’s 
implementation of the term through the writing of T.D.V. I would say that such 
a work would not merely ‘reveal’ the 6pisteme of its time but would agency its 
construction. “Cette legitimation du roman par une theorie du monde et de la 
culture, acquise par des voies rationnelles, etait le fondement de ce 
qu’Hermann Broch appela alors le “roman epistemologique” (H.B. Lettres, 
Gallimard, 1961; p. 25 - sqq.) : le roman se devait d’aller au-deie de 
I’explication psychologique des comportements humains pour mettre £ jour 
leur fondement ‘epistemologique’. Une telle entreprise fondait la valeur 
cognitive de I’oeuvre litteraire” (p. 49 - 50).
6. Erich Kahler, “Werttheorie und Erkenntnistheorie bei Hermann 
Broch,” In Hermann Broch: Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, 
MGnchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 353 - 370. This image o f Augustus 
as the ‘Person o f the One’ illustrates well the concept o f the 'whole' person,
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the completely rationalized subject. It suggests the complete transparency o f 
the subject whereby the void around which subjectivity is constructed is 
successfully eliminated. Kahler speaks o f the ‘rationalized system’ o f which 
the ‘rationalized subject’ would be but one example: “Es ergibt sich aber im 
rationalen System, das prinzipiel IQckenlos sein muB, noch eine andere, eine 
interne Art von Unbekannten durch auftauchende Lucken, 
SchiieBunterbrechungen, Unschlussigkeiten innerhalb des Systems” (p. 369).
7. Richard Brinkmann, “Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann 
Broch”, pp. 55 - 56. See Brinkmann for the equivalence in Broch between the 
deed and the ‘real’. “Ein uberaus wichtiges Moment in dieser Entwicklung der 
Neuzeit ist aber auch die Inthronisierung der Tat als eigentlich Wirklichen” (p.
53).
8. Kahler. The underlying rational for Rome as ‘symbol’, is based on 
the idea found in Broch that the concept o f ‘nation’, ‘state’, and so forth are 
primarily if not uniquely cognitive constructs. Kahler signals this notion as
inherent to Broch’s conceptual outlook: “ fur Broch die geschichtlichen
Einheiten und Vorgange -S taat, Nation, Epoche, Stil, Kuftur— nur vom 
individuellen Ich aus faBbar erschienen ” (p. 361).
9. Hannah Arendt, “Hermann Broch und der modeme Roman”, In 
Hermann Broch, Perspektiven der Forschung, ed. Manfred Durzak, Munchen: 
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972, pp. 25 -33. Arendt correctly indicates that for 
Broch the ‘moment’ of ‘noch nicht und doch schon’ is a moment of crisis 
situated at the ‘turning of an age’. The author Broch places himself -p laces 
Vergil as his surrogate— just at the center of crisis, squarely in the chaos that 
exists between the collapse of one age and the birth o f another in order to 
orchestrate a subsequent reconfiguration of the ‘real’. “Jede Krise, jede 
Wende der Zeiten ist Anfang und Ende zugleich. Als soiche birgt sie, in den 
Worten Brochs, ein Dreifaches in sich: das Nicht-mehr’ der Vergangenheit, 
das ‘Noch-nicht’ der Zukunft und das ‘Doch-schon’ der Gegenwart” (p. 25).
CONCLUSION
1. Ernst Robert Curtius, Europ&ische Literatur und Lateinisches 
Mittelalter, Bern und Munchen: Franke Verlag, 1948. (pp. 315 et passim)
2. Peter Haidu, The Subject o f Violence, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993.
3. Brian Stock, “Lecture, int£riorit6 et modules de comportement dans 
I’Europe des Xle s.”, Cahier de Civilization M6di6vale XXXIII, (1990) pp. 103 - 
112. One could almost apply the terms ‘tradition’ and traditionalism ’, as they 
are employed by Stock, to Roland and St. Giles, respectively: “II faut faire la 
distinction entre la tradition, heritage nonconscient d’une civilisation, et le
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traditionalisme, force active ‘fabriqu£e’ d’interpretation consciente de la 
tradition. Dans le deuxfeme cas, c’est la lecture qui est la force crgatrice. 
Sans lecture, pas d’interpr§tation : sans interpretation, pas de traditions 
nouvelles” (p. 112). St. Giles effects change by first ‘reading’ the highly 
stylized narrative executed by Roland at Roncevaux. A  careful reading o f that 
‘narrative’ clearly demonstrate the profound changes and weaknesses that 
have already come into existence in the feudal order.
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